Sullivan v. Welsh, 132 A.D.2d 945 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). · Go Syfert
Sullivan v. Welsh, 132 A.D.2d 945 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
5 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Spring v. Allegany-Limestone Cent. Sch. Dist. (nyappdiv, 2023-11-17)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Spring v. Allegany-Limestone Cent. Sch. Dist.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2023 · confidence medium
Given those personal interactions and exchanges with decedent regarding the apparent effect that the alleged bullying had on him, plaintiff opined that, while other factors may have contributed, the bullying was the root cause of decedent's suicide a few days after the conclusion of an academic year that allegedly involved persistent and unaddressed mistreatment at school ( cf. Sullivan v Welsh , 132 AD2d 945, 945-946 [4th Dept 1987], appeal dismissed 70 NY2d 796 [1987]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stein v. Kendal at Ithaca
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
The possibility that decedent would choose to take his own life in the absence of any actual terminal cancer diagnosis and rather than taking advantage of the second medical opinion — regarding a diagnosis and/or pain management — from the specialist that Skezas had secured for decedent is not a foreseeable consequence of the alleged negligent acts (see Stolarski v DeSimone, 83 AD3d at 1044 ; Pinkney v City of New York, 52 AD3d 242, 243 [2008]; Boehme v A.P.P.L.E., A Program Planned for Life Enrichment, 298 AD2d 540, 541 [2002]; Watkins v Labiak, 282 AD2d at 602 ; Van Valkenburgh v Robinso…
discussed Cited "see" D'Addezio v. Agway Petroleum Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
Agway had a lawful right to act as it did and the acts are "simply too attenuated to be the proximate cause of decedent’s suicidal act” (supra, at 954; see, Sullivan v Welsh, 132 AD2d 945, 946 , appeal dismissed 70 NY2d 796 ).
Shirley C. Sullivan, as Administratrix of the Estate of David L. Sullivan
v.
Mark Welsh
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jul 10, 1987.
132 A.D.2d 945
Dillon, Green.
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

Order reversed on the law without costs and motion granted. Memorandum: Decedent suffered a concussion and various back injuries in an automobile accident. Nearly 21 months later, he committed suicide by hanging. Defendants instituted this motion for partial summary judgment dismissing a wrongful death cause of action brought by his administratrix upon the grounds that the suicide was a supervening cause of death and that there is no evidence of causal connection between death and the accident. Special Term acknowledged that defendants’ claim had merit, but denied the motion.

We agree that suicide is not, as a matter of law, a superseding cause. We conclude, however, that defendants have demonstrated that, as a matter of law, the cause of action is without merit. Defendants submitted an attorney’s affidavit together with several papers and documents. An attorney’s affidavit is probative where, as here, it refers to and discusses the contents of other papers and documents submitted on the motion (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 563). Defendants’ submission reveals the absence of any claim or evidence that decedent suffered organic brain damage or any other form of mental injury or illness as a result of the accident. It also shows that death was caused by suicide by hanging; that decedent was not treated by any medical professional or other counselor for any mental problem; that plaintiff, his mother, never suggested that he consult with anyone concerning his depression; and that plaintiff’s theory that the[*946] decedent became despondent and depressed when his injuries prevented him from working and enjoying a full and productive life is supported only by plaintiff’s statement during an examination before trial that she "feels” decedent’s death was related to the accident because she could see that he was getting very depressed.

Defendants have adequately demonstrated the absence of any evidence of organic brain damage or other brain injury that could have caused the suicide (see, Fuller v Preis, 35 NY2d 425). They have additionally shown the absence of any evidence that would suggest any causal connection between the accident and death. Plaintiff’s statement that she "feels” some connection, unsupported by any medical or other professional opinion, does not raise a factual issue (see, Corrieri v Cole, 26 NY2d 932). There was no reason for defendants to physically examine decedent prior to death regarding his mental state, and the mental documentation before the court fails to reveal any such condition. To the extent that any party could submit affirmative proof of the nonexistence of a fact or causal relationship under these circumstances, defendants have satisfied the burden.

Once the movant has sufficiently demonstrated that a claim lacks merit, the plaintiff must come forward with proof in evidentiary form showing the existence of a bona fide and genuine issue of fact (GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d 965, 968). The plaintiff is obliged to "lay bare [her] proof’ (Siegel, NY Prac § 281, at 338). Plaintiff submitted an attorney’s affidavit with medical reports attached. The medical reports do not reveal the existence of any mental injury or state of depression and, indeed, indicate that the extent of decedent’s disability was "minor”. In sum, plaintiff has shown nothing relevant to the wrongful death action. As this court has stated numerous times, the mere shadowy semblance of an issue is not enough to defeat summary judgment (see, e.g., Metropolitan Bank v Hall, 52 AD2d 1084; Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v Barry Warehouses, 49 AD2d 320, 321). The causal nexus claimed by plaintiff between the accident and death is far too tenuous to permit a jury to speculate (Fuller v Preis, supra, at 434).

All concur, except Dillon, P. J., and Green, J., who dissent and vote to affirm, in the following memorandum.

Dissent

Dillon, P. J., and Green, J. (dissenting).

We respectfully disagree that this case is in a proper posture for a grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s cause of action for wrongful[*947] death. It is alleged that on November 21, 1982, decedent sustained injuries in an automobile collision caused by defendants’ negligence, and that "[a]s a consequence of the injuries” he died on August 3, 1984. The death was the result of a suicidal act of the decedent.

It is established that "the act of suicide, as a matter of law, is not a superseding cause in negligence law precluding liability” (Fuller v Preis, 35 NY2d 425, 429). A negligent tort-feasor may be held liable for the suicide of a person who, as the result of the tort-feasor’s negligence, suffers mental disturbance destroying the will to survive (Fuller v Preis, supra; Koch v Fox, 71 App Div 288; cf., Gioia v State of New York, 16 AD2d 354). Key to the analysis is that the suicide be an involuntary act coming as a direct consequence of the alleged tortious act.

It is also established that a defendant moving for summary judgment must come forward with admissible evidence, reciting the material facts and showing, that, as a matter of law, the cause of action is without merit (CPLR 3212 [b]; GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d 965; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557). Defendants have failed to meet that burden. While the moving papers and attached documents demonstrate that the suicide occurred nearly 21 months after the accident, that decedent had no medical history of organic brain damage, and that he had never been diagnosed or treated for mental illness or disturbance, defendants offered no affirmative medical proof that the suicidal act was not causally connected to their negligence. We, thus, conclude that Special Term properly denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Erie County, Wolfgang, J. — summary judgment.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Boomer, Green, Balio and Lawton, JJ.