New York Consolidated Laws
N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14 (2026)
Menacing in the second degree
✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 120.14 Menacing in the second degree. A person is guilty of menacing in the second degree when: 1. He or she intentionally places or attempts to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death by displaying a deadly weapon, dangerous instrument or what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; or 2. He or she repeatedly follows a person or engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts over a period of time intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death; or 3. He or she commits the crime of menacing in the third degree in violation of that part of a duly served order of protection, or such order which the defendant has actual knowledge of because he or she was present in court when such order was issued, pursuant to article eight of the family court act, section 530.12 of the criminal procedure law, or an order of protection issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in another state, territorial or tribal jurisdiction, which directed the respondent or defendant to stay away from the person or persons on whose behalf the order was issued. Menacing in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 271
cases (64 in the last 5 years), 1994–2026 · leading case: People v. Payton, 161 Misc. 2d 170 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1994).
People v. Payton, 161 Misc. 2d 170 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1994). “PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Defendant, charged, inter alla, with two counts of menacing (Penal Law § 120.14 [2]), which allegedly occurred on two separate occasions, now moves to dismiss the two counts on the grounds of facial insufficiency.”
Frederique v. Cnty. of Nassau, 168 F. Supp. 3d 455 (E.D.N.Y 2016). “Stanley Frederique Stanley was charged with: (i) one count of menacing in the second degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14 for threatening to release the pit bull and telling Ferrucci, “move away from the fucking door before I let the dog go”; and (ii) one count of…”
People v. Bartkow, 749 N.E.2d 158 (NY 2001). “Defendant was arrested, charged with menacing in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.14) and tried on an information.”
Matter of Kalyan v. Trasybule, 2020 NY Slip Op 07383 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020). “However, there was insufficient evidence to establish the family offense of menacing, in either the second or third degree (Penal Law §§ 120.14, 120.15). With respect to menacing in the second degree, there was no evidence that the appellant engaged in a "course of conduct" or…”
People v. Persen, 2020 NY Slip Op 4204 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020). “dangerous instrument" (Penal Law § 120.14 [1]), and when, as charged here, he or she was not justified in doing so ( see People v Padgett , 60 NY2d 142, 144-145 [1983]; People v Ellis , 233 AD2d 692, 693 [1996]).”
United States v. Patterson, 25 F.4th 123 (2d Cir. 2022). “In any event, officers knew that the menacing in this case had been committed with a gun. Thus, however such potentially life-threatening conduct might be charged under New York law, the victim’s firsthand report provided officers with probable cause to investigate specific,…”
The People v. Kaity Marshall, 45 N.E.3d 954 (NY 2015). “01 [2]), Menacing in the Second Degree and Third Degree (Penal Law §§ 120.14, 120.15), and Harassment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 240.”
People v. Nwogu, 22 Misc. 3d 201 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2008). “Defendant’s motion is decided as follows: Defendant Emmanuel Nwogu is charged with menacing in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.14 [1]), menacing in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.”
Marcano v. City of Schenectady, 38 F. Supp. 3d 238 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). “Further, Plaintiff roughly matched the limited description of the suspect in that the officers observed that Plaintiff was a dark-skinned male.”
The People v. Keith Johnson, 49 N.E.3d 1143 (NY 2016). “25), menacing in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.14 [1]), and possession or use of an imitation pistol or revolver (Administrative Code § 10-131 [g]).”
People v. Stone, 43 Misc. 3d 705 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2014). “Defendant, charged with menacing in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.14 [1]), and other, related offenses, moves to dismiss count one of the information, which charges him with that offense.”
United States v. Kurt Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2002). “In support of his motion, Defendant argued, inter alia, that, because the state offense to which Defendant pleaded guilty prohibits only the “intentionally placing] or attempting] to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death by…”
— N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14(1) — 7 cases
Mroz v. City of Tonawanda, 999 F. Supp. 436 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
People v. Garcia, 2025 NY Slip Op 50982(U) (N.Y. Cty. Ct., Columbia Cty. 2025).
Matter of Clifford, 2021 NY Slip Op 02793 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021).
Matter of Lushchinsky, 2022 NY Slip Op 04965 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022).
People v. Garcia, 2025 NY Slip Op 50982(U) (N.Y. Cty. Ct., Columbia Cty. 2025).
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