Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Massengale, 568 N.E.2d 1222 (Ohio 1991). · Go Syfert
Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Massengale, 568 N.E.2d 1222 (Ohio 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
362 citation events (240 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Bory v. Roudebush (ohioctapp, 2025-04-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bory v. Roudebush
Ohio Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale, 58 Ohio St.3d 121, 122 (1991).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Southworth v. Southworth
Ohio Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale, 58 Ohio St.3d 121, 122 (1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vega v. Friberg
Ohio Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will provide in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale, 58 Ohio St.3d 121, 122 (1991), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶11} Regarding our standard of review, we have previously established that “where the dispute is whether the evidence shows that a settlement agreement exists, this Court will not reverse the trial court’s finding where there is ‘sufficient evidence to support such fi…
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Y.W.
Ohio Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Wyandot Nos. 16-12-15 and 16-12-16, 2013-Ohio-4317, ¶ 42 , citing In re Meyer, 98 Ohio App.3d 189, 195 (3d Dist.1994), citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale, 58 Ohio St.3d 121, 122 (1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re C.C
Ohio Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e). {¶34} “Clear and convincing evidence is more than a preponderance of the evidence but not as much evidence as required to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as in a criminal case; rather, it is evidence which provides the trier of fact with a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re H.M.K., 2013-Ohio-4317, at ¶ 42 , citing In re Meyer, 98 Ohio App.3d 189, 195 (3d Dist.1994), citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale, 58 Ohio St.3d 121, 122 (1991).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Fisher
Ohio Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
No. 98AP-1305 (Sept. 30, 1999), quoting Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale, 58 Ohio St.3d 121, 122 (1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re H.M.K.
Ohio Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
In re Meyer, 98 Ohio App.3d 189, 195 (3d Dist.1994), citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale, 58 Ohio St.3d 121, 122 (1991). -15- Case Nos. 16-12-15, 16-12-16 {¶43} Upon review, an appellate court “must examine the record and determine if the trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy this burden of proof.” Meyer at 195 , citing In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re S.S.
Ohio Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
In re Meyer, 98 Ohio App.3d 189, 195 (3d Dist.1994), citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale, 58 Ohio St.3d 121, 122 (1991).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Myers, Unpublished Decision (2-10-2004) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cincinnati Bar Assn v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121 , 122 , 568 N.E.2d 1222 ; In re Meyer (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 189 , 195 , 648 N.E.2d 52 .
discussed Cited "see" In the Matter of Nibert, Unpublished Decision (1-22-2004) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121 , 122 , 568 N.E.2d 1222 ; In re Meyer (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 189 , 195 , 648 N.E.2d 52 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Shahan, Unpublished Decision (12-10-2003) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cincinnati Bar Ass'n. v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121 , 122 , 568 N.E.2d 1222 .
cited Cited "see" State v. Keerps, Unpublished Decision (9-5-2002)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121 , 122 , and In re Meyer (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 189 , 195 .
cited Cited "see" Evans v. Cole, Unpublished Decision (6-11-2001)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121 , 122 , and In re Meyer (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 189 , 195 .
discussed Cited "see" In Re Sprinkle, Unpublished Decision (11-24-1999) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Hiatt (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 716 , 725 , 621 N.E.2d 1222 , 1228 , citing Cincinnati Bar Assoc. v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121 , 122 , 568 N.E.2d 1222 , 1223 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Futrell, Unpublished Decision (11-10-1999)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Id., State v. Assad (June 11, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 72648, 72649, unreported; State v. Boss (Sept. 15, 1997), Clermont App. No. CA96-12-107, unreported; State v. Fincher (Oct. 14, 1997), Franklin App. No. 97 APA03-352, unreported.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re P.R., Unpublished Decision (4-25-2002) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121 , 122 , 568 N.E.2d 1222 . {¶ 15} "The standard of review for weight of the evidence issues, even where the burden of proof is `clear and convincing,' retains its focus upon the existence of some competent, credible evidence." Hawn v. Pleasant, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2578 (May 28, 1999), Scioto App. No. 98CA2595, unreported, citing State v. Schiebel (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 71 , 74 , 564 N.E.2d 54 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Pennington, Unpublished Decision (1-29-2002)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121 , 122 .Here, the common pleas court relied on this court's decision in State v. Henderson (Sept. 28, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-1591, unreported, and found "by clear and convincing evidence that the totality of the evidence including the age of the victims, the relationship of the Defendant to the victims and the pattern of abuse which has been demonstrated that, the defendant does fit the definition of a sexual predator as defined in R.C. 2950.01 et seq [sic] and that Defendant is likely to re-offend." (Decision, 4.) I…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Harper, Unpublished Decision (5-11-2001)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404 , 408 . 2 R.C. 2950.01 (E) defines a "sexual predator" as "a person who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to committing a sexually oriented offense and is likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses." Clear and convincing evidence is "that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere `preponderance of the evidence,' but not to the extent of such certainty as is required `beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal cases, and which will provide in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Benoit, Unpublished Decision (11-2-2000) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121 , 122 , 568 N.E.2d 1222 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re Glenn (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121, 122 , 568 N.E.2d 1222, 1222-1223 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Glenn (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121 , 122 , 568 N.E.2d 1222 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." In the Matter of Moore, Unpublished Decision (9-14-2000)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121 , 122 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." In the Matter of Thomas, Unpublished Decision (3-9-2000)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121 , 122 .
Cincinnati Bar Association
v.
Massengale
No. D.D. 12.
Ohio Supreme Court.
Mar 27, 1991.
568 N.E.2d 1222
Nelson B. Hunt, for petitioner., W. Deems Clifton and John G. Slauson, for relator.
Brown, Douglas, Holmes, Moyer, Resnick, Sweeney, Wright.
Cited by 256 opinions  |  Published
Per Curigm.

The board found that petitioner had not complied with our 1961 order “to desist and refrain from the practice of law, in any form, from this day forward * * *,” and had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is a proper person to be readmitted to the practice of law or that he possesses all the mental and educational qualifications that were required for his original admission to the bar. We agree and hereby deny petitioner’s petition for reinstatement.

Under Gov. Bar R. V(28):

“Requisites for Reinstatement. No person shall be reinstated unless he or she establishes all of the following by clear and convincing evidence to the satisfaction of the panel hearing the petition for reinstatement:
“(a) that he or she has made appropriate restitution to the persons who were harmed by his or her misconduct;
• “(b) that he or she possesses all of the mental, educational, and moral qualifications that were required of an applicant for admission to the Bar of Ohio at the time of his [or her] original admission;
“(c) that he or she has complied with the continuing legal education requirements of Rule X, Section 3(F) of the Rules;
“(d) that he or she is now a proper person to be readmitted to the Bar of Ohio, notwithstanding the previous disciplinary action taken against him or her.”

We have defined “clear and convincing evidence” as:

«*. * * [T]hat measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will provide in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469, 53 O.O. 361, 120 N.E. 2d 118, paragraph three of the syllabus.

Petitioner’s evidence falls far short of this standard. In his petition for reinstatement, petitioner states that since 1961 he has represented clients before the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) independently and under the supervision of attorneys. The board concluded that petitioner had not obeyed our 1961 order of suspension. While much of the[*123] evidence surrounding this issue was contradicted,, we find sufficient evidence to support the board’s conclusion. Although petitioner contended that he was authorized to practice before INS by a decision of a former district director of INS, dated February 4, 1976, on July 21, 1986, he entered into a consent agreement with the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which restricted his ability to practice to giving assistance in filling in blank spaces on INS forms for nominal consideration, assisting attorneys while working as a paralegal, teaching immigration law provided that students are notified in writing prior to the first class that petitioner is not a licensed attorney, and practicing before a tribunal that specifically authorizes him, by name, to appear before it. Moreover, petitioner admitted that the purported February 4, 1976 decision authorizing the practice before INS was unsigned and that INS had no record of it.

Evidence produced at the hearing also indicated that petitioner had business cards printed identifying him variously as “Doctor of Law” and “Attorney and Counselor.” He had also identified himself as an officer in the Maryland Wing of the United States Civil Air Patrol, when in fact he held no such position.

Moreover, petitioner organized and managed a law firm known as James Fox & Associates with offices in Washington, D.C. and Miami, Florida. Fox, who is an attorney licensed to practice in Virginia and Florida, has been severely debilitated by Parkinson’s disease, and has not practiced law since 1979 or 1980. Fox has variously repudiated and affirmed his relationship with petitioner. However, during his association with Fox & Associates, petitioner signed the aforementioned consent agreement and, in 1987, was investigated by the unauthorized practice of law counsel of the Florida Bar on complaints of unauthorized practice of law in 1985 filed by Michael Ray, a former Florida associate of James Fox & Associates. An affidavit provided by Florida’s unlicensed practice of law counsel indicated that on August 21, 1987, the Florida Bar filed a petition alleging that petitioner had engaged in the unlicensed practice of law. On December 7,1987, the Supreme Court of Florida dismissed the petition without prejudice “because of the age of the actions forming the basis of the petition and not because The Florida Bar was of the opinion that the unlicensed practice of law had not taken place.”

We also note that petitioner was convicted of a second federal crime in 1971 for the illegal rescue of property, involving a tax lien on an estate. He served approximately six months in a federal penitentiary on that conviction; petitioner also admitted signing another attorney’s name to a motion in a pending action, claiming authorization to do so, although the attorney denied such authorization.

We find from the foregoing evidence that petitioner has not obeyed our 1961 order and has not established by clear and convincing evidence that he is now a proper person to be readmitted to the practice of law.

The board also found that petitioner does not possess all the mental and educational qualifications that were required for his original admission to the bar. There is substantial evidence in the record that petitioner knows immigration law well. Petitioner was vague about what he has done otherwise to keep current in the law. We find that petitioner has failed to establish this prerequisite to his reinstatement by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we concur in[*124] the findings and recommendations of the board and hereby deny petitioner’s petition for reinstatement to the practice of law. Costs taxed to petitioner.

Judgment accordingly.

Moyer, C.J., Sweeney, Holmes, Douglas, Wright, H. Brown and Resnick, JJ., concur.