N.M. Stat. § 14-9-2 (2026)

Such records shall be notice to all the world of the existence and contents of the
instruments so recorded from the time of recording.

History: Laws 1886-1887, ch. 10, § 2; C.L. 1897, § 3954; Code 1915, § 4787; C.S.
1929, § 118-109; 1941 Comp., § 13-202; 1953 Comp., § 71-2-2.

                                    ANNOTATIONS

Bracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and is not
part of the law.

Cross references. — For recording assignment of royalties, see 70-1-1, 70-1-2 NMSA
1978.

                         I.     GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

False or void instruments. — Only valid instruments are authorized to be filed or
recorded, of which purchasers are charged with notice and if a false or void instrument
purporting upon its face to be conveyance is recorded, the record, like the instrument, is
void and does not protect a purchaser. Mosley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 1941-NMSC-
028, 45 N.M. 230, 114 P.2d 740.

Purpose. — Sections 14-9-1 and 14-9-3 NMSA 1978 are not intended to protect
creditors of the owners of property, but to impart information to those dealing with the
property respecting its transfer and encumbrances. First Nat'l Bank v. Haverkampf,
1911-NMSC-053, 16 N.M. 497, 121 P. 31, aff'd, 235 U.S. 689, 35 S. Ct. 204, 59 L. Ed.
426 (1914); Ilfeld v. de Baca, 1905-NMSC-007, 13 N.M. 32, 79 P. 723, rev'd on other
grounds, 1907-NMSC-014, 14 N.M. 65, 89 P. 244 (decided prior to 1923 amendment of
14-9-3 NMSA 1978).
A deed recorded in a county where the property is not located is ineffective as
constructive notice. Christmas v. Cowden, 1940-NMSC-051, 44 N.M. 517, 105 P.2d
484.

Seller under real estate contract holds perfected interest in property by virtue of
recording his interest pursuant to this article. Connelly v. Wertz, 1993-NMCA-090, 115
N.M. 803, 858 P.2d 1282, overruled on other grounds, Southwest Land Inv., Inc. v.
Hubbart, 1993-NMSC-072, 116 N.M. 742, 867 P.2d 412.

All documents affecting title to real property recorded in county records are
constructive notice to the world of their existence from the time of recordation.
Brown v. Behles & Davis, 2004-NMCA-028, 135 N.M. 180, 86 P.3d 605.

No time requirement for recording instruments. — There is no requirement that an
instrument be recorded within a particular period of time; the order in which deeds
appear on the record is not important in a notice jurisdiction. Angle v. Slayton, 1985-
NMSC-032, 102 N.M. 521, 697 P.2d 940.

Construed in pari materia. — This section must be considered with 14-9-3 NMSA
1978, with which it is in pari materia. Romero v. Sanchez, 1971-NMSC-129, 83 N.M.
358, 492 P.2d 140.

Necessity of notice. — To bind a purchaser of a servient estate by a servitude charged
thereon, he must have notice thereof, either actual or constructive, as in case of other
encumbrances upon land. Southern Union Gas Co. v. Cantrell, 1952-NMSC-024, 56
N.M. 184, 241 P.2d 1209.

Service by publication against "unknown claimants of interest" in quiet title action
does not affect the title of a person whose deed to that property is on record in the deed
records of the county in which the real estate in question is located. Houchen v.
Hubbell, 1969-NMSC-162, 80 N.M. 764, 461 P.2d 413.

Constructive service proper where names and addresses of defendants are not
reasonably ascertainable. — In a collateral attack on a 1948 quiet title judgment in
San Juan county, in which service of process was accomplished by publication in a
weekly newspaper, and where the plaintiffs in the 1948 complaint alleged that after
diligent search and inquiry, they had been unable to learn or determine the names,
places of residence, addresses and whereabouts of any unknown heirs of any
deceased defendants or if any defendants were still living and residing in New Mexico,
they could not be located because they had secreted themselves so that personal
service of process could not be effected, and where the return of service completed by
the sheriff of San Juan county indicated that after diligent search and inquiry, any
predecessors-in-interest could not be located and personally served with process, the
district court correctly found that the suit in this case constituted an improper collateral
attack on the 1948 judgment quieting title in defendants’ predecessors-in-interest,
because constructive notice given in the underlying case was sufficiently reasonably
calculated under the circumstances as they existed in 1948; constructive service of
process by publication satisfies due process if the names and addresses of the
defendants to be served are not reasonably ascertainable. T.H. McElvain Oil & Gas Ltd.
P’ship v. Benson-Montin-Greer Drilling Corp., 2017-NMSC-004, rev’g 2015-NMCA-004,
340 P.3d 1277.

Lack of notice. — This section does not impose a duty upon the owner of an interest in
real property to constantly peruse the records of the county clerk to determine whether
he or she has been divested of his or her property right in a lawsuit of which he or she
was not notified. T.H. McElvain Oil & Gas Ltd. P’ship v. Benson-Montin-Greer Drilling
Corp., 2015-NMCA-004, cert. granted, 2014-NMCERT-012.

Quiet title action. — In quiet title action, where defendants failed to undertake a
diligent and good faith effort to personally serve the owners of an interest in real
property with adequate notice of quiet title suit, constructive notice was not
constitutionally adequate. T.H. McElvain Oil & Gas Ltd. P’ship v. Benson-Montin-Greer
Drilling Corp., 2015-NMCA-004, cert. granted, 2014-NMCERT-012.

Appropriations for judicial salaries are subject to governor’s veto power. —
Judicial salaries must annually be established by the legislature in an appropriations
act, as set forth in Subsection E of 34-1-9 NMSA 1978, and are subject to the
governor’s partial veto authority. State ex rel. Cisneros v. Martinez, 2015-NMSC-001.

Governor’s partial veto must eliminate the whole of an item to be valid. — Where
the legislature provided for two separate judicial raises in two separate appropriations,
the governor’s partial veto of one appropriation failed to eliminate the second
appropriation providing for judicial raises. State ex rel. Cisneros v. Martinez, 2015-
NMSC-001.

Fraud. — The recording of a deed must be accompanied by other circumstances
sufficient to put a reasonable person upon inquiry in order for the recording to act as
constructive notice of fraud. Romero v. Sanchez, 1971-NMSC-129, 83 N.M. 358, 492
P.2d 140.

Failure to record mortgage promptly does not constitute a fraud in law as to
subsequent creditors. First Nat'l Bank v. Haverkampf, 1911-NMSC-053, 16 N.M. 497,
121 P. 31, aff'd, 235 U.S. 689, 35 S. Ct. 204, 59 L. Ed. 426 (1914).

Date of recording tax sale certificate does not affect period of redemption.
Hiltscher v. Jones, 1917-NMSC-089, 23 N.M. 674, 170 P. 884, appeal dismissed, 251
U.S. 545, 40 S. Ct. 218, 64 L. Ed. 407 (1920).

Recorded deed of trust was superior to the unrecorded interest of an investor
who admitted he had actual notice of the recorded interest, and the existing priorities
were not affected by the appointment of a receiver. Kuntsman v. Guaranteed Equities,
Inc., 1986-NMSC-083, 105 N.M. 49, 728 P.2d 459.
Estoppel. — Where defendant and her husband had entered into a property settlement
agreement which provided that after-acquired property would belong exclusively to the
acquiring party and such recorded agreement was later repudiated by defendant in a
recorded affidavit, but later ratified and confirmed in another recorded affidavit, plaintiffs,
who had purchased property from husband, were innocent purchasers for value and
entitled to rely on the record, and defendant was estopped by her conduct from
asserting the invalidity of the property settlement. Allison v. Curtis, 1957-NMSC-036, 62
N.M. 387, 310 P.2d 1042.

Priority of interests in bankruptcy. — Since priority of interest of competing
lienholders is determined by the date of recording under New Mexico’s recording
statutes (Sections 14-9-1 to 14-9-3 NMSA 1978), the second mortgage on debtor’s
property, as the only recorded lien of record, had priority over the trustee’s interest as
unperfected lienholder after avoidance of first mortgage holder’s unrecorded and
therefore unperfected security interest. In re Beltramo, 367 B.R. 825 (Bankr. D.N.M.
2007).

                      II.     PERSONS CHARGED WITH NOTICE.

Land ownership and well-sharing agreement. — Where the owners of adjoining
ranches entered into a written land ownership and well-sharing agreement to clarify the
ownership of certain property and to provide for sharing of water from two wells; the
agreement was recorded in each county in which the land and wells were located; and
one landowner sold the landowner’s ranch to a third party and orally advised the buyer
of the existence of the agreement, the buyer had constructive notice of the agreement
and had a duty to inquire about the agreement. Skeen v. Boyles, 2009-NMCA-080, 146
N.M. 627, 213 P.3d 531.

Constructive notice of restrictive covenant in deed. — Because a deed containing a
restrictive covenant was recorded, the defendant had constructive notice of the
covenant. Lex Pro Corp. v. Snyder Enters., Inc., 1983-NMSC-073, 100 N.M. 389, 671
P.2d 637.

Constructive notice in recorded deed of trust. — Pursuant to the policy underlying
the recording statutes, Sections 14-9-1 and -2 NMSA 1978, priority in the proceeds of
collateral underlying petitioners’ loans would be determined by the order in which the
deeds of trust were recorded; there was no question that the "master" deed of trust
issued to Group I was duly recorded first and that the latter deeds were expressly made
subject to it, so the investors in Group II and Group III thus had record notice of the
existence of the first deed of trust, in addition to actual notice in some cases. McInerny
v. Peterson, 1986-NMSC-099, 105 N.M. 207, 730 P.2d 1189.

"All the world" means those bound to search record. — "All the world" has been
limited to mean those persons who are bound to search the record, and it is to such
persons only that the law imputes constructive notice; subsequent purchasers are
charged with such notice. Angle v. Slayton, 1985-NMSC-032, 102 N.M. 521, 697 P.2d
940.

Constructive notice to subsequent purchasers. — Subsequent purchasers are
charged with such constructive notice of the contents of recorded instruments pursuant
to Section 14-9-2 NMSA 1978, since the term "all the world" has been limited to mean
persons who are bound to search the record, and it is only these persons that the law
imputes with constructive notice. Allen v. Timberlake Ranch Landowners Ass’n, 2005-
NMCA-115, 138 N.M. 318, 119 P.3d 743.

Constructive notice to laborers. — Claimants had constructive notice that title to the
real estate upon which they allegedly performed labor had been previously conveyed to
the grantee, where two deeds given to the grantee were both filed and recorded. In re
Estates of Salas, 1987-NMCA-018, 105 N.M. 472, 734 P.2d 250.

Record of instrument is constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and
encumbrancers only and does not affect prior parties. Romero v. Sanchez, 1971-
NMSC-129, 83 N.M. 358, 492 P.2d 140.

Who bound to search. — Those who, by the terms of the recording laws, are charged
with constructive notice of the record of an instrument affecting land are, therefore,
those who are bound to search the records for that particular instrument. Romero v.
Sanchez, 1971-NMSC-129, 83 N.M. 358, 492 P.2d 140.

Jury question. — If, considering all the surrounding facts and circumstances, a
reasonably prudent person in the exercise of ordinary diligence would have made
inquiry as to the state of the record, he is chargeable with knowledge that such inquiry
would have revealed from the time that it ought to have been made. This raises a
factual issue for resolution by the trier of the facts. Romero v. Sanchez, 1971-NMSC-
129, 83 N.M. 358, 492 P.2d 140.

                              III.   SCOPE OF NOTICE.

Scope of notice. — Where information of a specific claim or right is given to a person
or to the world by recordation of an instrument manifesting such claim or right, the
information contained therein is operative only in respect to the particular facts
communicated thereby, and it will not serve to put the parties charged with such notice
upon inquiry as to any other or different right. Zumwalt v. Goodwin, 133 F.2d 984 (10th
Cir. 1943).

"Knowledge" does not necessarily mean "actual knowledge," but means knowledge of
such circumstances as would ordinarily lead to a knowledge of the actual facts. In its
broadest interpretation, it means constructive notice. Recitals in a quitclaim deed of
existence of agreements, rights of redemption and mortgages charged the grantee with
notice of an unrecorded warranty deed. Taylor v. Hanchett Oil Co., 1933-NMSC-099, 37
N.M. 606, 27 P.2d 59.
Person who files and records leases long after others sued to foreclose vendor's
lien for balance of the purchase price and filed lis pendens notice in same county clerk's
office is deemed to have notice that his interest was attacked in the action, and his
interest is inferior to the lien of the vendor. Logan v. Emro Chem. Corp., 1944-NMSC-
044, 48 N.M. 368, 151 P.2d 329.

Effect of recording agreement. — Purchaser's written agreement to execute a second
mortgage on property when buildings were constructed on the land, or within one year
from date of sale, when filed for record, constituted constructive notice to all the world of
its existence and contents. Zumwalt v. Goodwin, 133 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1943).

An agreement as notice of a vendor's lien. — Vendor's recordation of agreement with
buyer of vacant land that when buildings were erected or in one year after date of sale
buyer was to give vendor a second mortgage on the property did not give constructive
notice to a surety on the buyer's note of the vendor's intention to reserve a vendor's lien,
and a mortgage executed to the surety to secure his signature to a renewal note had
priority over the vendor's lien. Zumwalt v. Goodwin, 133 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1943).

Recording of short form memorandum of agreement gave notice that defendant
was claiming some right to real estate under this section. Bingaman v. Cook, 1968-
NMSC-187, 79 N.M. 627, 447 P.2d 507.

Reference in contract to improvement agreement. — An unrecorded improvement
agreement, referred to in a recorded contract of sale, is in the chain of title. Camino
Real Enters., Inc. v. Ortega, 1988-NMSC-061, 107 N.M. 387, 758 P.2d 801.

Recorded chattel mortgage of crops to be raised is constructive notice of the
existence and contents of the mortgage, even though the land is generally but not
particularly described, where description could be aided by reasonable inquiry. Security
State Bank v. Clovis Mill & Elevator Co., 1937-NMSC-029, 41 N.M. 341, 68 P.2d 918.

Reliance on record. — An investigator may rely upon the truth of recitals contained in
the record when they are specific. Smith & Ricker v. Hill Bros., 1913-NMSC-004, 17
N.M. 415, 134 P. 243.

Priority of claims in bankruptcy. — Pursuant to New Mexico recordation statute
(Section 14-9-1 NMSA 1978), the ownership interests of the debtor and his wife as to
good faith purchasers and judgment lien creditors were delineated by the recorded deed
stating that they owned the subject property as joint tenants. In re Beery, 295 B.R. 385
(Bankr. D.N.M. 2003).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §§
90, 96; 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws §§ 88, 102 to 155; 77 Am. Jur. 2d
Vendor and Purchaser §§ 663 to 669.