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Oregon Revised Statutes

Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.019 (2026)

Civil negligence action for claim denied on basis of failure to meet major contributing cause standard; statute of limitations

✓ current as of May 2026
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      656.019 Civil negligence action for claim denied on basis of failure to meet major contributing cause standard; statute of limitations. (1)(a) An injured worker may pursue a civil negligence action for a work-related injury that has been determined to be not compensable because the worker has failed to establish that a work-related incident was the major contributing cause of the worker’s injury only after an order determining that the claim is not compensable has become final. The injured worker may appeal the compensability of the claim as provided in ORS 656.298, but may not pursue a civil negligence claim against the employer until the order affirming the denial has become final.

      (b) Nothing in this subsection grants a right for a person to pursue a civil negligence action that does not otherwise exist in law.

      (2)(a) Notwithstanding any other statute of limitation provided in law, a civil negligence action against an employer that arises because a workers’ compensation claim has been determined to be not compensable because the worker has failed to establish that a work-related incident was the major contributing cause of the worker’s injury must be commenced within the later of two years from the date of injury or 180 days from the date the order affirming that the claim is not compensable on such grounds becomes final.

      (b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subsection, a person may not commence a civil negligence action for a work-related injury that has been determined to be not compensable because the worker has failed to establish that a work-related incident was the major contributing cause of the worker’s injury, if the period within which such action may be commenced has expired prior to the filing of a timely workers’ compensation claim for the work-related injury. [2001 c.865 §15]

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 2005–2023 · leading case: Preble v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 287, 447 P.3d 42 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
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Preble v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 287, 447 P.3d 42 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 33× “Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that the action had been timely commenced under ORS 656.019 (2)(a). Defendant responded with a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was time barred.”
Bundy v. NuStar GP LLC, 533 P.3d 21 (Or. 2023). · cites it 88× “At issue in this case is whether ORS 656.019, which imposes certain procedural requirements on cases such as plaintiff’s, also serves as a “substantive exception” to ORS 656.”
Bundy v. Nustar GP LLC, 506 P.3d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 54× “Held: The trial court did not err in determining that ORS 656.019(1)(a) has all the hallmarks of a pro- cedural statute that governs the time for bringing a negligence action; it is not a substantive exception to the immunity provided in ORS 656.”
Alcutt v. Adams Fam. Food Servs., Inc., 311 P.3d 959 (Or. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 41× “, 332 Or 83 , 23 P3d 333 (2001), 2 and misinterpreted ORS 656.019 — a statute enacted soon after Smothers was decided.”
Bundy v. Nustar GP, LLC, 373 P.3d 1141 (Or. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 16× “With respect to the second ruling, plaintiff contends that the court erred in refusing to allow him to file a fourth amended complaint because that proposed pleading stated claims for negligence against NuStar as permitted by ORS 656.”
Rowden v. Hogan Woods, LLC, 476 P.3d 485 (Or. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 6× “The court in Bundy declined to resolve that ambiguity, “reserv[ing] for another day * * * the comprehensive statutory analysis needed to resolve whether the legisla- ture intended ORS 656.019 to function as a substantive exception to the exclusive remedy provision.”
Hudjohn v. S&g Mach. Co., 114 P.3d 1141 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 4× “First, the exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity embodied in the “Smothers-fix” statute, ORS 656.019(l)(a), did not apply to plaintiffs negligence claims against S&G because the ALJ had rejected plaintiffs workers’ compensation claim on grounds other than plaintiffs…”
Preble v. Centennial Sch. Dist., No. 287, 530 P.3d 497 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 44× “Here, by contrast, plaintiff did offer evidence that work was the major contributing cause of her injury. Held: Where a worker offers evidence that work was the major contributing cause of a combined condition, but the administrative law judge or Workers’ Compensation Board…”
Burley v. Clackamas Cnty., 446 P.3d 564 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “3d ---- (2019) (concluding that similar definition of the term "employer" for purposes of ORS chapter 656 meant that public employers were among the employers to which ORS 656.019(2)(a) applies). That express definition, standing alone, precludes the conclusion that the…”
Vasquez v. Double Press Mfg., Inc., 437 P.3d 1107 (Or. 2019). “018 (1985) (referring to an employer's exclusive liability for compensable injuries to workers "on account of such injuries or claims resulting therefore, specifically including claims for contribution or indemnity asserted by third persons from whom damages are sought on…”
Merten v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 228 P.3d 623 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). “3 But see ORS 656.019 (permitting plaintiffs to bring civil negligence claims for work-related conditions that fail to meet the burden of proof required by ORS chapter 656); Smothers v.”
Bundy v. NuStar GP, LLC (Or. 2017). · cites it 58× “018 by alleging that the conditions for which plaintiff seeks recovery in the negligence action were determined to be not compensable under the work- ers’ compensation laws on the basis that plaintiff failed to prove the work inci- dent was the major contributing cause.”
Show all 16 citing cases →
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.019(1) — 6 cases
Rowden v. Hogan Woods, LLC, 476 P.3d 485 (Or. Ct. App. 2020). “The court in Bundy declined to resolve that ambiguity, “reserv[ing] for another day * * * the comprehensive statutory analysis needed to resolve whether the legisla- ture intended ORS 656.019 to function as a substantive exception to the exclusive remedy provision.”
Preble v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 287, 447 P.3d 42 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that the action had been timely commenced under ORS 656.019 (2)(a). Defendant responded with a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was time barred.”
Bundy v. Nustar GP LLC, 506 P.3d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 2022). “Held: The trial court did not err in determining that ORS 656.019(1)(a) has all the hallmarks of a pro- cedural statute that governs the time for bringing a negligence action; it is not a substantive exception to the immunity provided in ORS 656.”
Preble v. Centennial Sch. Dist., No. 287, 530 P.3d 497 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). “Here, by contrast, plaintiff did offer evidence that work was the major contributing cause of her injury. Held: Where a worker offers evidence that work was the major contributing cause of a combined condition, but the administrative law judge or Workers’ Compensation Board…”
Preble v. Centennial Sch. Dist., No. 287 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.019(1)(a) — 7 cases
Bundy v. Nustar GP LLC, 506 P.3d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 2022). “Held: The trial court did not err in determining that ORS 656.019(1)(a) has all the hallmarks of a pro- cedural statute that governs the time for bringing a negligence action; it is not a substantive exception to the immunity provided in ORS 656.”
Bundy v. NuStar GP LLC, 533 P.3d 21 (Or. 2023). “At issue in this case is whether ORS 656.019, which imposes certain procedural requirements on cases such as plaintiff’s, also serves as a “substantive exception” to ORS 656.”
Bundy v. Nustar GP, LLC, 373 P.3d 1141 (Or. Ct. App. 2016). “With respect to the second ruling, plaintiff contends that the court erred in refusing to allow him to file a fourth amended complaint because that proposed pleading stated claims for negligence against NuStar as permitted by ORS 656.”
Preble v. Centennial Sch. Dist., No. 287, 530 P.3d 497 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). “Here, by contrast, plaintiff did offer evidence that work was the major contributing cause of her injury. Held: Where a worker offers evidence that work was the major contributing cause of a combined condition, but the administrative law judge or Workers’ Compensation Board…”
Bundy v. NuStar GP, LLC (Or. 2017).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.019(1)(b) — 2 cases
Bundy v. NuStar GP LLC, 533 P.3d 21 (Or. 2023). “At issue in this case is whether ORS 656.019, which imposes certain procedural requirements on cases such as plaintiff’s, also serves as a “substantive exception” to ORS 656.”
Bundy v. Nustar GP LLC, 506 P.3d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 2022). “Held: The trial court did not err in determining that ORS 656.019(1)(a) has all the hallmarks of a pro- cedural statute that governs the time for bringing a negligence action; it is not a substantive exception to the immunity provided in ORS 656.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.019(2) — 2 cases
Preble v. Centennial Sch. Dist., No. 287, 530 P.3d 497 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). “Here, by contrast, plaintiff did offer evidence that work was the major contributing cause of her injury. Held: Where a worker offers evidence that work was the major contributing cause of a combined condition, but the administrative law judge or Workers’ Compensation Board…”
Preble v. Centennial Sch. Dist., No. 287 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.019(2)(a) — 4 cases
Preble v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 287, 447 P.3d 42 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that the action had been timely commenced under ORS 656.019 (2)(a). Defendant responded with a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was time barred.”
Burley v. Clackamas Cnty., 446 P.3d 564 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “3d ---- (2019) (concluding that similar definition of the term "employer" for purposes of ORS chapter 656 meant that public employers were among the employers to which ORS 656.019(2)(a) applies). That express definition, standing alone, precludes the conclusion that the…”
Preble v. Centennial Sch. Dist., No. 287, 530 P.3d 497 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). “Here, by contrast, plaintiff did offer evidence that work was the major contributing cause of her injury. Held: Where a worker offers evidence that work was the major contributing cause of a combined condition, but the administrative law judge or Workers’ Compensation Board…”
Preble v. Centennial Sch. Dist., No. 287 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.019(l)(a) — 3 cases
Hudjohn v. S&g Mach. Co., 114 P.3d 1141 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). “First, the exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity embodied in the “Smothers-fix” statute, ORS 656.019(l)(a), did not apply to plaintiffs negligence claims against S&G because the ALJ had rejected plaintiffs workers’ compensation claim on grounds other than plaintiffs…”
Bundy v. Nustar GP, LLC, 373 P.3d 1141 (Or. Ct. App. 2016). “With respect to the second ruling, plaintiff contends that the court erred in refusing to allow him to file a fourth amended complaint because that proposed pleading stated claims for negligence against NuStar as permitted by ORS 656.”
Alcutt v. Adams Fam. Food Servs., Inc., 311 P.3d 959 (Or. Ct. App. 2013). “, 332 Or 83 , 23 P3d 333 (2001), 2 and misinterpreted ORS 656.019 — a statute enacted soon after Smothers was decided.”
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