People v. Reed, 6 N.E.3d 1108 (NY 2014). · Go Syfert
People v. Reed, 6 N.E.3d 1108 (NY 2014). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
52 citation events (52 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Coke (nyappdiv, 2025-03-06)
Treatment trajectory · 2014 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2014 2020 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 37 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Coke (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2025 · confidence medium
In a circumstantial evidence case, this Court "must decide whether a jury could rationally have excluded innocent explanations of the evidence offered by the defendant and found each element of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt" ( People v Reed, 22 NY3d 530, 535 [2014]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Williams (2×)
NY · 2025 · confidence medium
The jury also could have reasonably concluded that defendant's statements to the police during an interview, including that he "f—d up," he "did it," and "all [he] took was a [R]ed [B]ull," constituted an admission of his intent to steal even if—as defendant contends—some of those statements could also be interpreted as referencing a separate incident. [FN1] Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the availability of innocent explanations for his conduct did not preclude the jury from rationally finding that the People proved the elements of burglary in the third degree beyond a reasonable d…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Williams
NY · 2025 · confidence medium
The jury also could have reasonably concluded that defendant's statements to the police during an interview, including that he "f—d up," he "did it," and "all [he] took was a [R]ed [B]ull," constituted an admission of his intent to steal even if—as defendant contends—some of those statements could also be interpreted as referencing a separate incident. [FN*] Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the availability of innocent explanations for his conduct did not preclude the jury from rationally finding that the People proved the elements of burglary in the third degree beyond a reasonable d…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Griffin
N.Y. App. Div. · 2022 · confidence medium
The surveillance video showed defendant peering into the parked vehicle in which the victim was sleeping as though he was casing it, keeping other people who may have interfered to thwart the robbery away from the sleeping victim, and—most crucially—reaching into the vehicle in the vicinity of the victim's neck moments [*2]before the shooting and then running away as though he was holding something ( see People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 532, 535 [2014], rearg denied 23 NY3d 1009 [2014]; Luke , 279 AD2d at 535 ; People v Hope , 128 AD2d 638, 638-639 [2d Dept 1987], lv denied 69 NY2d 1005 [1987]…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Huddleston
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · confidence medium
There was ample evidence from which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant unlawfully entered the dwelling through a bedroom window ( see People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014], rearg denied 23 NY3d 1009 [2014]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Johnson
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · confidence medium
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People ( see People v Agudio , 194 AD3d 1270 , 1271 [2021]; People v Rudge , 185 AD3d at 1215), we conclude that "there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of [burglary in the second degree, based upon a theory of larcenous intent] proved beyond a reasonable doubt" ( People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Cole , 162 AD3d 1219 , 1224 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1002 [2018]; People v Rosa , 47 AD3d 1009, 1…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Johnson
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · confidence medium
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People ( see People v Agudio , 194 AD3d 1270, 1271 [2021]; People v Rudge , 185 AD3d at 1215 ), we conclude that "there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of [burglary in the second degree, based upon a theory of larcenous intent] proved beyond a reasonable doubt" ( People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Cole , 162 AD3d 1219 , 1224 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1002 [2018]; People v Rosa , 47 AD3d 1009, 1…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Clayton
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
Any inference that the jury could have drawn to the contrary would have been speculative inasmuch as the "jury could [not] rationally have excluded innocent explanations of the evidence offered by the defendant" ( People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 535 [2014], rearg denied 23 NY3d 1009 [2014]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Smith
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
Viewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we find that there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational juror could have concluded that defendant and Bell, his accomplice, forcibly stole property from the victim and that, during the course of that robbery, he caused the victim's death ( see People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 535-536 [2014]; People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 654 [2011]; People v Haggray, 164 AD3d 1522 , 1525 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1111 [2018]; People v Elliot, 57 AD3d 1095, 1097 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 783 [2009]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Partridge
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People ( see People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014], rearg denied 23 NY3d 1009 [2014]), we conclude that no rational person could conclude that the trial evidence was legally sufficient to establish that defendant committed predatory sexual assault against a child during the aforementioned time frame.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Micolo
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People ( see People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014], rearg denied 23 NY3d 1009 [2014]), we conclude that there is legally sufficient evidence to support the conviction ( see generally People v Bleakley , 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Sipp
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
Nevertheless, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the People ( see People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014], rearg denied 23 NY3d 1009 [2014]), "a rational person could conclude that the trial evidence was legally sufficient" to establish a serious physical injury ( People v Smith , 6 NY3d 827, 829 [2006], cert denied 548 US 905 [2006]; see generally People v Bleakley , 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]), i.e., serious and protracted disfigurement to the victim's face ( see § 10.00 [10]; People v Coote , 110 AD3d 485 , 485 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1198 [2014]; see also P…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Hill
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · confidence medium
Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, as we must ( see People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014], rearg denied 23 NY3d 1009 [2014]), "a rational person could conclude that the trial evidence was legally sufficient to support [the] conviction" ( People v Smith , 6 NY3d 827, 829 [2006], cert denied 548 US 905 [2006]; see generally People v Bleakley , 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Lentini
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · confidence medium
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the People ( see People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014]; People v Danielson , 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), a valid line of reasoning existed from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was capable of reporting the accident to the police and left the scene with her sister without doing so ( see People v Field , 175 AD2d 291, 291-292 [1991]; People v Petterson , 103 AD2d 811, 811 [1984]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Aleynikov
NY · 2018 · confidence medium
Analysis Under CPL 290.10 (1) (a), a court may grant a motion for a trial order of dismissal when the "trial evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged." Evidence is legally sufficient when "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable {**31 NY3d at 396}to the prosecution, 'there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt' " ( People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014], quoting People v Danielson , 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]; see Jackson v Virginia , 443 US …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Henry (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · confidence medium
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, as we must, we conclude that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have rationally excluded alternative explanations and determined that defendant was the person who shot the victim ( see People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534-535 [2014], rearg denied 23 NY3d 1009 [2014]; People v Moore [appeal No. 2], 78 AD3d 1658, 1659 [4th Dept 2010]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Poulin
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · confidence medium
Where, as here, the legal sufficiency of a verdict is challenged, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and assess whether "there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt" ( People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Tapia (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
I agree with the majority, that in assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, this Court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, "must decide whether a jury could rationally have excluded innocent explanations of the evidence . . . and found each element of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt" ( People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 535 [2014]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Gagnier
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Defendant maintains that the verdict is both legally insufficient and against the weight of the evidence, contending that the proof failed to establish that he ever possessed the heroin relative to the sale, possession and conspiracy charges, and that no showing was made that heroin constitutes “dangerous contraband.” Where the legal sufficiency of a verdict is challenged, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the People and assess whether “there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime prove…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ramsaran
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Even when a case is based upon circumstantial evidence, the legal sufficiency of the evidence is established when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (People v Reed, 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Tucker
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Reed, 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014]; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have concluded that Smith possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminality necessary to forcibly detain defendant.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Brown
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Testimony in the record provides a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was properly identified as the perpetrator and that he physically injured Taylor when he punched her in the face (see Penal Law § 120.00 [1]; People v *1179 Reed, 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014]; People v Boddie, 126 AD3d 1129, 1132 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1085 [2015]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Hutchins
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Evidence is legally sufficient when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” it provides “a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (People v Reed, 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Parbhudial
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
When considering legal sufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and determine whether “there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (People v Reed, 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Nelson
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Rather, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People (see People v Reed, 22 NY3d 530, 535 [2014]), we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on each of the counts.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Nicholas
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
Although Miller and Kelley each testified that no one had ever previously mentioned shooting or killing the victim, viewing the proof in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Kancharla, 23 NY3d 294, 302-303 [2014]; People v Reed, 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014]), we find that there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of conspiracy in the second degree (see People v Booker, 53 AD3d 697, 703 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 853 [2008]; People v Ballard, 38 AD3d 1001, 1003 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 840 [2007]) and intimid…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Nicholas
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
Although Miller and Kelley each testified that no one had ever previously mentioned shooting or killing the victim, viewing the proof in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Kancharla, 23 NY3d 294, 302-303 [2014]; People v Reed, 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014]), we find that there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of conspiracy in the second degree (see People v Booker, 53 AD3d 697, 703 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 853 [2008]; People v Ballard, 38 AD3d 1001, 1003 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 840 [2007]) and intimid…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Vicioso
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
The foregoing evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People, establishes a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to forcibly steal money from the victim when he intentionally aided Barnes in his plan to rob the victim by calling a cab to a vacant building while Barnes used what appeared to be a firearm to force the victim to hand over money (see People v Reed, 22 NY3d 530, 534-535 [2014]; People v Bush, 75 AD3d at 919 ; see also People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Vicioso
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
The foregoing evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People, establishes a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to forcibly steal money from the victim when he intentionally aided Barnes in his plan to rob the victim by calling a cab to a vacant building while Barnes used what appeared to be a firearm to force the victim to hand over money (see People v Reed, 22 NY3d 530, 534-535 [2014]; People v Bush, 75 AD3d at 919 ; see also People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987…
examined Cited "see" People v. Austin (3×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
The witness testified that the vehicle had a broken driver-side window, and that she heard the man state that the victims of the shooting should not have been out so late, and that he "didn't mean for that to happen to them." Contrary to defendant's contention, the evidence did not merely establish defendant's presence near the crime scene, but also his complicity in the crimes of which he was convicted ( see People v Hancock , 229 AD3d 1229, 1230-1231 [4th Dept [*2]2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1020 [2024]; see generally People v Reed , 97 AD3d 1142, 1143 [4th Dept 2012], affd 22 NY3d 530 [2014], …
discussed Cited "see" People v. Colon
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
In reviewing a legal sufficiency claim, this Court must, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, evaluate "whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion[s] reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of the crime[s] charged" ( People v Bleakley , 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; see People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. West
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
When reviewing a legal sufficiency claim, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and evaluate whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of the crime charged" ( People v Wilson , 164 AD3d 1012 , 1014 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2011]; People v Poulin , 159 AD3d 1049 , 1050 [2018], lv …
discussed Cited "see" People v. Marvin
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
The standard on appeal for determining whether a conviction is supported by legally sufficient evidence "is the same for circumstantial and non-circumstantial cases — whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" ( People v Grassi , 92 NY2d 695, 697 [1999], rearg denied 94 NY2d 900 [2000]; see People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014], rearg denied 23 NY3d 1009 [2014]; People v Clark , 142 AD3d 1339 , 1340 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 [*2]NY3d 1143 [2…
discussed Cited "see" People v. Neulander
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
"It is well settled that, even in circumstantial evidence cases, the standard for appellate review of legal sufficiency issues is whether any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the [jury] on the basis of the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the People" ( People v Hines , 97 NY2d 56, 62 [2001], rearg denied 97 NY2d 678 [2001] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014], rearg denied 23 NY3d 1009 [2014]; see generally People v Danielson , 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Maricle
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
In reviewing legal sufficiency, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and determines "whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences" upon which a rational jury could have found the elements of the charged crimes proven beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the evidence admitted at trial ( People v Salce , 124 AD3d 923, 924 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1207 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014]; People v Bleakley , 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Dunster
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we find a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was operating the motor vehicle in question while he was in an intoxicated condition (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]; see generally People v Reed, 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Clavell
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence low
Where the prosecution relies entirely on circumstantial evidence, before the fact-finder can draw an inference of guilt, that inference must be the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the proven facts, and the evidence must exclude beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence ( see People v Marin , 65 NY2d 741 , 742; People v Benzinger , 36 NY2d 29, 32 ; see also People v Reed , 22 NY3d 530, 534 ).
The People of the State of New York
v.
Lance J. Reed
New York Court of Appeals.
Feb 13, 2014.
6 N.E.3d 1108
POINTS OF COUNSEL, Harris Beach PLLC, Pittsford (Svetlana K. Ivy of counsel), and Timothy P Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Drew R. DuBrin of counsel), for appellant., Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Nicole M. Fantigrossi of counsel), for respondent.
Abdus, Graffeo, Lippman, Pigott, Read, Rivera, Salaam, Smith.
Cited by 45 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Pigott, J.

Shawn Thomas, a Rochester-area drug dealer, died of gunshot wounds to the head and chest on April 7, 2007. Before he left home that afternoon, Thomas had shown his girlfriend a large quantity of cash and asked her to count out $40,000. She did so, separating the $40,000 into banded $1,000 stacks and placing them in a plastic grocery bag bearing the logo of the Tops supermarket chain. She placed two knots in the top of the bag, tying the bag “real tight so you couldn’t take it out.” She then gave the bag to Thomas, who told her that he was going to re-up, which she took to mean that he was going to buy a supply of drugs for resale. Thomas left his home at around 1:00 p.m.

About an hour later the police responded to a residential neighborhood in Rochester, where Thomas lay dead of gunshot wounds in the middle of a street. His car was nearby. The police interviewed a number of neighborhood residents and passers-by who had been in the area. The interviews revealed that defendant Lance Jermaine Reed, whose father lived in the immediate vicinity, was present at the time of the shooting, and fled.

A witness who had been visiting defendant’s father at the time of the shooting recalled that defendant arrived at his father’s apartment at about 2:00 p.m. and asked to use his father’s car, a gray 1990 Lincoln Town Car with a dark blue roof. While defendant was in the apartment, the father’s visitor heard gunshots outside. Defendant told her, “those are firecrackers,” pushed her aside and bolted from the house. Looking outside, the visitor saw a man lying in the street.

Other neighborhood residents similarly heard gun shots and saw a man walk or run from defendant’s father’s apartment to a gray Lincoln Town Car with a dark blue top, get in the driver’s seat, and drive off. A mail carrier noticed someone lying in the middle of the street, and saw a man bend over the body quickly, get back up, and drive away in a car with a dark blue top. He wrote down part of the license plate number.

One eyewitness saw the actual shooting. He recalled that a masked man approached Thomas from behind and shot him in the head and twice more in the body, with a revolver, before getting into the rear seat of a Lincoln Town Car, also described as[*533] gray with a blue top. The eyewitness saw two other men get into the car; one was defendant, whom the eyewitness identified at trial. Defendant was in the driver’s seat. The men fled in the car.

The Lincoln, its plate number matching what the mail carrier had written down, was found in the parking lot of an apartment complex in the Rochester area, where defendant’s sister lived. She described defendant as having arrived at her apartment in the afternoon of the shooting, looking “scared” and “disheveled” and breathing heavily. The police obtained permission to tow and search the vehicle.

Under the armrest between the front seats of the vehicle, the police found a plastic Tops grocery bag, tied at the top and “ripped out” at the bottom. The next day, April 8, Thomas’s girlfriend identified the bag as the same one she had used to put the $40,000 in. At trial, she would testify that she had recognized it by its two knots.

Rochester police questioned defendant on April 9, 2007. Defendant admitted that he had been with Thomas, whom he had known, just before the killing and that he had driven his father’s Lincoln away from the scene immediately after the killing. Defendant told the police that Thomas had agreed to follow him to defendant’s father’s house, in his (Thomas’s) car, with the intention of giving him a ride after defendant dropped off his father’s car. Defendant said that he was dropping off the keys when he heard what sounded like firecrackers outside, and that, seeing Thomas lying in the middle of the street, he fled in the Lincoln because he did not “know what was going on.” In subsequent interviews, defendant was less forthcoming. He was arrested nearly a year later, on April 2, 2008, and charged with two counts of first-degree robbery, and one count each of felony murder and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon.

At trial, the jury heard testimony by the witnesses from the neighborhood, including the eyewitness who identified defendant as the man he had seen driving the Lincoln from the scene, with the gunman in the backseat. In addition, Thomas’s girlfriend testified about the events preceding his departure from home on April 7, 2007, and concerning her April 8, 2007 identification of the Tops bag found in the Lincoln as the same bag she had tied and put the cash in. However, no witness testified to seeing anything being taken from Thomas at the time of the shooting.

[*534] At the end of the People’s case, defendant moved for a trial order of dismissal, under CPL 290.10 (1), contending that there was legally insufficient evidence of robbery and therefore of felony murder.

The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree robbery as an accessory and one count of second-degree murder as an accessory, acquitting him of the weapon possession charge. County Court then denied defendant’s motion for a trial order of dismissal. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment (97 AD3d 1142 [2012]). Two Justices dissented, one of whom granted defendant leave to appeal to this Court.

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that he was the driver of the getaway car following the killing. Rather, defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence of a robbery, in the course of which the killing occurred. In order to prove that defendant was guilty of first-degree robbery, the prosecution had to produce sufficient evidence that defendant, or someone whom he intentionally aided, forcibly stole Thomas’s property. According to defendant, there was insufficient proof that anything was stolen from Thomas. He suggests that Thomas might have completed his planned purchase of drugs before he was attacked, so that he no longer had $40,000 on his person.

The evidence that $40,000 was taken from Thomas is circumstantial. However, it is well established that “[t]he standard of appellate review in determining whether the evidence before the jury was legally sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is the same for circumstantial and non-circumstantial cases” (People v Grassi, 92 NY2d 695, 697 [1999]; see also People v Cabey, 85 NY2d 417, 421 [1995]). That standard, of course, is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, “there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007], quoting People v Acosta, 80 NY2d 665, 672 [1993]; see Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 [1979]).

A jury, faced with a case in which the proof of a particular charge, or element thereof, consists entirely of circumstantial evidence, “must exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis” (People v Marin, 65 NY2d 741, 742 [1985];[*535] see People v Way, 59 NY2d 361, 365 [1983]; People v Bearden, 290 NY 478, 480 [1943]). But an appellate court’s duty, when reviewing the jury’s finding, is not to determine whether it would have reached the same conclusion as the jury with respect to a proposed innocent explanation of the evidence (see Grassi, 92 NY2d at 699 [“Defendant has offered myriad innocent explanations or inferences that could be drawn by a jury to counter this evidence. That, however, is not the legal standard by which this Court is bound for reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence appeal”]). Rather, the appellate court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, must decide whether a jury could rationally have excluded innocent explanations of the evidence offered by the defendant and found each element of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Applying this standard of review, we conclude that a rational jury could have inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that the $40,000 was stolen from Thomas by defendant and the men he aided. The jury heard evidence that Thomas was carrying $40,000, in a double-knotted Tops grocery bag, about an hour before he was killed; that defendant arranged for Thomas, whom he knew, to drive to the vicinity of defendant’s father’s house; that defendant fled the scene of Thomas’s shooting, along with the gunman, in his father’s car; that one of the men bent over Thomas’s body briefly before getting into the car; and that a double-knotted Tops grocery bag was found, with its bottom torn out and contents removed, under the driver’s armrest of the same car.

Although innocent explanations may be suggested, it was permissible for the jury to infer beyond a reasonable doubt from this evidence that defendant, and the men whom he aided, lured Thomas to an area where a getaway car would be readily available for the purpose of robbing him of the large quantity of cash he was carrying; that one of the men took the grocery bag from Thomas immediately after he was shot; that the men tore the bag open at the bottom because it was tied tightly at the top, and divided up the money in defendant’s father’s car; and that defendant thoughtlessly left the empty bag in the car when he reached his sister’s home. It was not irrational to reject the theory that Thomas no longer had $40,000 on his person when he was attacked.

Defendant further argues that the Appellate Division erred in relying on Thomas’s girlfriend’s identification of the Tops bag as the same one she had knotted. Defendant insists that a[*536] double-knotted Tops grocery bag is not visually distinctive, such that a person could no more identify it, as identical to one she had seen before, than she could recognize an individual penny or soda can as the same one she had seen before. We have no occasion to reach this issue, because the evidence was sufficient to prove robbery even without the witness’s identification of the bag. That is, even if Thomas’s girlfriend had not testified that the bag found in the car was the same one she had filled with cash, the fact that a grocery bag matching her description was found in the car was, alone, highly significant under the circumstances of this case. Given the testimony that Thomas was carrying a double-knotted Tops bag, stuffed with cash, shortly before he was killed, the evidence that a double-knotted Tops bag, emptied of its contents, was found in the car in which defendant fled from the scene, was sufficiently probative, without the identification by Thomas’s girlfriend.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Dissent

Chief Judge Lippman

(dissenting). Because the People failed to prove a crucial requisite element of felony murder and two counts of robbery in the first degree—that there was a forcible taking of property—I would find that the evidence was not legally sufficient to support the judgment of conviction. I therefore dissent.

“A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when he forcibly steals property and when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime,” as relevant here, causes serious physical injury to a nonparticipant in the crime or is armed with a deadly weapon (Penal Law § 160.15 [1], [2]). In order to be guilty of felony murder, the People must prove that, “[a]cting either alone or with one or more other persons, he commit[ted] or attempted] to commit [first degree] robbery . . . and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant. . . cause [d] the death of a [nonparticipant]” (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]). Here, there was ample evidence that a homicide took place. The absence of any evidence of a forcible taking, however, is fatal to defendant’s convictions of the above offenses.

Our standard of review for legal sufficiency is well settled. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we must determine whether “there is a valid line of reasoning[*537] and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Moreover, “the People are entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence” (People v Cintron, 95 NY2d 329, 332 [2000] [emphasis added]).

Although the legal sufficiency standard is highly deferential to the verdict reached by the jury after trial, there must be some limit to the inferences we will consider permissible based on the established facts. Here, seven people witnessed the shooting or its immediate aftermath and not one of them testified to seeing anything taken from the victim. In fact, they affirmatively stated that they did not see anything in the shooter’s hands other than the gun. It is true that the mail carrier saw the gunman bend over the body in the street, but he too maintained that he did not see the gunman do anything with his hands. Under these circumstances, the inference that a forcible taking occurred cannot reasonably be drawn.

The direct evidence does not merely have gaps that can be overcome by reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence, but contradicts the People’s case. In addition to the eyewitnesses who failed to observe any taking, it was not proved that the victim was still in possession of the money at the time he was shot. When he left the apartment at 1:00 p.m., he told his girlfriend that he would return in a half-hour. He was shot over an hour later, at a time when he had expected that the drug transaction would have been completed and he would have already used the cash as payment. We are not concerned with positing innocent explanations for the evidence. Rather, we are concerned with whether the jury’s conclusion that there was a forcible taking of the victim’s property was sufficiently supported by the evidence.

It appears the majority would agree the evidence of taking would be insufficient but for the knotted Tops supermarket bag. But this is unquestionably a very common local item. The inferential leap required to find that the presence of a plastic bag in defendant’s car supports the conclusion that a forcible taking occurred is simply too great.

As County Court observed, the issue of whether there was legally sufficient evidence in this case is “an extremely difficult[*538] and troubling” one. Since there was a failure of proof as to an essential element of the crimes, I would reverse defendant’s conviction and dismiss the indictment.

Judges Graffeo, Read and Smith concur with Judge Pigott; Chief Judge Lippman dissents and votes to reverse in an opinion in which Judges Rivera and Abdus-Salaam concur.

Order affirmed.