New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14 (2026)

Menacing in the second degree

✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 120.14 Menacing in the second degree.
  A person is guilty of menacing in the second degree when:
  1. He or she intentionally places or attempts to place another person
in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death
by displaying a deadly weapon, dangerous instrument or what appears to
be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; or
  2. He or she repeatedly follows a person or engages in a course of
conduct or repeatedly commits acts over a period of time intentionally
placing or attempting to place another person in reasonable fear of
physical injury, serious physical injury or death; or
  3. He or she commits the crime of menacing in the third degree in
violation of that part of a duly served order of protection, or such
order which the defendant has actual knowledge of because he or she was
present in court when such order was issued, pursuant to article eight
of the family court act, section 530.12 of the criminal procedure law,
or an order of protection issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in
another state, territorial or tribal jurisdiction, which directed the
respondent or defendant to stay away from the person or persons on whose
behalf the order was issued.
  Menacing in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 271 cases (64 in the last 5 years), 1994–2026 · leading case: People v. Payton, 161 Misc. 2d 170 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1994).
People v. Payton, 161 Misc. 2d 170 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1994). · cites it 19× “PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Defendant, charged, inter alla, with two counts of menacing (Penal Law § 120.14 [2]), which allegedly occurred on two separate occasions, now moves to dismiss the two counts on the grounds of facial insufficiency.”
Frederique v. Cnty. of Nassau, 168 F. Supp. 3d 455 (E.D.N.Y 2016). · cites it 3× “Stanley Frederique Stanley was charged with: (i) one count of menacing in the second degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14 for threatening to release the pit bull and telling Ferrucci, “move away from the fucking door before I let the dog go”; and (ii) one count of…”
People v. Bartkow, 749 N.E.2d 158 (NY 2001). · cites it 4× “Defendant was arrested, charged with menacing in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.14) and tried on an information.”
Matter of Kalyan v. Trasybule, 2020 NY Slip Op 07383 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020). · cites it 3× “However, there was insufficient evidence to establish the family offense of menacing, in either the second or third degree (Penal Law §§ 120.14, 120.15). With respect to menacing in the second degree, there was no evidence that the appellant engaged in a "course of conduct" or…”
People v. Persen, 2020 NY Slip Op 4204 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020). · cites it 2× “dangerous instrument" (Penal Law § 120.14 [1]), and when, as charged here, he or she was not justified in doing so ( see People v Padgett , 60 NY2d 142, 144-145 [1983]; People v Ellis , 233 AD2d 692, 693 [1996]).”
United States v. Patterson, 25 F.4th 123 (2d Cir. 2022). · cites it 2× “In any event, officers knew that the menacing in this case had been committed with a gun. Thus, however such potentially life-threatening conduct might be charged under New York law, the victim’s firsthand report provided officers with probable cause to investigate specific,…”
The People v. Kaity Marshall, 45 N.E.3d 954 (NY 2015). · cites it 2× “01 [2]), Menacing in the Second Degree and Third Degree (Penal Law §§ 120.14, 120.15), and Harassment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 240.”
People v. Nwogu, 22 Misc. 3d 201 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2008). · cites it 4× “Defendant’s motion is decided as follows: Defendant Emmanuel Nwogu is charged with menacing in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.14 [1]), menacing in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.”
Marcano v. City of Schenectady, 38 F. Supp. 3d 238 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). · cites it 2× “Further, Plaintiff roughly matched the limited description of the suspect in that the officers observed that Plaintiff was a dark-skinned male.”
The People v. Keith Johnson, 49 N.E.3d 1143 (NY 2016). · cites it 2× “25), menacing in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.14 [1]), and possession or use of an imitation pistol or revolver (Administrative Code § 10-131 [g]).”
People v. Stone, 43 Misc. 3d 705 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2014). · cites it 5× “Defendant, charged with menacing in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.14 [1]), and other, related offenses, moves to dismiss count one of the information, which charges him with that offense.”
United States v. Kurt Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2002). · cites it 2× “In support of his motion, Defendant argued, inter alia, that, because the state offense to which Defendant pleaded guilty prohibits only the “intentionally placing] or attempting] to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death by…”
— N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14(1) — 7 cases
Mroz v. City of Tonawanda, 999 F. Supp. 436 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
People v. Garcia, 2025 NY Slip Op 50982(U) (N.Y. Cty. Ct., Columbia Cty. 2025).
Matter of Clifford, 2021 NY Slip Op 02793 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021).
Matter of Lushchinsky, 2022 NY Slip Op 04965 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022).
People v. Garcia, 2025 NY Slip Op 50982(U) (N.Y. Cty. Ct., Columbia Cty. 2025).
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