2C:12-3. Terroristic threats.
a. A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience. A violation of this subsection is a crime of the second degree if it occurs during a declared period of national, State or county emergency. The actor shall be strictly liable upon proof that the crime occurred, in fact, during a declared period of national, State or county emergency. It shall not be a defense that the actor did not know that there was a declared period of emergency at the time the crime occurred.
b. A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to kill another with the purpose to put him in imminent fear of death under circumstances reasonably causing the victim to believe the immediacy of the threat and the likelihood that it will be carried out.
Notes of Decisions
Lazaro Larios v. Attorney Gen. United States, 978 F.3d 62 (3rd Cir. 2020).
· cites it 14× “Because we conclude the crime at issue—New Jersey’s terroristic-threats statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a)—should have been analyzed under the modified categorical approach, and, under that approach, the particular offense of which Larios was convicted is not a crime…”
Garlanger v. Verbeke, 223 F. Supp. 2d 596 (D.N.J. 2002).
· cites it 3× “) He was ultimately charged with one count of making terroristic threats in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3 of the New Jersey Criminal Justice Code, (id.”
State v. Jackson, 185 A.3d 262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018).
“2C:18-2 ; third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3 ; third-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.”
State v. Jones, 180 A.3d 288 (N.J. 2018).
“2C:20-7 ; and third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a). On the same date, a separate indictment charged defendant with second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.”
Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1998).
“After reviewing the facts, the Appellate Division concluded that defendant’s conduct on July 9, 1996, was insufficient to qualify as a terroristic threat, as defined by N.J.S.A 2C:12-3(b). The Appellate Division found that there was no evidence in the record that defendant’s…”
A.M.C. v. P.B., 148 A.3d 754 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).
“, a police officer in the Newark Police Department, committed acts of domestic violence 3 against her in the form of terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3, sexual assault, 4 N.J.S.”
State v. Carroll, 196 A.3d 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018).
· cites it 2× “" For example, to render the posts unlawful as a terroristic threat, the State would have to prove defendant intended to terrorize or recklessly disregarded *537 the risk of causing terror, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a). 7 Similarly, to claim the posts were unlawful harassment, which…”
Palma v. Atl. Cnty., 53 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D.N.J. 1999).
· cites it 4× “See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a). Section 2C:33-3 provides, in relevant part: [A] person is guilty of a crime .”
State of New Jersey v. Brandon Kane, 155 A.3d 612 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).
“2C:13-1(b); third-degree terroristic threats of Marjie, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3; third-degree significant bodily injury aggravated assault of C.”
State v. R.J.M., 180 A.3d 1201 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018).
“Defendant was indicted and tried for third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), third-degree resisting arrest, N.”
State of New Jersey v. James Gleaton, 143 A.3d 326 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).
“Under these circumstances, the trial judge's reliance on our decision in Rodriguez to strip juror number 1 of her title as foreperson was misplaced.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:12-3(a) — 144 cases
Lazaro Larios v. Attorney Gen. United States, 978 F.3d 62 (3rd Cir. 2020).
“Because we conclude the crime at issue—New Jersey’s terroristic-threats statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a)—should have been analyzed under the modified categorical approach, and, under that approach, the particular offense of which Larios was convicted is not a crime…”
State v. Jones, 180 A.3d 288 (N.J. 2018).
“2C:20-7 ; and third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a). On the same date, a separate indictment charged defendant with second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.”
State v. Carroll, 196 A.3d 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018).
“" For example, to render the posts unlawful as a terroristic threat, the State would have to prove defendant intended to terrorize or recklessly disregarded *537 the risk of causing terror, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a). 7 Similarly, to claim the posts were unlawful harassment, which…”
Palma v. Atl. Cnty., 53 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D.N.J. 1999).
“See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a). Section 2C:33-3 provides, in relevant part: [A] person is guilty of a crime .”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:12-3(a)(1) — 1 case
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:12-3(b) — 122 cases
Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1998).
“After reviewing the facts, the Appellate Division concluded that defendant’s conduct on July 9, 1996, was insufficient to qualify as a terroristic threat, as defined by N.J.S.A 2C:12-3(b). The Appellate Division found that there was no evidence in the record that defendant’s…”
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