Nevada Revised Statutes

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033 (2026)

Circumstances aggravating first degree murder

✓ current as of July 2026

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NRS 200.033 Circumstances aggravating first degree murder. The only circumstances by which murder of the first degree may be aggravated are:

1. The murder was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment.

2. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:

(a) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or

(b) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

Ê For the purposes of this subsection, a person shall be deemed to have been convicted at the time the jury verdict of guilt is rendered or upon pronouncement of guilt by a judge or judges sitting without a jury.

3. The murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.

4. The murder was committed while the person was engaged, alone or with others, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, arson in the first degree, burglary, invasion of the home or kidnapping in the first degree, and the person charged:

(a) Killed or attempted to kill the person murdered; or

(b) Knew or had reason to know that life would be taken or lethal force used.

5. The murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or to effect an escape from custody.

6. The murder was committed by a person, for himself or herself or another, to receive money or any other thing of monetary value.

7. The murder was committed upon a peace officer or firefighter who was killed while engaged in the performance of his or her official duty or because of an act performed in his or her official capacity, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace officer or firefighter. For the purposes of this subsection, “peace officer” means:

(a) An employee of the Department of Corrections who does not exercise general control over offenders imprisoned within the institutions and facilities of the Department, but whose normal duties require the employee to come into contact with those offenders when carrying out the duties prescribed by the Director of the Department.

(b) Any person upon whom some or all of the powers of a peace officer are conferred pursuant to NRS 289.150 to 289.360, inclusive, when carrying out those powers.

8. The murder involved torture or the mutilation of the victim.

9. The murder was committed upon one or more persons at random and without apparent motive.

10. The murder was committed upon a person less than 14 years of age.

11. The murder was committed upon a person because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, physical or mental disability, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of that person.

12. The defendant has, in the immediate proceeding, been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree. For the purposes of this subsection, a person shall be deemed to have been convicted of a murder at the time the jury verdict of guilt is rendered or upon pronouncement of guilt by a judge or judges sitting without a jury.

13. The person, alone or with others, subjected or attempted to subject the victim of the murder to nonconsensual sexual penetration immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the murder. For the purposes of this subsection:

(a) “Nonconsensual” means against the victim’s will or under conditions in which the person knows or reasonably should know that the victim is mentally or physically incapable of resisting, consenting or understanding the nature of his or her conduct, including, but not limited to, conditions in which the person knows or reasonably should know that the victim is dead.

(b) “Sexual penetration” means cunnilingus, fellatio or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of the victim’s body or any object manipulated or inserted by a person, alone or with others, into the genital or anal openings of the body of the victim, whether or not the victim is alive. The term includes, but is not limited to, anal intercourse and sexual intercourse in what would be its ordinary meaning.

14. The murder was committed on the property of a public or private school, at an activity sponsored by a public or private school or on a school bus while the bus was engaged in its official duties by a person who intended to create a great risk of death or substantial bodily harm to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action that would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person. For the purposes of this subsection, “school bus” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 483.160.

15. The murder was committed with the intent to commit, cause, aid, further or conceal an act of terrorism. For the purposes of this subsection, “act of terrorism” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 202.4415.

(Added to NRS by 1977, 1542; A 1981, 521, 2011; 1983, 286; 1985, 1979; 1989, 1451; 1993, 76; 1995, 2, 138, 1490, 2705; 1997, 1293; 1999, 1336; 2001 Special Session, 229; 2003, 2945; 2005, 317; 2017, 1065)

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 179 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1978–2025 · leading case: Greene v. State, 931 P.2d 54 (Nev. 1997).

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Greene v. State, 931 P.2d 54 (Nev. 1997). · cites it 49× “The murder was committed by a person who was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another. . . . . . 12. The defendant has, in the immediate proceeding, been convicted of more than one offense of murder in…”

Bejarano v. State, 146 P.3d 265 (Nev. 2006). · cites it 34× “I would hold that with one exception, the State may still pursue a death sentence against a first-degree murderer under McConnell as long as the murder is aggravated by at least one statutory circumstance under NRS 200.033. More specifically, I conclude that the only…”

McConnell v. State, 102 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2004). · cites it 22× “[74] McConnell also contends that Nevada's death penalty statutes fail to constitutionally narrow death eligibility because the statutory aggravating circumstances in NRS 200.033 are so numerous and because NRS 175.”

Lane v. State, 881 P.2d 1358 (Nev. 1994). · cites it 56× “NRS 200.033 enumerates the circumstances by which murder of the first degree may be aggravated.”

Evans v. State, 926 P.2d 265 (Nev. 1996). · cites it 34× “NRS 200.033(2). 2. The murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.”

Hidalgo v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 184 P.3d 369 (Nev. 2008). · cites it 34× “Accordingly, we grant the writ petition in part and instruct the district court to strike the two aggravating circumstances alleging solicitation to commit murder as prior violent felonies pursuant to NRS 200.033(2) and to allow the State to amend its notice of intent to seek…”

Leslie v. Warden, 59 P.3d 440 (Nev. 2002). · cites it 24× “This aggravator was initially included in the list that was to become NRS 200.033 but at some point was deleted.”

Hogan v. Warden, 860 P.2d 710 (Nev. 1993). · cites it 26× “" NRS 200.033(2). The primary thrust of Hogan's contention is that the Iowa manslaughter conviction was constitutionally infirm and that, in any event, the State did not prove that the Iowa felony involved the use or threat of violence to the person of the victim.”

Thomas v. State, 148 P.3d 727 (Nev. 2006). · cites it 16× “030 and NRS 200.033 [27] and reviewable for abuse of that discretion, such as when the intent to seek the death penalty is not warranted by statute or is improperly motivated by political considerations [28] or race, religion, color, or the like.”

Byford v. State, 994 P.2d 700 (Nev. 2000). · cites it 10× “NRS 200.033(8) provides as an aggravating circumstance that "[t]he murder involved torture or the mutilation of the victim.”

Nika v. State, 951 P.2d 1047 (Nev. 1997). · cites it 39× “NRS 200.033(4). 2. Evidence that the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest.”

Calambro v. State, 952 P.2d 946 (Nev. 1998). · cites it 30× “Pursuant to NRS 200.033(2), the twenty-eight California felony convictions constituted previous felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence.”

Show all 179 citing cases →

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(1) — 15 cases

Bejarano v. State, 146 P.3d 265 (Nev. 2006). “I would hold that with one exception, the State may still pursue a death sentence against a first-degree murderer under McConnell as long as the murder is aggravated by at least one statutory circumstance under NRS 200.033. More specifically, I conclude that the only…”

Geary v. State, 930 P.2d 719 (Nev. 1996).

Geary v. State, 952 P.2d 431 (Nev. 1998).

Browning v. State, 188 P.3d 60 (Nev. 2008).

Nevius v. State, 699 P.2d 1053 (Nev. 1985).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(10) — 5 cases

Thomas v. State, 148 P.3d 727 (Nev. 2006). “030 and NRS 200.033 [27] and reviewable for abuse of that discretion, such as when the intent to seek the death penalty is not warranted by statute or is improperly motivated by political considerations [28] or race, religion, color, or the like.”

Greene v. State, 931 P.2d 54 (Nev. 1997). “The murder was committed by a person who was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another. . . . . . 12. The defendant has, in the immediate proceeding, been convicted of more than one offense of murder in…”

State v. Nelson, 273 P.3d 632 (Ariz. 2012).

Domingues v. State, 917 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1996).

Maestas v. State, 275 P.3d 74 (Nev. 2012).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(12) — 9 cases

Johnson v. State, 148 P.3d 767 (Nev. 2006).

Weber v. State, 119 P.3d 107 (Nev. 2005).

Flanagan v. State, 930 P.2d 691 (Nev. 1996).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(13) — 3 cases

McConnell v. State, 102 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2004). “[74] McConnell also contends that Nevada's death penalty statutes fail to constitutionally narrow death eligibility because the statutory aggravating circumstances in NRS 200.033 are so numerous and because NRS 175.”

Leslie v. Warden, 59 P.3d 440 (Nev. 2002). “This aggravator was initially included in the list that was to become NRS 200.033 but at some point was deleted.”

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(2) — 41 cases

Leonard v. State, 17 P.3d 397 (Nev. 2001).

Hidalgo v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 184 P.3d 369 (Nev. 2008). “Accordingly, we grant the writ petition in part and instruct the district court to strike the two aggravating circumstances alleging solicitation to commit murder as prior violent felonies pursuant to NRS 200.033(2) and to allow the State to amend its notice of intent to seek…”

Evans v. State, 926 P.2d 265 (Nev. 1996). “NRS 200.033(2). 2. The murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.”

Calambro v. State, 952 P.2d 946 (Nev. 1998). “Pursuant to NRS 200.033(2), the twenty-eight California felony convictions constituted previous felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence.”

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(2)(b) — 22 cases

Redeker v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 127 P.3d 520 (Nev. 2006).

Nunnery v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 186 P.3d 886 (Nev. 2008).

Redeker v. Dist. Ct., 127 P.3d 520 (Nev. 2006).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(3) — 22 cases

Hogan v. Warden, 860 P.2d 710 (Nev. 1993). “" NRS 200.033(2). The primary thrust of Hogan's contention is that the Iowa manslaughter conviction was constitutionally infirm and that, in any event, the State did not prove that the Iowa felony involved the use or threat of violence to the person of the victim.”

Flanagan v. State, 930 P.2d 691 (Nev. 1996).

Nunnery v. State, 263 P.3d 235 (Nev. 2011).

Leslie v. State, 952 P.2d 966 (Nev. 1998).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(4) — 53 cases

Lane v. State, 881 P.2d 1358 (Nev. 1994). “NRS 200.033 enumerates the circumstances by which murder of the first degree may be aggravated.”

Leslie v. Warden, 59 P.3d 440 (Nev. 2002). “This aggravator was initially included in the list that was to become NRS 200.033 but at some point was deleted.”

Beets v. State, 821 P.2d 1044 (Nev. 1991).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(4)(a) — 3 cases

Belcher, Jr. (norman) Vs. State (death Penalty-direct), 2020 NV 31 (Nev. 2020).

Leslie v. Warden, 59 P.3d 440 (Nev. 2002). “This aggravator was initially included in the list that was to become NRS 200.033 but at some point was deleted.”

Browning v. State, 188 P.3d 60 (Nev. 2008).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(4)(b) — 1 case

Rodriguez v. State, 32 P.3d 773 (Nev. 2001).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(5) — 20 cases

Blake v. State, 121 P.3d 567 (Nev. 2005).

Jeremias v. State, 412 P.3d 43 (Nev. 2018).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(6) — 10 cases

Lane v. State, 881 P.2d 1358 (Nev. 1994). “NRS 200.033 enumerates the circumstances by which murder of the first degree may be aggravated.”

State v. McDonald, 661 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. 1983).

Archanian v. State, 145 P.3d 1008 (Nev. 2006).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(7) — 3 cases

State v. Reynolds, 457 N.W.2d 405 (Neb. 1990).

Eakins v. Nevada, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (D. Nev. 2002).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(8) — 49 cases

Byford v. State, 994 P.2d 700 (Nev. 2000). “NRS 200.033(8) provides as an aggravating circumstance that "[t]he murder involved torture or the mutilation of the victim.”

Hernandez v. State, 50 P.3d 1100 (Nev. 2002).

Browne v. State, 933 P.2d 187 (Nev. 1997).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033(9) — 17 cases

Nika v. State, 951 P.2d 1047 (Nev. 1997). “NRS 200.033(4). 2. Evidence that the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest.”

Leslie v. Warden, 59 P.3d 440 (Nev. 2002). “This aggravator was initially included in the list that was to become NRS 200.033 but at some point was deleted.”

State v. Bennett, 81 P.3d 1 (Nev. 2003).

Servin v. State, 32 P.3d 1277 (Nev. 2001).

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