New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 42-13-4 (2026)

Limitation on liability.

✓ current as of May 2026 Cite as: N.M. Stat. § 42-13-4 (2026)
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A. No person, corporation or partnership is liable for personal injuries to or for the
death of a rider that may occur as a result of the behavior of equine animals while
engaged in any equine activities.

    B. No person, corporation or partnership shall make any claim against, maintain any
action against or recover from a rider, operator, owner, trainer or promoter for injury,
loss or damage resulting from equine behavior unless the acts or omissions of the rider,
owner, operator, trainer or promoter constitute negligence.
    C. Nothing in the Equine Liability Act shall be construed to prevent or limit the
liability of the operator, owner, trainer or promoter of an equine activity who:

       (1)     provided the equipment or tack, and knew or should have known that the
equipment or tack was faulty and an injury was the proximate result of the faulty
condition of the equipment or tack;

      (2)    provided the equine and failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to
determine the ability of the rider to:

             (a) engage safely in the equine activity; or

            (b) safely manage the particular equine based on the rider's representations
of his ability;

       (3)      owns, leases, rents or otherwise is in lawful possession and control of the
land or facilities upon which a rider sustained injuries because of a dangerous condition
that was known to the operator, owner, trainer or promoter of the equine activity;

       (4)    committed an act or omission that constitutes conscious or reckless
disregard for the safety of a rider and an injury was the proximate result of that act or
omission; or

       (5)      intentionally injures a rider.

History: Laws 1993, ch. 117, § 4.

                                        ANNOTATIONS

Effective dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 117 contained no effective date provision, but,
pursuant to N.M. Const., art. IV, § 23, was effective June 18, 1993, 90 days after
adjournment of the legislature.

Intent of legislature. — While the phrase "unless the acts or omissions of the . . .
operator . . . constitute negligence" in Subsection B of this section serves to expressly
limit the definition of conduct for which equine operators cannot be held liable, the
legislative intent goes further than that to express a policy that equine operators should
be accountable for their own negligence. Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 2003-NMSC-
024, 134 N.M. 341, 76 P.3d 1098.

Act provides greater protections for patrons than common law. — Because
Subsection C of this section goes into considerable detail in explaining what types of
activities equine operators may be held liable for, while "equine behavior" is only briefly
addressed, this suggests that the legislature attempted to provide greater protection for
patrons of equine activities in the Equine Liability Act than they otherwise would have
enjoyed. Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 2003-NMSC-024, 134 N.M. 341, 76 P.3d
1098.

Liability releases disallowed. — Disallowing liability releases for negligence furthers
the purposes of the Equine Liability Act as expressed in 42-13-2 NMSA 1978.
Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 2003-NMSC-024, 134 N.M. 341, 76 P.3d 1098.

The policy generally expressed in the Equine Liability Act and other factors trigger the
public policy exception to the general rule that liability releases for negligence are
enforceable. Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 2003-NMSC-024, 134 N.M. 341, 76 P.3d
1098.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 3 cases, 2002–2007 · leading case: Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp.
Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp. (2002) nmctapp · cites it 54× “{25} Under Section 42-13-4(0(1), a plaintiff may overcome the ELA’s grant of immunity by establishing that (1) the defendant provided equipment or tack; (2) the equipment or tack was provided in a “faulty condition”; and (3) his injuries were “the proximate result” of the faulty…”
Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp. (2003) nm · cites it 16× “NMSA 1978, § 42-13-4 (1993). {41} Berlangieri argues that the Act imposes affirmative duties upon equine business operators to protect their patrons from harm under subsections one through five.”
Clyncke v. Waneka (2007) colo · cites it 2× “321(B)(2)(b) (2006)), New Mexico (N.M.Stat. § 42-13-4(C)(2) (2006)), North Carolina (N.”
— N.M. Stat. § 42-13-4(A) — 2 cases
Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp. (2002) nmctapp “{25} Under Section 42-13-4(0(1), a plaintiff may overcome the ELA’s grant of immunity by establishing that (1) the defendant provided equipment or tack; (2) the equipment or tack was provided in a “faulty condition”; and (3) his injuries were “the proximate result” of the faulty…”
Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp. (2003) nm “NMSA 1978, § 42-13-4 (1993). {41} Berlangieri argues that the Act imposes affirmative duties upon equine business operators to protect their patrons from harm under subsections one through five.”
— N.M. Stat. § 42-13-4(B) — 1 case
Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp. (2003) nm “NMSA 1978, § 42-13-4 (1993). {41} Berlangieri argues that the Act imposes affirmative duties upon equine business operators to protect their patrons from harm under subsections one through five.”
— N.M. Stat. § 42-13-4(C) — 2 cases
Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp. (2002) nmctapp “{25} Under Section 42-13-4(0(1), a plaintiff may overcome the ELA’s grant of immunity by establishing that (1) the defendant provided equipment or tack; (2) the equipment or tack was provided in a “faulty condition”; and (3) his injuries were “the proximate result” of the faulty…”
Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp. (2003) nm “NMSA 1978, § 42-13-4 (1993). {41} Berlangieri argues that the Act imposes affirmative duties upon equine business operators to protect their patrons from harm under subsections one through five.”
— N.M. Stat. § 42-13-4(C)(1) — 1 case
Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp. (2002) nmctapp “{25} Under Section 42-13-4(0(1), a plaintiff may overcome the ELA’s grant of immunity by establishing that (1) the defendant provided equipment or tack; (2) the equipment or tack was provided in a “faulty condition”; and (3) his injuries were “the proximate result” of the faulty…”
— N.M. Stat. § 42-13-4(C)(2) — 1 case
Clyncke v. Waneka (2007) colo “321(B)(2)(b) (2006)), New Mexico (N.M.Stat. § 42-13-4(C)(2) (2006)), North Carolina (N.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.