No person shall be liable in civil damages for any breach of a promise to marry, alienation of affections, or criminal conversation, and no person shall be liable in civil damages for seduction of any person eighteen years of age or older who is not incompetent, as defined in section 2111.01 of the Revised Code.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 42
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1981–2024 · leading case: Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988).
Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988). · cites it 24ד5 B We next address whether appellant can assert a claim against Pressnell for intentional infliction of emotional distress in light of R.C. 2305.29, the statute that abolished amatory actions.”
Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio 1989). · cites it 5דAppellant also contends that ap-pellee’s complaint is barred by R.C. 2305.29, the so-called “anti-heart balm” statute.”
Slusher v. Oeder, 476 N.E.2d 714 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 19דR.C. 2305.29 provides that: “No person shall be liable in civil damages for any breach of a promise to marry, alienation of affections, or criminal conversation, and no person shall be liable in civil damages for seduction of any person eighteen years of age or older who is not…”
Wilson v. Dabo, 461 N.E.2d 8 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 10דPlaintiff, Cheryl Wilson, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted on the ground that the complaint was for breach of promise to marry and, therefore, barred by…”
Haskins v. Bias, 441 N.E.2d 842 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981). · cites it 15דFinding that R.C. 2305.29 had abolished civil liability for the commission of the torts alleged in the counterclaim, the court entered judgment on January 16, 1981, granting the motion to dismiss.”
Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, Ohio (Slip Opinion), 2016 Ohio 8118 (Ohio 2016). · cites it 2ד2d 1235 (1988) (holding that R.C. 2305.29’s elimination of common-law amatory actions was constitutional because there was “ ‘no property or vested right in any of the rules of the common law, as guides of conduct’ ”), quoting Leis v.”
Dixon v. Smith, 695 N.E.2d 284 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 4דFirst, Harold argues that since Karen’s claims are based upon a broken promise of marriage, they are barred by R.C. 2305.29, Ohio’s “heart balm” statute.”
Ruther v. Kaiser, 2012 Ohio 5686 (Ohio 2012). · cites it 2דR.C. 2305.29; Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.”
Williams v. Ormsby, 2012 Ohio 690 (Ohio 2012). · cites it 2דFor instance, amatory causes of action were abolished in 1978 through R.C. 2305.29, see also Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.”
Vrabel v. Vrabel, 459 N.E.2d 1298 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 7ד1 *266 II A The question raised by the first assignment of error is, broadly, whether the Ohio “heart balm” statute, R.C. 2305.29, denies due process and/or equal protection under the United States Constitution and due course of law and equal protection 2 under the Ohio…”
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983). · cites it 2דRights Law § 80-a (McKinney 1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.29 (Page 1981); Vt.”
Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818 (S.D. 1981). · cites it 2דIn accord with these authorities, we believe that alienation of affections and criminal conversation, as viable legal remedies, are outmoded archaic holdovers from an era when wives [3] were considered the chattel of their spouse rather than distinct legal entities.”
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