NRS
41.100 Cause of action not lost by reason of death; damages; recovery
for loss arising out of unfair practice regarding policy of life insurance;
subrogation.
1. Except as otherwise provided in this
section, no cause of action is lost by reason of the death of any person, but
may be maintained by or against the person’s executor or administrator.
2. In an action against an executor or
administrator, any damages may be awarded which would have been recovered
against the decedent if the decedent had lived, except damages awardable under NRS 42.005 or 42.010 or other damages imposed primarily
for the sake of example or to punish the defendant.
3. Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, when a person who has a cause of action dies before judgment, the
damages recoverable by the decedent’s executor or administrator include all
losses or damages which the decedent incurred or sustained before the
decedent’s death, including any penalties or punitive and exemplary damages
which the decedent would have recovered if the decedent had lived, and damages
for pain, suffering or disfigurement and loss of probable support,
companionship, society, comfort and consortium. This subsection does not apply
to the cause of action of a decedent brought by the decedent’s personal
representatives for the decedent’s wrongful death.
4. The executor or administrator of the
estate of a person insured under a policy of life insurance may recover on
behalf of the estate any loss, including, without limitation, consequential
damages and attorney’s fees, arising out of the commission of an act that
constitutes an unfair practice pursuant to subsection 1 of NRS 686A.310.
5. This section does not prevent
subrogation suits under the terms and conditions of an uninsured motorists’
provision of an insurance policy.
[1:21:1937; 1931 NCL § 240.01]—(NRS A 1960,
322; 1967,
408; 1969,
285; 1979,
458; 1987,
1768; 1989,
485; 1997,
227; 2017,
2688)
ACTIONS FOR PERSONAL INJURIES BY WRONGFUL ACT, NEGLECT OR
DEFAULT
Notes of Decisions
Maxwell v. Allstate Ins. Companies, 728 P.2d 812 (Nev. 1986).
· cites it 11× “Our decision in that case rested upon the statutory interpretation of *504 NRS 41.100 which was subsequently amended.”
Gonor v. Dale, 432 P.3d 723 (Nev. 2018).
· cites it 8× “Although both motions were filed within the 90-day period, the motions failed to identify the proper party for substitution under NRS 41.100. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order dismissing the underlying complaint.”
Alsenz v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 864 P.2d 285 (Nev. 1993).
· cites it 7× “Second, Alsenz asserted that the wrongful death claim was really the decedent’s personal injury action, preserved for the estate by Nevada’s survival of actions statute, NRS 41.100. During the course of pretrial activity, Clark County filed a motion in limine to limit the…”
Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
· cites it 2× “§ 91-7-235 (1972); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.100 (1979); New York, N.”
Allen v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 487 (Nev. 1977).
· cites it 3× “On its face, Nevada’s broadly phrased survival statute might be read to mandate survival of punitive damage claims, not only following death of the aggrieved party but subsequent to the tortfeasor’s death as well.”
Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 404 P.2d 10 (Nev. 1965).
· cites it 4× “The right to sue in tort for personal injuries does survive in Nevada, NRS 41.100 (1), [2] and therefore is assignable.”
GJD BY GJD v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127 (Pa. 1998).
· cites it 2× “§ 91-7-235 (1973); Nevada, Nev.Rev.Stat. § 41.100 (1979); New York, N.”
Achrem v. Expressway Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 917 P.2d 447 (Nev. 1996).
· cites it 2× “In 1967, the Nevada Legislature specifically prohibited the assignment of a cause of action by passing NRS 41.100(3). 1967 Nev. Stat., ch. 190, § 3 at 408.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.100(1) — 14 cases
Gonor v. Dale, 432 P.3d 723 (Nev. 2018).
“Although both motions were filed within the 90-day period, the motions failed to identify the proper party for substitution under NRS 41.100. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order dismissing the underlying complaint.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.100(2) — 7 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.100(3) — 8 cases
Maxwell v. Allstate Ins. Companies, 728 P.2d 812 (Nev. 1986).
“Our decision in that case rested upon the statutory interpretation of *504 NRS 41.100 which was subsequently amended.”
Achrem v. Expressway Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 917 P.2d 447 (Nev. 1996).
“In 1967, the Nevada Legislature specifically prohibited the assignment of a cause of action by passing NRS 41.100(3). 1967 Nev. Stat., ch. 190, § 3 at 408.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.100(4) — 1 case
Maxwell v. Allstate Ins. Companies, 728 P.2d 812 (Nev. 1986).
“Our decision in that case rested upon the statutory interpretation of *504 NRS 41.100 which was subsequently amended.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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