green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
11.6 score
“agent is held to the utmost good faith in his dealings with his principal, and forfeits any right to compensation for his services if he acts adversely to his employer”
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995
2010
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers.
discussed
Cited "but see"
ca2 1998
But cf. Soam Corp. v. Trane Co., 202 A.D.2d 162, 163-64 , 608 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1st Dep't 1994)) (mem.) (rejecting claim of "unconscionable penalty" in light of "New York's strict application of the forfeiture doctrine which mandates the forfeiture of all compensation"), leave to appeal denied, 83 N.Y.2d 758 , 615 N.Y.S.2d 875 , 639 N.E.2d 416 (1994) 17 N.Y.
discussed
Cited "but see"
Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp.
But cf. Soam Corp. v. Trane Co., 202 A.D.2d 162, 163-64, 608 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1st Dep't 1994)) (mem.) (rejecting claim of "unconscionable penalty" in light of "New York’s strict application of the forfeiture doctrine which mandates the forfeiture of all compensation”), leave to appeal denied, 83 N.Y.2d 758 , 615 N.Y.S.2d 875 , 639 N.E.2d 416 (1994). .
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman
agent is held to the utmost good faith in his dealings with his principal, and forfeits any right to compensation for his services if he acts adversely to his employer
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Art Capital Group, LLC v. Rose
New York’s strict application of the faithless servant doctrine “mandates the forfeiture of all compensation . . . where . . . one who owes a duty of fidelity to a principal is faithless in the performance of his services” (Soam Corp. v Trane Co., 202 AD2d 162, 163-164 [1st Dept 1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 758 [1994]), and defendants cite no authority for their purported “friendly advice” exception to the faithless servant doctrine.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
City of Binghamton v. Whalen
Task-by-task forfeiture for salaried employees, like defendant, would not only run afoul of “New York’s strict application of the forfeiture doctrine” (Soam Corp. v Trane Co., 202 AD2d 162, 163 [1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 758 [1994]), but would also have the ill effect of “embroiling courts in deciding how much general compensation should be forfeited, where the general compensation was awarded while the agent was acting disloyally in some, but not all, of his [or her] work” (Phansalkar v Andersen Weinroth & Co., L.P., 344 F3d at 207 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
William Floyd Union Free School District v. Wright
Where, as here, defendants engaged in repeated acts of disloyalty, complete and permanent forfeiture of compensation, deferred or otherwise, is warranted under the faithless servant doctrine (see Feiger v Iral Jewelry, 41 NY2d 928 [1977]; Matter of Blumenthal [Kingsford], 32 AD3d 767 , 768 [2006]; American Map Corp. v Stone, 264 AD2d at 492-493 ; Soam Corp. v Trane Co., 202 AD2d 162, 163-164 [1994]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ulico Casualty Co. v. Wilson
Soam Corp. v Trane Co., 202 AD2d 162, 163 [1994], Iv denied 83 NY2d 758 [1994]; Maritime Fish Prods, v World-Wide Fish Prods., 100 AD2d 81, 91 [1984], appeal dismissed 63 NY2d 675 [1984]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re the Estate of Marceca
Realty Corp., 108 AD2d 705 [1985]; Maritime Fish Prods, v World-Wide Fish Prods., 100 AD2d 81, 91 [1984], appeal dismissed 63 NY2d 675 [1984]; Soam Corp. v Trane Co., 202 AD2d 162, 163-164 [1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 758 [1994]).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., L.P.
See, e.g., GRG Group, Inc. v. Ravenal, 247 A.D.2d 201 , 668 N.Y.S.2d 352, 352 (1st Dep't 1998) (affirming partial summary judgment for defendants on their counterclaims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty and approving forfeiture of $500,000 in management fees and brokerage commissions for the years 1991-1993, where "the evidence demonstrated disloyalty during those years and there is no basis in the record for apportionment”); Royal Carbo Corp. v. Flameguard, Inc., 229 A.D.2d 430 , 645 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (2d Dep't 1996) (employees who "surreptitiously organized a competing organization” w…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co.
To the extent that the court below interpreted Sequa as permitting a more lenient approach toward forfeiture than that applied in Musico , we note that the similarity of compensation arrangements in both cases ( i.e., in each the agreement provided for task-by-task payment) is more important than the distinction in the number of agency agreements ( i.e., there were four agency agreements in Musico and only one agency agreement in Sequa ). 17 See, e.g., GRG Group, Inc. v. Ravenal, 247 A.D.2d 201 , 668 N.Y.S.2d 352, 352 (1st Dep't 1998) (affirming partial summary judgment for defendants on their…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito America, Inc.
See also Soam Corp. v. Trane Co., 202 A.D.2d 162 , 608 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (N.Y.A.D. 1st Dept.1994) (“An agent is held to the utmost good faith in his dealings with his principal, and forfeits any right to compensation for his services if he acts adversely to his employer in any part of the transaction.”) (quotation omitted), leave to appeal denied, 83 N.Y.2d 758 , 615 N.Y.S.2d 875 , 639 N.E.2d 416 (1994); Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer, 94 Wis.2d 571, 580 , 289 N.W.2d 280 (Wis.1980) (“The general rule appears to be that an agent who is dishonest in the performance of his duties forfeits…
The People of the State of New York
v.
William Castillo
v.
William Castillo
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Mar 1, 1994.
Published
Citer courts: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial… (1)
—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Jerome Hornblass, J.), rendered November 13, 1991, which convicted defendant, after jury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and sentenced him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 2Vz to 5 years, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The evidence adduced at defendant’s trial established that he stabbed the complainant after ingesting crack/cocaine and engaging in an argument over the price of additional drugs. This evidence was sufficient to establish that he carried a knife with the intent to use it unlawfully against another (Penal Law § 265.02 [1]; § 265.01 [2]; compare, People v Yarrell, 75 NY2d 828, revg on dissenting mem 146 AD2d 819, 821). Moreover, any issue of credibility regarding defendant and complainant’s conflicting testimony was for the jury to resolve (see, People v Garafolo, 44 AD2d 86).
The trial court did not err by refusing the defendant’s request for a charge that he carried a knife as part of his duties at work where the question was one of fact and not law, and defendant’s employer never required him to carry a knife. Concur — Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Carro, Wallach and Tom, JJ.