§ 5530. Twenty-one year limitation.
(a) General rule.--The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within 21 years:
(1) Except as provided in section 5527.1 (relating to ten year limitation), an action
for the possession of real property.
(2) An action for the payment of any ground rent, annuity or other charge upon real property,
or any part or portion thereof. If this paragraph shall operate to bar any payment
of such a rent, annuity or charge, the rent, annuity or charge to which the payment
relates shall be extinguished and no further action may be commenced with respect
to subsequent payments.
(3) (Deleted by amendment).
(b) Entry upon land.--No entry upon real property shall toll the running of the period of limitation specified
in subsection (a)(1), unless a possessory action shall be commenced therefor within
one year after entry. Such an entry and commencement of a possessory action, without
recovery therein, shall not toll the running of such period of limitation in respect
of another possessory action, unless such other possessory action is commenced within
one year after the termination of the first.
(May 4, 2006, P.L.112, No.34, eff. 120 days; June 19, 2018, P.L.223, No.34, eff. one
year)
2018 Amendment. Act 34 amended subsec. (a)(1).
2006 Amendment. Act 34 deleted subsec. (a)(3). Section 6(1) of Act 34 provided that Act 34 shall apply
to all condemnations effected on or after the effective date of section 6. Section
(6)(3) of Act 34 provided that the amendment of subsec. (a)(3) shall apply only to
causes of action which accrue after the effective date of section 6.
Cross References. Section 5530 is referred to in section 5527.1 of this title.
Notes of Decisions
Robinson Coal Co. v. Goodall, 72 A.3d 685 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
· cites it 2× “In this respect, Appellant argues that the statute of limitations in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530 rather than 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(3) applies to Robinson’s count demanding return of or payment for the 192,000 tons of coal that it left at Goodall’s washing plant.”
Stark v. Equitable Gas Co., LLC, 116 A.3d 760 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015).
· cites it 2× “ts made in the field, that [Landowners] owned property up to the center line of the unopened road at the time [Equitablejs gas line was installed;” (2) overruling the preliminary objection based on the statute of limitations “in that [Landowners’] cause of action is governed by…”
Glenn v. Shuey, 595 A.2d 606 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
· cites it 2× “****** 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530. 4 . Glenn contends that the trial court’s order of September 26, 1989 was final, and consequently, the time period for filing an appeal began to run on that date.”
Croyle v. Dellape, 832 A.2d 466 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
“¶ 28 In their fifth issue, the Dellapes argue that the Croyles’ action in ejectment was barred by the statute of limitations provided in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530, *476 which indicates that an action for possession of real property must commence within twenty-one years.”
Williams v. Borough of Blakely, 25 A.3d 458 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011).
“Absent findings of fact by the trial court, we also decline to address the Borough’s argument that Owner’s de facto taking claim is barred by the 21-year statute of limitations in former 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530(a)(3) (governing inverse condemnation proceedings under the 1964 Eminent…”
Com. Union Assurance Co. v. Pucci, 523 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
“The critical issue, however, is whether or not the Puccis’ possession was hostile or adverse to the interests of the other devisees in the property.”
German v. City of Philadelphia, 683 A.2d 323 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
“Based on their contention that a taking clearly occurred, the Germans maintain that their action was timely because it was governed by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530(a)(3), which provides a twenty-one year statute of limitations for proceedings “in inverse condemnation, if property has been…”
Kraiser v. Horsham Twp., 455 A.2d 782 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
“In concluding that the appellant’s claim was barred by the lapse of time, the trial court relied on the six-year statute of limitations dictated by Section 5527(4) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C. S. §5527(4). The appellant, Kraiser, argues that the governing period of limitation…”
In Re Flowers, 734 A.2d 69 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
· cites it 3× “Regarding the Authority’s claim that Landowners’ Petition was time barred, the trial court held that the 21-year statute of limitations of Section 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530(a)(3) was applicable to Landowners’ Petition because the Authority’s actions did not deprive Landowners of the…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5530(a) — 4 cases
Com. Union Assurance Co. v. Pucci, 523 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
“The critical issue, however, is whether or not the Puccis’ possession was hostile or adverse to the interests of the other devisees in the property.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5530(a)(1) — 6 cases
Robinson Coal Co. v. Goodall, 72 A.3d 685 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
“In this respect, Appellant argues that the statute of limitations in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530 rather than 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(3) applies to Robinson’s count demanding return of or payment for the 192,000 tons of coal that it left at Goodall’s washing plant.”
Glenn v. Shuey, 595 A.2d 606 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
“****** 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530. 4 . Glenn contends that the trial court’s order of September 26, 1989 was final, and consequently, the time period for filing an appeal began to run on that date.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5530(a)(2) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5530(a)(3) — 9 cases
Stark v. Equitable Gas Co., LLC, 116 A.3d 760 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015).
“ts made in the field, that [Landowners] owned property up to the center line of the unopened road at the time [Equitablejs gas line was installed;” (2) overruling the preliminary objection based on the statute of limitations “in that [Landowners’] cause of action is governed by…”
Williams v. Borough of Blakely, 25 A.3d 458 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011).
“Absent findings of fact by the trial court, we also decline to address the Borough’s argument that Owner’s de facto taking claim is barred by the 21-year statute of limitations in former 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530(a)(3) (governing inverse condemnation proceedings under the 1964 Eminent…”
German v. City of Philadelphia, 683 A.2d 323 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
“Based on their contention that a taking clearly occurred, the Germans maintain that their action was timely because it was governed by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530(a)(3), which provides a twenty-one year statute of limitations for proceedings “in inverse condemnation, if property has been…”
Kraiser v. Horsham Twp., 455 A.2d 782 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
“In concluding that the appellant’s claim was barred by the lapse of time, the trial court relied on the six-year statute of limitations dictated by Section 5527(4) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C. S. §5527(4). The appellant, Kraiser, argues that the governing period of limitation…”
In Re Flowers, 734 A.2d 69 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
“Regarding the Authority’s claim that Landowners’ Petition was time barred, the trial court held that the 21-year statute of limitations of Section 42 Pa.C.S. § 5530(a)(3) was applicable to Landowners’ Petition because the Authority’s actions did not deprive Landowners of the…”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5530(a)(l) — 1 case
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