Ohio Rev. Code » Chapter 2919
Ohio Revised Code

Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25 (2026)

Domestic violence

✓ laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026)
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section ORCcodes.ohio.gov (official) Justiaon Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
Effective:
March 20, 2025
Latest Legislation:
House Bill 111 - 135th General Assembly
PDF:
Download Authenticated PDF
 

(A) No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household member.

(B) No person shall recklessly cause serious physical harm to a family or household member.

(C) No person, by threat of force, shall knowingly cause a family or household member to believe that the offender will cause imminent physical harm to the family or household member.

(D)(1) Whoever violates this section is guilty of domestic violence, and the court shall sentence the offender as provided in divisions (D)(2) to (6) of this section.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in divisions (D)(3) to (5) of this section, a violation of division (C) of this section is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree, and a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section is a misdemeanor of the first degree.

(3) Except as otherwise provided in division (D)(4) of this section, if the offender previously has pleaded guilty to or been convicted of domestic violence, a violation of an existing or former municipal ordinance or law of this or any other state or the United States that is substantially similar to domestic violence, a violation of section 2903.14, 2909.06, 2909.07, 2911.12, 2911.211, or 2919.22 of the Revised Code if the victim of the violation was a family or household member at the time of the violation, a violation of an existing or former municipal ordinance or law of this or any other state or the United States that is substantially similar to any of those sections if the victim of the violation was a family or household member at the time of the commission of the violation, or any offense of violence if the victim of the offense was a family or household member at the time of the commission of the offense, a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section is a felony of the fourth degree, and, if the offender knew that the victim of the violation was pregnant at the time of the violation, the court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender pursuant to division (D)(6) of this section, and a violation of division (C) of this section is a misdemeanor of the second degree.

(4) If the offender previously has pleaded guilty to or been convicted of two or more offenses of domestic violence or two or more violations or offenses of the type described in division (D)(3) of this section involving a person who was a family or household member at the time of the violations or offenses, a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree, and there is a presumption for a prison term for the offense, and a violation of division (C) of this section is a misdemeanor of the first degree. If the offender previously has pleaded guilty to or been convicted of two or more offenses of domestic violence or two or more violations or offenses of the type described in division (D)(3) of this section involving a person who was a family or household member at the time of the violations or offenses, and the offender knew that the victim of the violation was pregnant at the time of the violation, a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree, and the court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender pursuant to division (D)(6) of this section.

(5) Except as otherwise provided in division (D)(3) or (4) of this section, if the offender knew that the victim of the violation was pregnant at the time of the violation, a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section is a felony of the fifth degree, and the court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender pursuant to division (D)(6) of this section, and a violation of division (C) of this section is a misdemeanor of the third degree.

(6) If division (D)(3), (4), or (5) of this section requires the court that sentences an offender for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section to impose a mandatory prison term on the offender pursuant to this division, the court shall impose the mandatory prison term as follows:

(a) If the violation of division (A) or (B) of this section is a felony of the fourth or fifth degree, except as otherwise provided in division (D)(6)(b) or (c) of this section, the court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender of at least six months.

(b) If the violation of division (A) or (B) of this section is a felony of the fifth degree and the offender, in committing the violation, caused serious physical harm to the pregnant woman's unborn or caused the termination of the pregnant woman's pregnancy, the court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender of twelve months.

(c) If the violation of division (A) or (B) of this section is a felony of the fourth degree and the offender, in committing the violation, caused serious physical harm to the pregnant woman's unborn or caused the termination of the pregnant woman's pregnancy, the court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender of at least twelve months.

(d) If the violation of division (A) or (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree and the offender knew that the victim of the violation was pregnant at the time of the violation, except as otherwise provided in division (D)(6)(e) of this section and notwithstanding the range of definite prison terms prescribed in division (A)(3) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a felony of the third degree, the court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender of either a definite term of twelve months or one of the prison terms prescribed in division (A)(3)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for felonies of the third degree.

(e) If the violation of division (A) or (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree and the offender, in committing the violation, caused serious physical harm to the pregnant woman's unborn or caused the termination of the pregnant woman's pregnancy, notwithstanding the range of definite prison terms prescribed in division (A)(3) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a felony of the third degree, the court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender of either a definite term of eighteen months or one of the prison terms prescribed in division (A)(3)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for felonies of the third degree.

(E) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, no court or unit of state or local government shall charge any fee, cost, deposit, or money in connection with the filing of charges against a person alleging that the person violated this section or a municipal ordinance substantially similar to this section or in connection with the prosecution of any charges so filed.

(F) As used in this section and sections 2919.251 and 2919.26 of the Revised Code:

(1) "Family or household member" means any of the following:

(a) Any of the following who is residing or has resided with the offender:

(i) A spouse, a person living as a spouse, or a former spouse of the offender;

(ii) A parent, a foster parent, or a child of the offender, or another person related by consanguinity or affinity to the offender;

(iii) A parent or a child of a spouse, person living as a spouse, or former spouse of the offender, or another person related by consanguinity or affinity to a spouse, person living as a spouse, or former spouse of the offender.

(b) The natural parent of any child of whom the offender is the other natural parent or is the putative other natural parent.

(2) "Person living as a spouse" means a person who is living or has lived with the offender in a common law marital relationship, who otherwise is cohabiting with the offender, or who otherwise has cohabited with the offender within five years prior to the date of the alleged commission of the act in question.

(3) "Pregnant woman's unborn" has the same meaning as "such other person's unborn," as set forth in section 2903.09 of the Revised Code, as it relates to the pregnant woman. Division (C) of that section applies regarding the use of the term in this section, except that the second and third sentences of division (C)(1) of that section shall be construed for purposes of this section as if they included a reference to this section in the listing of Revised Code sections they contain.

(4) "Termination of the pregnant woman's pregnancy" has the same meaning as "unlawful termination of another's pregnancy," as set forth in section 2903.09 of the Revised Code, as it relates to the pregnant woman. Division (C) of that section applies regarding the use of the term in this section, except that the second and third sentences of division (C)(1) of that section shall be construed for purposes of this section as if they included a reference to this section in the listing of Revised Code sections they contain.

Last updated January 28, 2025 at 4:30 PM

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 1,941 cases (754 in the last 5 years), 1981–2026 · leading case: State v. Gwen, 2012-Ohio-5046, 982 N.E.2d 626.
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
State v. Gwen, 2012-Ohio-5046, 982 N.E.2d 626. · cites it 57× “{¶ 41} The purpose and legislative history of R.C. 2919.25 remove any doubt as to legislative intent.”
City of Cleveland v. Mincy, 2018-Ohio-3565, 118 N.E.3d 1163. · cites it 52× “The mens rea of knowingly for purposes of R.C. 2919.25 is supported where, “regardless of purpose * * * the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.”
State v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007). · cites it 25× “{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the domestic-violence statute codified at R.C. 2919.25 violates Section 11, Article XV of the Ohio Constitution.”
State v. Woullard, 814 N.E.2d 964 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004). · cites it 15× “{¶ 2} Woullard was indicted on December 19, 2002, on one count of domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). The offense, which is ordinarily a first-degree misdemeanor, was charged as a felony of the fifth degree pursuant to R.”
State v. Spaulding (Slip Opinion), 2016-Ohio-8126. · cites it 9× “And other witnesses testified about the incidents underlying the domestic-violence convictions. {¶ 154} We reject proposition of law Nos.”
City of Shaker Heights v. Mosely, 865 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio 2007). · cites it 16× “11 is a lesser included offense of domestic violence under R.C. 2919.25(A) or (B). See State v. Stuber (3d Dist.”
State v. Plott, 2017-Ohio-38, 80 N.E.3d 1108. · cites it 9× “Specifically, Plott argues that the State failed to prove that Mele was a “family or household member” within the meaning of R.C. 2919.25 and that the State failed to prove that Mele was “placed in fear” within the meaning of R.”
State v. Sanders, 2019-Ohio-1524. · cites it 18× “” {¶4} On January 30, 2018, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Sanders on one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a third-degree felony. The indictment included a furthermore specification clause alleging prior convictions for domestic violence,…”
State v. Hart, 673 N.E.2d 992 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1996). · cites it 28× “22(B)(3), a similar provision could have been inserted in R.C. 2919.25. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Ohio was also presented with the opportunity to engraft the defense of corporal punishment provided for in R.”
State v. Fry, 2010-Ohio-1017, 926 N.E.2d 1239. · cites it 8× “{¶ 89} A violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), the domestic-violence statute, is a first-degree misdemeanor.”
State v. Faggs (Slip Opinion), 2020-Ohio-523, 151 N.E.3d 593. · cites it 13× “] Criminal law—Affirmative defenses—Domestic violence and assault—Corporal punishment—Reasonable parental discipline is an affirmative defense to a charge of domestic violence under R.C. 2919.25(A) or assault under R.C. 2903.”
State v. McGlothan, 2014-Ohio-85, 4 N.E.3d 1021. · cites it 16× “{¶ 1} The state of Ohio appeals from a decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirming Jeffrey McGlothan’s conviction for attempted felonious assault but reversing his conviction for domestic violence.”
Show all 1,941 citing cases →
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(1)(a)(ii): 1 case
State v. Easterling, 2019-Ohio-2470.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A): 1315 cases
City of Cleveland v. Mincy, 2018-Ohio-3565, 118 N.E.3d 1163. “The mens rea of knowingly for purposes of R.C. 2919.25 is supported where, “regardless of purpose * * * the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.”
State v. Faggs (Slip Opinion), 2020-Ohio-523, 151 N.E.3d 593. “] Criminal law—Affirmative defenses—Domestic violence and assault—Corporal punishment—Reasonable parental discipline is an affirmative defense to a charge of domestic violence under R.C. 2919.25(A) or assault under R.C. 2903.”
State v. Gwen, 2012-Ohio-5046, 982 N.E.2d 626. “{¶ 41} The purpose and legislative history of R.C. 2919.25 remove any doubt as to legislative intent.”
State v. Woullard, 814 N.E.2d 964 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004). “{¶ 2} Woullard was indicted on December 19, 2002, on one count of domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). The offense, which is ordinarily a first-degree misdemeanor, was charged as a felony of the fifth degree pursuant to R.”
State v. Sanders, 2019-Ohio-1524. “” {¶4} On January 30, 2018, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Sanders on one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a third-degree felony. The indictment included a furthermore specification clause alleging prior convictions for domestic violence,…”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A)(1): 18 cases
State v. Dowey, 2012-Ohio-4915.
State v. Bowen, 2024-Ohio-1079.
State v. Barnes, 2011-Ohio-2917.
State v. Mauldin, 2010-Ohio-4192.
State v. Warner, 2025-Ohio-667.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A)(1)(a): 1 case
Cleveland v. Merritt, 2016-Ohio-4693, 69 N.E.3d 102.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A)(1)(a)(i): 1 case
Cleveland v. Merritt, 2016-Ohio-4693, 69 N.E.3d 102.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A)(2): 4 cases
City of Cleveland v. Mincy, 2018-Ohio-3565, 118 N.E.3d 1163. “The mens rea of knowingly for purposes of R.C. 2919.25 is supported where, “regardless of purpose * * * the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.”
Cleveland v. Merritt, 2016-Ohio-4693, 69 N.E.3d 102.
State v. Hennigan, 2024-Ohio-404.
C.D. v. P.O.C., 2024-Ohio-1294.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A)(4): 2 cases
State v. Ragland, 2018-Ohio-3292, 118 N.E.3d 1051.
State v. Henry, 2015-Ohio-4145.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A)(B): 2 cases
City of Hamilton v. Cameron, 700 N.E.2d 336 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist. 1997).
State v. Gomez, 2011-Ohio-5475.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A)(D): 6 cases
State v. Magby, 2019-Ohio-877.
State v. Mauldin, 2010-Ohio-4192.
State v. Miller, 2010-Ohio-6390.
State v. Bigsby, 2013-Ohio-5641.
State v. Howell, 2012-Ohio-4349.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A)(D)(1): 1 case
State v. Disher, 2025-Ohio-1287.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A)(D)(2): 4 cases
State v. Green, 2021-Ohio-3260.
State v. Allison, 2021-Ohio-3723.
State v. Cruz, 2023-Ohio-833, 210 N.E.3d 133.
State v. Maxwell, 2026-Ohio-1961.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A)(D)(3): 6 cases
State v. Williams, 2024-Ohio-5578, 258 N.E.3d 658.
State v. Matland, 2010-Ohio-6585.
State v. Nichols, 2024-Ohio-5530.
State v. Artz, 2015-Ohio-3789.
State v. Ali, 2019-Ohio-3192.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A)(D)(4): 7 cases
State v. Meadows, 2020-Ohio-4942.
State v. Kelly, 2013-Ohio-4755.
State v. Menifield, 2024-Ohio-2981.
State v. Clark, 2019-Ohio-4303.
State v. Roles, 2017-Ohio-7389.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A)(D)(5): 2 cases
State v. Rosales, 2020-Ohio-1646.
State v. Shriver, 2025-Ohio-1756.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(B): 21 cases
State v. Black, 2016-Ohio-383, 58 N.E.3d 561.
State v. Bean, 2014-Ohio-908.
State v. Costell, 2016-Ohio-3386.
State v. Dyer, 2017-Ohio-426.
State v. Grieco, 2020-Ohio-6956.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(C): 165 cases
City of Shaker Heights v. Mosely, 865 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio 2007). “11 is a lesser included offense of domestic violence under R.C. 2919.25(A) or (B). See State v. Stuber (3d Dist.”
State v. Casey, 2024-Ohio-689.
State v. Fisher, 2011-Ohio-5965, 968 N.E.2d 510.
City of Cleveland v. Mincy, 2018-Ohio-3565, 118 N.E.3d 1163. “The mens rea of knowingly for purposes of R.C. 2919.25 is supported where, “regardless of purpose * * * the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.”
State v. Peterson, 2021-Ohio-3947.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(C)(D)(2): 1 case
State v. Andrus, 2020-Ohio-6810.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(D): 21 cases
State v. Gwen, 2012-Ohio-5046, 982 N.E.2d 626. “{¶ 41} The purpose and legislative history of R.C. 2919.25 remove any doubt as to legislative intent.”
State v. Woullard, 814 N.E.2d 964 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004). “{¶ 2} Woullard was indicted on December 19, 2002, on one count of domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). The offense, which is ordinarily a first-degree misdemeanor, was charged as a felony of the fifth degree pursuant to R.”
State v. Sanders, 2019-Ohio-1524. “” {¶4} On January 30, 2018, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Sanders on one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a third-degree felony. The indictment included a furthermore specification clause alleging prior convictions for domestic violence,…”
State v. Gomez, 2011-Ohio-5475.
State v. Adkins, 761 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist. 2001).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(D)(1): 6 cases
State v. Browning, 2013-Ohio-2787.
State v. Gomez, 2011-Ohio-5475.
State v. Davis, 2015-Ohio-5196.
State v. D'Agostino, 2014-Ohio-551.
State v. Stark, 2017-Ohio-873.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(D)(1)(3): 1 case
Bryant v. City of Berea, No. 1:23-cv-02032 (N.D. Ohio June 24, 2025).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(D)(1)(4): 2 cases
State v. Swogger, 2025-Ohio-1003.
State v. Whittaker, 2020-Ohio-867.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(D)(2): 35 cases
State v. Gwen, 2012-Ohio-5046, 982 N.E.2d 626. “{¶ 41} The purpose and legislative history of R.C. 2919.25 remove any doubt as to legislative intent.”
State v. Arnold (Slip Opinion), 2016-Ohio-1595, 62 N.E.3d 153.
State v. Fry, 2010-Ohio-1017, 926 N.E.2d 1239. “{¶ 89} A violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), the domestic-violence statute, is a first-degree misdemeanor.”
State v. Jones, 877 N.E.2d 677 (Ohio 2007).
State v. Roberson, 2017-Ohio-4339.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(D)(3): 70 cases
State v. Mallory, 2022-Ohio-3667, 199 N.E.3d 104.
State v. Fry, 2010-Ohio-1017, 926 N.E.2d 1239. “{¶ 89} A violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), the domestic-violence statute, is a first-degree misdemeanor.”
State v. Gwen, 2012-Ohio-5046, 982 N.E.2d 626. “{¶ 41} The purpose and legislative history of R.C. 2919.25 remove any doubt as to legislative intent.”
State v. Vancleef, 2014-Ohio-2144.
City of Shaker Heights v. Mosely, 865 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio 2007). “11 is a lesser included offense of domestic violence under R.C. 2919.25(A) or (B). See State v. Stuber (3d Dist.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(D)(4): 76 cases
State v. Spaulding (Slip Opinion), 2016-Ohio-8126. “And other witnesses testified about the incidents underlying the domestic-violence convictions. {¶ 154} We reject proposition of law Nos.”
State v. Gwen, 2012-Ohio-5046, 982 N.E.2d 626. “{¶ 41} The purpose and legislative history of R.C. 2919.25 remove any doubt as to legislative intent.”
State v. Little, 2016-Ohio-8398, 78 N.E.3d 323.
State v. Fry, 2010-Ohio-1017, 926 N.E.2d 1239. “{¶ 89} A violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), the domestic-violence statute, is a first-degree misdemeanor.”
State v. Russell, 2013-Ohio-1381.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(D)(5): 14 cases
State v. Cross, 2011-Ohio-3250.
State v. Sanders, 2019-Ohio-1524. “” {¶4} On January 30, 2018, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Sanders on one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a third-degree felony. The indictment included a furthermore specification clause alleging prior convictions for domestic violence,…”
State v. Celli, 2017-Ohio-2746.
State v. Gomez, 2011-Ohio-5475.
State v. Cunningham, 2021-Ohio-2710.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(D)(6): 4 cases
State v. Gomez, 2011-Ohio-5475.
State v. Stump, 2016-Ohio-2723.
State v. Kramer, 2011-Ohio-3504.
State v. Abbott, 2013-Ohio-4666.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(D)(6)(a): 5 cases
State v. Celli, 2017-Ohio-2746.
State v. Gomez, 2014-Ohio-5257.
State v. Rosales, 2020-Ohio-1646.
State v. Krick, 2019-Ohio-4822.
State v. Kramer, 2011-Ohio-3504.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(D)(6)(b): 1 case
State v. Kramer, 2011-Ohio-3504.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(D)(6)(d): 1 case
State v. Abbott, 2013-Ohio-4666.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(E): 1 case
State v. Allen, 536 N.E.2d 1195 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 1988).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(E)(1): 2 cases
State v. Mrus, 595 N.E.2d 460 (Ohio Ct. App. 11th Dist. 1991).
State v. Allen, 536 N.E.2d 1195 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 1988).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(E)(1)(A): 1 case
State v. Miller, 664 N.E.2d 1309 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1995).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(E)(1)(a): 9 cases
State v. Williams, 683 N.E.2d 1126 (Ohio 1997).
State v. Woullard, 814 N.E.2d 964 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004). “{¶ 2} Woullard was indicted on December 19, 2002, on one count of domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). The offense, which is ordinarily a first-degree misdemeanor, was charged as a felony of the fifth degree pursuant to R.”
State v. Clay, 910 N.E.2d 14 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 2009).
Cleveland v. Merritt, 2016-Ohio-4693, 69 N.E.3d 102.
State v. Cobb, 795 N.E.2d 73 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2003).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(E)(1)(a)(iii): 1 case
State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St. 3d 459 (1997).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(E)(1)(b): 3 cases
State v. Jorden, 730 N.E.2d 447 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1999).
State v. Mrus, 595 N.E.2d 460 (Ohio Ct. App. 11th Dist. 1991).
State v. Stringfield, 707 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. 1998).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(E)(2): 17 cases
State v. McGlothan, 2014-Ohio-85, 4 N.E.3d 1021. “{¶ 1} The state of Ohio appeals from a decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirming Jeffrey McGlothan’s conviction for attempted felonious assault but reversing his conviction for domestic violence.”
State v. Williams, 683 N.E.2d 1126 (Ohio 1997).
State v. Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 1991).
State v. Riedel, 2017-Ohio-8865, 100 N.E.3d 1155.
State v. Miller, 664 N.E.2d 1309 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1995).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(E)(l)(a)(ii): 3 cases
State v. Harris, 673 N.E.2d 237 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1996).
State v. Jorden, 730 N.E.2d 447 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1999).
Soltesz v. City of Sandusky, 138 F. Supp. 2d 932 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(E)(l)(a)(iii): 1 case
State v. Williams, 683 N.E.2d 1126 (Ohio 1997).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F): 28 cases
State v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007). “{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the domestic-violence statute codified at R.C. 2919.25 violates Section 11, Article XV of the Ohio Constitution.”
State v. Riedel, 2017-Ohio-8865, 100 N.E.3d 1155.
State v. Clay, 910 N.E.2d 14 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 2009).
Cleveland v. Merritt, 2016-Ohio-4693, 69 N.E.3d 102.
State v. Billingsley, 2020-Ohio-2673.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(1): 38 cases
State v. Plott, 2017-Ohio-38, 80 N.E.3d 1108. “Specifically, Plott argues that the State failed to prove that Mele was a “family or household member” within the meaning of R.C. 2919.25 and that the State failed to prove that Mele was “placed in fear” within the meaning of R.”
State v. Woullard, 814 N.E.2d 964 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004). “{¶ 2} Woullard was indicted on December 19, 2002, on one count of domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). The offense, which is ordinarily a first-degree misdemeanor, was charged as a felony of the fifth degree pursuant to R.”
State v. McGlothan, 2014-Ohio-85, 4 N.E.3d 1021. “{¶ 1} The state of Ohio appeals from a decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirming Jeffrey McGlothan’s conviction for attempted felonious assault but reversing his conviction for domestic violence.”
State v. Martinez, 2013-Ohio-3189.
State v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007). “{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the domestic-violence statute codified at R.C. 2919.25 violates Section 11, Article XV of the Ohio Constitution.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(1)(a): 12 cases
State v. Billingsley, 2020-Ohio-2673.
State v. Brown, 2020-Ohio-3614, 154 N.E.3d 1129.
State v. Peterson, 2021-Ohio-3947.
State v. Ward, 849 N.E.2d 1076 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2006).
State v. Burk, 164 Ohio App. 3d 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 2005).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(1): 1 case
State v. Kirkman, 2024-Ohio-5276.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(I): 1 case
State v. Fernandez, 2012-Ohio-2538.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(i): 74 cases
State v. Howell, 2015-Ohio-4049.
State v. Williams, 2020-Ohio-5245.
State v. Riedel, 2017-Ohio-8865, 100 N.E.3d 1155.
State v. Brown, 2020-Ohio-3614, 154 N.E.3d 1129.
State v. Parker, 2020-Ohio-4607.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(ii): 18 cases
State v. Woullard, 814 N.E.2d 964 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004). “{¶ 2} Woullard was indicted on December 19, 2002, on one count of domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). The offense, which is ordinarily a first-degree misdemeanor, was charged as a felony of the fifth degree pursuant to R.”
State v. Quinn, 2016-Ohio-139.
State v. Price, 2019-Ohio-3201.
State v. Grant, 2020-Ohio-3055.
State v. Tripplett, 2023-Ohio-4644, 232 N.E.3d 304.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(iii): 9 cases
State v. Rosa, 2013-Ohio-5867.
State v. Meisel, 2011-Ohio-6426.
State v. Simon, 2021-Ohio-2738.
State v. Danner, 2023-Ohio-638.
State v. Crisp, 2023-Ohio-3537.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(1)(b): 32 cases
State v. Woullard, 814 N.E.2d 964 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004). “{¶ 2} Woullard was indicted on December 19, 2002, on one count of domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). The offense, which is ordinarily a first-degree misdemeanor, was charged as a felony of the fifth degree pursuant to R.”
State v. Moore, 2021-Ohio-1856.
State v. Cooper, 2020-Ohio-3559.
State v. Enoch, 2020-Ohio-3406.
Columbus v. C.G., 2021-Ohio-71.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(1)(i): 4 cases
State v. Simmons, 2011-Ohio-6074.
State v. Pauley, 2019-Ohio-2368.
State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-2478.
State v. Woodruff, 2024-Ohio-4926.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(2): 91 cases
State v. Woullard, 814 N.E.2d 964 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004). “{¶ 2} Woullard was indicted on December 19, 2002, on one count of domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). The offense, which is ordinarily a first-degree misdemeanor, was charged as a felony of the fifth degree pursuant to R.”
State v. Plott, 2017-Ohio-38, 80 N.E.3d 1108. “Specifically, Plott argues that the State failed to prove that Mele was a “family or household member” within the meaning of R.C. 2919.25 and that the State failed to prove that Mele was “placed in fear” within the meaning of R.”
State v. McGlothan, 2014-Ohio-85, 4 N.E.3d 1021. “{¶ 1} The state of Ohio appeals from a decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirming Jeffrey McGlothan’s conviction for attempted felonious assault but reversing his conviction for domestic violence.”
State v. Riedel, 2017-Ohio-8865, 100 N.E.3d 1155.
State v. Howell, 2015-Ohio-4049.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(2)(b): 1 case
State v. Simmons, 2011-Ohio-6074.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(a)(iii): 1 case
State v. Rivera, 2013-Ohio-3244.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(b): 1 case
State v. Peterson, 2021-Ohio-3947.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(l)(a)(i): 2 cases
State v. Ward, 849 N.E.2d 1076 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2006).
State v. Cobb, 795 N.E.2d 73 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2003).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(l)(a)(ii): 1 case
State v. Burk, 164 Ohio App. 3d 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 2005).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(F)(l)(i): 1 case
State v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007). “{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the domestic-violence statute codified at R.C. 2919.25 violates Section 11, Article XV of the Ohio Constitution.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(a): 1 case
State v. McAndrew, 2017-Ohio-8993.
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.