State v. Rhodes, 442 N.E.2d 1299 (Ohio 1982). · Go Syfert
State v. Rhodes, 442 N.E.2d 1299 (Ohio 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“it is the defendant's lawful right to possession which is key for purposes of the theft offense and r.c. 2913.01(d).”
95 citation events (72 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Bridgett
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) State v. Bridgett (2×)
unknown court · 2017 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
it is the defendant's lawful right to possession which is key for purposes of the theft offense and r.c. 2913.01(d).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re T.P.
Ohio Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
The important question is not whether the person from whom the property is stolen was the actual owner, but rather whether the defendant had any lawful right to possession.’” State v. Holloway, 2024-Ohio-3189, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Rhodes, 2 Ohio St.3d 74, 76 (1982). “‘The gist of a theft offense is the wrongful taking by the defendant, not the particular ownership of the property.’” In re D.J., 2024-Ohio- 738, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Jones, 2010-Ohio-902 , ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Holloway
Ohio Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
State v. Rhodes, 2 Ohio St.3d 74, 76 (1982). “‘The gist of a theft offense is the wrongful taking by the defendant, not the particular ownership of the property.’” In re D.J., 2024-Ohio-738, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Jones, 2010-Ohio-902 , ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Thomas, 2006-Ohio-6588 (8th Dist.).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Martin (3×)
unknown court · 2024 · confidence medium
Evenson further explained: In Rhodes, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that “[f]or purposes of determining the commission of a theft offense under R.C. 2913.01, one need not hold a certificate of title to be in lawful possession of a motor vehicle.” Rhodes at 76, 442 N.E.2d 1299 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Canankamp
Ohio Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Lake No. 2006-L-153, 2007-Ohio-1772 , ¶ 26, citing State v. Rhodes, 2 Ohio St.3d 74, 76 (1982). {¶46} For the reasons discussed, we conclude that the jury did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice that Canankamp’s falsification, theft, and criminal-damaging convictions must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re A.S.
Ohio Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
No. 09AP-296, 2009-Ohio- No. 20AP-18 12 6775, ¶ 23, citing State v. Rhodes, 2 Ohio St.3d 74, 77 (1982) (finding title ownership is not an element of a theft offense); see also State v. Mason, 10th Dist.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Jackson (2×)
Ohio · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 115 , 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383 , and State v. Rhodes (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 74 , 2 OBR 629, 442 N.E.2d 1299 . {¶ 138} However, counsel’s decisions in this area were trial strategy.
discussed Cited "see" Suru v. City of Cleveland, Unpublished Decision (2-25-1999)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Western Reserve Casualty Co. v. Mueller (1969), 18 Ohio App.2d 307 , 309 , Grogan Chrysler-Plymouth, Ind. v. Gottfried (1978), 59 Ohio App.2d 91 , Caledrone v. Jim's Body Shop (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 506 , 510 , Hoegler v. Hampler (1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 280 , State v. Rhodes (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 74 , 75 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Iker v. Estate of Jones (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Rhodes (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 74, 75 , 2 OBR 629, 442 N.E.2d 1299 .
The State of Ohio
v.
Rhodes
No. 82-128.
Ohio Supreme Court.
Dec 22, 1982.
442 N.E.2d 1299
Mr. George E. Pattison, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. Gregory Chapman, for appellee., Mr. Milton Berner, for appellant.
Brown, Celebrezze, Eighth, Holmes, Krupansky, Locher, Parrino, Sweeney.
Cited by 45 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 71%
Parrino, J.

The issue in this cause is whether the state in its prosecution of the defendant for the crime of theft of a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2913.02 was required to prove ownership of the vehicle in question by introduction into evidence of a certificate of title.

Appellant contends that in a prosecution for theft of a motor vehicle, R.C. 4505.04 provides the exclusive method by which ownership of that vehicle may be proved. We disagree.

In pertinent part R.C. 4505.04 provides:

“No court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title, claim, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle sold or disposed of, or mortgaged or encumbered, unless evidenced:

“(A) By a certificate of title or a manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate issued in accordance with sections 4505.01 to 4505.19, inclusive, of the Revised Code.

“(B) By admission in the pleadings or stipulation of the parties.”[1]

The applicability of R.C. 4505.04 to prove ownership in a prosecution for theft of a motor vehicle has not been previously addressed by this court. However, its application in a number of civil cases has engendered a substantial body of precedent. While these cases offer some guidance in the instant case, they do not control its disposition.

Essentially R.C. 4505.04 has been construed by this court to apply in civil cases wherein parties were asserting rival or competing interests pertaining to a motor vehicle. In interpreting R.C. 4505.04 in an action for damages to an automobile, Justice Clifford F. Brown of this court, when serving on the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, stated:

“The reason for the statute is to determine what proof, i.e., certificate of title, should be required where a plaintiff is asserting some right pertaining to his allegedly owned automobile and defendant’s defense or claim is based upon a claimed right, title or interest in the same automobile. The reason ceases when the defendant’s defense is not based upon some claimed right, title or interest in the same automobile.” Grogan Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v.[*76] Gottfried (1978), 59 Ohio App. 2d 91, 95 at fn. 4 [13 O.O.3d 154], This succinct statement is an accurate reflection of this statute’s inappropriateness in a prosecution of a theft offense.

The pertinent part of the theft statute, R.C. 2913.02, reads:

“(A) No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either:

“(1) Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent;

“(2) Beyond the scope of the express or implied consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent;

“(3) By deception;

“(4) By threat.”

R.C. 2913.02 and the definitional statute R.C. 2913.01(D) must be read in pari materia. R.C. 2913.01 provides:

“As used in sections 2913.01 to 2913.71 of the Revised Code:

* *

“(D) ‘Owner’ means any person, other than the actor, who is the owner of, or who has possession or control of, or any license or interest in property or services, even though such ownership, possession, control, license, or interest is unlawful.”

It is apparent from the language of R.C. 2913.01(D) that title ownership in a specific person other than the defendant is not an element of a theft offense. Indeed under this definition a thief can steal from a thief. Generally a thief is not concerned with who is the owner of property or who possesses a certificate of title to an automobile which he has stolen. Under these two sections it is merely necessary to prove that a defendant deprived someone of property who had “possession or control of, or any license or any interest in” that property. It is unnecessary, however, for one from whom possession or control is taken to have lawful possession or control.

In the instant case appellant does not claim that he possessed any right, title, claim or interest in the motor vehicle. The identity of the holder of a certificate of title to the motor vehicle is not the controlling issue. The issue is whether the defendant had lawful possession of the vehicle.

For purposes of determining the commission of a theft offense under R.C. 2913.02, one need not hold a certificate of title to be in lawful possession of a motor vehicle. The state must prove that the defendant deprived the owner, as such term is defined in R.C. 2913.01(D), of the vehicle. This definition makes it clear that the “ownership, possession, control, license, or interest” of the “owner,” as that term is used in R.C. 2913.01 through 2913.71, may be unlawful in itself. It is the “actor’s,” i.e., the defendant’s, relationship to the property which is controlling. The important question is not whether the person from whom the property was stolen was the actual owner, but rather whether the defendant had any lawful right to possession.

While introduction of a certificate of title is admissible to prove owner[*77] ship of a motor vehicle in a prosecution for theft of a motor vehicle,[2] such proof was not required in the instant case.

We therefore hold that in a prosecution for theft of a motor vehicle under R.C. 2913.02, R.C. 4505.04 does not mandate that a certificate of title be produced by the prosecution to demonstrate that the person deprived of the motor vehicle is the “owner” of the motor vehicle within the meaning of R.C. 2913.01(D).

Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is hereby affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Celebrezze, C.J., W. Brown, Locher, Holmes, C. Brown and Krupansky, JJ., concur. Parrino, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for Sweeney, J.
1

It is clear that appellant relies on division (A) of this statute to support his position. There is no allegation that ownership was admitted or stipulated.

2

Cf. State v. Emmons (1978), 57 Ohio App. 2d 173 [11 O.O.3d 173], wherein, at page 177, the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County stated:

“In this type of case, this evidence [testimony of owner] was proper and it was sufficient as to the element of ‘property of another’ and the certificate of title was immaterial and unnecessary.”