(a) A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon of mass destruction as defined in G.S. 14-288.21, poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree, a Class A felony, and any person who commits such murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment in the State's prison for life without parole as the court shall determine pursuant to G.S. 15A-2000, except that any such person who was under 18 years of age at the time of the murder shall be punished in accordance with Part 2A of Article 81B of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes.
(a1) If a murder was perpetrated with malice as described in subsection (b) of this section, and committed against a spouse, former spouse, a person with whom the defendant lives or has lived as if married, a person with whom the defendant is or has been in a dating relationship as defined in G.S. 50B-1(b)(6), or a person with whom the defendant shares a child in common, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the murder is a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing" under subsection (a) of this section and shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree, a Class A felony, if the perpetrator has previously been convicted of one of the following offenses involving the same victim:
(1) An act of domestic violence as defined in G.S. 50B-1(a).
(2) A violation of a domestic violence protective order under G.S. 50B-4.1(a), (f), (g), or (g1) or G.S. 14-269.8 when the same victim is the subject of the domestic violence protective order.
(3) Communicating a threat under G.S. 14-277.1.
(4) Stalking as defined in G.S. 14-277.3A.
(5) Cyberstalking as defined in G.S. 14-196.3.
(6) Domestic criminal trespass as defined in G.S. 14-134.3.
(b) A murder other than described in subsection (a) or (a1) of this section or in G.S. 14-23.2 shall be deemed second degree murder. Any person who commits second degree murder shall be punished as a Class B1 felon, except that a person who commits second degree murder shall be punished as a Class B2 felon if the malice necessary to prove second degree murder is based on an inherently dangerous act or omission, done in such a reckless and wanton manner as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty and deliberately bent on mischief.
(c) For the purposes of this section, it shall constitute murder where a child is born alive but (i) dies as a result of injuries inflicted prior to the child being born alive or (ii) dies as a result of an intentional, overt act performed after the child is born alive. The degree of murder shall be determined as described in subsections (a) and (b) of this section. (1893, cc. 85, 281; Rev., s. 3631; C.S., s. 4200; 1949, c. 299, s. 1; 1973, c. 1201, s. 1; 1977, c. 406, s. 1; 1979, c. 682, s. 6; 1979, c. 760, s. 5; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1251, ss. 1, 2; c. 1316, s. 47; 1981, c. 63, s. 1; c. 179, s. 14; c. 662, s. 1; 1987, c. 693; 1989, c. 694; 1993, c. 539, s. 112; 1994, Ex. Sess., c. 21, s. 1; c. 22, s. 4; c. 24, s. 14(c); 2001-470, s. 2; 2004-178, s. 1; 2007-81, s. 1; 2012-165, s. 1; 2013-47, s. 2; 2013-410, s. 3(a); 2017-94, s. 1; 2017-115, s. 9; 2023-14, s. 3(b); 2023-123, s. 2(a).)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
726
cases (
91 in the last 5 years), 1945–2026 · leading case:
State v. Arrington, 819 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 2018).
State v. Arrington, 819 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 2018).
· cites it 84× “ARRINGTON Opinion of the Court factual scenarios when the second-degree murder stems from either an inherently dangerous act or omission or a drug overdose.”
State v. Garcia, 597 S.E.2d 724 (N.C. 2004).
· cites it 50× “§ 15-144 are sufficient to charge first-degree murder on the basis of any theory set forth in N.C.G.S. § 14-17. Braxton, 352 N.C. at 174 , 531 S.”
State v. Atkinson, 167 S.E.2d 241 (N.C. 1969).
· cites it 81× “" Prospective juror Best stated that even though, after hearing all of the evidence, he was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty he would have "religious or moral scruples" which would prevent him "from bringing out a verdict of `guilty'" if he knew…”
State v. Rankin, 821 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 2018).
· cites it 12× “See N.C.G.S. § 14-17 (2017). And yet, murder is one of only a handful of crimes for which the General Assembly has permitted short-form indictments.”
State v. Jarrette, 202 S.E.2d 721 (N.C. 1974).
· cites it 42× “G.S. § 14-17. State v. Rich, 277 N.C. 333 , 177 S.”
State v. Waddell, 194 S.E.2d 19 (N.C. 1973).
· cites it 41× “§ 14-21 (rape), G.S. § 14-17 (murder), G.S. § 14-52 (burglary), and G.”
State v. Jones, 538 S.E.2d 917 (N.C. 2000).
· cites it 26× “For reasons outlined and discussed below, we hold the Court of Appeals erred in that for purposes of felony murder: (1) culpable negligence may not be used to satisfy the intent requirements for a first-degree murder charge; and, (2) a defendant may not be subject to a potential…”
State v. Wall, 286 S.E.2d 68 (N.C. 1982).
· cites it 30× “l be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape, or a sex offense, robbery,…”
State v. Brown, 358 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1987).
· cites it 18× “See N.C.G.S. § 14-17 (1986). The victim, Wayne Gerald, who had been working at his desk at home the evening of 5 May 1984, was killed by a single shotgun blast fired through the window beside him.”
State v. Vance, 403 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. 1991).
· cites it 30× “85, the terms of which are now embodied in N.C.G.S. § 14-17. That statute classifies murders as either first or second degree, but only for purposes of assigning punishment; it does not define or redefine the crime of murder.”
State v. McKoy, 394 S.E.2d 426 (N.C. 1990).
· cites it 22× “N.C.G.S. §§ 14-17, -21, -52, -58 (1969). Under N.”
State v. Strickland, 298 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. 1983).
· cites it 16× “While kidnapping was not a specified felony under the statute as it appeared in 1971, the present version of the statute is substantially the same and provides in pertinent part: A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving,…”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(a) — 28 cases
State v. Rankin, 821 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 2018).
“See N.C.G.S. § 14-17 (2017). And yet, murder is one of only a handful of crimes for which the General Assembly has permitted short-form indictments.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(b) — 11 cases
State v. Arrington, 819 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 2018).
“ARRINGTON Opinion of the Court factual scenarios when the second-degree murder stems from either an inherently dangerous act or omission or a drug overdose.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(b)(1) — 4 cases
State v. Arrington, 819 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 2018).
“ARRINGTON Opinion of the Court factual scenarios when the second-degree murder stems from either an inherently dangerous act or omission or a drug overdose.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(b)(2) — 2 cases
State v. Arrington, 819 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 2018).
“ARRINGTON Opinion of the Court factual scenarios when the second-degree murder stems from either an inherently dangerous act or omission or a drug overdose.”
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