Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660

Attorney General or chief legal officer of political subdivision may defend or provide support to person sued for engaging in right to petition or free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern; special counsel; filing special motion to dismiss; stay of discovery; adjudication upon merits

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NRS 41.660  Attorney General or chief legal officer of political subdivision may defend or provide support to person sued for engaging in right to petition or free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern; special counsel; filing special motion to dismiss; stay of discovery; adjudication upon merits.

      1.  If an action is brought against a person based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern:

      (a) The person against whom the action is brought may file a special motion to dismiss; and

      (b) The Attorney General or the chief legal officer or attorney of a political subdivision of this State may defend or otherwise support the person against whom the action is brought. If the Attorney General or the chief legal officer or attorney of a political subdivision has a conflict of interest in, or is otherwise disqualified from, defending or otherwise supporting the person, the Attorney General or the chief legal officer or attorney of a political subdivision may employ special counsel to defend or otherwise support the person.

      2.  A special motion to dismiss must be filed within 60 days after service of the complaint, which period may be extended by the court for good cause shown.

      3.  If a special motion to dismiss is filed pursuant to subsection 2, the court shall:

      (a) Determine whether the moving party has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern;

      (b) If the court determines that the moving party has met the burden pursuant to paragraph (a), determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim;

      (c) If the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability of prevailing on the claim pursuant to paragraph (b), ensure that such determination will not:

             (1) Be admitted into evidence at any later stage of the underlying action or subsequent proceeding; or

             (2) Affect the burden of proof that is applied in the underlying action or subsequent proceeding;

      (d) Consider such evidence, written or oral, by witnesses or affidavits, as may be material in making a determination pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b);

      (e) Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, stay discovery pending:

             (1) A ruling by the court on the motion; and

             (2) The disposition of any appeal from the ruling on the motion; and

      (f) Rule on the motion within 20 judicial days after the motion is served upon the plaintiff.

      4.  Upon a showing by a party that information necessary to meet or oppose the burden pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection 3 is in the possession of another party or a third party and is not reasonably available without discovery, the court shall allow limited discovery for the purpose of ascertaining such information.

      5.  If the court dismisses the action pursuant to a special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to subsection 2, the dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits.

      6.  The court shall modify any deadlines pursuant to this section or any other deadlines relating to a complaint filed pursuant to this section if such modification would serve the interests of justice.

      7.  As used in this section:

      (a) “Complaint” means any action brought against a person based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern, including, without limitation, a counterclaim or cross-claim.

      (b) “Plaintiff” means any person asserting a claim, including, without limitation, a counterclaim or cross-claim.

      (Added to NRS by 1993, 2848; A 1997, 1365, 2593; 2013, 623; 2015, 2455)

     

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 132 cases (57 in the last 5 years), 2009–2026 · leading case: Coker v. Sassone
Coker v. Sassone (2019) nev · cites it 23× “Central to its resolution are Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes-specifically NRS 41.660, which authorizes a litigant to file a special motion to dismiss when an action filed in court is "based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to…”
SPIRTOS v. YEMENIDJIAN (2021) nev · cites it 76× “3d 262, 268 (2017) ("[Nlo communication falls within the purview of NRS 41.660 unless it is 'truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.”
STARK VS. LACKEY (2020) nev · cites it 20× “Vi CLERK RF PREME COURT BY Appeal from a district court order denying a special motion to dismiss pursuant to NRS 41.660. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Connie J.”
ROSEN VS. TARKANIAN (2019) nev · cites it 16× “Shortly thereafter, Rosen filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss in accordance with NRS 41.660. In her anti-SLAPP motion, Rosen asserted that she believed that the statements were true based on multiple public accounts and Tarkanian's own admissions about his involvement…”
TAYLOR VS. COLON (2020) nev · cites it 16×
Century Surety Co. v. Prince (2017) nvd · cites it 16× “” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660 ; (ECF No. 37). Prince argues that Century’s complaint is a strategic lawsuit against public participation (“SLAPP”) complaint.”
Patin v. Ton Vinh Lee (2018) nev · cites it 7× “Lee did not satisfy either of these requirements, the statement was not protected under NRS 41.660, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute. We therefore affirm the district court's order denying Patin's special motion to dismiss.”
KOSOR, JR. VS. OLYMPIA CO.'S, LLC (2020) nev · cites it 10× “After filing an answer, Kosor moved to dismiss under NRS 41.660, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute. The district court held that Kosor had failed to establish a prima facie case under NRS 41.”
In re EB Holdings II, Inc. (2017) nvb · cites it 10× “On December 14, 2016, in response to the EBH Complaint, the GoldenTree Parties filed a special motion to dismiss under NRS 41.660 ("GoldenTree Special Motion").”
Stubbs v. Strickland (2013) nev · cites it 4× “670(2) allows a defendant to bring a separate action for damages, attorney fees, and costs resulting from a SLAPP suit, even if the plaintiff filing the alleged SLAPP suit voluntarily dismisses the action before a defendant appears in the lawsuit or has the opportunity to file…”
TAYLOR VS. COLON (2020) nev · cites it 16× “Specifically, NRS 41.660 allows a party to file an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss and sets forth a two-pronged test for determining whether the district court should grant or deny such motion.”
WYNN VS. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (2020) nev · cites it 6× “On remand, consistent with the parties stipulation, the district court shall evaluate AP Respondents' anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss under NRS 41.660. Specifically, the district court shall determine whether AP Respondents can meet their burden under the first prong of the…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(1) — 16 cases
STARK VS. LACKEY (2020) nev “Vi CLERK RF PREME COURT BY Appeal from a district court order denying a special motion to dismiss pursuant to NRS 41.660. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Connie J.”
ROSEN VS. TARKANIAN (2019) nev “Shortly thereafter, Rosen filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss in accordance with NRS 41.660. In her anti-SLAPP motion, Rosen asserted that she believed that the statements were true based on multiple public accounts and Tarkanian's own admissions about his involvement…”
Patin v. Ton Vinh Lee (2018) nev “Lee did not satisfy either of these requirements, the statement was not protected under NRS 41.660, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute. We therefore affirm the district court's order denying Patin's special motion to dismiss.”
Stubbs v. Strickland (2013) nev “670(2) allows a defendant to bring a separate action for damages, attorney fees, and costs resulting from a SLAPP suit, even if the plaintiff filing the alleged SLAPP suit voluntarily dismisses the action before a defendant appears in the lawsuit or has the opportunity to file…”
Panik v. TMM, Inc. (2023) nev
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(1)(a) — 3 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(1)(b) — 3 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(2) — 4 cases
Panik v. TMM, Inc. (2023) nev
Davis v. Parks (2014) nev
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(3) — 14 cases
SPIRTOS v. YEMENIDJIAN (2021) nev “3d 262, 268 (2017) ("[Nlo communication falls within the purview of NRS 41.660 unless it is 'truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.”
WILLIAMS VS. LAZER (2021) nev
Stubbs v. Strickland (2013) nev “670(2) allows a defendant to bring a separate action for damages, attorney fees, and costs resulting from a SLAPP suit, even if the plaintiff filing the alleged SLAPP suit voluntarily dismisses the action before a defendant appears in the lawsuit or has the opportunity to file…”
In re EB Holdings II, Inc. (2017) nvb “On December 14, 2016, in response to the EBH Complaint, the GoldenTree Parties filed a special motion to dismiss under NRS 41.660 ("GoldenTree Special Motion").”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(3)(a) — 60 cases
SPIRTOS v. YEMENIDJIAN (2021) nev “3d 262, 268 (2017) ("[Nlo communication falls within the purview of NRS 41.660 unless it is 'truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.”
ROSEN VS. TARKANIAN (2019) nev “Shortly thereafter, Rosen filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss in accordance with NRS 41.660. In her anti-SLAPP motion, Rosen asserted that she believed that the statements were true based on multiple public accounts and Tarkanian's own admissions about his involvement…”
STARK VS. LACKEY (2020) nev “Vi CLERK RF PREME COURT BY Appeal from a district court order denying a special motion to dismiss pursuant to NRS 41.660. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Connie J.”
Coker v. Sassone (2019) nev “Central to its resolution are Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes-specifically NRS 41.660, which authorizes a litigant to file a special motion to dismiss when an action filed in court is "based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to…”
TAYLOR VS. COLON (2020) nev
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(3)(b) — 52 cases
STARK VS. LACKEY (2020) nev “Vi CLERK RF PREME COURT BY Appeal from a district court order denying a special motion to dismiss pursuant to NRS 41.660. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Connie J.”
ROSEN VS. TARKANIAN (2019) nev “Shortly thereafter, Rosen filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss in accordance with NRS 41.660. In her anti-SLAPP motion, Rosen asserted that she believed that the statements were true based on multiple public accounts and Tarkanian's own admissions about his involvement…”
TAYLOR VS. COLON (2020) nev
SPIRTOS v. YEMENIDJIAN (2021) nev “3d 262, 268 (2017) ("[Nlo communication falls within the purview of NRS 41.660 unless it is 'truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.”
Coker v. Sassone (2019) nev “Central to its resolution are Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes-specifically NRS 41.660, which authorizes a litigant to file a special motion to dismiss when an action filed in court is "based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(3)(b)(2) — 2 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(3)(c)(1) — 2 cases
DELUCCHI VS. SONGER (2017) nev
DELUCCHI VS. SONGER (2017) nev
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(3)(d) — 5 cases
Coker v. Sassone (2019) nev “Central to its resolution are Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes-specifically NRS 41.660, which authorizes a litigant to file a special motion to dismiss when an action filed in court is "based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to…”
COKER VS. SASSONE (2019) nev
COKER VS. SASSONE (2019) nev
Neilsen Vs. Wynn (2020) nev
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(3)(e) — 3 cases
Pope Vs. Fellhauer (2021) nev
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(3)(e)(2) — 2 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(3)(f) — 1 case
Padda Vs. Hendrick (2020) nev
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(4) — 16 cases
ROSEN VS. TARKANIAN (2019) nev “Shortly thereafter, Rosen filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss in accordance with NRS 41.660. In her anti-SLAPP motion, Rosen asserted that she believed that the statements were true based on multiple public accounts and Tarkanian's own admissions about his involvement…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(4)(e) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(5) — 5 cases
Smith v. Craig (2020) nvd
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(6) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(a) — 1 case
Smith v. Craig (2020) nvd
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(b) — 1 case
Shapiro v. Welt (2018) nev
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(l) — 1 case
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