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Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981
2003
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
State v. Sibert
reviewing court should be limited to what transpired in the trial court as reflected by the record made of the proceedings.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
State v. Debruce
reviewing court should be limited to 7 what transpired in the trial court as reflected by the record made of the proceedings.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Reed v. Jagnow
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (quoted)
a reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it, which was not a part of the trial court's proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
State v. Feemorlu
since a reviewing court can only reverse the judgment of a trial court if it finds error in the proceedings of such court, it follows that a reviewing court should be limited to what transpired in the trial court as reflected by the record made of the proceedings.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
State v. Meyers
(2×)
ttaching a photocopy of a transcript to a brief does not fulfill the appellant's obligation to furnish the transcript as part of the record on appeal or comply with the requirements of app.r. 9
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Mitchell Family Trust Fund v. Cole
Further, “[t]his court cannot consider matters dehors the record.” Lisboa v. Lisboa, 2011-Ohio-351 , ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 377 (1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. McKinney
State v. Belton, 2016-Ohio-1581 (on direct appeal, defendant cannot rely upon evidence outside of the record); State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 299 (2001) (if establishing ineffective assistance of counsel requires proof outside the record, then such claim is not appropriately considered on direct appeal); State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406 (1978) (the appellate court is limited to what transpired as reflected by the record on direct appeal). {¶54} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons we disagree with appellant’s argument that trial counsel performed LAWRENCE, 23CA21 30 i…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Schoenstein
State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 402 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus ("A reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it, which was not a part of the trial court's proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter."). -2- Butler CA2022-04-044 Dependents Case and a capias was issued for appellant's arrest.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hughes v. Hughes
No. 05AP-1281, 2006-Ohio-2831, ¶ 7 ("appellate review is limited to the record as it existed at the time the trial court rendered judgment"); State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 405 (1978), quoting Bennett v. Dayton Mem.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
DSS Servs., L.L.C. v. Eitel's Towing, L.L.C.
In reviewing a judgment, an appellate court " 'may consider only that which was considered by the trial court and nothing more.' " State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 405 (1978), quoting Bennett v. Dayton Mem.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Easley v. Akron
“Since a reviewing court can only reverse the judgment of a trial court if it finds error in the proceedings of such court, it follows that a reviewing court should be limited to what transpired in the trial court as reflected by the record made of the proceedings.” State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406 (1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Lacava
State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406 (1978) (explaining that a reviewing court is “limited to what transpired in the trial court as reflected by the record made of the proceedings.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
East v. McGhee
This prohibition arises from the maxim that " 'in an appeal on questions of law the reviewing court may consider only that which was considered by the trial court No. 17AP-239 3 and nothing more.' " State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 405 (1978), quoting Bennett v. Dayton Mem.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matthews v. United Airlines, Inc.
Summit No. 26965, 2014-Ohio-371, ¶ 6 , citing State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406 (1978) (explaining that a reviewing court is “limited to what transpired in the trial court as reflected by the record made of the proceedings.”) Moreover, a review of the transcript from the small claims hearing reveals that Matthews provided no testimony concerning the written claim form, even after United Airlines’ legal representative testified that Matthews failed to submit the form in a timely manner. {¶13} Accordingly, having reviewed the record, we cannot say that the trial court clearly lost…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Paintiff v. Eberwein
Summit No. 26538, 2013-Ohio-2318, ¶ 11 , quoting State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406 (1978) (reviewing courts are “‘limited to what transpired in the trial court as reflected by the record made of the proceedings’”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
J.R. v. Pless
Summit No. 26965, 2014-Ohio-371, ¶ 6 , citing State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406 (1978) (explaining that a reviewing court is “limited to what transpired in the trial court as reflected by the record made of the proceedings.”). {¶16} Pless’ assignment of error is overruled.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Schroeder v. Watson
State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 405 (1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Heard
State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406 (1978) (explaining that a reviewing court is “limited to what transpired in the trial court as reflected by the record made of the proceedings.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Clayton v. Walker
“The rationale for this rule is 5 that an appellate court cannot review the propriety of the trial court’s reliance on such prior proceedings when that record is not before the appellate court.” In re J.C. at ¶ 15. “[A] reviewing court should be limited to what transpired in the trial court as reflected by the record made of the proceedings.” State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406 (1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
James Hanna v. Todd Ishee
Because Ohio law prohibits the addition of new evidence to the trial record on direct appeal, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 , 377 N.E.2d 500, 502 (1978), the state has excepted from res judicata those matters that may only be reasonably determined by reference to evidence that would necessarily fall outside the trial record — for instance, whether trial counsel sufficiently prepared in advance of trial or whether the defense had strategic motivations for its decisions.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bray v. Andrews
It is true that, on direct appeal, Ohio appellate courts are limited to reviewing the evidence that was in the record before the trial court, see State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 , 377 N.E.2d 500, 502 (1978), and that the only way to introduce new evidence is in a post-conviction hearing under Ohio Rev.Code § 2953.21, see State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112 , 443 N.E.2d 169, 171 (1982).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Jones
State v. Ishmail (1976), 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406 (cannot add matter to record that was not in record before the trial court). ¶{12} In any event, appellant’s petition was untimely and successive.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Burnette
State v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio.St.3d 274, 299 (if establishing ineffective assistance of counsel requires proof outside the record, then such claim is not appropriately considered on direct appeal); State v. Ishmail (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406 (the appellate court is limited to what transpired as reflected by the record on direct appeal and cannot rely upon evidence de hors the record).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Samatar v. Clarridge
State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 , 377 N.E.2d 500, 502 (1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Donald Williams, Petitioner-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Carl S. Anderson, Respondent-Appellant/cross-Appellee
(2×)
State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 , 377 N.E.2d, 500, 501 (1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hungler v. City of Cincinnati
As we stated in State v. Ishmail (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 402, 405-406 [ 8 O.O.3d 405 ], “[s]ince a reviewing court can only reverse the judgment of a trial court if it finds error in the proceedings of such court, it follows that a reviewing court should be limited to what transpired in the trial court as reflected by the record made of the proceedings.” We therefore reverse that portion of the appellate court’s decision remanding this issue to the trial court for further litigation.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Trader
See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978).” It is also a longstanding rule “that the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in the brief.” Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 1980 WL 350992 (4th Dist., Feb. 28, 1980), citing Scioto Bank v. Columbus Union Stock Yards, 120 Ohio App. 55, 59 (10th Dist. 1963).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Jones
See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978).” It is also a longstanding rule “that the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in the brief.” Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 1980 WL 350992 (4th Dist., Feb. 28, 1980), citing Scioto Bank v. Columbus Union Stock Yards, 120 Ohio App. 55, 59 (10th Dist. 1963).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Jones
See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978).” It is also a longstanding rule that “the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in the brief.” Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 1980 WL 350992 (4th Dist., Feb. 28, 1980), citing Scioto Bank v. Columbus Union Stock Yards, 120 Ohio App. 55, 59 (10th Dist. 1963).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Jones
See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978).” It is also a longstanding rule that “the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in the brief.” Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 1980 WL 350992 (4th Dist., Feb. 28, 1980), citing Scioto Bank v. Columbus Union Stock Yards, 120 Ohio App. 55, 59 (10th Dist. 1963).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Shepherd
See State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus.
discussed
Cited "see"
Norman v. Kellie Auto Sales, Inc.
See App.R. 9(A)(1) (stating that “[t]the original papers and exhibits thereto filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, including exhibits, and a certified copy of the docket and journal entries prepared by the clerk of the trial court shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases”). “ ‘A reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it, which was not a part of the trial court’s proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter.’ ” Morgan v. Eads, 104 Ohio St.3d 142 , 2004-Ohio-6110 , ¶ 13, quoting State v. Ishmail, 54 Oh…
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. McRae
See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978).” It is also a longstanding rule “that the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in the brief.” Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 1980 WL 350992 (4th Dist., Feb. 28, 1980), citing Scioto Bank v. Columbus Union Stock Yards, 120 Ohio App. 55, 59 , (10th Dist. 1963).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Thompkins
See State v. Ishmail, Pickaway App. No. 22CA11 35 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406 (1978).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Durham
See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978).” It is also a longstanding rule “that the record cannot be enlarged by factual Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 10 0050 11 assertions in the brief.” Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 1980 WL 350992 (4th Dist.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Harris
See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978).” It is also a longstanding rule “that the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in the brief.” Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 1980 WL 350992 (4th Dist., Feb. 28, 1980), citing Scioto Bank v. Columbus Union Stock Yards, 120 Ohio App. 55, 59 , (10th Dist. 1963).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Farmer
See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978).” It is also a longstanding rule “that the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in the brief.” Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 1980 WL 350992 (4th Dist.
discussed
Cited "see"
In re J.B.
See State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus (“A reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it, which was not a part of the trial court’s proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter.”). 5 Case No. 2023-T-0103 based on several factors.
discussed
Cited "see"
Maleky v. Ohio State Univ., Office of Compliment & Integrity
(2×)
See State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 , 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus (holding that “[a] reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it, which was not a part of the trial court’s proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter”); State v. Hooks, 92 Ohio St.3d 83 , 748 N.E.2d 528 (2001) (“a reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it that was not a part of the trial court’s proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter”). {¶33} The principle discussed in Ishmail and Hooks applies to Re…
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Matthews
(2×)
See State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406 , 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978) (where trial court does not review transcript of plea hearing, the transcript is not part of the record reviewed by the appellate court). {¶ 20} Because a guilty plea is conclusive, “courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences.” State v. Milanovich, 42 Ohio St.2d 46, 49 , 325 N.E.2d 540 (1975), quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 , 47 S.Ct. 582 , 71 L.Ed.1009 (1927).
discussed
Cited "see"
Cephas v. Warden, Lebanon Correctional Institution
(2×)
See State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 , 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Fields, 1st Dist.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Emch
(2×)
See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 , 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978).” It is also a longstanding rule “that the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in the brief.” Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 4th Dist.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Wilson
(2×)
See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 , 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978).” It is also a longstanding rule “that the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in the brief.” State v. Long, 5th Dist.
discussed
Cited "see"
England v. 116 W. Main, L.L.C.
(2×)
See State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 406 , 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978).
discussed
Cited "see"
Monaco v. Monaco
(2×)
See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 , 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978).” It is also a longstanding rule “that the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in the brief.” Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 4th Dist.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Matthews
(2×)
See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 , 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978)." It is also true "that the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in the brief." Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 4th Dist.
examined
Cited "see"
State v. McCreary
(3×)
See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 , 8 O.O.3d 405 , 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Moss
(2×)
See State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 , 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶31} Our review of the record indicates that appointed counsel successfully moved the case from the suspended docket on February 13, 2020, when Moss’s felony case was “still pending.” Although appointed counsel did not formally withdraw from representation, Moss became represented by retained counsel shortly after that date and remained represented by retained counsel through the date of the misdemeanor sentencing hearing.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Morrow
(2×)
See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 , 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978).” It is also a longstanding rule "that the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in the brief.” Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 4th Dist.
The State of Ohio
v.
Ishmail, Appellee The State of Ohio v. Donald
v.
Ishmail, Appellee The State of Ohio v. Donald
Nos. 77-577 and 77-578.
Ohio Supreme Court.
Jun 21, 1978.
Mr. Simon L. Leis, Jr., prosecuting attorney, and Mr. Leonard Kirschner, for appellant in Cases Nos. 77-577 and 77-578., Mr. Max A. Levin, for appellees in Cases Nos. 77-577 and 77-578.
Brown, Celebrezze, Cole, Cook, Eleventh, Herbert, Locher, Neill, Sweeney, Third.
Cited by 922 opinions | Published
Citer courts: Ohio Court of Appeals (4)
The threshold issue in each case is whether a reviewing court can add matter to the record before[*404] it, which was not part of the trial court proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter.
In the causes sub judice, the trial court did not consider the transcript of proceedings of the hearing at which the guilty pleas were entered in denying defendants-ap-pellees’ petitions for post-conviction relief. The Court of Appeals granted leave for the record to be supplemented by the addition of that transcript. The Court of Appeals then reversed the judgments of the trial court and vacated the guilty pleas on the basis that the trial court failed to adhere scrupulously to Crim. R. 11(C)(2) in accepting the guilty pleas, a conclusion gleaned from the transcript of the plea proceedings. But see State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St. 2d 86.
We find no reported cases in Ohio deciding this precise question. However, there are several reported cases which are helpful in determining the issue.
In State, ex rel. Klorer, v. Fimple (1914), 91 Ohio St. 99, the relatrix in a mandamus action sought an order requiring the trial judge to allow and sign a bill of exceptions in a matter which had been referred to a referee and the referee had not returned a bill of exceptions to the trial judge. This court discussed the function of a bill of exceptions in such a case and the statutory duty, pursuant to G. C. 11484, of the referee to return such a bill of exceptions to the court. This court stated at pages 102-103:
“The function of a bill of exceptions is to bring upon the record matters material to further judicial inquiry which would not otherwise appear. The trial judge here naturally and properly answers that he has no personal knowledge respecting the proceedings before the referee. For information upon that subject he was confined to the referee’s report. That report was before him, as the sole basis of his action in overruling exceptions and in rendering judgment. It is equallg available to the court of appeals. It is to be observed that in this case the report of the referee was confirmed and judgment rendered upon it and upon it alone. There could, therefore, have been [*405] no evidence whatever before the court of common pleas that was not embraced in the; report of the referee, already a part of the record.” (Emphasis added.)
The Court of Appeals for Montgomery County in Bennett v. Dayton Mem. Park & Cemetery Assn. (1950), 88 Ohio App. 98, relied upon Klorer in holding in paragraph one of its syllabus:
“In an appeal on questions of law the reviewing court may consider only that which was considered by the trial court and nothing more.”
In the Bennett case, a bill of exceptions was not allowed and signed by a referee and returned with his report to the Court of Common Pleas, as required by law, and no bill of exceptions was before the Court of Common Pleas at the time of entry of judgment on the report of the referee, from which judgment an appeal was taken.
The Court of Appeals stated, at page 101, in its opinion:
“It is axiomatic that in an appeal on questions of law the reviewing court may consider only that which was considered by the trial court and nothing more. 2 Ohio Jurisprudence (App. Rev., Pt. I), 296, Section 150. Inasmuch as the trial court did not have before it the bill of exceptions and could not have considered its contents, this court may not consider it. A reviewing court may not consider the contents of a bill of exceptions filed by the referee when it appears that the bill was not returned to the trial court until after final judgment was rendered by the trial court on the report of the referee. The record in this case shows clearly the underlying reason for the statutory requirement that the referee return the bill of exceptions to the court with his report; otherwise the court, in rendering final judgment, may consider-only the report of the referee, and, in that event, it necessarily follows that the reviewing court, in reviewing the final judgment, may consider only the report of the referee.”
Since a reviewing court can only reverse the judg[*406] ment of a trial court if it finds error in the proceedings of such conrt, it follows that a reviewing court should be limited to what transpired in the trial court as reflected by the record made of the proceedings.
The record in the instant causes indicates the trial court did not review the transcript of proceedings of the hearing at which the guilty pleas were entered prior to denying appellees’ petitions for post-conviction relief. Therefore, that transcript was properly not involved in the record of the trial court proceedings transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
We conclude it was prejudicial error to the state of Ohio, appellant herein, for the Court of Appeals to add the transcript to the record before it and to render its decision based upon the contents of that transcript.
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed and the causes are remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistant with this opinion.
Judgments reversed.