(A)(1) Notwithstanding an otherwise applicable period of limitations specified in this chapter or in section 2125.02 of the Revised Code and except as otherwise provided in divisions (A)(2), (A)(3), (C), and (D) of this section, no cause of action to recover damages for bodily injury, an injury to real or personal property, or wrongful death that arises out of a defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property and no cause of action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained as a result of bodily injury, an injury to real or personal property, or wrongful death that arises out of a defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property shall accrue against a person who performed services for the improvement to real property or a person who furnished the design, planning, supervision of construction, or construction of the improvement to real property later than ten years from the date of substantial completion of such improvement.
(2) Notwithstanding an otherwise applicable period of limitations specified in this chapter or in section 2125.02 of the Revised Code, a claimant who discovers a defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property during the ten-year period specified in division (A)(1) of this section but less than two years prior to the expiration of that period may commence a civil action to recover damages as described in that division within two years from the date of the discovery of that defective and unsafe condition.
(3) Notwithstanding an otherwise applicable period of limitations specified in this chapter or in section 2125.02 of the Revised Code, if a cause of action that arises out of a defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property accrues during the ten-year period specified in division (A)(1) of this section and the plaintiff cannot commence an action during that period due to a disability described in section 2305.16 of the Revised Code, the plaintiff may commence a civil action to recover damages as described in that division within two years from the removal of that disability.
(B) Division (A) of this section does not apply to a civil action commenced against a person who is an owner of, tenant of, landlord of, or other person in possession and control of an improvement to real property and who is in actual possession and control of the improvement to real property at the time that the defective and unsafe condition of the improvement to real property constitutes the proximate cause of the bodily injury, injury to real or personal property, or wrongful death that is the subject matter of the civil action.
(C) Division (A)(1) of this section is not available as an affirmative defense to a defendant in a civil action described in that division if the defendant engages in fraud in regard to furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property or in regard to any relevant fact or other information that pertains to the act or omission constituting the alleged basis of the bodily injury, injury to real or personal property, or wrongful death or to the defective and unsafe condition of the improvement to real property.
(D) Division (A)(1) of this section does not prohibit the commencement of a civil action for damages against a person who has expressly warranted or guaranteed an improvement to real property for a period longer than the period described in division (A)(1) of this section and whose warranty or guarantee has not expired as of the time of the alleged bodily injury, injury to real or personal property, or wrongful death in accordance with the terms of that warranty or guarantee.
(E) This section does not create a new cause of action or substantive legal right against any person resulting from the design, planning, supervision of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property.
(F) This section shall be considered to be purely remedial in operation and shall be applied in a remedial manner in any civil action commenced on or after the effective date of this section, in which this section is relevant, regardless of when the cause of action accrued and notwithstanding any other section of the Revised Code or prior rule of law of this state, but shall not be construed to apply to any civil action pending prior to the effective date of this section.
(G) As used in this section, "substantial completion" means the date the improvement to real property is first used by the owner or tenant of the real property or when the real property is first available for use after having the improvement completed in accordance with the contract or agreement covering the improvement, including any agreed changes to the contract or agreement, whichever occurs first.
New Riegel Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer Grp. Architecture & Eng., Inc. (Slip Opinion), 2019 Ohio 2851 (Ohio 2019). · cites it 96ד] Contracts—Construction statute of repose, R.C. 2305.131—Court of appeals erred in reversing trial court’s dismissal of school district’s breach-of-contract claims as time-barred and in applying stare decisis to hold that current version of R.”
Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St. 3d 192 (Ohio 2008). · cites it 22דThe trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on former R.C. 2305.131, a ten-year statute of repose covering architects and builders, and the court of appeals affirmed, upholding the constitutionality of that statute.”
State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999). · cites it 16ד' A Statutes of Repose Former R.C. 2305.131, 134 Ohio Laws, Part I, 530, barred tort actions against designers and engineers of improvements to real property that were brought *476 more than ten years after the completion of the construction services.”
Oaktree Condo. Assn., Inc. v. Hallmark Bldg. Co., 2014 Ohio 1937 (Ohio 2014). · cites it 58ד] Statutes of repose—R.C. 2305.131—Retroactive application to accrued cause of action unconstitutional—Article II, Section 28—Statute of limitations applied.”
Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994). · cites it 23דI We are first asked to decide whether the law of fixtures should be applied when determining if an improvement to real property exists as that term is used in R.C. 2305.131. Citing Zangerle v. Std. Oil of Ohio (1945), 144 Ohio St.”
Union Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Grae-Con Constr., Inc., 2019 Ohio 4877 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 40דThe trial court found the school district’s breach of contract claims barred by the ten-year construction statute of repose in R.C. 2305.131. The school district originally argued this statute of repose is limited to tort claims and does not apply to contract claims, relying on…”
Tuslaw Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. CT Taylor Co., Inc., 2019 Ohio 1731 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 31דTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF MKC ARCHITECTS, INC; CT TAYLOR, INC; AND HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY BECAUSE IT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE BOARD’S BREACH-OF-CONTRACT CLAIMS DID NOT ACCRUE WITHIN THE 10- YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE PROVIDED BY R.C.…”
State v. Karl R. Rohrer Assocs., Inc., 2018 Ohio 65 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 26ד{¶ 5} On September 28, 2015, Appellee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Appellants' complaint was barred by Ohio's statute of repose, R.C. 2305.131. The trial overruled the motion on December 31, 2015, finding R.”
State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 1999 Ohio 123 (Ohio 1999). · cites it 16ד2d 938 , and holding that former R.C. 2305.131, a statute of repose barring tort actions against designers and engineers of improvements to real property, that are brought more than ten years after completion of construction services, violates the right to a remedy guaranteed by…”
Elizabeth Gamble Deaconess Home Ass'n v. Turner Constr. Co., 470 N.E.2d 950 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 17דR.C. 2305.131 sets forth a ten-year bar to any action against architects, engineers, builders and others, for injuries to body or property “arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property.”
Adair v. Koppers Co., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. Ohio 1982). · cites it 19דNo action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained as a result…”
Cyrus v. Henes, 623 N.E.2d 1256 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 13דOn April 9, 1992, Westinghouse moved for summary judgment contending that Cyrus’ action was barred by the statute of repose under R.C. 2305.131. The trial court agreed, granting summary judgment in favor of Westinghouse on October 6, 1992.”
Tuslaw Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. CT Taylor Co., Inc., 2019 Ohio 1731 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF MKC ARCHITECTS, INC; CT TAYLOR, INC; AND HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY BECAUSE IT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE BOARD’S BREACH-OF-CONTRACT CLAIMS DID NOT ACCRUE WITHIN THE 10- YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE PROVIDED BY R.C.…”
Union Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Grae-Con Constr., Inc., 2019 Ohio 4877 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). “The trial court found the school district’s breach of contract claims barred by the ten-year construction statute of repose in R.C. 2305.131. The school district originally argued this statute of repose is limited to tort claims and does not apply to contract claims, relying on…”
Tuslaw Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. CT Taylor Co., Inc., 2019 Ohio 1731 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF MKC ARCHITECTS, INC; CT TAYLOR, INC; AND HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY BECAUSE IT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE BOARD’S BREACH-OF-CONTRACT CLAIMS DID NOT ACCRUE WITHIN THE 10- YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE PROVIDED BY R.C.…”
Oaktree Condo. Assn., Inc. v. Hallmark Bldg. Co., 2014 Ohio 1937 (Ohio 2014). “] Statutes of repose—R.C. 2305.131—Retroactive application to accrued cause of action unconstitutional—Article II, Section 28—Statute of limitations applied.”
Union Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Grae-Con Constr., Inc., 2019 Ohio 4877 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). “The trial court found the school district’s breach of contract claims barred by the ten-year construction statute of repose in R.C. 2305.131. The school district originally argued this statute of repose is limited to tort claims and does not apply to contract claims, relying on…”
Tuslaw Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. CT Taylor Co., Inc., 2019 Ohio 1731 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF MKC ARCHITECTS, INC; CT TAYLOR, INC; AND HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY BECAUSE IT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE BOARD’S BREACH-OF-CONTRACT CLAIMS DID NOT ACCRUE WITHIN THE 10- YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE PROVIDED BY R.C.…”
Union Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Grae-Con Constr., Inc., 2019 Ohio 4877 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). “The trial court found the school district’s breach of contract claims barred by the ten-year construction statute of repose in R.C. 2305.131. The school district originally argued this statute of repose is limited to tort claims and does not apply to contract claims, relying on…”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.131(B) — 1 case
Union Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Grae-Con Constr., Inc., 2019 Ohio 4877 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). “The trial court found the school district’s breach of contract claims barred by the ten-year construction statute of repose in R.C. 2305.131. The school district originally argued this statute of repose is limited to tort claims and does not apply to contract claims, relying on…”
Union Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Grae-Con Constr., Inc., 2019 Ohio 4877 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). “The trial court found the school district’s breach of contract claims barred by the ten-year construction statute of repose in R.C. 2305.131. The school district originally argued this statute of repose is limited to tort claims and does not apply to contract claims, relying on…”
Tuslaw Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. CT Taylor Co., Inc., 2019 Ohio 1731 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF MKC ARCHITECTS, INC; CT TAYLOR, INC; AND HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY BECAUSE IT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE BOARD’S BREACH-OF-CONTRACT CLAIMS DID NOT ACCRUE WITHIN THE 10- YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE PROVIDED BY R.C.…”
Union Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Grae-Con Constr., Inc., 2019 Ohio 4877 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). “The trial court found the school district’s breach of contract claims barred by the ten-year construction statute of repose in R.C. 2305.131. The school district originally argued this statute of repose is limited to tort claims and does not apply to contract claims, relying on…”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.131(E) — 1 case
Union Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Grae-Con Constr., Inc., 2019 Ohio 4877 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). “The trial court found the school district’s breach of contract claims barred by the ten-year construction statute of repose in R.C. 2305.131. The school district originally argued this statute of repose is limited to tort claims and does not apply to contract claims, relying on…”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.131(F) — 2 cases
Union Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Grae-Con Constr., Inc., 2019 Ohio 4877 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). “The trial court found the school district’s breach of contract claims barred by the ten-year construction statute of repose in R.C. 2305.131. The school district originally argued this statute of repose is limited to tort claims and does not apply to contract claims, relying on…”
State v. Karl R. Rohrer Assocs., Inc., 2018 Ohio 65 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). “{¶ 5} On September 28, 2015, Appellee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Appellants' complaint was barred by Ohio's statute of repose, R.C. 2305.131. The trial overruled the motion on December 31, 2015, finding R.”
Union Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Grae-Con Constr., Inc., 2019 Ohio 4877 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). “The trial court found the school district’s breach of contract claims barred by the ten-year construction statute of repose in R.C. 2305.131. The school district originally argued this statute of repose is limited to tort claims and does not apply to contract claims, relying on…”
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