Demmel v. Triumph of Eur., Inc., 26 Misc. 2d 1070 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960). · Go Syfert
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Demmel v. Triumph of Eur., Inc., 26 Misc. 2d 1070 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
9 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Denny v. Mertz (wis, 1982-03-30)
Top citers, strongest first. 1 distinct citer.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Denny v. Mertz
Wis. · 1982 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Schaefer, 77 Wis. 2d at 125 . [36] In holding that the Gertz protections do not apply to non-media defamation defendants, we decline to follow the suggestion in sec. 580B Restatement (2d) of Torts, comment e, that the Gertz protections are not restricted to the media, but should apply to all defamation defendants. [37] See n. 3, supra. [38] Webster's Third New International Dictionary, (unab. 1961) at 2359. [39] Demmel v. Triumph of Europe, Inc., 208 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1960); Becker v. Toulmin, 165 Ohio St. 549 , 138 N.E.2d 391 (1956). [40] "594.
J. Robert Demmel
v.
Triumph of Europe, Inc.
New York Supreme Court.
Sep 26, 1960.
26 Misc. 2d 1070
Casey, Lane & Mittendorf (Samuel M. Lane, Robert W. Sweet and Preben Jensen of counsel), for defendant. Rogers, Hoge & Hills (James F. Ouchterloney of counsel), for plaintiff.
Telzer.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
George Telzer, J.

This is a motion pursuant to rule 106 of the Rules of Civil Practice for judgment dismissing the second cause of action on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The first cause of action is for damages for breach of an employment contract. The second is for libel. A reading of the complaint indicates that this cause of action is based on a letter dictated to a stenographer by a vice-president of the defendant which discharged the plaintiff. It is a one-paragraph letter which asserted plaintiff had failed to perform his contracts and therefore his employment was terminated. The court does not believe that the letter would tend to hold the plaintiff to ridicule, aversion or induce an evil opinion of him or was calculated to prejudice him in seeking a livelihood in his business. In addition, there was no publication of the alleged libel. It is the law of this Department that the dictation of a letter by a defendant corporation to a stenographer who is part of the corporation’s organization does not constitute publication of a libel (Wells v. Belstrat Hotel Corp., 212 App. Div. 366). Accordingly, as there was no publication, and as the words were not libelous, the motion is granted.