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Ohio Rev. CodeChapter 4511

Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.19 (2026)

Operating vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs - OVI

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1955–2026 2,474citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 2,474 opinions since 1955, 565 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (A)(1)(a) (1,288 cases).

(A)(1) No person shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state, if, at the time of the operation, any of the following apply:

(a) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them.

(b) The person has a concentration of eight-hundredths of one per cent or more but less than seventeen-hundredths of one per cent by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's whole blood.

(c) The person has a concentration of ninety-six-thousandths of one per cent or more but less than two hundred four-thousandths of one per cent by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's blood serum or plasma.

(d) The person has a concentration of eight-hundredths of one gram or more but less than seventeen-hundredths of one gram by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of the person's breath.

(e) The person has a concentration of eleven-hundredths of one gram or more but less than two hundred thirty-eight-thousandths of one gram by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of the person's urine.

(f) The person has a concentration of seventeen-hundredths of one per cent or more by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's whole blood.

(g) The person has a concentration of two hundred four-thousandths of one per cent or more by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's blood serum or plasma.

(h) The person has a concentration of seventeen-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of the person's breath.

(i) The person has a concentration of two hundred thirty-eight-thousandths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of the person's urine.

(j) Except as provided in division (K) of this section, the person has a concentration of any of the following controlled substances or metabolites of a controlled substance in the person's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, or urine that equals or exceeds any of the following:

(i) The person has a concentration of amphetamine in the person's urine of at least five hundred nanograms of amphetamine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of amphetamine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least one hundred nanograms of amphetamine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(ii) The person has a concentration of cocaine in the person's urine of at least one hundred fifty nanograms of cocaine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of cocaine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of cocaine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(iii) The person has a concentration of cocaine metabolite in the person's urine of at least one hundred fifty nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of cocaine metabolite in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(iv) The person has a concentration of heroin in the person's urine of at least two thousand nanograms of heroin per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of heroin in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of heroin per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(v) The person has a concentration of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) in the person's urine of at least ten nanograms of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least ten nanograms of heroin metabolite (6-monoacetyl morphine) per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(vi) The person has a concentration of L.S.D. in the person's urine of at least twenty-five nanograms of L.S.D. per milliliter of the person's urine or a concentration of L.S.D. in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least ten nanograms of L.S.D. per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(vii) The person has a concentration of marihuana in the person's urine of at least ten nanograms of marihuana per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of marihuana in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least two nanograms of marihuana per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(viii) Either of the following applies:

(I) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them, and the person has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's urine of at least fifteen nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least five nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(II) The person has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's urine of at least thirty-five nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(ix) The person has a concentration of methamphetamine in the person's urine of at least five hundred nanograms of methamphetamine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of methamphetamine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least one hundred nanograms of methamphetamine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(x) The person has a concentration of phencyclidine in the person's urine of at least twenty-five nanograms of phencyclidine per milliliter of the person's urine or has a concentration of phencyclidine in the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma of at least ten nanograms of phencyclidine per milliliter of the person's whole blood or blood serum or plasma.

(xi) The state board of pharmacy has adopted a rule pursuant to section 4729.041 of the Revised Code that specifies the amount of salvia divinorum and the amount of salvinorin A that constitute concentrations of salvia divinorum and salvinorin A in a person's urine, in a person's whole blood, or in a person's blood serum or plasma at or above which the person is impaired for purposes of operating any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state, the rule is in effect, and the person has a concentration of salvia divinorum or salvinorin A of at least that amount so specified by rule in the person's urine, in the person's whole blood, or in the person's blood serum or plasma.

(2) No person who, within twenty years of the conduct described in division (A)(2)(a) of this section, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this division, a violation of division (A)(1) of this section, or any other equivalent offense shall do both of the following:

(a) Operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them;

(b) Subsequent to being arrested for operating the vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley as described in division (A)(2)(a) of this section, being asked by a law enforcement officer to submit to a chemical test or tests under section 4511.191 of the Revised Code, and being advised by the officer in accordance with section 4511.192 of the Revised Code of the consequences of the person's refusal or submission to the test or tests, refuse to submit to the test or tests.

(B) No person under twenty-one years of age shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state, if, at the time of the operation, any of the following apply:

(1) The person has a concentration of at least two-hundredths of one per cent but less than eight-hundredths of one per cent by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's whole blood.

(2) The person has a concentration of at least three-hundredths of one per cent but less than ninety-six-thousandths of one per cent by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person's blood serum or plasma.

(3) The person has a concentration of at least two-hundredths of one gram but less than eight-hundredths of one gram by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of the person's breath.

(4) The person has a concentration of at least twenty-eight one-thousandths of one gram but less than eleven-hundredths of one gram by weight of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of the person's urine.

(C) In any proceeding arising out of one incident, a person may be charged with a violation of division (A)(1)(a) or (A)(2) and a violation of division (B)(1), (2), or (3) of this section, but the person may not be convicted of more than one violation of these divisions.

(D)(1)(a) In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A)(1)(a) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is vehicle-related, the result of any test of any blood, oral fluid, or urine withdrawn and analyzed at any health care provider, as defined in section 2317.02 of the Revised Code, may be admitted with expert testimony to be considered with any other relevant and competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

(b) In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is vehicle-related, the court may admit evidence on the presence and concentration of alcohol, drugs of abuse, controlled substances, metabolites of a controlled substance, or a combination of them in the defendant's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, urine, oral fluid, or other bodily substance at the time of the alleged violation as shown by chemical analysis of the substance withdrawn within three hours of the time of the alleged violation. The three-hour time limit specified in this division regarding the admission of evidence does not extend or affect the two-hour time limit specified in division (A) of section 4511.192 of the Revised Code as the maximum period of time during which a person may consent to a chemical test or tests as described in that section. The court may admit evidence on the presence and concentration of alcohol, drugs of abuse, or a combination of them as described in this division when a person submits to a blood, breath, urine, oral fluid, or other bodily substance test at the request of a law enforcement officer under section 4511.191 of the Revised Code or a blood or urine sample is obtained pursuant to a search warrant. Only a physician, a registered nurse, an emergency medical technician-intermediate, an emergency medical technician-paramedic, or a qualified technician, chemist, or phlebotomist shall withdraw a blood sample for the purpose of determining the alcohol, drug, controlled substance, metabolite of a controlled substance, or combination content of the whole blood, blood serum, or blood plasma. This limitation does not apply to the taking of breath, oral fluid, or urine specimens. A person authorized to withdraw blood under this division may refuse to withdraw blood under this division, if in that person's opinion, the physical welfare of the person would be endangered by the withdrawing of blood.

The bodily substance withdrawn under division (D)(1)(b) of this section shall be analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the director of health by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the director pursuant to section 3701.143 of the Revised Code.

(c) As used in division (D)(1)(b) of this section, "emergency medical technician-intermediate" and "emergency medical technician-paramedic" have the same meanings as in section 4765.01 of the Revised Code.

(2) In a criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is vehicle-related, if there was at the time the bodily substance was withdrawn a concentration of less than the applicable concentration of alcohol specified in divisions (A)(1)(b), (c), (d), and (e) of this section or less than the applicable concentration of a listed controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a controlled substance specified for a violation of division (A)(1)(j) of this section, that fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. This division does not limit or affect a criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (B) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is substantially equivalent to that division.

(3) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the chemical test shall be made available to the person or the person's attorney, immediately upon the completion of the chemical test analysis.

If the chemical test was obtained pursuant to division (D)(1)(b) of this section, the person tested may have a physician, a registered nurse, or a qualified technician, chemist, or phlebotomist of the person's own choosing administer a chemical test or tests, at the person's expense, in addition to any administered at the request of a law enforcement officer. If the person was under arrest as described in division (A)(5) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code, the arresting officer shall advise the person at the time of the arrest that the person may have an independent chemical test taken at the person's own expense. If the person was under arrest other than described in division (A)(5) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code, the form to be read to the person to be tested, as required under section 4511.192 of the Revised Code, shall state that the person may have an independent test performed at the person's expense. The failure or inability to obtain an additional chemical test by a person shall not preclude the admission of evidence relating to the chemical test or tests taken at the request of a law enforcement officer.

(4)(a) As used in divisions (D)(4)(b) and (c) of this section, "national highway traffic safety administration" means the national highway traffic safety administration established as an administration of the United States department of transportation under 96 Stat. 2415 (1983), 49 U.S.C.A. 105.

(b) In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section, of a municipal ordinance relating to operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol and a drug of abuse, or of a municipal ordinance relating to operating a vehicle with a prohibited concentration of alcohol, a controlled substance, or a metabolite of a controlled substance in the whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, oral fluid, or urine, if a law enforcement officer has administered a field sobriety test to the operator of the vehicle involved in the violation and if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test in substantial compliance with the testing standards for any reliable, credible, and generally accepted field sobriety tests that were in effect at the time the tests were administered, including, but not limited to, any testing standards then in effect that were set by the national highway traffic safety administration, all of the following apply:

(i) The officer may testify concerning the results of the field sobriety test so administered.

(ii) The prosecution may introduce the results of the field sobriety test so administered as evidence in any proceedings in the criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding.

(iii) If testimony is presented or evidence is introduced under division (D)(4)(b)(i) or (ii) of this section and if the testimony or evidence is admissible under the Rules of Evidence, the court shall admit the testimony or evidence and the trier of fact shall give it whatever weight the trier of fact considers to be appropriate.

(c) Division (D)(4)(b) of this section does not limit or preclude a court, in its determination of whether the arrest of a person was supported by probable cause or its determination of any other matter in a criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding of a type described in that division, from considering evidence or testimony that is not otherwise disallowed by division (D)(4)(b) of this section.

(E)(1) Subject to division (E)(3) of this section, in any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A)(1)(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), or (j) or (B)(1), (2), (3), or (4) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is substantially equivalent to any of those divisions, a laboratory report from any laboratory personnel issued a permit by the department of health authorizing an analysis as described in this division that contains an analysis of the whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, urine, or other bodily substance tested and that contains all of the information specified in this division shall be admitted as prima-facie evidence of the information and statements that the report contains. The laboratory report shall contain all of the following:

(a) The signature, under oath, of any person who performed the analysis;

(b) Any findings as to the identity and quantity of alcohol, a drug of abuse, a controlled substance, a metabolite of a controlled substance, or a combination of them that was found;

(c) A copy of a notarized statement by the laboratory director or a designee of the director that contains the name of each certified analyst or test performer involved with the report, the analyst's or test performer's employment relationship with the laboratory that issued the report, and a notation that performing an analysis of the type involved is part of the analyst's or test performer's regular duties;

(d) An outline of the analyst's or test performer's education, training, and experience in performing the type of analysis involved and a certification that the laboratory satisfies appropriate quality control standards in general and, in this particular analysis, under rules of the department of health.

(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law regarding the admission of evidence, a report of the type described in division (E)(1) of this section is not admissible against the defendant to whom it pertains in any proceeding, other than a preliminary hearing or a grand jury proceeding, unless the prosecutor has served a copy of the report on the defendant's attorney or, if the defendant has no attorney, on the defendant.

(3) A report of the type described in division (E)(1) of this section shall not be prima-facie evidence of the contents, identity, or amount of any substance if, within seven days after the defendant to whom the report pertains or the defendant's attorney receives a copy of the report, the defendant or the defendant's attorney demands the testimony of the person who signed the report. The judge in the case may extend the seven-day time limit in the interest of justice.

(F) Except as otherwise provided in this division, any physician, registered nurse, emergency medical technician-intermediate, emergency medical technician-paramedic, or qualified technician, chemist, or phlebotomist who withdraws blood from a person pursuant to this section or section 4511.191 or 4511.192 of the Revised Code, and any hospital, first-aid station, or clinic at which blood is withdrawn from a person pursuant to this section or section 4511.191 or 4511.192 of the Revised Code, is immune from criminal liability and civil liability based upon a claim of assault and battery or any other claim that is not a claim of malpractice, for any act performed in withdrawing blood from the person. The immunity provided in this division also extends to an emergency medical service organization that employs an emergency medical technician-intermediate or emergency medical technician-paramedic who withdraws blood under this section. The immunity provided in this division is not available to a person who withdraws blood if the person engages in willful or wanton misconduct.

As used in this division, "emergency medical technician-intermediate" and "emergency medical technician-paramedic" have the same meanings as in section 4765.01 of the Revised Code.

(G)(1) Whoever violates any provision of divisions (A)(1)(a) to (i) or (A)(2) of this section is guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them. Whoever violates division (A)(1)(j) of this section is guilty of operating a vehicle while under the influence of a listed controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a controlled substance. The court shall sentence the offender for either offense under Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code, except as otherwise authorized or required by divisions (G)(1)(a) to (e) of this section:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (G)(1)(b), (c), (d), or (e) of this section, the offender is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, and the court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section, a mandatory jail term of three consecutive days. As used in this division, three consecutive days means seventy-two consecutive hours. The court may sentence an offender to both an intervention program and a jail term. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the three-day mandatory jail term or intervention program. However, in no case shall the cumulative jail term imposed for the offense exceed six months.

The court may suspend the execution of the three-day jail term under this division if the court, in lieu of that suspended term, places the offender under a community control sanction pursuant to section 2929.25 of the Revised Code and requires the offender to attend, for three consecutive days, a drivers' intervention program certified under section 5119.38 of the Revised Code. The court also may suspend the execution of any part of the three-day jail term under this division if it places the offender under a community control sanction pursuant to section 2929.25 of the Revised Code for part of the three days, requires the offender to attend for the suspended part of the term a drivers' intervention program so certified, and sentences the offender to a jail term equal to the remainder of the three consecutive days that the offender does not spend attending the program. The court may require the offender, as a condition of community control and in addition to the required attendance at a drivers' intervention program, to attend and satisfactorily complete any treatment or education programs that comply with the minimum standards adopted pursuant to Chapter 5119. of the Revised Code by the director of mental health and addiction services that the operators of the drivers' intervention program determine that the offender should attend and to report periodically to the court on the offender's progress in the programs. The court also may impose on the offender any other conditions of community control that it considers necessary.

If the court grants unlimited driving privileges to a first-time offender under section 4510.022 of the Revised Code, all penalties imposed upon the offender by the court under division (G)(1)(a)(i) of this section for the offense apply, except that the court shall suspend any mandatory or additional jail term imposed by the court under division (G)(1)(a)(i) of this section upon granting unlimited driving privileges in accordance with section 4510.022 of the Revised Code.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, except as otherwise provided in this division, a mandatory jail term of at least three consecutive days and a requirement that the offender attend, for three consecutive days, a drivers' intervention program that is certified pursuant to section 5119.38 of the Revised Code. As used in this division, three consecutive days means seventy-two consecutive hours. If the court determines that the offender is not conducive to treatment in a drivers' intervention program, if the offender refuses to attend a drivers' intervention program, or if the jail at which the offender is to serve the jail term imposed can provide a driver's intervention program, the court shall sentence the offender to a mandatory jail term of at least six consecutive days.

If the court grants unlimited driving privileges to a first-time offender under section 4510.022 of the Revised Code, all penalties imposed upon the offender by the court under division (G)(1)(a)(ii) of this section for the offense apply, except that the court shall suspend any mandatory or additional jail term imposed by the court under division (G)(1)(a)(ii) of this section upon granting unlimited driving privileges in accordance with section 4510.022 of the Revised Code.

The court may require the offender, under a community control sanction imposed under section 2929.25 of the Revised Code, to attend and satisfactorily complete any treatment or education programs that comply with the minimum standards adopted pursuant to Chapter 5119. of the Revised Code by the director of mental health and addiction services, in addition to the required attendance at drivers' intervention program, that the operators of the drivers' intervention program determine that the offender should attend and to report periodically to the court on the offender's progress in the programs. The court also may impose any other conditions of community control on the offender that it considers necessary.

(iii) In all cases, a fine of not less than five hundred sixty-five and not more than one thousand seventy-five dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a suspension of the offender's driver's or commercial driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege for a definite period of one to three years. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code. The court may grant unlimited driving privileges with an ignition interlock device relative to the suspension and may reduce the period of suspension as authorized under section 4510.022 of the Revised Code.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in division (G)(1)(e) of this section, an offender who, within ten years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one violation of division (A) of this section or one other equivalent offense is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. The court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section, a mandatory jail term of ten consecutive days. The court shall impose the ten-day mandatory jail term under this division unless, subject to division (G)(3) of this section, it instead imposes a sentence under that division consisting of both a jail term and a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the ten-day mandatory jail term. The cumulative jail term imposed for the offense shall not exceed six months.

In addition to the jail term or the term of house arrest with electronic monitoring or continuous alcohol monitoring or both types of monitoring and jail term, the court shall require the offender to be assessed by a community addiction services provider that is authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The purpose of the assessment is to determine the degree of the offender's alcohol usage and to determine whether or not treatment is warranted. Upon the request of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, except as otherwise provided in this division, a mandatory jail term of twenty consecutive days. The court shall impose the twenty-day mandatory jail term under this division unless, subject to division (G)(3) of this section, it instead imposes a sentence under that division consisting of both a jail term and a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the twenty-day mandatory jail term. The cumulative jail term imposed for the offense shall not exceed six months.

In addition to the jail term or the term of house arrest with electronic monitoring or continuous alcohol monitoring or both types of monitoring and jail term, the court shall require the offender to be assessed by a community addiction service provider that is authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The purpose of the assessment is to determine the degree of the offender's alcohol usage and to determine whether or not treatment is warranted. Upon the request of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(iii) In all cases, notwithstanding the fines set forth in Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code, a fine of not less than seven hundred fifteen and not more than one thousand six hundred twenty-five dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege for a definite period of one to seven years. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(v) In all cases, if the vehicle is registered in the offender's name, immobilization of the vehicle involved in the offense for ninety days in accordance with section 4503.233 of the Revised Code and impoundment of the license plates of that vehicle for ninety days.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in division (G)(1)(e) of this section, an offender who, within ten years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to two violations of division (A) of this section or other equivalent offenses is guilty of a misdemeanor. The court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section, a mandatory jail term of thirty consecutive days. The court shall impose the thirty-day mandatory jail term under this division unless, subject to division (G)(3) of this section, it instead imposes a sentence under that division consisting of both a jail term and a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the thirty-day mandatory jail term. Notwithstanding the jail terms set forth in sections 2929.21 to 2929.28 of the Revised Code, the additional jail term shall not exceed one year, and the cumulative jail term imposed for the offense shall not exceed one year.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, a mandatory jail term of sixty consecutive days. The court shall impose the sixty-day mandatory jail term under this division unless, subject to division (G)(3) of this section, it instead imposes a sentence under that division consisting of both a jail term and a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The court may impose a jail term in addition to the sixty-day mandatory jail term. Notwithstanding the jail terms set forth in sections 2929.21 to 2929.28 of the Revised Code, the additional jail term shall not exceed one year, and the cumulative jail term imposed for the offense shall not exceed one year.

(iii) In all cases, notwithstanding the fines set forth in Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code, a fine of not less than one thousand forty and not more than two thousand seven hundred fifty dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege for a definite period of two to twelve years. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(v) In all cases, if the vehicle is registered in the offender's name, criminal forfeiture of the vehicle involved in the offense in accordance with section 4503.234 of the Revised Code. Division (G)(6) of this section applies regarding any vehicle that is subject to an order of criminal forfeiture under this division.

(vi) In all cases, the court shall order the offender to participate with a community addiction services provider authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The operator of the services provider shall determine and assess the degree of the offender's alcohol dependency and shall make recommendations for treatment. Upon the request of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in division (G)(1)(e) of this section, an offender who, within ten years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or four violations of division (A) of this section or other equivalent offenses, an offender who, within twenty years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to five or more violations of that nature, or an offender who previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1413 of the Revised Code, is guilty of a felony of the fourth degree. The court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section, a mandatory prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years as required by and in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1413 of the Revised Code or, in the discretion of the court, either a mandatory term of local incarceration of sixty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code or a mandatory prison term of sixty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(2) of that section if the offender is not convicted of and does not plead guilty to a specification of that type. If the court imposes a mandatory term of local incarceration, it may impose a jail term in addition to the sixty-day mandatory term, the cumulative total of the mandatory term and the jail term for the offense shall not exceed one year, and, except as provided in division (A)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code, no prison term is authorized for the offense. If the court imposes a mandatory prison term, notwithstanding division (A)(4) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, it also may sentence the offender to a definite prison term that shall be not less than six months and not more than thirty months and the prison terms shall be imposed as described in division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code. If the court imposes a mandatory prison term or mandatory prison term and additional prison term, in addition to the term or terms so imposed, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction for the offense, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, a mandatory prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years as required by and in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1413 of the Revised Code or, in the discretion of the court, either a mandatory term of local incarceration of one hundred twenty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code or a mandatory prison term of one hundred twenty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(2) of that section if the offender is not convicted of and does not plead guilty to a specification of that type. If the court imposes a mandatory term of local incarceration, it may impose a jail term in addition to the one hundred twenty-day mandatory term, the cumulative total of the mandatory term and the jail term for the offense shall not exceed one year, and, except as provided in division (A)(1) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code, no prison term is authorized for the offense. If the court imposes a mandatory prison term, notwithstanding division (A)(4) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, it also may sentence the offender to a definite prison term that shall be not less than six months and not more than thirty months and the prison terms shall be imposed as described in division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code. If the court imposes a mandatory prison term or mandatory prison term and additional prison term, in addition to the term or terms so imposed, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction for the offense, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

(iii) In all cases, notwithstanding section 2929.18 of the Revised Code, a fine of not less than one thousand five hundred forty nor more than ten thousand five hundred dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a class two license suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(2) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(v) In all cases, if the vehicle is registered in the offender's name, criminal forfeiture of the vehicle involved in the offense in accordance with section 4503.234 of the Revised Code. Division (G)(6) of this section applies regarding any vehicle that is subject to an order of criminal forfeiture under this division.

(vi) In all cases, the court shall order the offender to participate with a community addiction services provider authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The operator of the services provider shall determine and assess the degree of the offender's alcohol dependency and shall make recommendations for treatment. Upon the request of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(vii) In all cases, if the court sentences the offender to a mandatory term of local incarceration, in addition to the mandatory term, the court, pursuant to section 2929.17 of the Revised Code, may impose a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring. The term shall not commence until after the offender has served the mandatory term of local incarceration.

(e) An offender who previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of division (A) of this section that was a felony, regardless of when the violation and the conviction or guilty plea occurred, is guilty of a felony of the third degree. The court shall sentence the offender to all of the following:

(i) If the offender is being sentenced for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section, a mandatory prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years as required by and in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1413 of the Revised Code or a mandatory prison term of sixty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender is not convicted of and does not plead guilty to a specification of that type. The court may impose a prison term in addition to the mandatory prison term. The cumulative total of a sixty-day mandatory prison term and the additional prison term for the offense shall not exceed five years. In addition to the mandatory prison term or mandatory prison term and additional prison term the court imposes, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction for the offense, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

(ii) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of division (A)(1)(f), (g), (h), or (i) or division (A)(2) of this section, a mandatory prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years as required by and in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section 2941.1413 of the Revised Code or a mandatory prison term of one hundred twenty consecutive days in accordance with division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code if the offender is not convicted of and does not plead guilty to a specification of that type. The court may impose a prison term in addition to the mandatory prison term. The cumulative total of a one hundred twenty-day mandatory prison term and the additional prison term for the offense shall not exceed five years. In addition to the mandatory prison term or mandatory prison term and additional prison term the court imposes, the court also may sentence the offender to a community control sanction for the offense, but the offender shall serve all of the prison terms so imposed prior to serving the community control sanction.

(iii) In all cases, notwithstanding section 2929.18 of the Revised Code, a fine of not less than one thousand five hundred forty nor more than ten thousand five hundred dollars;

(iv) In all cases, a class two license suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(2) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(v) In all cases, if the vehicle is registered in the offender's name, criminal forfeiture of the vehicle involved in the offense in accordance with section 4503.234 of the Revised Code. Division (G)(6) of this section applies regarding any vehicle that is subject to an order of criminal forfeiture under this division.

(vi) In all cases, the court shall order the offender to participate with a community addiction services provider authorized by section 5119.21 of the Revised Code, subject to division (I) of this section, and shall order the offender to follow the treatment recommendations of the services provider. The operator of the services provider shall determine and assess the degree of the offender's alcohol dependency and shall make recommendations for treatment. Upon the request of the court, the services provider shall submit the results of the assessment to the court, including all treatment recommendations and clinical diagnoses related to alcohol use.

(2) An offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A) of this section and who subsequently seeks reinstatement of the driver's or occupational driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege suspended under this section as a result of the conviction or guilty plea shall pay a reinstatement fee as provided in division (F)(2) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code.

(3) If an offender is sentenced to a jail term under division (G)(1)(b)(i) or (ii) or (G)(1)(c)(i) or (ii) of this section and if, within sixty days of sentencing of the offender, the court issues a written finding on the record that, due to the unavailability of space at the jail where the offender is required to serve the term, the offender will not be able to begin serving that term within the sixty-day period following the date of sentencing, the court may impose an alternative sentence under this division that includes a term of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring.

As an alternative to a mandatory jail term of ten consecutive days required by division (G)(1)(b)(i) of this section, the court, under this division, may sentence the offender to five consecutive days in jail and not less than eighteen consecutive days of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The cumulative total of the five consecutive days in jail and the period of house arrest with electronic monitoring, continuous alcohol monitoring, or both types of monitoring shall not exceed six months. The five consecutive days in jail do not have to be served prior to or consecutively to the period of house arrest.

As an alternative to the mandatory jail term of twenty consecutive days required by division (G)(1)(b)(ii) of this section, the court, under this division, may sentence the offender to ten consecutive days in jail and not less than thirty-six consecutive days of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The cumulative total of the ten consecutive days in jail and the period of house arrest with electronic monitoring, continuous alcohol monitoring, or both types of monitoring shall not exceed six months. The ten consecutive days in jail do not have to be served prior to or consecutively to the period of house arrest.

As an alternative to a mandatory jail term of thirty consecutive days required by division (G)(1)(c)(i) of this section, the court, under this division, may sentence the offender to fifteen consecutive days in jail and not less than fifty-five consecutive days of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The cumulative total of the fifteen consecutive days in jail and the period of house arrest with electronic monitoring, continuous alcohol monitoring, or both types of monitoring shall not exceed one year. The fifteen consecutive days in jail do not have to be served prior to or consecutively to the period of house arrest.

As an alternative to the mandatory jail term of sixty consecutive days required by division (G)(1)(c)(ii) of this section, the court, under this division, may sentence the offender to thirty consecutive days in jail and not less than one hundred ten consecutive days of house arrest with electronic monitoring, with continuous alcohol monitoring, or with both electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring. The cumulative total of the thirty consecutive days in jail and the period of house arrest with electronic monitoring, continuous alcohol monitoring, or both types of monitoring shall not exceed one year. The thirty consecutive days in jail do not have to be served prior to or consecutively to the period of house arrest.

(4) If an offender's driver's or occupational driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege is suspended under division (G) of this section and if section 4510.13 of the Revised Code permits the court to grant limited driving privileges, the court may grant the limited driving privileges in accordance with that section. If division (A)(7) of that section requires that the court impose as a condition of the privileges that the offender must display on the vehicle that is driven subject to the privileges restricted license plates that are issued under section 4503.231 of the Revised Code, except as provided in division (B) of that section, the court shall impose that condition as one of the conditions of the limited driving privileges granted to the offender, except as provided in division (B) of section 4503.231 of the Revised Code.

(5) Fines imposed under this section for a violation of division (A) of this section shall be distributed as follows:

(a) Twenty-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii), thirty-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(b)(iii), one hundred twenty-three dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(c)(iii), and two hundred ten dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(d)(iii) or (e)(iii) of this section shall be paid to an enforcement and education fund established by the legislative authority of the law enforcement agency in this state that primarily was responsible for the arrest of the offender, as determined by the court that imposes the fine. The agency shall use this share to pay only those costs it incurs in enforcing this section or a municipal OVI ordinance and in informing the public of the laws governing the operation of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the dangers of the operation of a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, and other information relating to the operation of a vehicle under the influence of alcohol and the consumption of alcoholic beverages.

(b) Fifty dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii) of this section shall be paid to the political subdivision that pays the cost of housing the offender during the offender's term of incarceration. If the offender is being sentenced for a violation of division (A)(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (j) of this section and was confined as a result of the offense prior to being sentenced for the offense but is not sentenced to a term of incarceration, the fifty dollars shall be paid to the political subdivision that paid the cost of housing the offender during that period of confinement. The political subdivision shall use the share under this division to pay or reimburse incarceration or treatment costs it incurs in housing or providing drug and alcohol treatment to persons who violate this section or a municipal OVI ordinance, costs of any immobilizing or disabling device used on the offender's vehicle, and costs of electronic house arrest equipment needed for persons who violate this section.

(c) Twenty-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii) and fifty dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(b)(iii) of this section shall be deposited into the county or municipal indigent drivers' alcohol treatment fund under the control of that court, as created by the county or municipal corporation under division (H) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code.

(d) One hundred fifteen dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(b)(iii), two hundred seventy-seven dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(c)(iii), and four hundred forty dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(d)(iii) or (e)(iii) of this section shall be paid to the political subdivision that pays the cost of housing the offender during the offender's term of incarceration. The political subdivision shall use this share to pay or reimburse incarceration or treatment costs it incurs in housing or providing drug and alcohol treatment to persons who violate this section or a municipal OVI ordinance, costs for any immobilizing or disabling device used on the offender's vehicle, and costs of electronic house arrest equipment needed for persons who violate this section.

(e) One hundred twenty-five dollars of the fine imposed under divisions (G)(1)(a)(iii), (G)(1)(b)(iii), (G)(1)(c)(iii), (G)(1)(d)(iii), and (G)(1)(e)(iii) of this section shall be deposited into the special projects fund of the court in which the offender was convicted and that is established under division (E)(1) of section 2303.201, division (B)(1) of section 1901.26, or division (B)(1) of section 1907.24 of the Revised Code, to be used exclusively to cover the cost of immobilizing or disabling devices, including certified ignition interlock devices, and remote alcohol monitoring devices for indigent offenders who are required by a judge to use either of these devices. If the court in which the offender was convicted does not have a special projects fund that is established under division (E)(1) of section 2303.201, division (B)(1) of section 1901.26, or division (B)(1) of section 1907.24 of the Revised Code, the one hundred twenty-five dollars shall be deposited into the indigent drivers interlock and alcohol monitoring fund under division (I) of section 4511.191 of the Revised Code.

(f) Seventy-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii), one hundred twenty-five dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(b)(iii), two hundred fifty dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(c)(iii), and five hundred dollars of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(d)(iii) or (e)(iii) of this section shall be transmitted to the treasurer of state for deposit into the indigent defense support fund established under section 120.08 of the Revised Code.

(g) One hundred fifteen dollars shall be credited to the statewide treatment and prevention fund created by section 4301.30 of the Revised Code. Money credited to the fund under this section shall be used for purposes identified under section 5119.22 of the Revised Code.

(h) The balance of the fine imposed under division (G)(1)(a)(iii), (b)(iii), (c)(iii), (d)(iii), or (e)(iii) of this section shall be disbursed as otherwise provided by law.

(6) If title to a motor vehicle that is subject to an order of criminal forfeiture under division (G)(1)(c), (d), or (e) of this section is assigned or transferred and division (B)(2) or (3) of section 4503.234 of the Revised Code applies, in addition to or independent of any other penalty established by law, the court may fine the offender the value of the vehicle as determined by publications of the national automobile dealers association. The proceeds of any fine so imposed shall be distributed in accordance with division (C)(2) of that section.

(7) In all cases in which an offender is sentenced under division (G) of this section, the offender shall provide the court with proof of financial responsibility as defined in section 4509.01 of the Revised Code. If the offender fails to provide that proof of financial responsibility, the court, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, may order restitution pursuant to section 2929.18 or 2929.28 of the Revised Code in an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars for any economic loss arising from an accident or collision that was the direct and proximate result of the offender's operation of the vehicle before, during, or after committing the offense for which the offender is sentenced under division (G) of this section.

(8) A court may order an offender to reimburse a law enforcement agency for any costs incurred by the agency with respect to a chemical test or tests administered to the offender if all of the following apply:

(a) The offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A) of this section.

(b) The test or tests were of the offender's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, oral fluid, or urine.

(c) The test or tests indicated that the offender had one of the following at the time of the offense:

(i) A prohibited concentration of a controlled substance or a metabolite of a controlled substance in the offender's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, or urine;

(ii) A drug of abuse or a metabolite of a drug of abuse in the offender's oral fluid.

(9) A court may warn any person who is convicted of or who pleads guilty to a violation of division (A) of this section or an equivalent offense that a subsequent violation of this section or an equivalent offense that results in the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy may result in the person being guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide under section 2903.06 of the Revised Code. The court may warn the person of the applicable penalties for that violation under sections 2903.06 and 2929.142 of the Revised Code.

(10) As used in division (G) of this section, "electronic monitoring," "mandatory prison term," and "mandatory term of local incarceration" have the same meanings as in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.

(H) Whoever violates division (B) of this section is guilty of operating a vehicle after underage alcohol consumption and shall be punished as follows:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in division (H)(2) of this section, the offender is guilty of a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. In addition to any other sanction imposed for the offense, the court shall impose a class six suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(6) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code. The court may grant unlimited driving privileges with an ignition interlock device relative to the suspension and may reduce the period of suspension as authorized under section 4510.022 of the Revised Code. If the court grants unlimited driving privileges under section 4510.022 of the Revised Code, the court shall suspend any jail term imposed under division (H)(1) of this section as required under that section.

(2) If, within one year of the offense, the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one or more violations of division (A) of this section or other equivalent offenses, the offender is guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree. In addition to any other sanction imposed for the offense, the court shall impose a class four suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(4) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code. The court may grant limited driving privileges relative to the suspension under sections 4510.021 and 4510.13 of the Revised Code.

(3) The offender shall provide the court with proof of financial responsibility as defined in section 4509.01 of the Revised Code. If the offender fails to provide that proof of financial responsibility, then, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, the court may order restitution pursuant to section 2929.28 of the Revised Code in an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars for any economic loss arising from an accident or collision that was the direct and proximate result of the offender's operation of the vehicle before, during, or after committing the violation of division (B) of this section.

(I)(1) No court shall sentence an offender to an alcohol treatment program under this section unless the treatment program complies with the minimum standards for alcohol treatment programs adopted under Chapter 5119. of the Revised Code by the director of mental health and addiction services.

(2) An offender who stays in a drivers' intervention program or in an alcohol treatment program under an order issued under this section shall pay the cost of the stay in the program. However, if the court determines that an offender who stays in an alcohol treatment program under an order issued under this section is unable to pay the cost of the stay in the program, the court may order that the cost be paid from the court's indigent drivers' alcohol treatment fund.

(J) If a person whose driver's or commercial driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege is suspended under this section files an appeal regarding any aspect of the person's trial or sentence, the appeal itself does not stay the operation of the suspension.

(K) Division (A)(1)(j) of this section does not apply to a person who operates a vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley while the person has a concentration of a listed controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, or urine that equals or exceeds the amount specified in that division, if both of the following apply:

(1) The person obtained the controlled substance pursuant to a prescription issued by a licensed health professional authorized to prescribe drugs.

(2) The person injected, ingested, or inhaled the controlled substance in accordance with the health professional's directions.

(L) The prohibited concentrations of a controlled substance or a metabolite of a controlled substance listed in division (A)(1)(j) of this section also apply in a prosecution of a violation of division (D) of section 2923.16 of the Revised Code in the same manner as if the offender is being prosecuted for a prohibited concentration of alcohol.

(M) All terms defined in section 4510.01 of the Revised Code apply to this section. If the meaning of a term defined in section 4510.01 of the Revised Code conflicts with the meaning of the same term as defined in section 4501.01 or 4511.01 of the Revised Code, the term as defined in section 4510.01 of the Revised Code applies to this section.

(N)(1) The Ohio Traffic Rules in effect on January 1, 2004, as adopted by the supreme court under authority of section 2937.46 of the Revised Code, do not apply to felony violations of this section. Subject to division (N)(2) of this section, the Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to felony violations of this section.

(2) If, on or after January 1, 2004, the supreme court modifies the Ohio Traffic Rules to provide procedures to govern felony violations of this section, the modified rules shall apply to felony violations of this section.

The Legislative Service Commission presents the text of this section as a composite of the section as amended by multiple acts of the General Assembly. This presentation recognizes the principle stated in R.C. 1.52(B) that amendments are to be harmonized if reasonably capable of simultaneous operation.

Last updated October 20, 2025 at 11:44 AM

The 20 cases that cite Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.19 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Mayl, 833 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio 2005).
cites § 4511.19 81×subsections: (D)(1) 45× (A) 13× (A)(1)(a) 4× (D) 4×cited by 109 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“06(A) provides: {¶ 9} “No person, while operating * * * a motor vehicle, * * * shall cause the death of another * * * in any of the following ways: {¶ 10} “(1) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of section 4511.”
The case’s holding
The state must demonstrate substantial compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements to admit blood-alcohol test results in an aggravated vehicular homicide prosecution.
Later courts cite it for
“its findings of fact are to be accepted if they are supported by competent, credible evidence, and we are to independently determine whether they satisfy the applicable legal standard.” · 10 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Hoover, 2009-Ohio-4993, 916 N.E.2d 1056.
cites § 4511.19 95×subsections: (A)(2) 64× (G)(1)(b)(ii) 11× (A)(1) 6× (A)(1)(a) 4×cited by 60 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“ll be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, or urine to determine the alcohol, drug of abuse, controlled substance, metabolite of a controlled substance, or combination content of the person's whole…”
The case’s holding
A driver implicitly consents to a chemical test to determine intoxicating substance levels upon arrest for driving under the influence as a condition of driving in the state.
Later courts cite it for
“as part of obtaining the privilege to drive in ohio, a driver implicitly consents to a search, through means of a chemical test, to determine the amount of intoxicating substances in the driver's body upon the driver's arrest for dui.” · 6 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Earley, 2015-Ohio-4615, 145 Ohio St. 3d 281.
cites § 4511.19 48×subsections: (A)(1)(a) 30× (A)(1) 3× (G)(1)(a) 3×cited by 146 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“{¶ 14} R.C. 4511.19 provides: (A)(1) No person shall operate any vehicle * * * within this state, if, at the time of the operation, any of the following apply: (a) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them.”
The case’s holding
Aggravated vehicular assault and operating a vehicle under the influence are not allied offenses of similar import because they involve dissimilar levels of harm.
Later courts cite it for
“an affirmative answer to any of the required questions under ruff will permit separate convictions.” · 5 citing courts
4
GREENState v. South, 2015-Ohio-3930, 42 N.E.3d 734.
cites § 4511.19 67×subsections: (A)(1)(a) 12× (G)(1)(e)(i) 7× (A)(1)(d) 4× (G)(1) 4×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“] R.C. 4511.19, 2941.1413, 2929.13, and 2929.”
The case’s holding
A court must impose a mandatory prison term for a repeat-offender specification and may impose a discretionary term for the underlying third-degree-felony OVI offense.
Later courts cite it for
“consider them together to determine the general assembly's intent.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Richardson, 2016-Ohio-8448, 150 Ohio St. 3d 554.
cites § 4511.19 20×subsections: (A) 5× (A)(1)(a) 5× (A)(2) 4× (G)(1)(e) 4×cited by 207 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“] Criminal law—R.C. 4511.19(A)—Operating a vehicle while under the influence— Court of appeals erred in concluding that prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence linking defendant’s ingestion of drug of abuse with his impairment—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and…”
The case’s holding
Expert testimony is unnecessary to link drug ingestion to impairment when the effects of the drug are sufficiently well known.
Later courts cite it for
“this naturally entails a review of the elements of the charged offense and a review of the state's evidence.” · 80 citing courts
6
GREENState v. O'Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, 206 N.E.3d 662.
cites § 4511.19 128×subsections: (G)(1)(c)(v) 58× (G)(1)(c)(iii) 10× (A)(1) 8× (A)(1)(a) 8×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“The court found the vehicle’s value to be around $31,000, which was roughly 11 times greater than the maximum fine for O’Malley’s offense under R.C. 4511.19. {¶ 10} In considering the hardship on O’Malley, the trial court did not believe that the forfeiture would significantly…”
Later courts cite it for
“the drunk driver essentially plays russian roulette every time he or she drives on the road while impaired.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Burnside, 797 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 2003).
cites § 4511.19 9×subsections: (A)(2) 2× (A)(1) (D) (D)(1)cited by 2,252 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“Code 3701-53-05 are admissible in a prosecution under R.C. 4511.19.” Id. at syllabus. *157 {¶ 24} In the wake of Plummer , courts have applied a burden-shifting procedure to govern the admissibility of alcohol-test results.”
The case’s holding
The state fails to meet the substantial compliance standard for alcohol-testing regulations if it fails to use a solid anticoagulant as required by administrative code.
Later courts cite it for
“appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” · 213 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Blatnik, 478 N.E.2d 1016 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1984).
cites § 4511.19 26×subsections: (A)(1) 13× (A) 2×cited by 230 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“The description of the offense to which appellant pled guilty states that it was appellant’s seventh offense of violating R.C. 4511.19 or a municipal ordinance relating to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol within five years.”
The case’s holding
A court need not hold a hearing on a post-sentence motion to withdraw a plea if the alleged facts, accepted as true, do not constitute manifest injustice.
Later courts cite it for
“a hearing is not required if the facts alleged by the defendant, and accepted as true by the court, would not require that the guilty plea be withdrawn.” · 12 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Hassler, 875 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 2007).
cites § 4511.19 39×subsections: (D) 8× (A) 5× (D)(1) 5× (A)(1) 4×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“Analysis {¶ 7} We begin our analysis with R.C. 4511.19. The General Assembly amended certain portions of that statute in 2006 to allow admissibility of testing *324 obtained within three hours of the alleged violation, but former R.”
The case’s holding
A blood sample taken outside the statutory time frame is admissible to prove impairment if administrative requirements are substantially complied with and expert testimony is provided.
Later courts cite it for
“a blood sample taken outside the time frame set out in r.c. 4511.19(d) is admissible to prove that a person is under the influence of alcohol as proscribed by r.c. 4511.19(a)(1)(a) , provided that the administrative requirements of r.c. 4511.19(d) are substantially complied with and expert testimony is offered.” · 7 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Harris, 2017-Ohio-5594, 92 N.E.3d 1283.
cites § 4511.19 21×subsections: (A)(2) 11× (A)(1)(a) 8× (A) 2×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“In these consolidated appeals, he claims that following a jury trial, the jury returned inconsistent verdicts on two offenses of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol ("OVI") pursuant to R.C. 4511.19(A), and that the state failed to present evidence to establish…”
The case’s holding
Inconsistent verdicts on separately charged offenses decided independently are not reversible error, and a stipulation to a prior conviction satisfies the state's proof burden.
Later courts cite it for
“to receive consideration on appeal, trial court errors must be raised by assignment of error and must be argued and supported by legal authority and citation to the record” · 5 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Harpel, 2020-Ohio-4513.
cites § 4511.19 36×subsections: (A)(2) 11× (A) 9× (G)(1)(d)(ii) 9× (A)(1)cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“1413 reads, in its relevant part, as follows: Imposition of a mandatory additional prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years upon an offender * * * is precluded unless the indictment * * * charging a felony violation of division (A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised…”
Later courts cite it for
“to deter fourth amendment violations, the supreme court of the united states has adopted an exclusionary rule under which 'any evidence that is obtained during an unlawful search or seizure will be excluded from being used against the defendant.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Baker, 2016-Ohio-451, 58 N.E.3d 1114.
cites § 4511.19 27×subsections: (A) 6× (A)(1)(b) 6× (D)(1) 6× (D)(1)(b) 6×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“Code 3701-53-05 are admissible in a 6 January Term, 2016 prosecution under R.C. 4511.19.’ ” Id., quoting Plummer at the syllabus.”
The case’s holding
A blood specimen left unrefrigerated for four hours and ten minutes before transit is a de minimis lapse that does not render blood-alcohol results inadmissible for substantial noncompliance with regulations.
Later courts cite it for
“failing to refrigerate a blood specimen for a period of four hours and ten minutes before placing it in transit for analysis is a de minimis error and does not render the test result inadmissible for failure to substantially comply with ohio adm.code 3701-53-06(g).” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Sullivan, 2017-Ohio-8937, 102 N.E.3d 86.
cites § 4511.19 11×subsections: (A)(1)(a) 8× (D)(4)(b) 3×cited by 89 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“Bauer also admitted that his consultation was over the phone; that this consultation occurred three months after the accident on May 20, 2016; that he had never talked with Sullivan in person outside of the courtroom; and that he had not been involved in any treatments for this…”
The case’s holding
A conviction for operating a vehicle under the influence is sustained if any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Later courts cite it for
“under the sufficiency of the evidence standard, 'the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” · 5 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Boczar, 863 N.E.2d 155 (Ohio 2007).
cites § 4511.19 15×subsections: (D)(4)(b) 8× (A)(1) 2× (A)(3)cited by 147 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“*152 {¶ 18} We next consider the constitutionality of R.C. 4511.19 at the trial level. Section 5(B), Article IV provides: “The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the state * * *.”
The case’s holding
Horizontal gaze nystagmus test results are admissible without expert testimony if the officer establishes a foundation regarding their training and the specific technique used during administration.
Later courts cite it for
“the rules of evidence do not apply to suppression hearings.” · 8 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Hayes, 2016-Ohio-7241.
cites § 4511.19 34×subsections: (A)(1)(f) 14× (A)(1)(a) 7× (A)(1) 2× (A)(1)(b) 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“41(B)(3) explicitly provides that a sentence for a violation of R.C. 4511.19, OVI, can be served either consecutively or concurrently to a sentence for a violation of R.”
16
GREENState v. Ulrich, 478 N.E.2d 812 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1984).
cites § 4511.19 51×subsections: (A)(3) 23× (B) 6× (A) 5× (A)(1) 3×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“I The Ohio General Assembly, by its passage of R.C. 4511.19, effective March 16, 1983, has made it illegal to operate a vehicle not only while under the influence of alcohol (R.”
Later courts cite it for
“expert testimony is not necessary to correlate intoxilyzer test results to the time of the alleged offense.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Klembus, 2016-Ohio-1092, 51 N.E.3d 641.
cites § 4511.19 19×subsections: (G)(1)(d) 8× (A)(1)(a) 2× (G)(1) 2× (A)(2)cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“Relevant Background {¶ 3} In 2012, appellee, Dean Klembus, was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol and was charged with violating R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) (driving under the influence of alcohol) and 4511.”
The case’s holding
Applying a repeat-OVI specification and graduated felony penalty to offenders with five or more OVI convictions in twenty years does not violate equal protection.
Later courts cite it for
“equal protection does not forbid the legislature from making classifications but simply prohibits 'treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Leasure, 2015-Ohio-5327, 43 N.E.3d 477.
cites § 4511.19 38×subsections: (A)(2) 32× (A)(1)(a) 3× (A) (G)(1)(b)(i)cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“194(A)(2) and (B); while to “operate” a vehicle as required in violating R.C. 4511.19, “means to cause or have caused movement of a vehicle * * * [.”
Later courts cite it for
“thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not disturb a trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENCity of Newark v. Lucas, 532 N.E.2d 130 (Ohio 1988).
cites § 4511.19 23×subsections: (A)(1) 4× (B) 4× (A)(2) 3× (A)cited by 127 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“The ordinance allegedly violated in this action is obviously patterned after R.C. 4511.19. Thus, any analysis of the issue in this action requires references to that statute and any case law relevant thereto.”
The case’s holding
Chemical test results are inadmissible in per se prosecutions if the substance is withdrawn more than two hours after the alleged violation but remain admissible in under-the-influence prosecutions with expert testimony.
Later courts cite it for
“the results of a properly administered bodily substances test may be admitted in evidence only if the bodily substance is withdrawn within two hours of the time of the alleged violation.” · 7 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Naylor, 2024-Ohio-1648, 242 N.E.3d 195.
cites § 4511.19 47×subsections: (A)(1)(j)(viii) 19× (A) 3× (A)(1)(a) 3× (A)(1)(j)(ii) 3×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 4511.19
“08(A)(2)(b) 5 Operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drug of abuse (“OVI”), a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 4511.19 6 Operating a vehicle while under the influence of a listed metabolite of a controlled substance, a first-degree misdemeanor,…”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
195419902026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 292 cases in 2012–2013. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ohio Ct. App.2,231Ohio162S.D. Ohio21N.D. Ohio13Bankr. N.D. Ohio86th Cir.4Iowa3N.J.3

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 29 courts in all.

By subsection
(A)278 cases
State v. Mayl, 833 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio 2005).“06(A) provides: {¶ 9} “No person, while operating * * * a motor vehicle, * * * shall cause the death of another * * * in any of the following ways: {¶ 10} “(1) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of section 4511.”
State v. Richardson, 2016-Ohio-8448, 150 Ohio St. 3d 554.“] Criminal law—R.C. 4511.19(A)—Operating a vehicle while under the influence— Court of appeals erred in concluding that prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence linking defendant’s ingestion of drug of abuse with his impairment—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and…”
State v. Mayl, 798 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2003).
State v. Harpel, 2020-Ohio-4513.“1413 reads, in its relevant part, as follows: Imposition of a mandatory additional prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years upon an offender * * * is precluded unless the indictment * * * charging a felony violation of division (A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised…”
State v. Long, 713 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1998).
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(A)(1)495 cases
State v. Blatnik, 478 N.E.2d 1016 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1984).“The description of the offense to which appellant pled guilty states that it was appellant’s seventh offense of violating R.C. 4511.19 or a municipal ordinance relating to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol within five years.”
State v. Lewis, 722 N.E.2d 147 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1999).
State v. French, 650 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio 1995).
State v. Hoover, 2009-Ohio-4993, 916 N.E.2d 1056.“ll be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, or urine to determine the alcohol, drug of abuse, controlled substance, metabolite of a controlled substance, or combination content of the person's whole…”
State v. Richardson, 2016-Ohio-8448, 150 Ohio St. 3d 554.
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(A)(1)(a)1,288 cases
State v. Earley, 2015-Ohio-4615, 145 Ohio St. 3d 281.“{¶ 14} R.C. 4511.19 provides: (A)(1) No person shall operate any vehicle * * * within this state, if, at the time of the operation, any of the following apply: (a) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them.”
State v. Sullivan, 2017-Ohio-8937, 102 N.E.3d 86.“Bauer also admitted that his consultation was over the phone; that this consultation occurred three months after the accident on May 20, 2016; that he had never talked with Sullivan in person outside of the courtroom; and that he had not been involved in any treatments for this…”
State v. Richardson, 2016-Ohio-8448, 150 Ohio St. 3d 554.
State v. South, 2015-Ohio-3930, 42 N.E.3d 734.“] R.C. 4511.19, 2941.1413, 2929.13, and 2929.”
State v. Harris, 2017-Ohio-5594, 92 N.E.3d 1283.“In these consolidated appeals, he claims that following a jury trial, the jury returned inconsistent verdicts on two offenses of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol ("OVI") pursuant to R.C. 4511.19(A), and that the state failed to present evidence to establish…”
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(A)(1)(b)67 cases
State v. Baker, 2016-Ohio-451, 58 N.E.3d 1114.“Code 3701-53-05 are admissible in a 6 January Term, 2016 prosecution under R.C. 4511.19.’ ” Id., quoting Plummer at the syllabus.”
State v. Mayl, 833 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio 2005).
State v. Robinson, 2020-Ohio-4880.
State v. Hayes, 2016-Ohio-7241.“41(B)(3) explicitly provides that a sentence for a violation of R.C. 4511.19, OVI, can be served either consecutively or concurrently to a sentence for a violation of R.”
State v. Wood, 2023-Ohio-2788, 222 N.E.3d 1247.
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(A)(1)(c)6 cases
State v. Thompson, 2016-Ohio-4689.
State v. Hollis, 2013-Ohio-2586.
State v. Kincade, 2010-Ohio-1497.
Hrynciw v. Crump (In re Crump), 321 B.R. 879 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004).
State v. Miller, 2022-Ohio-2554.
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(A)(1)(d)232 cases
State v. South, 2015-Ohio-3930, 42 N.E.3d 734.
State v. Payne, 2019-Ohio-4218.
State v. Adams, 2017-Ohio-7743, 97 N.E.3d 1137.
State v. Kirkpatrick, 2017-Ohio-7629, 97 N.E.3d 871.
State v. Gladman, 2014-Ohio-2554.
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(A)(1)(e)22 cases
State v. McGlinch, 2019-Ohio-1380, 135 N.E.3d 406.
State v. Klintworth, 2011-Ohio-3553.
State v. Eason, 2016-Ohio-5516.
State v. Wieland, 2016-Ohio-261.
State v. Mullins, 2013-Ohio-2688.
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(A)(1)(f)61 cases
State v. Hayes, 2016-Ohio-7241.
State v. Persinger, 2016-Ohio-858, 60 N.E.3d 831.
State v. Goudy, 2017-Ohio-7306.
State v. Guth, 2016-Ohio-8221.
State v. O'Neill, 887 N.E.2d 394 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 2008).
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(A)(1)(g)9 cases
State v. Forbes, 2022-Ohio-2871.
State v. Slater, 2023-Ohio-608.
State v. Ray, 2014-Ohio-4689.
State v. King, 2012-Ohio-1281.
State v. Burnette, 2022-Ohio-3251.
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(A)(1)(h)108 cases
State v. Eckles, 879 N.E.2d 829 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. 2007).
State v. Wysin, 2013-Ohio-5363.
State v. McCullough, 2018-Ohio-1967.
State v. Tribune, 2017-Ohio-1407.
State v. Dugan, 2013-Ohio-447.
Showing the top 5 of 108. More in the list view →
(A)(1)(i)13 cases
State v. Hlinovsky, 2011-Ohio-6421.
State v. Hubbs, 2010-Ohio-4849.
State v. Ruth, 2020-Ohio-4506.
State v. Miranda, 2014-Ohio-5312.
State v. Terrell, 2021-Ohio-1840.
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(A)(1)(i)(i)1 case
Abner v. Warden, London Corr. Inst., No. 1:23-cv-00229 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2024).
(A)(1)(j)18 cases
State v. Moore, 2019-Ohio-3705.
State v. Naylor, 2024-Ohio-1648, 242 N.E.3d 195.“08(A)(2)(b) 5 Operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drug of abuse (“OVI”), a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 4511.19 6 Operating a vehicle while under the influence of a listed metabolite of a controlled substance, a first-degree misdemeanor,…”
State v. McKinney, 2011-Ohio-3951.
State v. Detienne, 2017-Ohio-9105.
State v. Montgomery, 2022-Ohio-4030.
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(A)(1)(j)(i)11 cases
State v. Abner, 2021-Ohio-4549.
State v. Summit, 2021-Ohio-4562.
State v. Ramos, 2022-Ohio-886.
State v. Greene, 2019-Ohio-3155.
State v. Rolf, 2022-Ohio-3049.
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(A)(1)(j)(ii)12 cases
State v. Moore, 2019-Ohio-3705.
State v. Naylor, 2024-Ohio-1648, 242 N.E.3d 195.
State v. Price, 2018-Ohio-2896.
State v. Hatfield, 901 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 2009).
State v. Massucci, 2021-Ohio-88.
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(A)(1)(j)(iii)7 cases
State v. Brickles, 2021-Ohio-178.
State v. Myers, 2021-Ohio-475.
State v. Urbanski, 2023-Ohio-3966.
State v. Caudell, 2020-Ohio-1557.
State v. Wilson, 2023-Ohio-830.
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(A)(1)(j)(ix)13 cases
State v. Barnhart, 2021-Ohio-2874.
State v. Abner, 2021-Ohio-4549.
State v. Ramos, 2022-Ohio-886.
State v. Scudder, 2025-Ohio-1267.
State v. Greene, 2019-Ohio-3155.
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(A)(1)(j)(v)1 case
State v. Mormile, 2018-Ohio-4858.
(A)(1)(j)(vii)18 cases
State v. Krzemieniewski, 2016-Ohio-4991.
State v. Fitzgerald, 2020-Ohio-4346, 158 N.E.3d 664.
State v. Naylor, 2024-Ohio-1648, 242 N.E.3d 195.
State v. Hayes, 2016-Ohio-7241.
State v. Billenstein, 2014-Ohio-255.
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(A)(1)(j)(viii)42 cases
State v. Naylor, 2024-Ohio-1648, 242 N.E.3d 195.
State v. Ossege, 2014-Ohio-3186.
State v. Whalen, 2013-Ohio-1861.
State v. Sanford, 2021-Ohio-1619.
State v. Topolosky, 2015-Ohio-4963.
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(A)(1)(j)(x)1 case
State v. Phelan, 2019-Ohio-4546.
(A)(1)(viii)1 case
State v. Balmert, 2025-Ohio-5588, 281 N.E.3d 1075.
(A)(2)250 cases
State v. Hoover, 2009-Ohio-4993, 916 N.E.2d 1056.
State v. Leasure, 2015-Ohio-5327, 43 N.E.3d 477.“194(A)(2) and (B); while to “operate” a vehicle as required in violating R.C. 4511.19, “means to cause or have caused movement of a vehicle * * * [.”
State v. Harris, 2017-Ohio-5594, 92 N.E.3d 1283.
State v. Richardson, 2016-Ohio-8448, 150 Ohio St. 3d 554.
State v. Varner, 2020-Ohio-1329, 153 N.E.3d 514.
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(A)(2)(a)44 cases
City of Cleveland v. Giering, 2017-Ohio-8059, 98 N.E.3d 1131.
State v. Eason, 2016-Ohio-5516.
Cleveland v. Maxwell, 2017-Ohio-4442.
State v. Heidelberg, 2019-Ohio-2257, 138 N.E.3d 537.
State v. Wayman, 2019-Ohio-1194.
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(A)(2)(b)31 cases
State v. Cunningham, 2018-Ohio-912.
State v. Ricer, 2018-Ohio-426, 106 N.E.3d 819.
State v. Fields, 2020-Ohio-5538.
State v. McCausland, 2009-Ohio-5933, 124 Ohio St. 3d 8.
State v. Filip, 2017-Ohio-5622, 94 N.E.3d 125.
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(A)(2)(d)1 case
State v. Pajestka, 2022-Ohio-2257.
(A)(3)199 cases
State v. Ulrich, 478 N.E.2d 812 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1984).“I The Ohio General Assembly, by its passage of R.C. 4511.19, effective March 16, 1983, has made it illegal to operate a vehicle not only while under the influence of alcohol (R.”
City of Defiance v. Kretz, 573 N.E.2d 32 (Ohio 1991).
State v. Woerner, 474 N.E.2d 354 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 1984).
State v. Williams, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1993).
State v. Lloyd, 709 N.E.2d 913 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. 1998).
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(A)(4)18 cases
State v. Plummer, 490 N.E.2d 902 (Ohio 1986).
State v. Gordon, 801 N.E.2d 493 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 2003).
State v. Jacot, 646 N.E.2d 1128 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. 1993).
State v. Estep, 598 N.E.2d 96 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 1991).
State v. Shuler, 858 N.E.2d 1254 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2006).
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(A)(5)4 cases
State v. Campbell, 779 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2002).
State v. Campbell, 2003-Ohio-6804, 100 Ohio St. 3d 361.
State v. Pulaski, 797 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2003).
State v. Boafor, 2013-Ohio-4255.
(A)(6)8 cases
State v. Campbell, 779 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2002).
State v. Campbell, 2003-Ohio-6804, 100 Ohio St. 3d 361.
State ex rel. Douglas v. Burlew, 106 Ohio St. 3d 180 (2005).
State v. Durnwald, 837 N.E.2d 1234 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 2005).
State v. Lake, 784 N.E.2d 162 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. 2003).
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(B)42 cases
Cline v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehs., 573 N.E.2d 77 (Ohio 1991).
City of Newark v. Lucas, 532 N.E.2d 130 (Ohio 1988).“The ordinance allegedly violated in this action is obviously patterned after R.C. 4511.19. Thus, any analysis of the issue in this action requires references to that statute and any case law relevant thereto.”
State v. Ulrich, 478 N.E.2d 812 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1984).
State v. Dress, 461 N.E.2d 1312 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1982).
State v. Adams, 598 N.E.2d 176 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1992).
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(B)(1)4 cases
Stillwell v. Johnson, 602 N.E.2d 1254 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1991).
State v. Tancak, 2022-Ohio-880.
State v. Lopez, 2024-Ohio-2394, 246 N.E.3d 681.
State v. Billiter, 2012-Ohio-4551.
(B)(1)(b)1 case
State v. Williams, 2017-Ohio-4455, 93 N.E.3d 90.
(B)(2)5 cases
In re Eric W., 680 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1996).
State v. Steinke, 814 N.E.2d 1230 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2004).
State v. Lopez, 2024-Ohio-2394, 246 N.E.3d 681.
State v. Lauer, 766 N.E.2d 193 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2001).
Dublin v. Young, 75 Ohio St. 3d 472 (1996).
(B)(2)(b)1 case
State v. Muster, 2014-Ohio-689.
(B)(3)14 cases
State v. Hatcher, 2013-Ohio-445.
State v. Yeaples, 907 N.E.2d 333 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2009).
State v. Burkhart, 2016-Ohio-7534, 64 N.E.3d 1004.
State v. Briggs, 2017-Ohio-686.
State v. Martinez, 2014-Ohio-2425.
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(C)5 cases
City of Beachwood v. Sims, 647 N.E.2d 821 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1994).
State v. Kilbarger, 2014-Ohio-4949.
Toledo v. Molina, 2018-Ohio-1240.
Wood v. Warden, Noble Corr. Inst., No. 3:19-cv-00304 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2020).
State v. Martin, 2014-Ohio-2948.
(D)75 cases
State v. Hassler, 875 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 2007).“Analysis {¶ 7} We begin our analysis with R.C. 4511.19. The General Assembly amended certain portions of that statute in 2006 to allow admissibility of testing *324 obtained within three hours of the alleged violation, but former R.”
State v. Mayl, 833 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio 2005).
State v. Brand, 811 N.E.2d 156 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2004).
State v. Burnside, 797 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 2003).“Code 3701-53-05 are admissible in a prosecution under R.C. 4511.19.” Id. at syllabus. *157 {¶ 24} In the wake of Plummer , courts have applied a burden-shifting procedure to govern the admissibility of alcohol-test results.”
State v. Dugan, 2013-Ohio-447.
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(D)(1)62 cases
State v. Mayl, 833 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio 2005).
State v. Baker, 2016-Ohio-451, 58 N.E.3d 1114.
State v. Mayl, 798 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2003).
State v. Hassler, 875 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 2007).
State v. Burnside, 797 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 2003).
Showing the top 5 of 62. More in the list view →
(D)(1)(a)20 cases
State v. Williams, 2020-Ohio-1367.
State v. Owens, 2016-Ohio-3092.
State v. Persinger, 2016-Ohio-858, 60 N.E.3d 831.
State v. Abner, 2021-Ohio-4549.
State v. Bugg, 2018-Ohio-2544.
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(D)(1)(b)115 cases
State v. Johnson, 2013-Ohio-440.
State v. Baker, 2016-Ohio-451, 58 N.E.3d 1114.
State v. Hatcher, 2013-Ohio-445.
State v. Owens, 2016-Ohio-3092.
State v. Canino, 2013-Ohio-551.
Showing the top 5 of 115. More in the list view →
(D)(1)(c)1 case
State v. Mets, 2023-Ohio-710.
(D)(2)4 cases
State v. Hassler, 875 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 2007).
State v. Ott, 729 N.E.2d 391 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. 1999).
State v. Henderson, 2019-Ohio-4041.
State v. Reich, 2024-Ohio-1197.
(D)(3)7 cases
City of Hilliard v. Elfrink, 672 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio 1996).
State v. Mayl, 833 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio 2005).
Hilliard v. Elfrink, 77 Ohio St. 3d 155 (1996).
State v. Elfrink, 657 N.E.2d 1377 (Ohio 1995).
State v. Strohacker, 77 Ohio St. 3d 162 (1996).
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(D)(4)11 cases
State v. Schmitt, 801 N.E.2d 446 (Ohio 2004).
State v. Yost, 2018-Ohio-2873.
State v. Nation, 2023-Ohio-106.
State v. Line, 2019-Ohio-4221.
State v. Henson, 2020-Ohio-4019.
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(D)(4)(b)119 cases
State v. Boczar, 863 N.E.2d 155 (Ohio 2007).“*152 {¶ 18} We next consider the constitutionality of R.C. 4511.19 at the trial level. Section 5(B), Article IV provides: “The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the state * * *.”
State v. Sullivan, 2017-Ohio-8937, 102 N.E.3d 86.
State v. Bish, 2010-Ohio-6604, 947 N.E.2d 257.
State v. Codeluppi, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691.
State v. Filip, 2017-Ohio-5622, 94 N.E.3d 125.
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(D)(4)(b)(i)7 cases
State v. Russo, 2020-Ohio-3236.
Willowick v. Osborne, 2019-Ohio-3235.
State v. Nesbitt, 2025-Ohio-223.
State v. Watterson, 2024-Ohio-5456.
State v. Willett, 2012-Ohio-2186.
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(D)(4)(b)(iii)2 cases
State v. Boles, 2020-Ohio-4485, 158 N.E.3d 1013.
Parma v. Benedict, 2015-Ohio-3340.
(D)(4)(c)3 cases
State v. Boles, 2020-Ohio-4485, 158 N.E.3d 1013.
State v. Nesbitt, 2025-Ohio-223.
State v. Washington, 2012-Ohio-1391.
(D)(4)(iii)1 case
State v. Robinson, 828 N.E.2d 1050 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2005).
(E)3 cases
State v. Syx, 944 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010).
State v. Whitman, 2019-Ohio-2307.
State v. Jackson, 2023-Ohio-4467.
(E)(1)1 case
State v. Detienne, 2017-Ohio-9105.
(E)(3)2 cases
State v. Detienne, 2017-Ohio-9105.
State v. Stankorb, 2023-Ohio-3808.
(G)24 cases
State v. Hoover, 2009-Ohio-4993, 916 N.E.2d 1056.
State v. O'Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, 206 N.E.3d 662.“The court found the vehicle’s value to be around $31,000, which was roughly 11 times greater than the maximum fine for O’Malley’s offense under R.C. 4511.19. {¶ 10} In considering the hardship on O’Malley, the trial court did not believe that the forfeiture would significantly…”
State v. Jozwiak, 2020-Ohio-3694.
State v. Kilbane, 2014-Ohio-1228.
State v. Gregoire, 2020-Ohio-415.
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(G)(1)32 cases
State v. South, 2015-Ohio-3930, 42 N.E.3d 734.
State v. Klembus, 2016-Ohio-1092, 51 N.E.3d 641.“Relevant Background {¶ 3} In 2012, appellee, Dean Klembus, was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol and was charged with violating R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) (driving under the influence of alcohol) and 4511.”
State v. Kincade, 2010-Ohio-1497.
Wilson, 2014-Ohio-3182.
State v. O'Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, 206 N.E.3d 662.
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(G)(1)(a)47 cases
State v. Earley, 2015-Ohio-4615, 145 Ohio St. 3d 281.
State v. South, 2015-Ohio-3930, 42 N.E.3d 734.
State v. O'Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, 206 N.E.3d 662.
State v. Brooke, 863 N.E.2d 1024 (Ohio 2007).
State v. Sims, 2023-Ohio-4711, 232 N.E.3d 956.
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(G)(1)(a)(i)12 cases
State v. Robinson, 2020-Ohio-4880.
State v. Ice, 2024-Ohio-5341, 257 N.E.3d 492.
State v. Kennedy, 2011-Ohio-4291.
State v. Cook, 2025-Ohio-946.
State v. Martin, 2017-Ohio-763.
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(G)(1)(a)(ii)3 cases
State v. Hoover, 878 N.E.2d 1116 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2007).
State v. Goudy, 2017-Ohio-7306.
State v. Hale, 2019-Ohio-1398.
(G)(1)(a)(iii)6 cases
State v. O'Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, 206 N.E.3d 662.
State v. Small, 2015-Ohio-3640.
State v. Craig, 2023-Ohio-3777, 226 N.E.3d 998.
State v. Crossley, 2022-Ohio-2599, 194 N.E.3d 424.
State v. Kirchgessner, 2022-Ohio-3944, 200 N.E.3d 374.
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(G)(1)(a)(iv)3 cases
State v. Forbes, 2022-Ohio-2871.
Parma v. Benedict, 2013-Ohio-1990.
State v. Kelley, 2012-Ohio-2309.
(G)(1)(b)11 cases
State v. Hoover, 2009-Ohio-4993, 916 N.E.2d 1056.
State v. Heidelberg, 2019-Ohio-2257, 138 N.E.3d 537.
State v. Hoover, 878 N.E.2d 1116 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2007).
State v. Klembus, 2016-Ohio-1092, 51 N.E.3d 641.
State v. McClellan, 2020-Ohio-5551, 163 N.E.3d 1202.
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(G)(1)(b)(i)10 cases
State v. Hoover, 2009-Ohio-4993, 916 N.E.2d 1056.
State v. Klembus, 2016-Ohio-1092, 51 N.E.3d 641.
State v. Woody, 2016-Ohio-631.
State v. Hittle, 2019-Ohio-5172.
State v. Leasure, 2015-Ohio-5327, 43 N.E.3d 477.
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(G)(1)(b)(ii)6 cases
State v. Hoover, 2009-Ohio-4993, 916 N.E.2d 1056.
State v. Hoover, 878 N.E.2d 1116 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2007).
State v. Goudy, 2017-Ohio-7306.
State v. Tower, 2025-Ohio-5593.
State v. Armes, 2017-Ohio-7011.
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(G)(1)(b)(iii)2 cases
State v. O'Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, 206 N.E.3d 662.
State v. Moore, 2024-Ohio-2382.
(G)(1)(b)(iv)3 cases
State v. Heidelberg, 2019-Ohio-2257, 138 N.E.3d 537.
State v. Revere, 2022-Ohio-3803.
State v. Garland, 2020-Ohio-6712.
(G)(1)(b)(v)2 cases
State v. O'Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, 206 N.E.3d 662.
State v. Goudy, 2017-Ohio-7306.
(G)(1)(c)19 cases
State v. Wysin, 2013-Ohio-5363.
State v. O'Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, 206 N.E.3d 662.
State v. Brooke, 863 N.E.2d 1024 (Ohio 2007).
State v. McGlinch, 2019-Ohio-1380, 135 N.E.3d 406.
State v. Whitman, 2019-Ohio-2307.
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(G)(1)(c)(i)2 cases
State v. Klembus, 2016-Ohio-1092, 51 N.E.3d 641.
State v. O'Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, 206 N.E.3d 662.
(G)(1)(c)(ii)1 case
State v. Pinnick, 2024-Ohio-687.
(G)(1)(c)(iii)2 cases
State v. O'Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, 206 N.E.3d 662.
State v. Tomcik, 2019-Ohio-1396.
(G)(1)(c)(iv)1 case
State v. Revere, 2022-Ohio-3803.
(G)(1)(c)(v)11 cases
State v. O'Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, 206 N.E.3d 662.
State v. O'Malley, 2020-Ohio-3141, 155 N.E.3d 156.
State v. Torres, 2020-Ohio-3077, 154 N.E.3d 736.
State v. Cremeans, 2017-Ohio-4400.
Bowling Green v. Coble, 2023-Ohio-1308.
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(G)(1)(d)76 cases
State v. Klembus, 2016-Ohio-1092, 51 N.E.3d 641.
State v. Bode, 41 N.E.3d 1156 (Ohio 2015).
State v. Brooke, 863 N.E.2d 1024 (Ohio 2007).
State v. Adkins, 2011-Ohio-3141, 951 N.E.2d 766.
State v. Klembus, 2014-Ohio-3227, 17 N.E.3d 603.
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(G)(1)(d)(i)27 cases
State v. Liles, 2019-Ohio-3029.
State v. Kennedy, 2011-Ohio-4291.
State v. Hendrix, 2012-Ohio-5610.
State v. Latapie, 2023-Ohio-1505.
State v. Waggoner, 2013-Ohio-5204.
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(G)(1)(d)(ii)13 cases
State v. Harpel, 2020-Ohio-4513.
State v. Fields, 2021-Ohio-3845.
State v. Klembus, 2014-Ohio-3227, 17 N.E.3d 603.
State v. Bode, 41 N.E.3d 1156 (Ohio 2015).
State v. Ballard, 2016-Ohio-364.
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(G)(1)(d)(iii)6 cases
State v. O'Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, 206 N.E.3d 662.
State v. Liles, 2019-Ohio-3029.
State v. Lyons, 2024-Ohio-2820.
State v. Spangler, 2024-Ohio-883.
State v. Solomon, 2025-Ohio-5423.
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(G)(1)(d)(iv)2 cases
State v. Ballard, 2016-Ohio-364.
State v. Holnapy, 2015-Ohio-4322.
(G)(1)(d)(v)4 cases
State v. Liles, 2019-Ohio-3029.
State v. O'Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, 206 N.E.3d 662.
State v. Howze, 2024-Ohio-5447, 257 N.E.3d 1213.
State v. Kennedy, 2011-Ohio-4291.
(G)(1)(e)36 cases
State v. Richardson, 2016-Ohio-8448, 150 Ohio St. 3d 554.
State v. South, 2015-Ohio-3930, 42 N.E.3d 734.
State v. Kincade, 2010-Ohio-1497.
State v. Semenchuk, 2015-Ohio-5408.
State v. Sims, 2023-Ohio-4711, 232 N.E.3d 956.
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(G)(1)(e)(i)17 cases
State v. South, 2015-Ohio-3930, 42 N.E.3d 734.
State v. May, 2014-Ohio-1542.
State v. Sturgill, 2013-Ohio-4648.
State v. Cunningham, 2017-Ohio-377.
State v. Weideman, 2014-Ohio-5768.
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(G)(1)(e)(ii)7 cases
State v. Owen, 2013-Ohio-2824.
State v. May, 2014-Ohio-1542.
State v. Sturgill, 2013-Ohio-4648.
State v. Olp, 2016-Ohio-3508.
State v. Earnest, 2022-Ohio-2374.
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(G)(1)(e)(iii)2 cases
State v. Strickland, 2019-Ohio-3922.
State v. Russell, 2012-Ohio-2336.
(G)(1)(e)(iv)1 case
State v. Manocchio, 2012-Ohio-5720.
(G)(2)1 case
State v. Kennedy, 2011-Ohio-4291.
(G)(3)2 cases
State v. Jones, 2014-Ohio-5705.
State v. Tower, 2025-Ohio-5593.
(G)(7)3 cases
State v. Craig, 2023-Ohio-3777, 226 N.E.3d 998.
State v. Revere, 2022-Ohio-3803.
State v. Yang, 2025-Ohio-691, 264 N.E.3d 450.
(G)(10)(a)1 case
(I)1 case
State v. Liles, 2019-Ohio-3029.
(K)2 cases
State v. Detienne, 2017-Ohio-9105.
Gonzales v. Franklin Cnty. Mun. Court, 595 F. Supp. 382 (S.D. Ohio 1984).

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