Duncan v. Duncan, 742 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. 2013). · Go Syfert
Duncan v. Duncan, 742 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. 2013). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
93 citation events (93 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: DeMaria Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Lab. Design, Equip. & Installations LLC (ncctapp, 2025-06-18)
Treatment trajectory · 2013 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2013 2019 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 30 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) DeMaria Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Lab. Design, Equip. & Installations LLC (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
N.C. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
an order that completely decides the merits of an action therefore constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal even when the trial court reserves for later determination collateral issues such as attorney's fees and costs.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) McMillan v. McMillan (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
N.C. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
an order that completely decides the merits of an action therefore constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal even when the trial court reserves for later determination collateral issues such as attorney's fees and costs.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Radiator Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co. (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
N.C. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
certification under rule 54(b) permits an interlocutory appeal from orders that are final as to a specific portion of the case, but which do not dispose of all claims as to all parties.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Radiator Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co. (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
N.C. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
certification under rule 54(b) permits an interlocutory appeal from orders that are final as to a specific portion of the case, but which do not dispose of all claims as to all parties.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Kornegay Family Farms, LLC v. Cross Creek Seed, Inc. (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2016 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
certification under rule 54(b) permits an interlocutory appeal from orders that are final as to a specific portion of the case, but which do not dispose of all claims as to all parties.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Blackrock Equestrian Ranch, L.L.C. v. Hardin
N.C. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
In other words, “[a] final judgment ‘“generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits.”’” Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 545 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013) (quoting Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988)); - 10 - BLACKROCK EQUESTRIAN RANCH, LLC V.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Farmers & Merchs. Bank v. Henley (3×) also: Cited "see"
N.C. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
“A final judgment generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits.” Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 545 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Flomeh-Mawutor v. City of Winston-Salem
N.C. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
A trial court’s “[c]ertification under Rule 54(b) permits an interlocutory appeal from orders that are final as to a specific portion of the case, but which do not dispose of all claims as to all parties.” Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 545 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Baer v. Baer
N.C. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 545 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 800 (2013).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Duffy v. Camp
N.C. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b). ¶ 13 “Certification under Rule 54(b) permits an interlocutory appeal from orders that are final as to a specific portion of the case, but which do not dispose of all claims as to all parties.” Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 545 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Coles v. Sugarleaf Labs
N.C. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Stated differently, “[a] final judgment generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits.” Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 545 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013) (cleaned up). ¶ 16 Interlocutory orders differ substantially from final judgments both in their character and their appealability.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Coles v. Sugarleaf Labs
N.C. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Stated differently, “[a] final judgment generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits.” Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 545 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013) (cleaned up). ¶ 16 Interlocutory orders differ substantially from final judgments both in their character and their appealability.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Coles v. Sugarleaf Labs
N.C. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Stated differently, “[a] final judgment generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits.” Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 545 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013) (cleaned up). ¶ 16 Interlocutory orders differ substantially from final judgments both in their character and their appealability.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Asher v. Honeycutt
N.C. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
HUNEYCUTT 2022-NCCOA-517 Opinion of the Court which do not dispose of all claims as to all parties.” Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 545 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Asher v. Honeycutt
N.C. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
HUNEYCUTT 2022-NCCOA-517 Opinion of the Court which do not dispose of all claims as to all parties.” Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 545 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Peterson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
D. Conn. · 2022 · confidence medium
Duncan v. Duncan, 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (N.C. 2013) (citing N.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alexander v. NC State Bd. of Elections
N.C. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
App. 565, 568-69 , 786 S.E.2d 379, 382 (2016) (quoting Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 546 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013)). ¶9 The three-judge panel’s 25 September 2020 order reserved the issue of attorney’s fees and determined all other matters were moot.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alexander v. NC State Bd. of Elections
N.C. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
App. 565, 568-69 , 786 S.E.2d 379, 382 (2016) (quoting Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 546 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013)). ¶9 The three-judge panel’s 25 September 2020 order reserved the issue of attorney’s fees and determined all other matters were moot.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ward v. Fsc I, LLC
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
The Court held “[a]n order that completely decides the merits of an action therefore constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal even when the trial court reserves for later determination collateral issues such as attorney’s fees and costs.” 366 N.C. at 546 , 742 S.E.2d at 801 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fid. Bank v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2016 · confidence medium
Therefore, a final judgment “‘generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits.’” Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 545 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013) (quoting Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988)). {27} As discussed previously, the 2010 Case raised two issues: the Deductibility Issue and the Interest Abatement Issue.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re: Cranor
N.C. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Our Supreme Court has held that “[a]n order that completely decides the merits of an action [] constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal even when the trial court reserves for later determination collateral issues such as attorney’s fees and costs.” Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 546 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sanders v. State Personnel Commission (2×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Our Supreme Court has held that “[a]n order that completely decides the merits of an action [] constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal even when the trial court reserves for later determination collateral issues such as attorney’s fees and costs." Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 546 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited "see" Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. v. Marilley
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2026 · signal: see · confidence high
See Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 546 (2013) (recognizing trial court may “reserve[ ] for later determination collateral issues such as attorneys’ fees”).
discussed Cited "see" Charles Schwab & Co. v. Marilley
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2026 · signal: see · confidence high
See Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 546 (2013) (recognizing trial court may “reserve[ ] for later determination collateral issues such as attorneys’ fees”).
discussed Cited "see" State of N.C. v. The Chemours Co. FC (2×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 545 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013) (“A final judgment generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). ¶ 25 The Consent Order in this case is analogous to the consent decree this Court treated as a final judgment when analyzing the timeliness of a motion to intervene in State ex rel.
discussed Cited "see" State of N.C. v. The Chemours Co. FC (2×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 545 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013) (“A final judgment generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). ¶ 25 The Consent Order in this case is analogous to the consent decree this Court treated as a final judgment when analyzing the timeliness of a motion to intervene in State ex rel.
discussed Cited "see" Ayers v. Currituck Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. (2×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 546 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013) (“An order that completely decides the merits of an action therefore constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal even when the trial court reserves for later determination collateral issues such as attorney’s fees and costs.” (citation omitted)).
examined Cited "see" Beasley v. Beasley (4×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 546 , 742 S.E.2d at 801 ("Though an open request for attorney's fees and costs necessitates further proceedings in the trial court, the unresolved issue does not prevent judgment on the merits from being final." (internal citations omitted)).
discussed Cited "see" Salvie v. Medical Center Pharmacy of Concord, Inc. (2×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 546 , 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2013) (holding that order may be final for purposes of appeal “even when the trial court reserves for later determination collateral issues such as attorney’s fees and costs”).
cited Cited "see" Simon v. Simon
N.C. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Duncan v. Duncan, _ N.C. _, 742 S.E.2d 799 (2013).
Barbara R. Duncan
v.
John H. Duncan
450PA12.
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
Jun 13, 2013.
742 S.E.2d 799
Siemens Family Law Group, by Jim Siemens; and Ruley Law Offices, by Douglas A. Ruley, for plaintiff-appellee. , Hyler & Lopez, P.A., by Stephen P. Agan and George B. Hyler, Jr., for defendant-appellant.
Newby, Beasley.
Cited by 34 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 84%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of North Caro… (2) · North Carolina Business Court (1)
[*545] NEWBY, Justice.

Today we clarify the effect of an unresolved request for attorney’s fees on an appeal from an order that otherwise fully determines the action. Once the trial court enters an order that decides all substantive claims, the right to appeal commences. Failure to appeal from that order forfeits the right. Because attorney’s fees and costs are collateral to a final judgment on the merits, an unresolved request for attorney’s fees and costs does not render interlocutory an appeal from the trial court’s order. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

After filing for divorce from defendant, plaintiff sought alimony and attorney’s fees. As a result, the District Court, Macon County, ordered defendant to pay plaintiff alimony in the amount of five hundred dollars per month. With regard to plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees, the court “ma[de] no order” and “reservefd] this issue for later determination.” Defendant appealed, but the Court of Appeals reasoned that the outstanding claim for attorney’s fees made defendant’s appeal interlocutory. Duncan v. Duncan , — N.C. App. —, —, 732 S.E.2d 390, 392 (2012) (citing Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 364 N.C. 195, 204, 695 S.E.2d 442, 448 (2010)). Because defendant failed to have the order certified as immediately appealable under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the Court of Appeals dismissed defendant’s appeal as untimely. Id. at —, 732 S.E.2d at 391. We allowed defendant’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether defendant’s right to appeal had accrued, thus making Rule 54(b) inapplicable. Duncan v. Duncan, — N.C. —, 736 S.E.2d 186 (2013).

Upon entry of final judgment in a civil matter, appeals may be taken as of right to the Court of Appeals. N.C.G.S. § l-277(a) (2011); id. § 7A-27(c) (2011). A final judgment “ ‘generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits.’ ” Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199, 108 S. Ct. 1717, 1720, 100 L. Ed. 2d 178, 183 (1988) (citation omitted); see also Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950) (“A final judgment is one which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial court.” (citations omitted)). Certification under Rule 54(b) permits an interlocutory appeal from orders that are final as to a specific portion of the case, but which do not dispose of all claims as to all parties.

[*546] Though an open request for attorney’s fees and costs necessitates further proceedings in the trial court, the unresolved issue “ ‘does not prevent judgment on the merits from being final.’ ” Bumpers, 364 N.C. at 200, 695 S.E.2d at 446 (quoting Budinich, 486 U.S. at 202, 108 S. Ct. at 1722, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 185)). An order that completely decides the merits of an action therefore constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal even when the trial court reserves for later determination collateral issues such as attorney’s fees and costs. See Budinich, 486 U.S. at 202-03, 108 S. Ct. at 1722, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 185 (“Courts and litigants are best served by the bright-line rule, which accords with traditional understanding, that a decision on the merits is a ‘final decision’ for purposes of [appeal] whether or not there remains for adjudication a request for attorney’s fees attributable to the case.”). Because an order resolving all substantive claims is a final judgment, Rule 54(b) certification is superfluous, and such a final order is immediately appealable as of right. N.C.G.S. § 1-277(a); id. § 7A-27(c). Failure to file a timely notice of appeal from the final judgment waives the right to appeal. Id. § 1-279.1 (2011); N.C. R. App. P. 3 (“Appeal in Civil Cases — How and When Taken”). This bright-line rule applies to all cases in which a trial court enters an order disposing of the parties’ substantive claims yet leaves open a request for attorney’s fees and costs. To promote clarity and uniformity, we disavow any language in Bumpers v. Community Bank of Northern Virginia that may be read to conflict with our holding in the case at hand. 364 N.C. 195, 695 S.E.2d 442.

In this instance, the trial court resolved the merits of all the claims between the parties with the exception of attorney’s fees. While the trial court could have determined the attorney’s fee issue contemporaneously with plaintiff’s alimony demand, the failure to do so did not negate the finality of the trial court’s order. We hold that the trial court’s order was final and immediately appealable because attorney’s fees were not part of the substantive claims. As a party to a final judgment on the merits, defendant preserved his right to appeal by giving timely notice thereof. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing defendant’s appeal is reversed. This case is remanded to that court for consideration of the remaining issues.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Justice BEASLEY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.