N.M. Stat. § 52-1-24 (2026)

As used in the Workers' Compensation Act:

   A. "impairment" means an anatomical or functional abnormality existing after the
date of maximum medical improvement as determined by a medically or scientifically
demonstrable finding and based upon the most recent edition of the American medical
association's guide to the evaluation of permanent impairment or comparable
publications of the American medical association. Impairment includes physical
impairment, primary mental impairment and secondary mental impairment;

    B. "primary mental impairment" means a mental illness arising from an accidental
injury arising out of and in the course of employment when the accidental injury involves
no physical injury and consists of a psychologically traumatic event that is generally
outside of a worker's usual experience and would evoke significant symptoms of
distress in a worker in similar circumstances, but is not an event in connection with
disciplinary, corrective or job evaluation action or cessation of the worker's employment;
and
   C. "secondary mental impairment" means a mental illness resulting from a physical
impairment caused by an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of
employment.

History: 1978 Comp., § 52-1-24, enacted by Laws 1987, ch. 235, § 10; 1990 (2nd
S.S.), ch. 2, § 7.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Repeals and reenactments. — Laws 1987, ch. 235, § 10 repeals former 52-1-24
NMSA 1978 as reenacted by Laws 1986, ch. 22, § 4, relating to permanent total
disability, and enacts the above section, effective June 19, 1987. For present
comparable provisions, see 52-1-25 NMSA 1978.

Compiler's notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 235, § 54A, effective June 19, 1987, repealed
Laws 1986, ch. 22, § 105 which had formerly repealed this section effective July 1,
1987.

The 1990 (2nd S.S.) amendment, effective January 1, 1991, added the first sentence
in Subsection A.

Constitutionality. — The limitations on proof of primary mental impairment in
Subsection B are not arbitrary and unreasonable, but are rationally related to a
legitimate legislative purpose. Therefore, the statute is constitutional. Holford v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 1990-NMCA-066, 110 N.M. 366, 796 P.2d 259, cert. denied, 110 N.M.
330, 795 P.2d 1022.

The provision requiring use of the American medical association's guide to evaluate
impairment in Subsection A does not represent an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority to a nongovernmental entity; additionally, the provision does not
violate due process or equal protection rights. Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1996-NMSC-
064, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250.

Equal protection. – The statute does not violate equal protection even though it makes
a classification based on mental disability and imposes a proof requirement on workers
with mental disabilities that is not imposed on workers with physical disabilities. Romero
v. City of Santa Fe, 2006-NMCA-055, 139 N.M. 440, 134 P.3d 131.

Medical evidence of impairment rating was not controverted. — Where worker
suffered an injury while on break at worker’s workplace when a co-worker grabbed
worker by the shoulders in the area of the worker’s neck and lifted the worker off the
ground; the doctor who performed an independent medical examination on the worker
testified that the worker had a pre-existing, but asymptomatic spinal condition, spinal
stenosis, that became symptomatic upon being lifted off the ground and a central
nervous system condition, myelopathy, that resulted from the accident and that surgery
was required to prevent worsening of significant symptoms; the doctor assigned the
worker a combined whole person impairment rating of twenty-six percent based on eight
percent impairment from the spinal stenosis and the results of a cervical fusion and
twenty percent from myelopathy; and the doctor’s testimony was uncontradicted, the
workers’ compensation judge’s finding of twenty-six percent whole-body impairment for
the worker was supported by substantial evidence. Esckelson v. Miners’ Colfax Med.
Ctr., 2014-NMCA-052.

Sufficient allegation of general bodily impairment. — Statement of the injury,
together with the further statement that by reason thereof he was totally unable to
perform any work in any general field of endeavor in which he could engage, and that
his disability was total and permanent, we think, was a sufficient allegation of general
bodily impairment resulting from the described injury. Gonzales v. Gackle Drilling Co.,
1962-NMSC-063, 70 N.M. 131, 371 P.2d 605.

Worker's knowledge of impairment for purposes of statute of limitations. — The
fact that a worker is restricted to proving his claim by the testimony of a health care
provider agreed upon by the parties or approved by the workers' compensation judge,
and that the provider is directed to use American medical association publications in
establishing the degree of disability, does not limit the running of the statute of
limitations to only those situations when a health care provider has actually informed the
worker that he has sustained a permanent impairment; thus, resolution of when a
worker was deemed to have sustained impairment for purposes of running of the
limitations period constituted a factual issue unsuitable for resolution by summary
judgment. Montoya v. Kirk-Mayer, Inc., 1995-NMCA-104, 120 N.M. 550, 903 P.2d 861.

Capacity to perform work. — The primary test of disability is capacity to perform work.
The word "capacity" connotes qualities inherent in the individual. "Capacity to perform
work" is the product of the individual's physical and mental power and dexterity, as
augmented by education, training, and experience. Barnett & Casbarian, Inc. v. Ortiz,
1992-NMCA-071, 114 N.M. 322, 838 P.2d 476.

Whether an individual's skills constitute a capacity to perform work depends upon what
work is being performed by members of society; thus, in measuring one's capacity to
work, it is necessary to look at the job market. Barnett & Casbarian, Inc. v. Ortiz, 1992-
NMCA-071, 114 N.M. 322, 838 P.2d 476.

Proof of impairment not essential. — Proof of an impairment, as defined in
Subsection A, is not essential for recovery under 52-1-43 NMSA 1978. Lucero v.
Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., 1994-NMCA-076, 118 N.M. 35, 878 P.2d 353, cert. denied,
118 N.M. 90, 879 P.2d 91.

"Job market" defined. — The job market by which disability is to be measured should
be the general market in which workers are being employed. Barnett & Casbarian, Inc.
v. Ortiz, 1992-NMCA-071, 114 N.M. 322, 838 P.2d 476.
Assignment of rating by workers' compensation judge. — Even though only one
doctor testified on the issue of the worker's physical impairment, since there was
evidence that cast doubt on the worker's reports of pain to the doctor, the worker's
compensation judge was entitled to discount the doctor's establishment of a 5%
impairment rating and to find that the worker had no physical impairment. Peterson v. N.
Home Care, 1996-NMCA-030, 121 N.M. 439, 912 P.2d 831.

Workers' compensation judge should not have assigned an impairment rating where
there was no testimony on impairment from a pulmonologist and where the worker had
asthma and bronchopulmonary aspergillosis prior to her chemical exposure. Yeager v.
St. Vincent Hosp., 1999-NMCA-020, 126 N.M. 598, 973 P.2d 850, cert. denied, 127
N.M. 391, 981 P.2d 1209.

Specific findings required. — Although worker's compensation judge has discretion to
reduce or suspend benefits, the judge is required to make findings as to impairment
and, if applicable, injurious practices by claimant, and failure to do so warrants a
remand with instructions to make specific findings thereon. Chavarria v. Basin Moving &
Storage, 1999-NMCA-032, 127 N.M. 67, 976 P.2d 1019.

"Primary mental impairment". — Subsection B reflects a legislative intent to limit
primary impairment to sudden, emotion-provoking events of a catastrophic nature, as
opposed to gradual, progressive stress-producing causes. Jensen v. N.M. State Police,
1990-NMCA-007, 109 N.M. 626, 788 P.2d 382, cert. denied, 109 N.M. 563, 787 P.2d
1246.

In order for there to be a primary mental impairment, first there must be a
"psychologically traumatic event." That is the threshold criterion. Additionally, the
psychologically traumatic event must be one that is generally outside the worker's usual
experience and one that would evoke significant symptoms of distress in a worker in
similar circumstances. Jensen v. N.M. State Police, 1990-NMCA-007, 109 N.M. 626,
788 P.2d 382, cert. denied, 109 N.M. 563, 787 P.2d 1246.

Under Subsection B, in order for there to be a primary mental impairment, there first
must be a psychologically traumatic event. Holford v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 1990-
NMCA-066, 110 N.M. 366, 796 P.2d 259, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 330, 795 P.2d 1022.

Claimant, who alleged that as a result of job harassment, which caused work stress, her
husband shot himself in the head, could not recover compensation where no
psychologically traumatic event had been alleged. Holford v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
1990-NMCA-066, 110 N.M. 366, 796 P.2d 259, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 330, 795 P.2d
1022.

To determine whether the worker seeking benefits suffered "a psychologically traumatic
event that is generally outside of a worker's usual experience," a comparison must be
made between that worker's psychologically traumatic event and the usual experiences
generally encountered by workers in the same or similar jobs as the worker seeking
benefits, regardless of whether they work for the same employer. Collado v. City of
Albuquerque, 1995-NMCA-117, 120 N.M. 608, 904 P.2d 57.

It was not the intent of the legislature to exclude any occupational group from seeking
compensation under Subsection B; thus, it was error for the court to construe the
subsection to exclude any emergency-type workers, such as paramedics, from
compensation for primary mental impairment. Collado v. City of Albuquerque, 1995-
NMCA-117, 120 N.M. 608, 904 P.2d 57.

A claim of primary mental impairment requires that 1) the worker must establish a work-
related accident; 2) the accident must be a traumatic event; and 3) the traumatic event
must cause a mental injury that involves no physical injury. Chavez v. Mountain States
Constructors, 1996-NMSC-070, 122 N.M. 579, 929 P.2d 971.

Primary mental impairment is a mental disability that satisfies all of the criteria of
Subsection B and occurs as a result of a traumatic event, regardless of the presence of
any physical injury; thus, the fact that a claimant received personal injuries in an
accident did not bar him from compensation for primary mental impairment, since the
mental impairment was not caused by the injuries. Chavez v. Mountain States
Constructors, 1996-NMSC-070, 122 N.M. 579, 929 P.2d 971.

Secondary mental impairment. — A worker is not required to have a current physical
impairment in order to have a secondary mental impairment; thus, when a worker was
paid total temporary disability benefits for 89 weeks, after which a judge found she no
longer had any physical impairment, she was entitled to benefits for secondary mental
impairment for 11 weeks under Section 52-1-42B NMSA 1978. Peterson v. N. Home
Care, 1996-NMCA-030, 121 N.M. 439, 912 P.2d 831.

Traumatic event. — A worker driving a loaded dump truck suffered a traumatic event
"outside of a worker's usual experience" when the truck's brakes failed on a downgrade,
and the accident was one which "would evoke significant symptoms of distress in a
worker in similar circumstances." Chavez v. Mountain States Constructors, 1996-
NMSC-070, 122 N.M. 579, 929 P.2d 971.

Uncontroverted medical evidence rule applies to issues of causation and the
question whether a worker experienced a traumatic event is not a causation issue. The
term "traumatic event" is a term of art within the meaning of the statute and a question
of law that is not subject to conclusive proof by expert testimony. Romero v. City of
Santa Fe, 2006-NMCA-055, 139 N.M. 440, 134 P.3d 131.

Unable to perform work because of anxiety reaction. — That the outward
manifestations of the anxiety reaction could be controlled by medication does not alter
the fact that plaintiff still was unable to perform any type of work such as he had
formerly been able to do, or which, by reason of his age, mental condition, training and
experience, he would have been able to do. Roybal v. County of Santa Fe, 1968-
NMSC-073, 79 N.M. 99, 440 P.2d 291.
Alleged stress of understaffing in a state police radio dispatchers' office did not meet
the definition of a "psychologically traumatic event", and a dispatcher was therefore not
entitled to compensation. Jensen v. N.M. State Police, 1990-NMCA-007, 109 N.M. 626,
788 P.2d 382, cert. denied, 109 N.M. 563, 787 P.2d 1246.

Work-related, stress-caused neurochemical depression is a "mental impairment",
not a "physical impairment", and does not constitute a compensable "primary mental
impairment" under Subsection B because no single psychologically traumatic event
triggers such an injury. Examination of the provisions of this section, and the Workers'
Compensation Act as a whole, indicates the legislature's intent to make gradual, stress-
caused mental injuries noncompensable. Douglass v. State, Regulation & Licensing
Dep't, 1991-NMCA-041, 112 N.M. 183, 812 P.2d 1331, cert. denied, 112 N.M. 77, 811
P.2d 575.

Illness caused by ongoing stress. — Where worker, who worked as a swimming pool
manager, was required to remove pigeon feces, carcasses and feathers, which created
foul odors, from pool, areas surrounding the pool and the roof of the pool and
experienced nausea and mild headaches after dealing with pigeon matter, worker did
not suffer psychologically traumatic event. Romero v. City of Santa Fe, 2006-NMCA-
055, 139 N.M. 440, 134 P.3d 131.

Liability for mental injury. — Whenever physical injury from a work-related accident is
accompanied by mental injury arising out of the same accident, the worker's sole
remedy is workers' compensation, whether or not the particular injury may be
compensated by a monetary award under the act. Maestas v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
1990-NMCA-092, 110 N.M. 609, 798 P.2d 210, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 653, 798 P.2d
1039.

Injury not work-related. — Anonymous bomb threats made by a co-employee to a
worker's employer, demanding that either the worker be fired or the school where the
worker was employed would be bombed, did not provide a legal basis for recovery
under this section for alleged psychological injury because the incident arose out of
personal animosity by the co-employee toward the worker involving matters unrelated to
her employment. Bader-Rondeau v. Truth or Consequences Mun. Sch., 1991-NMCA-
150, 113 N.M. 218, 824 P.2d 358.

Psychological disability incurred outside provisions of this section. — Since a
workers' compensation judge determined that the worker suffered a work related mental
disability, but that the disability was not compensable since it fell outside the definition of
primary mental impairment, the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act did not bar the worker's prima facie tort claim against her employer
and supervisor. Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 1995-NMCA-070, 120
N.M. 343, 901 P.2d 761, cert. denied, 120 N.M. 68, 898 P.2d 120.

Effect on Section 52-1-49 NMSA 1978. — In order for medical benefits to be payable
as a result of an "injury" sustained by the worker within the contemplation of Section 52-
1-49 NMSA 1978, the injury must be of such nature that any "impairment" which may
result therefrom would be compensable under this section. Douglass v. State,
Regulation & Licensing Dep't, 1991-NMCA-041, 112 N.M. 183, 812 P.2d 1331, cert.
denied, 112 N.M. 77, 811 P.2d 575.

Law reviews. — For case note, "WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW: A Clinical
Psychologist Is Qualified to Give Expert Medical Testimony Regarding Causation:
Madrid v. University of California, d/b/a Los Alamos National Laboratory," see 18 N.M.L.
Rev. 637 (1988).

For survey of 1990-91 workers' compensation law, see 22 N.M.L. Rev. 845 (1992).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 82 Workmen's Compensation §§ 301,
302.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant
as result of nonsudden stimuli - Right to compensation under particular statutory
provisions, 97 A.L.R.5th 1.

99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 201.