659A.142
Discrimination against individual with disability by employment agency, labor
organization, place of public accommodation or state government prohibited;
discrimination in provision of healthcare; mental disorder treatment not
evidence of inability to manage property. (1) As used in this section:
(a) “Health care
facility” has the meaning given that term in ORS 442.015.
(b) “Health
professional regulatory board” has the meaning given that term in ORS 676.160.
(c) “Medical
resources” includes but is not limited to:
(A) Medical
devices or equipment.
(B) Prescription
drugs.
(C) Laboratory
testing.
(d) “Provider”
means:
(A) An individual
licensed or certified by a health professional regulatory board.
(B) A health care
facility.
(e) “State
government” has the meaning given that term in ORS 174.111.
(2) It is an
unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to
refer for employment, or otherwise discriminate against, any individual because
that individual has a disability, or to classify or refer for employment any
individual because that individual has a disability.
(3) It is an
unlawful employment practice for a labor organization, because an individual
has a disability, to exclude or to expel from its membership such individual or
to discriminate in any way against such individual.
(4) It is an
unlawful practice for any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement as
defined in ORS 659A.400, or any person acting on behalf of such place, to make
any distinction, discrimination or restriction because a customer or patron is
an individual with a disability.
(5)(a) It is an
unlawful practice for state government to exclude an individual from
participation in or deny an individual the benefits of the services, programs
or activities of state government or to make any distinction, discrimination or
restriction because the individual has a disability.
(b) Paragraph (a)
of this subsection is intended to ensure equal access to available services,
programs and activities of state government.
(c) Paragraph (a)
of this subsection is not intended to:
(A) Create an
independent entitlement to any service, program or activity of state
government; or
(B) Require state
government to take any action that state government can demonstrate would
result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program or
activity of state government or would result in undue financial or
administrative burdens on state government.
(6)(a) It is an
unlawful practice for a provider or any person acting on behalf of a provider
to discriminate by doing any of the following based on the patient’s race,
color, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, age or
disability:
(A) Deny medical
treatment to the patient that is likely to benefit the patient based on an
individualized assessment of the patient using objective medical evidence; or
(B) Limit or restrict
in any manner the allocation of medical resources to the patient.
(b) In
determining whether medical treatment is likely to benefit a patient under
paragraph (a)(A) of this subsection, a provider shall consult with the patient
and others legally authorized to act on behalf of the patient, if available.
(c) This
subsection does not:
(A) Restrict the
authority of a patient, or an individual legally authorized to act on behalf of
a patient, to consent to or decline medical treatment;
(B) Require the
provision of medical treatment that is prohibited by state or federal law; or
(C) Restrict a
provider, after completing the individualized assessment described in paragraph
(a)(A) of this subsection and the consultation described in paragraph (b) of
this subsection, from providing objective information to the patient about the
risks and benefits of treatment.
(7) Receipt or
alleged receipt of treatment for a mental disorder does not constitute evidence
of an individual’s inability to acquire, rent or maintain property. [Formerly
659.425; 2003 c.254 §3; 2007 c.70 §297; 2009 c.508 §14; 2021 c.584 §1]
Notes of Decisions
Fenimore v. Blachly-Lane Cnty. C.E.A., 441 P.3d 699 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 40× “Specifically, BOLI found that there was "substantial evidence" that defendants had "violated ORS 659A.142 in making a restriction based on Complainant's disability" based on the fact that defendants had offered plaintiff only "physically segregated" access to the meetings and…”
Abraham v. Corizon Health, Inc., 511 P.3d 1083 (Or. 2022).
· cites it 23× “142?” Held: (1) Plaintiff was a “customer” or “patron” of defendant within the meaning of ORS 659A.142; (2) a private contractor pro- viding healthcare services at a county jail is a “place of public accommodation” within the meaning of ORS 659A.”
Johnson v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 415 P.3d 1071 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 9× “*337 In the final order challenged in this judicial review proceeding, the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI) determined that respondent Johnson, owner and operator of Duck Stop Market (DSM), violated ORS 659A.142(4) and OAR 839-006-0300(2) (Feb.”
C.O. v. Portland Pub. Schs., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D. Or. 2005).
· cites it 5× “Should the claim under Or.Rev. Stat. § 659A.142 be dismissed? At oral argument, plaintiffs identified this claim as one asserted under Or.”
Grimm v. Bd. of Parole, 310 P.3d 736 (Or. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 3× “) Petitioner points to nothing in either the ADA, ORS 659A.142, or case law interpreting those statutes, that would suggest that the board is obliged to release a dangerous inmate into the community simply because the dangerousness is related to, or the result of, a disability.”
Andrew Abraham v. Corizon Health, Inc., 985 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2021).
· cites it 3× “He also asked the district court to certify the following question to the Oregon Supreme Court: “Whether private entities that provide services at a local correction facility are excluded from the definition of ‘a place of public accommodation’ and therefore exempt from Or. Rev.…”
Roe v. Providence Health Sys.-oregon, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D. Or. 2009).
“A jury ruled in favor of the Hospital on Roe’s state public accommodation disability discrimination claim, alleged under ORS 659A.142(3), finding that Roe did not prove that defendants unlawfully discriminated against her.”
Getman v. Oregon Health & Sci. Univ. (D. Or. 2022).
· cites it 29× “DISCUSSION OHSU moves for summary judgment on three grounds: (1) Getman’s claims for equitable relief are moot; (2) Getman’s federal claims for compensatory damages fail as a matter of law; and (3) there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether OHSU violated ORS §…”
Abraham v. Corizon Health Inc. (D. Or. 2019).
· cites it 8× “Abraham brought claims under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, the federal Rehabilitation Act, and Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.142, which is the Oregon public accommodations statute.”
Sheila Gund v. Marion Cnty. & State of Oregon (D. Or. 2026).
· cites it 7× “The remaining claims are for violations of the ADA against the State and the County (First Claim); violations of the Rehabilitation Act against the State and the County (Second Claim); violations of the Fourth Amendment against the County (Third Claim); violations of Oregon…”
Kim v. Beaverton Sch. Dist. 48J (D. Or. 2021).
· cites it 6× “As with the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, to state a claim under § 659A.142, “a plaintiff must allege that: (1) she is an individual with a disability; (2) she is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or…”
Getman v. Oregon Health & Sci. Univ. (D. Or. 2022).
· cites it 6× “§ 659A.142 claim to the operative complaint at this time does not infringe on the efficient adjudication of this case because it requires no additional discovery nor an extension of the discovery or dispositive motion deadlines or trial date.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.142(2) — 1 case
Fenimore v. Blachly-Lane Cnty. C.E.A., 441 P.3d 699 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
“Specifically, BOLI found that there was "substantial evidence" that defendants had "violated ORS 659A.142 in making a restriction based on Complainant's disability" based on the fact that defendants had offered plaintiff only "physically segregated" access to the meetings and…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.142(3) — 2 cases
C.O. v. Portland Pub. Schs., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D. Or. 2005).
“Should the claim under Or.Rev. Stat. § 659A.142 be dismissed? At oral argument, plaintiffs identified this claim as one asserted under Or.”
Roe v. Providence Health Sys.-oregon, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D. Or. 2009).
“A jury ruled in favor of the Hospital on Roe’s state public accommodation disability discrimination claim, alleged under ORS 659A.142(3), finding that Roe did not prove that defendants unlawfully discriminated against her.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.142(4) — 13 cases
Fenimore v. Blachly-Lane Cnty. C.E.A., 441 P.3d 699 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
“Specifically, BOLI found that there was "substantial evidence" that defendants had "violated ORS 659A.142 in making a restriction based on Complainant's disability" based on the fact that defendants had offered plaintiff only "physically segregated" access to the meetings and…”
Abraham v. Corizon Health, Inc., 511 P.3d 1083 (Or. 2022).
“142?” Held: (1) Plaintiff was a “customer” or “patron” of defendant within the meaning of ORS 659A.142; (2) a private contractor pro- viding healthcare services at a county jail is a “place of public accommodation” within the meaning of ORS 659A.”
Johnson v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 415 P.3d 1071 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
“*337 In the final order challenged in this judicial review proceeding, the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI) determined that respondent Johnson, owner and operator of Duck Stop Market (DSM), violated ORS 659A.142(4) and OAR 839-006-0300(2) (Feb.”
Andrew Abraham v. Corizon Health, Inc., 985 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2021).
“He also asked the district court to certify the following question to the Oregon Supreme Court: “Whether private entities that provide services at a local correction facility are excluded from the definition of ‘a place of public accommodation’ and therefore exempt from Or. Rev.…”
Getman v. Oregon Health & Sci. Univ. (D. Or. 2022).
“DISCUSSION OHSU moves for summary judgment on three grounds: (1) Getman’s claims for equitable relief are moot; (2) Getman’s federal claims for compensatory damages fail as a matter of law; and (3) there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether OHSU violated ORS §…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.142(5) — 2 cases
Fenimore v. Blachly-Lane Cnty. C.E.A., 441 P.3d 699 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
“Specifically, BOLI found that there was "substantial evidence" that defendants had "violated ORS 659A.142 in making a restriction based on Complainant's disability" based on the fact that defendants had offered plaintiff only "physically segregated" access to the meetings and…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.142(5)(a) — 2 cases
Grimm v. Bd. of Parole, 310 P.3d 736 (Or. Ct. App. 2013).
“) Petitioner points to nothing in either the ADA, ORS 659A.142, or case law interpreting those statutes, that would suggest that the board is obliged to release a dangerous inmate into the community simply because the dangerousness is related to, or the result of, a disability.”
Kim v. Beaverton Sch. Dist. 48J (D. Or. 2021).
“As with the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, to state a claim under § 659A.142, “a plaintiff must allege that: (1) she is an individual with a disability; (2) she is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or…”
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