Penner v. . Elliott, 33 S.E.2d 124 (N.C. 1945). · Go Syfert
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Penner v. . Elliott, 33 S.E.2d 124 (N.C. 1945). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
61 citation events (38 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: DeLoy v. Lekowski (ncctapp, 2025-10-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1962 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1962 1994 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) DeLoy v. Lekowski
N.C. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Indeed, “[t]he policy of the law has much restricted the range of defamatory utterances which are actionable per se.” Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 34 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1945).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hill v. Ewing
N.C. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Regarding “special damages,” that Court has stated that “general damages are such as might accrue to any person similarly injured, while special damages are such as did in fact accrue to a particular individual by reason of the particular circumstances of the case.” Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 35 (1945).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hill v. Ewing
N.C. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
EWING Opinion of the Court “general damages are such as might accrue to any person similarly injured, while special damages are such as did in fact accrue to a particular individual by reason of the particular circumstances of the case.” Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 35 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1945).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hill v. Ewing
N.C. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
EWING Opinion of the Court “general damages are such as might accrue to any person similarly injured, while special damages are such as did in fact accrue to a particular individual by reason of the particular circumstances of the case.” Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 35 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1945).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maynard v. Crook
N.C. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 9(g) (2022) (“When items of special damage are claimed each shall be averred.”). “[G]eneral damages are such as might accrue to any person similarly injured, while special damages are such as did in fact accrue to the particular individual by reason of the particular circumstances of the case.” Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 35 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1945) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “[S]pecial damages are usually synonymous with pecuniary loss[,]” Iadanza v. Harper, 169 N.C.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lippard v. Holleman
N.C. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 34 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1945). 31 LIPPARD V.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lippard v. Holleman
N.C. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 34 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1945). 31 LIPPARD V.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Robinson v. Williams
E.D.N.C. · 2020 · confidence medium
Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 35 (1945); Scott v. Harrison, 215 N.C. 427, 431 (1939).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Crescent Univ. City Venture, LLC v. Ap Atl., Inc.
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2019 · confidence medium
Ct. Oct. 3, 2017) (citing Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 35 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1945)), and are a “natural, and proximate result” of a breach of contract, Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 14 , 55 S.E.2d 810, 812 (1949); N.C.P.I.-Civil 503.21 (“Direct damages are the economic losses that usually or customarily result from a breach of contract.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SAS Institute, Inc. v. World Programming Ltd.
4th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
Direct damages, also known as general damages, "are such as might accrue to any person similarly injured,” while consequential (or special) damages "are such as did in fact accrue to the particular individual by reason of the particular circumstances of the case.” Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1945) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hopkins v. Mwr Mgmt. Co.
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
According to the Supreme Court, “general damages are such as might accrue to any person similarly injured, while special damages are such as did in fact accrue to the particular individual by reason of the particular circumstances of the case.” Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 35 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1945).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kingsdown, Inc. v. Hinshaw
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2016 · confidence medium
App. 1 , 11–12, 356 S.E.2d 378, 385 (1987). {109} “‘[G]eneral damages are such as might accrue to any person similarly injured, while special damages are such as did in fact accrue to the particular individual by reason of the particular circumstances of the case.’” Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 35 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1945) (citations and quotations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ward v. JETT PROPERTIES, LLC
N.C. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Finally, our Supreme Court held in Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 34 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1945), that no claim for libel per se existed for statements that the plaintiff was a man who would not pay his debts, would not work, and was "a man that respectable people had best not have anything to do with." In this case, plaintiff has identified as libelous defendant's statements that plaintiff was causing problems in his community with other tenants and was harassing or pestering defendant with his frivolous complaints.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Iadanza v. Harper
N.C. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
App. 650, 671 , 464 S.E.2d 47, 62 (1995) (quoting Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 35 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1945)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dobson v. Harris
N.C. · 2000 · confidence medium
Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 34 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1945).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc. (2×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
According to our Supreme Court, "`general damages are such as might accrue to any person similarly injured, while special damages are such as did in fact accrue to the particular individual by reason of the particular circumstances of the case.'" Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 35 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1945) ( quoting Black's Law Dictionary 314-315 (2d ed.)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Donovan v. Fiumara
N.C. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 112, at 788-92 (5th ed. 1984), “[t]he policy of the law has much restricted the range of defamatory utterances which are actionable per se.” Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 34 , 33 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1945).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Canady v. Mann
N.C. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
(Citation omitted.) Special damages are “[t]hose which are the actual, but not the necessary, result of the injury complained of, and which in fact follow it as a natural and proximate consequence in the particular case, that is, by reason of special circumstances or conditions.” Black’s Law Dictionary, (4th ed. 1951) p. 469. “ ‘[GJeneral damages are such as might accrue to any person similarly injured, while special damages are such as did in fact accrue to the particular individual by reason of the particular circumstances of the case.’ ” Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 35 , 33…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Morris v. Bruney (2×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Penner v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33 , 33 S.E. 2d 124 (1945); Beane v. Weiman Co., Inc., 5 N.C.
J. R. Penner
v.
J. B. Elliott.
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
Feb 28, 1945.
33 S.E.2d 124
Thomas A. Curry for plaintiff, appellee. , Sale, Pennell & Pennell for defendant, appellant.
Seawell.
Cited by 28 opinions  |  Published
Seawell, J.

Slander, as that term is appropriated to oral defamatory utterances as distinguished from libel, may be actionable per se or only per quod. That is, the false remarks in themselves may form the basis of an action for damages, in which case both malice and damage are, as a matter of law, presumed; or the false utterance may be such as to sustain an action only when causing some special damage, in which case both the malice and the special damage must be alleged and proved.

The policy of the law has much restricted the range of defamatory utterances which are actionable per se. Some statutes, with which we are not here concerned, make a limited number of defamations slanderous per se; but ordinarily we must look to the history of the subject in the common law, under the guidance of our own decided cases, in order to determine which are of that character. Included amongst them are accusations of crime or offenses involving moral turpitude, defamatory statements about a person with respect to his trade, occupation or business, imputations of having a loathesome disease, and the like. It is sufficient to say that the words alleged of the defendant do not come within any of the categories recognized as actionable per se; and that[*35] plaintiff bas not alleged against bim any special damage — that is, damage sustained by reason of any special circumstances or conditions attending tbe breach of duty of wbicb plaintiff complains, and tbis is fatal to tbe case as presently laid in tbe complaint.

In Ringgold v. Land, 212 N. C., 369, loc. cit. 371, Justice Schenck, speaking for tbe Court, quotes tbe following from Black’s Law Dictionary as defining special damages :

“Special damages are those wbicb are tbe actual, but not tbe necessary, result of tbe injury complained of, and wbicb in fact follow it as a natural and proximate consequence in tbe particular case, that is, by reason of special circumstances or conditions. Hence general damages are such as might accrue to any person similarly injured, while special damages' are such as did in fact accrue to tbe particular individual by reason of tbe particular circumstances of tbe case.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 2d Ed., pp. 314-15, and authorities there cited.

In tbis respect plaintiff is not aided by bis “second count,” in wbicb be alleges that tbe defamatory words were wanton and malicious, and that be suffered humiliation and mental anguish. To recover at all, be must allege and prove malice; and damages for humiliation and mental suffering are not special damages within tbe accepted definition.

Ringgold v. Land, supra, contains a full discussion of tbe subject, with copious citations, on a statement of fact remarkably similar to tbe one here considered, and we reaffirm its authority.

Tbe demurrer should have been sustained. It is so ordered.

Judgment reversed.