green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 2×
35.8 score
“appellee contendsand we agreethat the mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.”
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
State v. Clark
he mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
State v. Hayes
appellee contendsand we agreethat the mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Clark
However, “the mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime . . . is insufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Maynard
“However, ‘ “the mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.” ’ ” Id. quoting Johnson at 243, quoting State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Dobson
R.C. 2923.03(A) governs complicity and provides in relevant part, that “[n]o person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall . . . [a]id or abet another in committing the offense.” R.C. 2923.03(A)(2). “[T]o support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal.” State v. Johnson, 93 O…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ivery v. McConahay
Relevant to this case, “a firearm is an inherently dangerous instrumentality, the use of which is reasonably likely to produce death[.]” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 270 (1982).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Foster
“The mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove . . . that the accused was an aider and abettor.” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Pettaway
However, “‘the mere presence of the accused at the scene of the crime, is not sufficient, on its own, to prove that the accused is an aider and abettor.’” Johnson at 243 , quoting State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Crumpton
However, “‘the mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.’” Id. at 243, quoting State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Parks
In Johnson, the court noted that “ ‘the mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.’ ” Johnson at 243 , quoting State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Wilborn
“The mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime, however, is insufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Jones
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240 (2001), syllabus. “‘[T]he mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.’” Id. at 243 , quoting State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Ransom
However, “[t]he mere presence of an accused at the scene of the crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Smith
Further “[i]t is a fundamental principle that a person is presumed to intend the natural, reasonable and probable consequences of his voluntary acts.” State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214 , 2006-Ohio-791 , 842 N.E.2d 996 , ¶ 143, quoting State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.2d 35, 39 , 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978). {¶24} “[A] firearm is an inherently dangerous instrumentality, the use of which is reasonably likely to produce death * * *.” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 270 , 431 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (1982). “‘[I]n an attempted-murder prosecution, a defendant’s specific intent to kill another…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Jackson
Moreover, “‘a firearm is an inherently dangerous instrumentality, the use of which is reasonably likely to produce death.’” A.J.S., supra, quoting State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 270 (1982). {¶29} Here, intent may be reasonably inferred from the fact that Mr. Jackson fired, by his own testimony, ten shots “rapid fire” at Mr. Anderson from a firearm.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re G.K.
“A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. §2901.22. {¶23} To be complicit, “the evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal.” State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240 , 754 N.E.2d 796 (2001), syllabus. “[T]he mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Young v. Warden, Warren Correctional Institution
(2×)
R.C. 2923.03(A) defines the offense of complicity, in relevant part, as follows: No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: * * * (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense. “[T]o support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal.” State v. John…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Krowiak
(2×)
In convicting him under R.C. 2909.06(A)(2), Mr. Krowiak argues the trial court “erroneously attempted to equate the term ‘inherently dangerous agency’ with ‘inherently dangerous instrumentality.’” Mr. Krowiak further argues that though “[t]his subsection [of the law] clearly 7 envisages and encompasses chemical spills, bio-hazardous substances, poisons, etc.[,] [i]t does not [encompass] * * * firearms.” Although the legislature has not defined firearms as “inherently dangerous instrumentalities,” Mr. Krowiak correctly notes, and does not dispute, that Ohio courts have long …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Gillespie
Id. {¶26} However, "the mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor." State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Laws
Union Nos. 14-19-28 and 14-19-29, 2020-Ohio-4883, ¶ 24 , quoting State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Rudasill
The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he offense of aggravated robbery, when committed with a loaded gun, is 'likely to produce death.' " State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 554 (1995), quoting State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 270 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Martinez
“The mere presence of an accused at the scene -14- Case Nos. 14-19-28, 14-19-29 of the crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 , 431 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Rulong
A specific intent to 16 commit murder may reasonably be inferred from “the fact that a firearm is an inherently dangerous instrumentality, the use of which is reasonably likely to produce death[.]” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 270 (1982) (citation omitted). {¶65} Here, appellant admitted to the police that he had been in the bar earlier that evening and that when he returned in his truck, he fired multiple bullets into a bar he knew to be open and occupied.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Ivery
Relevant to this case, “a firearm is an inherently dangerous instrumentality, the use of which is reasonably likely to produce death[.]” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 270 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Young
(2×)
R.C. 2923.03(A) defines the offense of complicity, in relevant part, as follows: No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: *** (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense. "[T]o support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal." State v. Johnson, 9…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Tackett
A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense. {¶34} “‘[T]he mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.’” State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 243 (2001), quoting State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. LaFollette
“The mere presence of an accused at the scene of the crime is Guernsey County, Case No. 19 CA 0010 6 not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 , 431 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Hector
State v. Sims, 10 Ohio App.3d 56 (8th Dist.1983), paragraph two of the syllabus; Johnson at 243 , citing State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982). {¶ 32} Whoever violates R.C. 2923.03 is guilty of complicity in the commission of an offense and "shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Bitting
Instead, the extent of Mr. Bitting’s involvement in the crime, if any, was at issue. “[T]he mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Burrell
Again, as one officer testified, the shots appeared "sporadic throughout the house. * * * Some were higher, some were lower," with some entering the home below the so-called "six foot line." {¶24} As noted by the Ohio Supreme Court, "'a firearm is an inherently dangerous instrumentality, the use of which is likely to produce death.'" State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 316 (1995), quoting State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 270 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Aaron Gipson v. Ed Sheldon
State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267 , 431 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (1982) (per curiam); cf. Rosemond v. United States, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1240, 1248 , 188 L.Ed.2d 248 (2014) (“To aid and abet a crime, a defendant must not just ‘in some sort associate himself with the venture,’ but also ‘participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about’ and ‘seek by his action to make it succeed.’ ” (quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 , 69 S.Ct. 766 , 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949))).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Reed
It is settled law that " 'the mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.' " State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 243 (2001), quoting State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Graham
However, “the mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982). “[T]here must be some level of active participation by way of providing assistance or encouragement.” State v. Nievas, 121 Ohio App.3d 451, 456 (8th Dist.1997). “‘Mere approval or acquiescence, without expressed concurrence or the doing of something to contribute to an unlawful act, is not an aiding or abetting of the act.’” Id., quoting State v. Sims, 10 Ohio App.3d 56, 59 (8t…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Lollis
Therefore, to be complicit through aiding and abetting, the accused must have taken some role in causing the commission of the offense. “[T]he mere presence of an accused at the scene of the crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982). {¶10} As part of the State’s case-in-chief, it produced the testimony of Lashawna Boswell, Mr. Suleiman’s brother Fadi Suleiman, law enforcement officers from the City of 5 Akron Police Department, employees of cellular telephone service providers, Tasha T…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Horton
State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 245 (2001). {¶40} Therefore, to be complicit through aiding and abetting, the accused must have taken some role in causing the commission of the offense. “[T]he mere presence of an accused at the scene of the crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider 18 and abettor.” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Bates
Therefore, to be complicit through aiding and abetting, the accused must have taken some role in causing the commission of the offense. “[T]he mere presence of an accused at the scene of the crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982). 5 {¶12} Here, as part of the State’s case-in-chief, it produced the testimony of the Harmaths, Mr. Tesar, Ms. Hammon and police officers, who recounted events spanning from September 12, 2011 through September 16, 2011. {¶13} John Harmath and his father, Wi…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Peterson
Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the crime.” State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 245 (2001). {¶12} Therefore, to be complicit through aiding and abetting, the accused must have taken some role in causing the commission of the offense. “[T]he mere presence of an accused at the scene of the crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269 (1982). {¶13} As part of the State’s case-in-chief, it produced the testimony of McCormick, Raed Mansour, Officer Daniel Murphy, Offi…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson v. Hall
State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267 , 431 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Calwise, Unpublished Decision (6-27-2003)
Widner , 69 Ohio St.2d at 270 (using a gun in the commission of an offense is likely to produce death). {¶ 33} Sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find that Calwise was a principal offender causing the death of DeShun.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Scales
(2×)
See State v. McFarland, 162 Ohio St.3d 36 , 2020-Ohio-3343 , 164 N.E.3d 316, ¶ 25 (considering the sufficiency of the evidence challenge only on those convictions surviving merger), citing State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319 , 2010-Ohio-2 , 922 N.E.2d 182 , ¶ 24 (“conviction” consists of a finding of guilt and a sentence) and State v. Myers, 154 Ohio St.3d 405 , 2018-Ohio-1903 , 114 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 138 (merger of kidnapping count with aggravated-robbery and aggravated-burglary counts moots sufficiency-of-the- evidence claim regarding kidnapping count). 517 (1954), paragraph five of th…
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Johnson
(2×)
Accord, State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267 , 431 N.E.2d 1025 (1982) (finding purpose to kill in passenger’s firing gun at individual from moving vehicle); State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 316 , 652 N.E.2d 988 (1995), certiorari denied (1996), 516 U.S. 1096 , 116 S.Ct.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Null
(2×)
Accord, State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267 , 431 N.E.2d 1025 (1982) (finding purpose to kill in passenger’s firing gun at individual from moving vehicle); State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 316 , 652 N.E.2d 988 (1995), certiorari denied (1996), 516 U.S. 1096 , 116 S.Ct. 822 , 133 L.Ed.2d 765 .
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Jones
(2×)
See State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267 , 431 N.E.2d 1025 (1982) (upholding conviction for attempted murder under an aiding and abetting theory); State v. Brooks, 8th Dist.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. McRae
(2×)
See State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 270 , 431 N.E.2d 1025 (1982) (noting that because a gun is an “inherently dangerous instrumentality” and its use is likely to produce death, a jury could conclude that the defendant formed specific intent to kill); State v. Wilson, 8th Dist.
examined
Cited "see"
State v. Thomas
(4×)
Accord, State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267 , 431 N.E.2d 1025 (1982) (finding purpose to kill in passenger's firing gun at individual from moving vehicle); State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 316 , 652 N.E.2d 988 (1995), certiorari denied (1996), 516 U.S. 1096 , 116 S.Ct. 1096 , 133 L.Ed.2d 765 .
examined
Cited "see"
State v. Dorsey
(4×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Accord, State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267 , 431 N.E.2d 1025 (1982) (finding purpose to kill in passenger's firing gun at individual from moving vehicle); State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 316 , 652 N.E.2d 988 (1995), certiorari denied (1996), 516 U.S. 1096 , 116 S.Ct. 1096 , 133 L.Ed.2d 765 .
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Smith
(2×)
Accord, State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267 , 431 N.E.2d 1025 (1982) (finding purpose to kill in passenger's firing gun at individual from moving vehicle); State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 316 , 652 N.E.2d 988 (1995), certiorari denied (1996), 516 U.S. 1096 , 116 S.Ct. 1096 , 133 L.Ed.2d 765 .
discussed
Cited "see"
McDade v. Russell
(2×)
See State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 270 , 431 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (1982) (holding that the jury could reasonably infer defendant’s specific intent to kill when he used a firearm because it was, “an inherently dangerous instrumentality, the use of which is reasonably likely to produce death”).
The State of Ohio
v.
Widner
v.
Widner
No. 81-1825.
Ohio Supreme Court.
Feb 19, 1982.
Mr. John T. Corrigan, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. John B. Gibbons, for appellant., Mr. George L. Nyerges, for appellee.
Brown, Celebrezze, Holmes, Krupansky, Locher, Sweeney.
Cited by 226 opinions | Published
R. C. 2923.03 provides in part:
“(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:
“(1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense;
“(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense.” (Emphasis added.)
R. C.- 2903.02 provides in part:
“(A) No person shall purposely cause the death of another.” (Emphasis added.)
R. C. 2901.22 provides in part:
“(A) A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is his specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” (Emphasis added.)
Finally, R. C. 2923.02 defines “attempt” as:
“(A) No person, purposely or knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge is sufficient culpability for the commission of an offense, shall engage in conduct which, if successful, would constitute or result in the offense.”
Thus, reading the foregoing statutes in pari materia, in order to convict appellee of attempted murder, the prosecution[*269] had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that: (1) appellee and the passenger had the specific intention, or purpose, to kill Brooks and Scanlon, and (2) appellee somehow aided the passenger in committing the offense of attempted murder.
Appellee contends — and we agree — that the mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor. See, generally, 21 American Jurisprudence 2d 324, Criminal Law, Section 167; Columbus v. Russell (1973), 39 Ohio App. 2d 139.
However, as the facts show, appellee was much more than a passive spectator who was “merely present” at the scene of the gun battle. Rather, the record demonstrates that appellee actively assisted his brother in the attempted murders. Therefore, for the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate appellee’s convictions for two counts of attempted murder.
Under controlling precedent of the United States Supreme Court, Officer Brooks’ investigative stop of appellee and his brother was lawful. The totality of the circumstances, particularly the covered license plate, demonstrated the requisite, specific, articulable facts which justified a reasonable suspicion that appellee and his brother were involved in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U. S. 1. See, also, Brown v. Texas (1979), 443 U. S. 47.
There is sufficient evidence, direct and circumstantial, in this record from which a jury could infer that appellee knew that his brother was in possession of a gun at the time Officer Brooks began questioning the two men. During this questioning appellee: (1) failed to comply with the police officer’s directions to turn off the car motor and produce some identification, and (2) evaded a proper investigative stop by driving the car away.
When the passenger pointed and fired the gun at the policeman and the security guard, appellee, the driver, failed to terminate the flight. Instead, appellee, with the full knowledge that a firearm was being discharged by the passenger, continued to drive away. These intentional evasive actions by the appellee clearly aided the passenger in the attempted murder of Brooks and Scanlon.
[*270] Given the fact that a firearm is an inherently dangerous instrumentality, the use of which is reasonably likely to produce death, see State v. Lockett (1976), 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, paragraphs three and four of the syllabus, we believe that, based on the entire record, a jury could reasonably infer that appellee: (1) formed the specific intention to commit murder, and (2) aided his brother in the commission of the charged offenses.
The jury’s verdict — guilty of two counts of attempted murder — unambiguously demonstrates that the prosecutor proved each element of attempted murder beyond reasonable doubt. As such, we see no reason to disturb the finding of the jury. State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 169.
For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the sentence of the trial court ordered into execution.
Judgment reversed.