Yong-Myun Rho v. Ambach, 546 N.E.2d 188 (NY 1989). · Go Syfert
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Yong-Myun Rho v. Ambach, 546 N.E.2d 188 (NY 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
40 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Matter of Mandelstam v. McDonald (nyappdiv, 2024-07-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Mandelstam v. McDonald
N.Y. App. Div. · 2024 · confidence medium
To support a finding of professional misconduct based on negligence, the Board must establish a physician's negligence on more than one occasion, while gross negligence on a particular occasion will support imposition of penalties; gross negligence may be either egregious conduct on a particular occasion or multiple acts of negligence ( see Education Law § 6530 [3]-[[*2]4]; Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach , 74 NY2d 318, 322-323 [1989]; Matter of Lampidis v Mills , 305 AD2d 876, 878 [3d Dept 2003]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 27 Jay Street, LLC v. City of New York
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2010 · confidence medium
And, in reviewing the Loft Board’s interpretation of the RCNY, this court is reminded that, while “statutory construction is the function of the courts” (Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318, 321 [1989] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), where a rule does not run counter to a statutory provision “[a]n agency’s interpretation of the statutes it administers generally should be upheld if not unreasonable or irrational.” (Matter of Rodriguez v Perales, 86 NY2d 361, 367 [1995].) Petitioner contends that the Loft Board has “totally distorted the definition of �…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Diaz v. State Board for Professional Medical Conduct
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
For a physician to be found to have practiced negligently on more than one occasion, there must be a finding of “distinct events of some duration during which an act or acts amounting to ordinary negligence occur” (Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318, 322 [1989]; see Education Law § 6530 [3]; Matter of Corines v State Bd. for Professional Med.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. Davis
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
Bank, 97 NY2d 456, 460-461 [2002]; Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318, 322 [1989]; Matter of Sutka v Conners, 73 NY2d 395, 403 [1989]; Janssen v Incorporated Vil. of Rockville Ctr., 59 AD3d 15, 28 [2008], citing Ragucci v Professional Constr.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ho v. Novello
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · confidence medium
Addressing petitioner’s first contention regarding patient A’s admission to SIUH under another physician’s care at the beginning of January 2000, it is clear that petitioner’s treatment of patient A prior to that point was sufficient to sustain the charge against him based upon Tyson’s testimony (see Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318, 322-323 [1989]; Matter of Bell v New York State Dept. of Health, 291 AD2d 744, 746 [2002]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lampidis v. Mills
N.Y. App. Div. · 2003 · confidence medium
To sustain a finding of gross negligence in a professional misconduct proceeding, it must be determined that either a particular act of negligence was of “egregious proportions or [that] multiple acts of negligence * * * cumulatively amount to egregious conduct” (Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318, 322 [1989]; see Matter of Berger v Board of Regents of State of N.Y., 178 AD2d 748 , 751 [1991], appeal dismissed 79 NY2d 977 [1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 918 [1992], cert denied 507 US 1018 [1993]; Matter of Spero v Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 158 AD2d 763, 764 [1990]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lincoln West Partners, L.P. v. Department of Housing Preservation & Development
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 1998 · confidence medium
Although the construction afforded a particular statute by the agency responsible for its administration is entitled to the greatest weight (Matter of Tommy & Tina v Department of Consumer Affairs, 95 AD2d 724 [1st Dept 1983], affd 62 NY2d 671 [1984]), and should be upheld if not irrational or unreasonable (Matter of Johnson v Joy, 48 NY2d 689 [1979]), such is not always the case “[w]hen ‘the question is one of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent’ ” (Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318, 321 [1989]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Wing (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.Y. App. Div. · 1998 · confidence medium
In that situation, “ ‘there is little basis to rely on any special competence or expertise of the administrative agency” ” (Matter of Rho v Ambach, supra, at 321, quoting Kurcsics v Merchants Mut.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) St. Jacques v. City of New York
N.Y. App. Div. · 1995 · confidence medium
Ctr., 61 NY2d 67, 74 ). "[T]he plain and obvious meaning of a statute is always preferred to any curious, narrow or hidden sense that nothing but a strained interpretation of legislative intent would discern. * * * "[CJourts may only look behind the words of a statute when the law itself is doubtful or ambiguous.” (Finger Lakes Racing Assn. v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., supra, at 479-480 [emphasis added]; Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, supra, at 322.) Hence, in light of the clear wording of the statute, there is, in my view, no need to go beyond the unambiguous provisions of the…
cited Cited "see" In re OnBank & Trust Co.
unknown court · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
Co., 49 NY2d 451, 459 ; see, Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318, 321 ; Galbreath-Ruffin Corp. v 40th & 3rd Corp., 19 NY2d 354, 365-366 , rearg denied 19 NY2d 973 ).
cited Cited "see" Gwise v. Sobol
N.Y. App. Div. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
Therefore, petitioner cannot be found guilty of "negligence or incompetence on more than one occasion” (Education Law § 6509 [2]; see, Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318, 321-323 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Green v. State of New York Department of Correctional Services
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence low
A serious disciplinary infraction shall be identified as behavior which results in criminal or disciplinary sanctions as follows: “(1) any conviction for a State or Federal crime that was committed after the inmate was committed to the Department of Correctional Services; “(2) a finding under Part 253 or 254 of this Title of violation of any of the following rules as described in section 270.2 of this Title: “(i) 1.00 — Penal Law offenses; “(ii) 100.10 — assault on inmate; “(iii) 100.11 — assault on staff; “(iv) 100.12 — assault on other; “(v) 101.10 — sex offense; “(…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Petikas
nydistct · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence low
Accordingly, this court will consider the defendant’s argument with regard to the court’s interpretation of CPL 360.25 (1) (e). (ii) CPL 360.25 (1) (e) Statutory construction is a function of the courts (see, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 75; see also Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318 [1989]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Morrissey v. Sobol
N.Y. App. Div. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
It was the Board of Regents’ duty to determine what constituted gross negligence (see, Matter of Ross v Commissioner of Educ. of State of N. Y., 167 AD2d 569, 570 ), and we cannot say, in these circumstances, that the Board acted irrationally in finding that petitioner’s conduct was egregious (see, supra; see also, Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318, 322 ; Matter of Gandianco v Sobol, 171 AD2d 965, 967 ; Matter of Spero v Board of Regents, 158 AD2d 763, 764 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Gandianco v. Sobol
N.Y. App. Div. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
This court has sustained such charges on prior occasions (see, e.g., Matter of D’Amico v Commissioner of Educ. of State of N. Y., 167 AD2d 769 ; Matter of Hirose v Sobol, 167 AD2d 570 ; Matter of Revici v Commissioner of Educ. of State of N. Y., 154 AD2d 797, 799 ) and has indicated that "gross negligence” requires "egregious” conduct (see, Matter of Spero v Board of Regents, 158 AD2d 763, 764 ; see also, Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318, 322 ).
In the Matter of Yong-Myun Rho
v.
Gordon M. Ambach, as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York
New York Court of Appeals.
Oct 19, 1989.
546 N.E.2d 188
POINTS OF COUNSEL, Joseph Frost for appellant., Robert Abrams, Attorney-General (John J. O’Grady and O. Peter Sherwood of counsel), for respondents.
Alexander.
Cited by 34 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Alexander, J.

In 1985, the State Board of Professional Medical Conduct charged petitioner, who had been licensed to practice medicine in New York since 1970, with professional misconduct under[*320] Education Law § 6509 (2).[1] The Board alleged that petitioner, a Deputy Chief Medical Examiner for the New York City Medical Examiner’s office, had improperly conducted two autopsies. In particular, it charged that in one autopsy petitioner had inappropriately recorded the events leading to decedent J’s death under a heading on the death certificate titled cause of death and that, in the other autopsy, he had made seven specified errors in investigating and reporting decedent B’s gunshot wound.[2]

After a hearing, a committee of the Board determined that the charges concerning decedent J had not been sustained but that two of the specifications of negligence or incompetence had been sustained regarding the autopsy of decedent B— petitioner had neglected to explain in the autopsy report why he could not ascertain the order in which the decedent had worn his clothes and had improperly and inadequately performed, documented, and interpreted a sodium rhodizonate test.

Nevertheless, the committee concluded that petitioner had not practiced medicine with negligence or incompetence "on more than one occasion” and recommended that no disciplinary action be taken. The Commissioner of Health recommended to respondent Board of Regents that the hearing committee’s findings of fact, conclusions, and recommendations be accepted in full.

Declaring that it "took a more serious view” of the case than the hearing committee, the Regents Review Committee found that in addition to the two instances of negligence cited by the hearing committee, petitioner also had been negligent in describing decedent B’s bullet wound inadequately and incompletely. The Regents Review Committee concluded that these three deficiencies constituted negligence or incompetence on more than one occasion and recommended that petitioner be censured and reprimanded. Respondent Commissioner of Education accepted this recommendation and directed that a copy of the order of censure and reprimand, along with a copy of the report and vote of the Regents Review Committee, be added to petitioner’s permanent file.

[*321] Petitioner instituted this article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division (see,. Education Law § 6510-a [4]), seeking to annul the Commissioner’s determination. The Appellate Division confirmed the determination and dismissed the petition, concluding that it was not unreasonable for the respondents to consider the multiple acts of negligence during one autopsy separate derelictions for purposes of appraising petitioner’s professional conduct (144 AD2d 774, 776). Leave to appeal was granted by this court.

For the reasons that follow, we now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and annul the determination of the Commissioner of Education.

I.

Education Law § 6509 (2) defines as professional misconduct: "Practicing the profession fraudulently, beyond its authorized scope, with gross incompetence, with gross negligence on a particular occasion or negligence or incompetence on more than one occasion”. The dispute between the parties centers on the interpretation of the phrase "on more than one occasion” — whether three acts of negligence during one autopsy constitute negligence "on more than one occasion”.

Initially, we reject respondents’ contention that because the Board of Regents is the agency charged with the enforcement of Education Law § 6509 (2), its construction of the statute should be afforded great weight and accepted unless irrational. When "the question is one of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent, there is little basis to rely on any special competence or expertise of the administrative agency” (Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451, 459). This is so because " 'statutory construction is the function of the courts’ ” (Matter of Howard v Wyman, 28 NY2d 434, 438, quoting Matter of Mounting & Finishing Co. v McGoldrick, 294 NY 104, 108).

Respondents urge that the use of the word "occasion” in the phrase "negligence * * * on more than one occasion” renders the phrase ambiguous; thus a reasonable interpretation of the phrase would be "more than one occurrence, happening or incident of negligence.” .Particularly is this true, respondents argue, in light of the statute’s purpose of disciplining errant professionals in order to discourage negligence.

When a statute is free from ambiguity, a court must con[*322] strue it so as to give effect to its plain meaning (Doctors Council v New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 71 NY2d 669, 674-675; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §§ 76, 94). "[T]he plain and obvious meaning of a statute is always preferred to any curious, narrow or hidden sense that nothing but a strained interpretation of legislative intent would discern. * * * [C]ourts may only look behind the words of a statute when the law itself is doubtful or ambiguous” (Finger Lakes Racing Assn. v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 45 NY2d 471, 479-480).

We perceive no ambiguity in the subject phrase resulting from the use of the word "occasion”. The word "occasion” ordinarily refers to an event of some duration, occurring at a particular time and place, and not simply to a discrete act of negligence which can occur in an instant.

Moreover, section 6509 (2) distinguishes between professional misconduct resulting from practicing with gross negligence on a "particular occasion” and practicing with ordinary negligence "on more than one occasion”. The inference is compelling that by its use of the phrase "particular occasion” in describing gross negligence, the Legislature was referring to an event of some duration occurring at a particular time or place, during which either a single act of negligence of egregious proportions or multiple acts of negligence that cumulatively amount to egregious conduct could constitute gross negligence. Use of the phrase "on more than one occasion” suggests, with equal force, that the Legislature was referring to distinct events of some duration during which an act or acts amounting to ordinary negligence occur.

Respondents’ contention that such an interpretation will give physicians license to commit unlimited acts of negligence during a medical procedure, such as the autopsies in this case, because those acts would go unredressed, does not withstand analysis. As indicated, multiple acts of negligence during one event can amount to gross negligence on a particular occasion, warranting disciplinary action against the offending physician.

Further support for our analysis and conclusion is found in the legislative history of section 6509 (2). As initially enacted, this provision did not define professional misconduct as including ordinary negligence; only negligence that amounted to "gross negligence” could be the basis for a disciplinary proceeding (L 1971, ch 987, § 2). The statute was amended in 1973, to expand the definition of professional misconduct to[*323] include gross negligence "on a particular occasion or negligence on repeated occasions” (L 1973, ch 1026, § 1). The Sponsor’s Memorandum notes that the amendment was intended to address the problem of a physician "treating patients consistently below medical standards which, although [sic] may not be gross incompetence or gross negligence as presently set forth in the statute is a cause of great concern for the medical profession and the public in general” (Sponsor’s Mem, 1973, NY Legis Ann, at 184 [emphasis added]). The Memorandum continued: "The commissioner should have the authority to hold hearings when there is evidence on repeated occasions of such practices” (id. [emphasis added]).

The statute was amended, in 1975, to replace the phrase "on repeated occasions” with the phrase "on more than one occasion” (L 1975, ch 109, §30), thus eliminating the possible interpretation that more than two occasions must occur to support disciplinary proceedings. It is significant that the Legislature did not change the requirement to several acts of negligence on one occasion, as occurred here.

Because we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and annul the determination of the Commissioner of Education, we need not address the other arguments advanced by petitioner on this appeal.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division judgment should be reversed, with costs, and the determination of the Commissioner of Education annulled.

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur.

Judgment reversed, etc.

1

Section 6509 (2) provides that the following constitutes professional misconduct: "Practicing the profession fraudulently, beyond its authorized scope, with gross incompetence, with gross negligence on a particular occasion or negligence or incompetence on more than one occasion”.

2

The decedents were referred to by letters to preserve confidentiality.