(a) An administrative law judge shall stay any contested case under this Article on motion of an agency which is a party to the contested case, if the agency shows by supporting affidavits that it is engaged in other litigation or administrative proceedings, by whatever name called, with or before a federal agency, and this other litigation or administrative proceedings will determine the position, in whole or in part, of the agency in the contested case. At the conclusion of the other litigation or administrative proceedings, the contested case shall proceed and be determined as expeditiously as possible.
(b) An administrative law judge may:
(1) Administer oaths and affirmations;
(2) Sign, issue, and rule on subpoenas in accordance with G.S. 150B-27 and G.S. 1A-1, Rule 45;
(3) Provide for the taking of testimony by deposition and rule on all objections to discovery in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, the Rules of Civil Procedure;
(3a) Rule on all prehearing motions that are authorized by G.S. 1A-1, the Rules of Civil Procedure;
(4) Regulate the course of the hearings, including discovery, set the time and place for continued hearings, and fix the time for filing of briefs and other documents;
(5) Direct the parties to appear and confer to consider simplification of the issues by consent of the parties;
(6) Stay the contested action by the agency pending the outcome of the case, upon such terms as he deems proper, and subject to the provisions of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 65;
(7) Determine whether the hearing shall be recorded by a stenographer or by an electronic device; and
(8) Enter an order returnable in the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, to show cause why the person should not be held in contempt. The Court shall have the power to impose punishment as for contempt for any act which would constitute direct or indirect contempt if the act occurred in an action pending in Superior Court.
(9) Determine that a rule as applied in a particular case is void because (1) it is not within the statutory authority of the agency, (2) is not clear and unambiguous to persons it is intended to direct, guide, or assist, or (3) is not reasonably necessary to enable the agency to fulfill a duty delegated to it by the General Assembly.
(10) Impose the sanctions provided for in G.S. 1A-1 or Chapter 3 of Title 26 of the North Carolina Administrative Code for noncompliance with applicable procedural rules.
(11) Order the assessment of reasonable attorneys' fees and witnesses' fees against the State agency involved in contested cases decided under this Article where the administrative law judge finds that the State agency named as respondent has substantially prejudiced the petitioner's rights and has acted arbitrarily or capriciously or under Chapter 126 where the administrative law judge finds discrimination, harassment, or orders reinstatement or back pay.
(12) Repealed by Session Laws 2011-398, s. 17. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note. (1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 878, ss. 5, 9, 10, 26; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1111, ss. 18, 19; 1991, c. 35, s. 5; 2000-190, s. 5; 2004-156, s. 4; 2011-398, s. 17; 2012-187, s. 7.2.)
Notes of Decisions
State Ex Rel. Martin v. Melott, 359 S.E.2d 783 (N.C. 1987).
· cites it 12× “N.C.G.S. § 150B-33 (Cum.Supp.1985). These judicial functions are the heart of his job and far outweigh the administrative or executive-type powers and duties also provided for in the statute.”
Watlington v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Rockingham Cty., 799 S.E.2d 396 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 4× “Furthermore, we note N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-33(11), which is cited by the ALJ in support of the award of back pay, does not provide the ALJ with independent authority to award back pay.”
Hooper v. North Carolina, 379 F. Supp. 2d 804 (M.D.N.C. 2005).
· cites it 2× “Dai then initiated a lawsuit in state court, which was removed to the federal district court. The federal district court found that, despite the fact that the grievance committee was not vested with the same inherent powers as are Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) by N.”
Fearrington v. Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 487 S.E.2d 169 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 4× “N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-33(b)(9), entitled “Powers of administrative law judge,” provides that an ALJ may determine that a rule as applied in a particular case is void, however, it does not authorize an ALJ to make a “final decision” with respect to the validity of agency rules.”
Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Saf., 830 S.E.2d 865 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 6× “ontested cases where reinstatement or back pay is ordered, and only authorizes the OAH to award attorneys' fees for the administrative portion of a contested case, would interpret the law in a way that renders the General Assembly's actions meaningless The OAH already had the…”
Eury v. Nc Emp. Sec. Com'n, 446 S.E.2d 383 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
“While the Personnel Commission's conclusions of law do not explicitly address how the Personnel Commission viewed the administrative law judge's denial of respondent-ESC's motion to withdraw the admissions, we conclude that the abuse of discretion standard is appropriate in…”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-33(11) — 2 cases
Watlington v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Rockingham Cty., 799 S.E.2d 396 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).
“Furthermore, we note N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-33(11), which is cited by the ALJ in support of the award of back pay, does not provide the ALJ with independent authority to award back pay.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-33(6) — 1 case
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-33(b) — 5 cases
Eury v. Nc Emp. Sec. Com'n, 446 S.E.2d 383 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
“While the Personnel Commission's conclusions of law do not explicitly address how the Personnel Commission viewed the administrative law judge's denial of respondent-ESC's motion to withdraw the admissions, we conclude that the abuse of discretion standard is appropriate in…”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-33(b)(11) — 10 cases
Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Saf., 830 S.E.2d 865 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019).
“ontested cases where reinstatement or back pay is ordered, and only authorizes the OAH to award attorneys' fees for the administrative portion of a contested case, would interpret the law in a way that renders the General Assembly's actions meaningless The OAH already had the…”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-33(b)(3) — 1 case
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-33(b)(3a) — 2 cases
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-33(b)(4) — 2 cases
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-33(b)(9) — 2 cases
Fearrington v. Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 487 S.E.2d 169 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
“N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-33(b)(9), entitled “Powers of administrative law judge,” provides that an ALJ may determine that a rule as applied in a particular case is void, however, it does not authorize an ALJ to make a “final decision” with respect to the validity of agency rules.”
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