Rosenstock v. Scaringe, 357 N.E.2d 347 (NY 1976). · Go Syfert
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Rosenstock v. Scaringe, 357 N.E.2d 347 (NY 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
32 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Stefanik v. Hochul (nyappdiv, 2024-05-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1979 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stefanik v. Hochul
N.Y. App. Div. · 2024 · confidence medium
Our decision upholding the Act comports with the NY Constitution's embrace of broad voting rights for the state electorate, the history and language of article II, and the fundamental right to vote ( see Matter of Rosenstock v Scaringe , 40 NY2d 563, 564 [1976]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walsh v. Katz
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
The statute must be upheld against an equal protection challenge if the residency requirement is rationally related to a legitimate State interest {see Matter of Rosenstock v Scaringe, 40 NY2d 563, 564 [1976]; Galbraith v New York Conservative Party, 155 AD2d 183, 185 [1990]; Matter of Roth v Cuevas, 158 Misc 2d 238, 252-253 [1993], affd 197 AD2d 369 [1993]; see also Golden v Clark, 76 NY2d 618 [1990]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Anonymous v. City of Rochester
N.Y. App. Div. · 2008 · confidence medium
With respect to each provision, our analysis begins with determining the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny (see Matter of Rosenstock v Scaringe, 40 NY2d 563, 564 [1976]; Ramos, 353 F3d at 174 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roth v. Cuevas
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 1993 · confidence medium
"Far from recognizing candidacy as a 'fundamental right,’ we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate’s access to the ballot 'does not of itself compel close scrutiny.’ ” (Clements v Fashing, 457 US 957, 963 [1982], quoting Bullock v Carter, 405 US 134, 143 [1972]; see, Hatten v Rains, 854 F2d 687, 693 [5th Cir 1988]; Matter of Rosenstock v Scaringe, 40 NY2d 563, 564 [1976], supra.) Because the right of elected officials to seek office is not deemed "fundamental” and does not require strict scrutiny, the proposed local law can be sustained against an equal protection c…
In the Matter of Simon Rosenstock
v.
Charles P. Scaringe, Constituting the Board of Elections of Albany County, and Eileen Gallagher
New York Court of Appeals.
Oct 21, 1976.
357 N.E.2d 347
Ruth Tompkins Bridgham, Albany, for appellant., Stephen W Herrick, Albany, for Simon Rosenstock, respondent., Robert G. Lyman, Albany, for Charles P. Scaringe and others, respondents., Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney-General (Lawrence L. Doolittle and Ruth Kessler Toch of counsel), Albany, in his statutory capacity under section 71 of the Executive Law.
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published

[*564] Memorandum. The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Appellant attacks subdivision 3 of section 2103 of the Education Law as violative of the equal protection clause. The threshold question therefore is a determination of the standard of review to be applied in assaying the statute’s constitutionality (Alevy v Downstate Med. Center of State of N. Y., 39 NY2d 326, 331; Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 59).

Where a statute directly infringes upon the fundamental right to vote, the appropriate standard of review is to strictly scrutinize the legislation to determine if it is necessary to promote a compelling State interest (Harper v Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US 663). However, the direct impact of subdivision 3 of section 2103 is not on one’s right to vote, but on an individual’s right to hold public office, and the right to be a candidate is not in itself sufficient to call for strict scrutiny of the statute (see Bullock v Carter, 405 US 134, 142-143).

Appellant’s reliance on Bullock as calling for rigorous review of the statute is misplaced. In Bullock, the Supreme Court found a Texas statute, which imposed a requirement that a potential candidate pay substantial filing fees as a condition to his right to run for certain local offices, to be "patently exclusionary [in] character” in that its effect would be the disenfranchisement of voters who happen to be members of the less affluent segment of the community (Bullock v Carter, supra, at pp 143-144). Noting that the statutory scheme had a direct and appreciable impact on the right to vote, the court concluded that the strict scrutiny test was to be applied.

No such direct and appreciable impact on the right to vote can be found in the present case. No identifiable class has been disenfranchised. The statute’s effect on the right to vote is merely incidental and remote and does not rise to a level which would require that the statute be closely scrutinized in order to pass constitutional muster. We agree therefore with the Appellate Division that the rational basis approach is the proper standard of review in the present case, and we conclude, as did that court and for the reasons set forth in their opinion, that subdivision 3 of section 2103 meets that test.

Finally, we would note that the word "family” as used in the statute might well be ambiguous as applied in another context, but here, where the appellant is the wife and lives in the same household with the present school board member,[*565] she would clearly come within the class contemplated by the statute.

Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Cooke concur.

Order affirmed, without costs, in a memorandum.