People v. Floyd J., 462 N.E.2d 1194 (NY 1984). · Go Syfert
People v. Floyd J., 462 N.E.2d 1194 (NY 1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
42 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Assi (nyappdiv, 2009-03-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Assi
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
Section 9 of the act provided that it “shall take effect 90 days after it shall have become law”; thus the effective date commenced at midnight on Sunday, October 8, 2000—the date of defendant’s criminal conduct (People v Floyd J., 61 NY2d 895, 896 [1984] [courts must give effect to the plain meaning of a statute’s words]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Austin
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2003 · confidence medium
The defendant’s reading requires that the agreement specify that the juvenile “engage in or cause the performance of’ a class A felony. 4 Both parties claim that the statutory language is “clear and unambiguous,” so as to preclude the court from examining legislative documents or history (People v Finnegan, 85 NY2d 53, 58 [1995]; People v Floyd J., 61 NY2d 895, 896 [1984]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Dieppa
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 1993 · confidence medium
(People v Floyd J., 61 NY2d 895, 896 [1984].) On its face, Civil Rights Law § 40-c is clear: all persons are protected from harassment or discrimination in the exercise of their civil rights because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, marital status or disability by any other person or institution.
discussed Cited "see" People v. Jusino
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
(CPL 720.35 [1]; see People v Floyd J., 61 NY2d 895 [1984] [youthful offender finding has practical and legal effect of a reversal].) With respect to counts two, three and five, the court, after a modified dispositional proceeding, found defendant a juvenile delinquent, and sentenced him to two concurrent probationary terms of two years.
examined Cited "see" DEVISON (3×)
BIA · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Floyd J., 462 N.E.2d 1194 (N.Y. 1994).
examined Cited "see" State v. Parker (12×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Utah Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Floyd, 61 N.Y.2d 895 , 474 N.Y.S.2d 476 , 462 N.E.2d 1194 (App.1984) (mem.).
discussed Cited "see" Laiosa v. Camelot AMC/Jeep, Ltd.
N.Y. App. Div. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court must construe the statute to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used in the statute (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 76; see, People v Floyd J., 61 NY2d 895, 896 ; Eaton v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 56 NY2d 340, 345 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Acres Storage Co. v. Chu
N.Y. App. Div. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
Construing the language of Tax Law § 1141 (c) to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used therein, as we must (see, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 76; see also, People v Floyd J., 61 NY2d 895, 896 ; Eaton v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 56 NY2d 340, 345 ), we think it it clear that liability for taxes due from the seller in a bulk sale transaction rests secondarily only upon the immediate purchaser, transferee or assignee in that transaction who has failed to notify the State Tax Commission of such bulk sale (see, Matter of Sam’s Big M Supermarket, O…
The People of the State of New York
v.
Floyd J.
New York Court of Appeals.
Feb 28, 1984.
462 N.E.2d 1194
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Rose H. Sconiers, Joseph B. Mistrett and Charles D. Halvorsen for appellant., Richard J. Arcara, District Attorney {John J. DeFranks and Don I. Dally of counsel), for respondent.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the County Court should be modified to the extent of vacating the penalty assessment and, as so modified, affirmed.

Subdivision 1 of section 60.35 of the Penal Law mandates the imposition of a penalty assessment (now denominated a “mandatory surcharge”, L 1983, ch 15, § 2) upon a conviction for a felony, a misdemeanor, or a violation. CPL 720.35 (subd 1) states that a “youthful offender adjudication is not a judgment of conviction”. When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court is constrained to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute’s words (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 76; Eaton v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 56 NY2d 340).

The People’s contention that the imposition of the penalty assessment was proper in this case because CPL 720.20 (subd 1) requires that a youthful offender adjudication be based on a conviction must be rejected. Subdivision 4 of section 60.35 of the Penal Law states that: “Any person who has paid a mandatory surcharge * * * based upon a conviction that is subsequently reversed * * * shall be entitled to a refund”. CPL 720.20 (subd 3) requires that “[u]pon determining that an eligible youth is a youthful offender, the court must direct that the conviction be deemed vacated and replaced by a youthful offender find[*897] ing”. Inasmuch as a mandatory vacatur of conviction pursuant to CPL 720.20 (subd 3) has the practical and legal effect of a reversal, subdivision 4 of section 60.35 of the Penal Law precludes the imposition of a penalty assessment based on youthful offender adjudications (see People v Gruber, 118 Misc 2d 363).

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler, Meyer, Simons and Kaye concur.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.4), order modified in accordance with the memorandum herein and, as so modified, affirmed.