Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025
Disorderly conduct in the second degree
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166.025 Disorderly conduct in the second degree. (1) A person commits the crime of disorderly conduct in the second degree if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the person:
(a) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior;
(b) Makes unreasonable noise;
(c) Disturbs any lawful assembly of persons without lawful authority;
(d) Obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic on a public way;
(e) Initiates or circulates a report, knowing it to be false, concerning an alleged or impending fire, explosion, crime, catastrophe or other emergency; or
(f) Creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which the person is not licensed or privileged to do.
(2)(a) Disorderly conduct in the second degree is a Class B misdemeanor.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subsection, disorderly conduct in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor if the crime is committed within 200 feet of the real property on which the person knows a funeral service is being conducted.
(3) As used in this section, “funeral service” means a burial or other memorial service for a deceased person. [1971 c.743 §220; 1983 c.546 §5; 2001 c.104 §55; 2005 c.631 §1; 2012 c.35 §1]
166.030 [Repealed by 1971 c.743 §432]
166.035 [1971 c.743 §221; repealed by 1975 c.715 §2]
166.040 [Repealed by 1971 c.743 §432]
166.045 [1971 c.743 §222; repealed by 1983 c.546 §3]
166.050 [Repealed by 1971 c.743 §432]
166.060 [Amended by 1959 c.436 §1; 1961 c.503 §1; repealed by 1971 c.743 §432]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 197
cases (52 in the last 5 years), 1972–2026 · leading case: State v. Ausmus
State v. Ausmus (2003)
“” This court previously has explained that the statutory phrase “intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof,” does not *501 describe a harm, or a risk of a harm, that ORS 166.025(1) prohibits. See State v. Spencer, 289 Or 225,…”
State v. Atwood (2004)
“190, and two counts of disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025. The first of the disorderly conduct counts alleged that defendant had engaged in “tumultuous and threatening behavior” in violation of ORS 166.”
State v. Cantwell (1984)
“The court sustained defendants’ demurrers to complaints charging them with disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025 (1)(a), on the ground that under Article 1, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution the underlying statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in its entirety.”
State v. Pucket (2018)
“The officers ultimately arrested defendant, who was charged with violating ORS 166.025 (1)(b) by "recklessly creat[ing] a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance and alarm by making unreasonable noise.”
State v. Richardson (2016)
“182(4) (Count 2), and two counts of second-degree disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025 (Counts 3 and 4). Defendant raises three assignments of error, 1 all related to Count 3, disorderly conduct for engaging in “fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior.”
State v. Davis (2020)
“Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for disorderly conduct in the second degree, ORS 166.025, assigning error to the trial court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal.”
State v. Rich (2008)
“ORS 166.025 was enacted as part of the Oregon Criminal Code of 1971.”
State v. Moyle (1985)
“While harassment was nominally a new crime in Oregon when enacted in 1971, it was designed along with the disorderly conduct statute ( former ORS 166.025) to replace laws classified as "disturbing the peace.”
State v. Moore (2023)
“Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge, arguing that the state failed to adduce sufficient evidence that he “obstructed traffic” as required under ORS 166.025. Held: A reasonable factfinder could conclude that defendant…”
State v. Hosley (2016)
“In this appeal from a judgment of conviction for disorderly conduct based upon “[e]ngag[ing] * * * in threatening behavior” ORS 166.025 (l)(a), defendant assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal.”
Palm Gardens, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission (1973)
“The petitioners contend that the definition of "disorderly" must be derived from that given in ORS 166.025. [1] The OLCC, on the other hand, contends that petitioners' reliance on ORS 166.”
State v. Chakerian (1997)
“However, in carrying out this first level of analysis under PGE , we also look to the context of ORS 166.025. As an initial matter, we are confronted with the question whether the commentary is “context” or, rather, should be treated as legislative history.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(1) — 34 cases
State v. Ausmus (2003)
“” This court previously has explained that the statutory phrase “intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof,” does not *501 describe a harm, or a risk of a harm, that ORS 166.025(1) prohibits. See State v. Spencer, 289 Or 225,…”
City of Portland v. Jackson (1992)
State v. Ruff (2009)
State v. Atwood (2004)
“190, and two counts of disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025. The first of the disorderly conduct counts alleged that defendant had engaged in “tumultuous and threatening behavior” in violation of ORS 166.”
State v. Pierce (2009)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(1)(a) — 22 cases
State v. Richardson (2016)
“182(4) (Count 2), and two counts of second-degree disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025 (Counts 3 and 4). Defendant raises three assignments of error, 1 all related to Count 3, disorderly conduct for engaging in “fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior.”
State v. Cantwell (1984)
“The court sustained defendants’ demurrers to complaints charging them with disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025 (1)(a), on the ground that under Article 1, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution the underlying statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in its entirety.”
State v. Davis (2020)
“Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for disorderly conduct in the second degree, ORS 166.025, assigning error to the trial court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal.”
State v. Eggers (2023)
State v. Donahue (1979)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(1)(b) — 9 cases
State v. Pucket (2018)
“The officers ultimately arrested defendant, who was charged with violating ORS 166.025 (1)(b) by "recklessly creat[ing] a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance and alarm by making unreasonable noise.”
State v. Lopez-Vega (1992)
State v. Harrington (1984)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(1)(c) — 8 cases
State v. Moyle (1985)
“While harassment was nominally a new crime in Oregon when enacted in 1971, it was designed along with the disorderly conduct statute ( former ORS 166.025) to replace laws classified as "disturbing the peace.”
State v. Cantwell (1984)
“The court sustained defendants’ demurrers to complaints charging them with disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025 (1)(a), on the ground that under Article 1, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution the underlying statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in its entirety.”
State v. Robertson (1982)
State v. Rangel (1999)
State v. Harrington (1984)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(1)(d) — 9 cases
State v. Moore (2023)
“Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge, arguing that the state failed to adduce sufficient evidence that he “obstructed traffic” as required under ORS 166.025. Held: A reasonable factfinder could conclude that defendant…”
State v. Silver (2024)
State v. Robison (2005)
State v. Maskell (2024)
State v. Moore (2023)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(1)(e) — 5 cases
City of Chicago v. Morales (1999)
State v. Borowski (2009)
State v. Horn (1982)
Chernaik v. Brown (2020)
State v. Ausmus (2004)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(1)(f) — 1 case
State v. Mejia (2024)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(1)(h) — 1 case
State v. Clark (1979)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(2) — 1 case
Carr v. City of Hillsboro (2007)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(a) — 3 cases
State v. House (1984)
Ashley v. Sutton (2007)
State v. Aldridge (2024)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(c) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(l)(a) — 16 cases
State v. Atwood (2004)
“190, and two counts of disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025. The first of the disorderly conduct counts alleged that defendant had engaged in “tumultuous and threatening behavior” in violation of ORS 166.”
State v. Hosley (2016)
“In this appeal from a judgment of conviction for disorderly conduct based upon “[e]ngag[ing] * * * in threatening behavior” ORS 166.025 (l)(a), defendant assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal.”
State v. Kreft (2015)
State v. Miller (2009)
State v. Wade (2016)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(l)(b) — 8 cases
State v. Rich (2008)
“ORS 166.025 was enacted as part of the Oregon Criminal Code of 1971.”
State v. Atwood (2004)
“190, and two counts of disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025. The first of the disorderly conduct counts alleged that defendant had engaged in “tumultuous and threatening behavior” in violation of ORS 166.”
State v. Richardson (2016)
“182(4) (Count 2), and two counts of second-degree disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025 (Counts 3 and 4). Defendant raises three assignments of error, 1 all related to Count 3, disorderly conduct for engaging in “fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior.”
State v. Higley (2010)
State v. Harrington (1984)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(l)(c) — 8 cases
State v. Spencer (1980)
State v. Moyle (1985)
“While harassment was nominally a new crime in Oregon when enacted in 1971, it was designed along with the disorderly conduct statute ( former ORS 166.025) to replace laws classified as "disturbing the peace.”
State v. House (1984)
State v. Plowman (1992)
State v. Anderson (1982)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(l)(d) — 1 case
State v. Robison (2005)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(l)(e) — 9 cases
State v. Ausmus (2003)
“” This court previously has explained that the statutory phrase “intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof,” does not *501 describe a harm, or a risk of a harm, that ORS 166.025(1) prohibits. See State v. Spencer, 289 Or 225,…”
State v. Illig-Renn (2006)
State v. Ausmus (2001)
City of Chicago v. Morales (1999)
State v. Illig-Renn (2004)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(l)(f) — 2 cases
State v. Hawkins (2016)
State v. Lang (2015)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(l)(h) — 1 case
State v. Clark (1979)
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025(lXa) — 1 case
State v. Wade (2016)
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