memorandum opinion detailing its reasons for dismissing Appellant’s petition. At the conclusion of the opinion, the PCRA court stated, “For the Reasons set forth, an order dismissing [Appellant’s] second-amended PCRA petition will be entered.” PCRA Court Opinion, 12/6/22, at 22 (emphasis added). The PCRA court docket contains an entry confirming that a memorandum opinion was filed on December 6, 2022. See PCRA Court Docket at 51 (December 6, 2022 entry). Absent from this docket entry is a notation that an order

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On February 16, 2002, a jury convicted Appellant of second-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, burglary, robbery, and two counts of theft by unlawful taking.^[2] Verdict Slip, 2/16/02; see also N.T., 2/13/02, at 840.3 Appellant’s convictions stemmed from an incident that occurred on April 17, 2000, whereby Appellant shot and killed the victim at his hunting cabin in Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania. Prior to the shooting, Appellant and two accomplices, Tommy Duvall (“Duvall”) and Chris Muckle (“Muckle”), ____________________________________________ dismissing the petition was filed in conjunction with the December 6, 2022 opinion. Id. On December 12, 2022, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing Appellant’s petition. PCRA Court Order, 12/12/22. The entry of this order is confirmed by a review of the PCRA court docket, although we note that the entry was incorrectly described as “order denying post-sentence motion.” PCRA Court Docket at 51 (December 12, 2022 entry) (extraneous capitalization omitted). Because the December 6, 2022 order dismissing Appellant’s petition is not part of the certified record, we deem Appellant’s appeal to lie from the December 12, 2022 order dismissing his petition. See Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc) (stating that, “under the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, any document which is not part of the officially certified record is deemed non-existent - a deficiency which cannot be remedied merely by including copies of the missing documents in a brief or in the reproduced record”), appeal denied, 916 A.2d 632 (Pa. 2007). The caption has been corrected accordingly. ^[2] 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 903(a)(1), 3502(a), 3701(a)(1)(i), and 3921(a) (2 counts), respectively. ^[3] We note that Appellant’s trial took place from February 13, 2002, to February 16, 2002. Each volume of the notes of testimony from trial, however, is dated February 13, 2002, and the notes of testimony are continuously paginated for all four days of trial. As such, we refer to the notes of testimony by the date February 13, 2002.

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burglarized a nearby home and stole several guns and a cross-bow. In fleeing the nearby home out of fear of getting caught, Appellant and the two accomplices came upon the victim’s hunting cabin where the victim’s truck was parked. While the accomplices were attempting to steal the truck to use as a get-away vehicle, the victim confronted the men. During the interaction between the victim and the two accomplices, Appellant appeared and shot the victim four times. After hiding the victim’s body under a canoe behind the hunting cabin, the three individuals fled in the victim’s truck. The three individuals were apprehended shortly thereafter. See generally, PCRA Court Opinion, 12/6/22, at 2-9. On May 20, 2002, Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for his second-degree murder conviction.^[4] Sentencing Order, 5/20/02. On August 17, 2004, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on December 22, 2004. Commonwealth v. Branthafer, 860 A.2d 1124, 1699 MDA 2003 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. ^[17], 2004) (non-precedential decision), appeal denied, 864 A.2d 528 (Pa. 2004). Appellant did not seek further discretionary review by the Supreme Court of the United States. As such, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final March 22, 2005, upon expiration of the time for seeking discretionary review with the Supreme Court ____________________________________________ 4 Appellant was also ordered to pay the costs of prosecution ($1,200.75), as well as restitution in the amount of $12,915.30. Sentencing Order, 5/20/02.

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of the United States. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (stating, “A petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court that is subject to discretionary review by the state court of last resort is timely when it is filed with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order denying discretionary review.”); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review”). On March 15, 2005, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition, his first. PCRA counsel was subsequently appointed to represent Appellant, and filed an amended petition on August 15, 2006.5 After conducting multiple hearings related to Appellant’s petition, the PCRA court denied the petition on September 28, 2011. On December 24, 2012, this Court affirmed the PCRA court order denying Appellant’s petition,6 and our Supreme Court denied ____________________________________________ 5 For ease of identification in discussions infra, Appellant’s PCRA counsel associated with the 2005 PCRA petition is identified as “initial-PCRA counsel.” 6 In affirming the PCRA court order denying Appellant’s petition, this Court held that Appellant’s issue – that “the PCRA court erred in applying the Strickland[ v. Washington, 466 U.S. ^[68] (1984)] performance/prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel, rather than the per se ineffective assistance of counsel rule found in United States v. Cronic, [466 U.S. 648 (1984)]” – was waived for failure to raise the issue before the PCRA court or in his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). Branthafer, 64 A.3d 25, 2012 WL 7831640, 1878 MDA 2011, at 4.

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Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on June 27, 2013. Commonwealth v. Branthafer, 64 A.3d 35, 2012 WL 7831640, 1878 MDA 2011 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. ^[24], 2012) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 64 A.3d 35 (Pa. 2013). On February 1, 2014, Appellant filed pro se a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, asserting claims of ineffective assistance of initial-PCRA counsel and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Branthafer v. Glunt, 2015 WL 5569128, at *4 (M.D.Pa. filed Sept. ^[22], 2015) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 15-3571 (3rd Cir. filed Mar. ^[24], 2016). On September 22, 2015, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied Appellant’s petition and dismissed the case. Branthafer, 2015 WL 5569128, at *1. On July 26, 2018, Appellant filed pro se the instant PCRA, his second. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition on July 31, 2019. Thereafter, Appellant retained PCRA counsel, and new PCRA counsel filed a second amended petition on July 28, 2021.7 The PCRA court conducted an ____________________________________________ 7 On June 6, 2022, Appellant filed pro se a motion requesting that his privately retained counsel be appointed to represent him. The PCRA court granted Appellant’s request on June 9, 2022.

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evidentiary hearing on January 5, 2022. On December 12, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. This appeal followed.^[8] Appellant raises the following issues for our review: [1.] Is the limitation period under 42 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 9545(b) non-jurisdictional? [2.] If the PCRA time-limitation is “jurisdictional,” is the time-limitation, as applied to [Appellant], unconstitutional? [3.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] first claim was untimely? [4.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] fourth claim was untimely? [5.] If McCoy[ v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018)] did not announce a new constitutional rule, did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] fifth claim was untimely? [6.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] first claim lacked merit? [7.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] second claim lacked merit? [8.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] third claim lacked merit? Appellant’s Brief at 8 (extraneous capitalization omitted).9 Jurisdictional Argument ____________________________________________ 8 Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. In its 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court explained that the PCRA court judge who entered the December 12, 2022 dismissal order retired on December 31, 2022. The PCRA court adopted the retired jurist’s December 6, 2022 opinion that accompanied the order dismissing the petition. PCRA Court Opinion, 2/13/23. 9 For ease of disposition, Appellant’s issues have been reorganized.

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It is a well-settled principle that if a PCRA petition is untimely, neither the PCRA court nor this Court has jurisdiction over the petition and cannot address the substantive claims. Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1143 (Pa. 2020), citing Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006). Recognizing this well-settled principle, Appellant’s first issue, nonetheless, alleges that the one-year time-bar pertaining to the filing of PCRA petitions, as set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1),10 is not jurisdictional in nature. Appellant’s Brief at 71-73. Appellant asserts that our Supreme Court’s “decisional law declaring the PCRA deadlines[, set forth in Section 9545(b)(1),] as jurisdictional was erroneously decided and that the time-provision[ of one year] was intended to be a statute of limitations.” Id. at 71. Appellant argues that “[t]he time-bar was never originally intended to serve as a jurisdictional hurdle” as evidenced by the fact that Section 9545(b)(1) never utilizes the word “jurisdiction.” Id. at 71-72. Rather, Appellant contends our Supreme Court’s “holdings to the contrary have resulted in what should have been unnecessary attempts to escape the Gordian [K]not[11] of its own creation in rare circumstances.” Id. at 72. ____________________________________________ 10 Section 9545(b)(1) states that a PCRA petition, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves” one of the three enumerated exceptions, as discussed in greater detail infra. ^[42] Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 11 The cutting of the Gordian Knot is an Ancient Greek legend associated with Alexander the Great[, while he was] in Gordium[,] Phrygia [(an ancient city

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Alternately, Appellant’s second issue asserts that, if Pennsylvania courts continue to apply Section 9545(b)(1) as a jurisdictional rule, then Section 9545(b)(1) is unconstitutional. Id. at 73-79. Appellant contends that the jurisdictional nature of the time limitation violates his due process rights and right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, i.e., imprisonment, under the Pennsylvania and United States constitutions. Id. at 73. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the time limitation “deprives [him] of an enforcement mechanism for his due process right to effective PCRA counsel.” Id. at 78-79 (asserting that, the jurisdictional time-bar prevents him from raising an ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel claim in a timely petition). Appellant contends that because the time limitations prevent him from presenting a “timely petition,” he is deprived of his freedom of movement and freedom from punishment as an innocent man, which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 76-77. In the seminal case, Commonwealth v. Peterkin, our Supreme Court, for the first time, declared that the PCRA one-year time-bar under Section ____________________________________________ located in modern-day Turkey)], regarding a complex knot that tied an oxcart. Reputedly, whoever could untie [the knot] would be destined to rule all of Asia. In 333 [B.C.,] Alexander [the Great] was challenged to untie the knot. Instead of untangling it laboriously as expected, he dramatically cut through it with his sword, thus exercising another form of mental genius. It is thus used as a metaphor for a seemingly intractable problem which is solved by exercising an unexpectedly direct, novel, rule-bending, decisive, and simple approach that removes the perceived constraints. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gordian_Knot (last visited Feb. ^[27], 2024).

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9545(b)(1) was jurisdictional in nature. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 772 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa. 1998); see also Reid, 235 A.3d at 1167. The Peterkin Court further rejected the argument that the jurisdictional nature of the one-year time-bar was unconstitutional, finding no due process violation, as the time for filing a petition is reasonable, and no ex post facto violation existed because the time limitation “is procedural in nature and does not fall within the categories of retrospective laws prohibited by the ex post facto clause.” Peterkin, 772 A.2d at 642-643, n.8 (stating, the PCRA time limitation “strikes a reasonable balance between society's need for finality in criminal cases and the convicted person's need to demonstrate that there has been an error in the proceedings that resulted in his[, or her,] conviction”). For more than two decades, Pennsylvania courts have steadfastly held to the view that the PCRA one-year time-bar was jurisdictional in nature and constitutionally sound. See Reid, 235 A.3d at 1167 (collecting cases that have held to the principles that the PCRA time limitation is jurisdictional in nature and constitutional). Recently, our Supreme Court, in Reid, supra, roundly rejected a call for “fine-tuning” the precedent first announced in Peterkin. Reid, 235 A.3d at 1168 (rejecting the argument that a court’s inability to afford a petitioner relief based on lack of jurisdiction means the PCRA failed to afford sufficient due process and the statute is, therefore, constitutionally infirm). Finding “no present need” to abandon decades-old PCRA jurisprudence, the Reid Court further remarked that the doctrine of stare decisis required continued

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adherence to the well-enshrined principle first set forth in Peterkin.^[12] Id. at 1169. Thus, bound by the decisions of our Supreme Court, we continue to adhere to the principle that the PCRA time limitation is jurisdictional in nature. See Reid, 235 A.3d at 1159 (stating, “[i]t is elementary that unless the United States Supreme Court reverses a decision of [our Supreme Court], or [our Supreme Court] overrules its prior decision, the law emanating from the decision remains law” (citation and original quotation marks omitted)). Regarding Appellant’s second issue that the jurisdictional time limitation of the PCRA violates his due process rights and right against cruel and unusual punishment, we find this argument to be of no avail. To reiterate, Appellant’s constitutional challenge rests on the argument that the jurisdictional time-bar prevents him from asserting an ineffectiveness claim involving initial-PCRA counsel. Appellant’s Brief at 78. After careful review, we believe the statutory ____________________________________________ 12 As described by the Reid Court, the doctrine of stare decisis ensures “evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[s] reliance on judicial decisions, and contribute[s] to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Reid, 235 A.2d at 1168 (citation and original brackets omitted). The Reid Court further explained that because the precedent set forth in Peterkin – the PCRA one-year time-bar is jurisdictional in nature – rests on statutory interpretation, verses constitutional construction, the doctrine of stare decisis holds “greater sanctity” since the legislature is free to amend a statute if it so disagrees with a court’s interpretation. Id. at 1168-1169 (noting that, “[a] statutory construction, once made and followed, should never be altered upon the changed views of new personnel of the court”). - 10 - J-S03012-24 structure and judicial construction of the PCRA both diminish and refute the due process claims raised by Appellant. As discussed supra, the Peterkin Court set forth the well-settled principle that the PCRA jurisdictional time limitation is constitutionally sound and does not violate, inter alia, a petitioner’s due process rights. Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 643, n.8. As the Peterkin Court explained, “[b]ecause the one-year period within which petitions normally must be filed is sufficiently generous to prepare even the most difficult case, and because the exceptions to this filing period encompass government misconduct, [newly-discovered facts], and constitutional changes,” the PCRA jurisdictional time-bar is both reasonable and constitutional. Id. at 643 (noting, “[t]he purpose of law is not to provide convicted criminals with the means to escape well-deserved sanctions, but to provide a reasonable opportunity for those who have been wrongly convicted to demonstrate the injustice of their conviction”). The PCRA time limitation “strikes a reasonable balance between society's need for finality in criminal cases and the convicted person's need to demonstrate that there has been an error in the proceedings that resulted in his[, or her,] conviction.” Id. Moreover, our Supreme Court recently held, in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), that a petitioner may raise an ineffective assistance of initial-PCRA counsel claim at the first opportunity to do so, either via new PCRA counsel or pro se, even if raised for the first time on appeal. Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401. In so holding, however, our Supreme Court did - 11 - J-S03012-24 not overrule the well-established principle that a claim of ineffective assistance of initial-PCRA counsel does not automatically overcome the PCRA jurisdictional one-year time-bar.^[13] Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 1999) (stating, “an untimely petition will not be addressed simply because it is couched in terms of ineffectiveness”); Commonwealth v. Beasley, 741 A.2d 1258, 1286 (Pa. 1999) (stating that, “the fact that some of [a petitioner’s] claims are couched in terms of ineffectiveness[] will [not] save [a] petition from application of [S]ection 9545”); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911, 915 (Pa. 2000) (finding that, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not overcome the jurisdictional time-bar, and a petitioner is still required to plead and prove one of the enumerated exceptions provided in Section 9545(b)(1)(i – iii) based on the ineffectiveness claim); Commonwealth v. Miller, 2023 WL 6378154, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. ^[29], 2023) (non-precedential decision) (analyzing Miller’s ineffectiveness claim within the legal framework of the PCRA’s established exceptions to the jurisdictional time-bar rather than as a claim that automatically overcame the jurisdictional time-bar). Thus, Bradley ____________________________________________ 13 Bradley’s PCRA petition was timely filed pursuant to Section 9545(b)(1), thus making the invocation of one of the three enumerated exceptions set forth therein unnecessary. As such, in reaching its holding, the Bradley Court did not explicitly address a circumstance involving an untimely PCRA petition, which is the situation in the case sub judice. Notwithstanding, as the Peterkin Court recognized, the permissible filing period of the PCRA may be extended where governmental interference, newly-discovered facts, or constitutional developments are present. These exceptions offer reasonable opportunities to challenge wrongful convictions outside the one-year limitation. - 12 - J-S03012-24 expanded the opportunities afforded a petitioner to raise ineffectiveness claims, albeit still requiring that the petitioner satisfy the jurisdictional one-year time-bar requirement. Finding no case law, and Appellant has not cited any, that overruled the constitutional validity of the PCRA jurisdictional one-year time-bar, we continue to adhere to the principle that the PCRA time limitation is constitutionally sound and, therefore, does not violate Appellant’s constitutional rights. See Reid, 235 A.3d at 1159. Timeliness Exceptions Appellant’s third, fourth, and fifth issues challenge the trial court’s order dismissing his petition on the ground that Appellant failed to plead and prove one of the timeliness exceptions enumerated in Section 9545(b)(1), as discussed infra. Appellant’s Brief at 35-42, 60-70. In addressing Appellant’s issues, we are mindful of our well-settled standard and scope of review of an order denying a PCRA petition. Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a petition is limited to an examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding.” - 13 - J-S03012-24 Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 140 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014). If a PCRA petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the claims and cannot grant relief. Reid, 235 A.3d at 1143 (stating, “[w]ithout jurisdiction, [courts] simply do not have legal authority to address the substantive claims” (citation and original quotation marks omitted)). As discussed supra, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on March 22, 2005. Appellant filed pro se his current PCRA petition on July 26, 2018, more than 12 years after the deadline for filing a timely PCRA petition. Therefore, Appellant’s current PCRA petition is patently untimely. If a PCRA petition is untimely, the jurisdictional time-bar can only be overcome if the petitioner alleges and proves one of the three statutory exceptions, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017). The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time-bar are as follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly[-]discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i - iii). A petition invoking an exception to the jurisdictional time-bar must be filed - 14 - J-S03012-24 within one year of the date that the claim could have been presented. ^[14] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2) (effective Dec. ^[24], 2018). If a petitioner fails to invoke a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar, courts are without jurisdiction to review the petition and provide relief. Spotz, 171 A.3d at 676. Upon conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court made the following findings of fact:

memorandum opinion detailing its reasons for dismissing Appellant’s petition. At the conclusion of the opinion, the PCRA court stated, “For the Reasons set forth, an order dismissing [Appellant’s] second-amended PCRA petition will be entered.” PCRA Court Opinion, 12/6/22, at 22 (emphasis added). The PCRA court docket contains an entry confirming that a memorandum opinion was filed on December 6, 2022. See PCRA Court Docket at 51 (December 6, 2022 entry). Absent from this docket entry is a notation that an order

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On February 16, 2002, a jury convicted Appellant of second-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, burglary, robbery, and two counts of theft by unlawful taking.^[2] Verdict Slip, 2/16/02; see also N.T., 2/13/02, at 840.3 Appellant’s convictions stemmed from an incident that occurred on April 17, 2000, whereby Appellant shot and killed the victim at his hunting cabin in Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania. Prior to the shooting, Appellant and two accomplices, Tommy Duvall (“Duvall”) and Chris Muckle (“Muckle”), ____________________________________________ dismissing the petition was filed in conjunction with the December 6, 2022 opinion. Id. On December 12, 2022, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing Appellant’s petition. PCRA Court Order, 12/12/22. The entry of this order is confirmed by a review of the PCRA court docket, although we note that the entry was incorrectly described as “order denying post-sentence motion.” PCRA Court Docket at 51 (December 12, 2022 entry) (extraneous capitalization omitted). Because the December 6, 2022 order dismissing Appellant’s petition is not part of the certified record, we deem Appellant’s appeal to lie from the December 12, 2022 order dismissing his petition. See Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc) (stating that, “under the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, any document which is not part of the officially certified record is deemed non-existent - a deficiency which cannot be remedied merely by including copies of the missing documents in a brief or in the reproduced record”), appeal denied, 916 A.2d 632 (Pa. 2007). The caption has been corrected accordingly. ^[2] 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 903(a)(1), 3502(a), 3701(a)(1)(i), and 3921(a) (2 counts), respectively. ^[3] We note that Appellant’s trial took place from February 13, 2002, to February 16, 2002. Each volume of the notes of testimony from trial, however, is dated February 13, 2002, and the notes of testimony are continuously paginated for all four days of trial. As such, we refer to the notes of testimony by the date February 13, 2002.

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burglarized a nearby home and stole several guns and a cross-bow. In fleeing the nearby home out of fear of getting caught, Appellant and the two accomplices came upon the victim’s hunting cabin where the victim’s truck was parked. While the accomplices were attempting to steal the truck to use as a get-away vehicle, the victim confronted the men. During the interaction between the victim and the two accomplices, Appellant appeared and shot the victim four times. After hiding the victim’s body under a canoe behind the hunting cabin, the three individuals fled in the victim’s truck. The three individuals were apprehended shortly thereafter. See generally, PCRA Court Opinion, 12/6/22, at 2-9. On May 20, 2002, Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for his second-degree murder conviction.^[4] Sentencing Order, 5/20/02. On August 17, 2004, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on December 22, 2004. Commonwealth v. Branthafer, 860 A.2d 1124, 1699 MDA 2003 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. ^[17], 2004) (non-precedential decision), appeal denied, 864 A.2d 528 (Pa. 2004). Appellant did not seek further discretionary review by the Supreme Court of the United States. As such, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final March 22, 2005, upon expiration of the time for seeking discretionary review with the Supreme Court ____________________________________________ 4 Appellant was also ordered to pay the costs of prosecution ($1,200.75), as well as restitution in the amount of $12,915.30. Sentencing Order, 5/20/02.

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of the United States. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (stating, “A petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court that is subject to discretionary review by the state court of last resort is timely when it is filed with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order denying discretionary review.”); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review”). On March 15, 2005, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition, his first. PCRA counsel was subsequently appointed to represent Appellant, and filed an amended petition on August 15, 2006.5 After conducting multiple hearings related to Appellant’s petition, the PCRA court denied the petition on September 28, 2011. On December 24, 2012, this Court affirmed the PCRA court order denying Appellant’s petition,6 and our Supreme Court denied ____________________________________________ 5 For ease of identification in discussions infra, Appellant’s PCRA counsel associated with the 2005 PCRA petition is identified as “initial-PCRA counsel.” 6 In affirming the PCRA court order denying Appellant’s petition, this Court held that Appellant’s issue – that “the PCRA court erred in applying the Strickland[ v. Washington, 466 U.S. ^[68] (1984)] performance/prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel, rather than the per se ineffective assistance of counsel rule found in United States v. Cronic, [466 U.S. 648 (1984)]” – was waived for failure to raise the issue before the PCRA court or in his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). Branthafer, 64 A.3d 25, 2012 WL 7831640, 1878 MDA 2011, at 4.

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Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on June 27, 2013. Commonwealth v. Branthafer, 64 A.3d 35, 2012 WL 7831640, 1878 MDA 2011 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. ^[24], 2012) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 64 A.3d 35 (Pa. 2013). On February 1, 2014, Appellant filed pro se a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, asserting claims of ineffective assistance of initial-PCRA counsel and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Branthafer v. Glunt, 2015 WL 5569128, at *4 (M.D.Pa. filed Sept. ^[22], 2015) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 15-3571 (3rd Cir. filed Mar. ^[24], 2016). On September 22, 2015, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied Appellant’s petition and dismissed the case. Branthafer, 2015 WL 5569128, at *1. On July 26, 2018, Appellant filed pro se the instant PCRA, his second. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition on July 31, 2019. Thereafter, Appellant retained PCRA counsel, and new PCRA counsel filed a second amended petition on July 28, 2021.7 The PCRA court conducted an ____________________________________________ 7 On June 6, 2022, Appellant filed pro se a motion requesting that his privately retained counsel be appointed to represent him. The PCRA court granted Appellant’s request on June 9, 2022.

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evidentiary hearing on January 5, 2022. On December 12, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. This appeal followed.^[8] Appellant raises the following issues for our review: [1.] Is the limitation period under 42 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 9545(b) non-jurisdictional? [2.] If the PCRA time-limitation is “jurisdictional,” is the time-limitation, as applied to [Appellant], unconstitutional? [3.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] first claim was untimely? [4.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] fourth claim was untimely? [5.] If McCoy[ v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018)] did not announce a new constitutional rule, did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] fifth claim was untimely? [6.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] first claim lacked merit? [7.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] second claim lacked merit? [8.] Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] third claim lacked merit? Appellant’s Brief at 8 (extraneous capitalization omitted).9 Jurisdictional Argument ____________________________________________ 8 Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. In its 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court explained that the PCRA court judge who entered the December 12, 2022 dismissal order retired on December 31, 2022. The PCRA court adopted the retired jurist’s December 6, 2022 opinion that accompanied the order dismissing the petition. PCRA Court Opinion, 2/13/23. 9 For ease of disposition, Appellant’s issues have been reorganized.

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It is a well-settled principle that if a PCRA petition is untimely, neither the PCRA court nor this Court has jurisdiction over the petition and cannot address the substantive claims. Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1143 (Pa. 2020), citing Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006). Recognizing this well-settled principle, Appellant’s first issue, nonetheless, alleges that the one-year time-bar pertaining to the filing of PCRA petitions, as set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1),10 is not jurisdictional in nature. Appellant’s Brief at 71-73. Appellant asserts that our Supreme Court’s “decisional law declaring the PCRA deadlines[, set forth in Section 9545(b)(1),] as jurisdictional was erroneously decided and that the time-provision[ of one year] was intended to be a statute of limitations.” Id. at 71. Appellant argues that “[t]he time-bar was never originally intended to serve as a jurisdictional hurdle” as evidenced by the fact that Section 9545(b)(1) never utilizes the word “jurisdiction.” Id. at 71-72. Rather, Appellant contends our Supreme Court’s “holdings to the contrary have resulted in what should have been unnecessary attempts to escape the Gordian [K]not[11] of its own creation in rare circumstances.” Id. at 72. ____________________________________________ 10 Section 9545(b)(1) states that a PCRA petition, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves” one of the three enumerated exceptions, as discussed in greater detail infra. ^[42] Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 11 The cutting of the Gordian Knot is an Ancient Greek legend associated with Alexander the Great[, while he was] in Gordium[,] Phrygia [(an ancient city

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Alternately, Appellant’s second issue asserts that, if Pennsylvania courts continue to apply Section 9545(b)(1) as a jurisdictional rule, then Section 9545(b)(1) is unconstitutional. Id. at 73-79. Appellant contends that the jurisdictional nature of the time limitation violates his due process rights and right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, i.e., imprisonment, under the Pennsylvania and United States constitutions. Id. at 73. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the time limitation “deprives [him] of an enforcement mechanism for his due process right to effective PCRA counsel.” Id. at 78-79 (asserting that, the jurisdictional time-bar prevents him from raising an ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel claim in a timely petition). Appellant contends that because the time limitations prevent him from presenting a “timely petition,” he is deprived of his freedom of movement and freedom from punishment as an innocent man, which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 76-77. In the seminal case, Commonwealth v. Peterkin, our Supreme Court, for the first time, declared that the PCRA one-year time-bar under Section ____________________________________________ located in modern-day Turkey)], regarding a complex knot that tied an oxcart. Reputedly, whoever could untie [the knot] would be destined to rule all of Asia. In 333 [B.C.,] Alexander [the Great] was challenged to untie the knot. Instead of untangling it laboriously as expected, he dramatically cut through it with his sword, thus exercising another form of mental genius. It is thus used as a metaphor for a seemingly intractable problem which is solved by exercising an unexpectedly direct, novel, rule-bending, decisive, and simple approach that removes the perceived constraints. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gordian_Knot (last visited Feb. ^[27], 2024).

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9545(b)(1) was jurisdictional in nature. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 772 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa. 1998); see also Reid, 235 A.3d at 1167. The Peterkin Court further rejected the argument that the jurisdictional nature of the one-year time-bar was unconstitutional, finding no due process violation, as the time for filing a petition is reasonable, and no ex post facto violation existed because the time limitation “is procedural in nature and does not fall within the categories of retrospective laws prohibited by the ex post facto clause.” Peterkin, 772 A.2d at 642-643, n.8 (stating, the PCRA time limitation “strikes a reasonable balance between society's need for finality in criminal cases and the convicted person's need to demonstrate that there has been an error in the proceedings that resulted in his[, or her,] conviction”). For more than two decades, Pennsylvania courts have steadfastly held to the view that the PCRA one-year time-bar was jurisdictional in nature and constitutionally sound. See Reid, 235 A.3d at 1167 (collecting cases that have held to the principles that the PCRA time limitation is jurisdictional in nature and constitutional). Recently, our Supreme Court, in Reid, supra, roundly rejected a call for “fine-tuning” the precedent first announced in Peterkin. Reid, 235 A.3d at 1168 (rejecting the argument that a court’s inability to afford a petitioner relief based on lack of jurisdiction means the PCRA failed to afford sufficient due process and the statute is, therefore, constitutionally infirm). Finding “no present need” to abandon decades-old PCRA jurisprudence, the Reid Court further remarked that the doctrine of stare decisis required continued

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adherence to the well-enshrined principle first set forth in Peterkin.^[12] Id. at 1169. Thus, bound by the decisions of our Supreme Court, we continue to adhere to the principle that the PCRA time limitation is jurisdictional in nature. See Reid, 235 A.3d at 1159 (stating, “[i]t is elementary that unless the United States Supreme Court reverses a decision of [our Supreme Court], or [our Supreme Court] overrules its prior decision, the law emanating from the decision remains law” (citation and original quotation marks omitted)). Regarding Appellant’s second issue that the jurisdictional time limitation of the PCRA violates his due process rights and right against cruel and unusual punishment, we find this argument to be of no avail. To reiterate, Appellant’s constitutional challenge rests on the argument that the jurisdictional time-bar prevents him from asserting an ineffectiveness claim involving initial-PCRA counsel. Appellant’s Brief at 78. After careful review, we believe the statutory ____________________________________________ 12 As described by the Reid Court, the doctrine of stare decisis ensures “evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[s] reliance on judicial decisions, and contribute[s] to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Reid, 235 A.2d at 1168 (citation and original brackets omitted). The Reid Court further explained that because the precedent set forth in Peterkin – the PCRA one-year time-bar is jurisdictional in nature – rests on statutory interpretation, verses constitutional construction, the doctrine of stare decisis holds “greater sanctity” since the legislature is free to amend a statute if it so disagrees with a court’s interpretation. Id. at 1168-1169 (noting that, “[a] statutory construction, once made and followed, should never be altered upon the changed views of new personnel of the court”). - 10 - J-S03012-24 structure and judicial construction of the PCRA both diminish and refute the due process claims raised by Appellant. As discussed supra, the Peterkin Court set forth the well-settled principle that the PCRA jurisdictional time limitation is constitutionally sound and does not violate, inter alia, a petitioner’s due process rights. Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 643, n.8. As the Peterkin Court explained, “[b]ecause the one-year period within which petitions normally must be filed is sufficiently generous to prepare even the most difficult case, and because the exceptions to this filing period encompass government misconduct, [newly-discovered facts], and constitutional changes,” the PCRA jurisdictional time-bar is both reasonable and constitutional. Id. at 643 (noting, “[t]he purpose of law is not to provide convicted criminals with the means to escape well-deserved sanctions, but to provide a reasonable opportunity for those who have been wrongly convicted to demonstrate the injustice of their conviction”). The PCRA time limitation “strikes a reasonable balance between society's need for finality in criminal cases and the convicted person's need to demonstrate that there has been an error in the proceedings that resulted in his[, or her,] conviction.” Id. Moreover, our Supreme Court recently held, in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), that a petitioner may raise an ineffective assistance of initial-PCRA counsel claim at the first opportunity to do so, either via new PCRA counsel or pro se, even if raised for the first time on appeal. Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401. In so holding, however, our Supreme Court did - 11 - J-S03012-24 not overrule the well-established principle that a claim of ineffective assistance of initial-PCRA counsel does not automatically overcome the PCRA jurisdictional one-year time-bar.^[13] Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 1999) (stating, “an untimely petition will not be addressed simply because it is couched in terms of ineffectiveness”); Commonwealth v. Beasley, 741 A.2d 1258, 1286 (Pa. 1999) (stating that, “the fact that some of [a petitioner’s] claims are couched in terms of ineffectiveness[] will [not] save [a] petition from application of [S]ection 9545”); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911, 915 (Pa. 2000) (finding that, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not overcome the jurisdictional time-bar, and a petitioner is still required to plead and prove one of the enumerated exceptions provided in Section 9545(b)(1)(i – iii) based on the ineffectiveness claim); Commonwealth v. Miller, 2023 WL 6378154, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. ^[29], 2023) (non-precedential decision) (analyzing Miller’s ineffectiveness claim within the legal framework of the PCRA’s established exceptions to the jurisdictional time-bar rather than as a claim that automatically overcame the jurisdictional time-bar). Thus, Bradley ____________________________________________ 13 Bradley’s PCRA petition was timely filed pursuant to Section 9545(b)(1), thus making the invocation of one of the three enumerated exceptions set forth therein unnecessary. As such, in reaching its holding, the Bradley Court did not explicitly address a circumstance involving an untimely PCRA petition, which is the situation in the case sub judice. Notwithstanding, as the Peterkin Court recognized, the permissible filing period of the PCRA may be extended where governmental interference, newly-discovered facts, or constitutional developments are present. These exceptions offer reasonable opportunities to challenge wrongful convictions outside the one-year limitation. - 12 - J-S03012-24 expanded the opportunities afforded a petitioner to raise ineffectiveness claims, albeit still requiring that the petitioner satisfy the jurisdictional one-year time-bar requirement. Finding no case law, and Appellant has not cited any, that overruled the constitutional validity of the PCRA jurisdictional one-year time-bar, we continue to adhere to the principle that the PCRA time limitation is constitutionally sound and, therefore, does not violate Appellant’s constitutional rights. See Reid, 235 A.3d at 1159. Timeliness Exceptions Appellant’s third, fourth, and fifth issues challenge the trial court’s order dismissing his petition on the ground that Appellant failed to plead and prove one of the timeliness exceptions enumerated in Section 9545(b)(1), as discussed infra. Appellant’s Brief at 35-42, 60-70. In addressing Appellant’s issues, we are mindful of our well-settled standard and scope of review of an order denying a PCRA petition. Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a petition is limited to an examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding.” - 13 - J-S03012-24 Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 140 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014). If a PCRA petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the claims and cannot grant relief. Reid, 235 A.3d at 1143 (stating, “[w]ithout jurisdiction, [courts] simply do not have legal authority to address the substantive claims” (citation and original quotation marks omitted)). As discussed supra, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on March 22, 2005. Appellant filed pro se his current PCRA petition on July 26, 2018, more than 12 years after the deadline for filing a timely PCRA petition. Therefore, Appellant’s current PCRA petition is patently untimely. If a PCRA petition is untimely, the jurisdictional time-bar can only be overcome if the petitioner alleges and proves one of the three statutory exceptions, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017). The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time-bar are as follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly[-]discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i - iii). A petition invoking an exception to the jurisdictional time-bar must be filed - 14 - J-S03012-24 within one year of the date that the claim could have been presented. ^[14] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2) (effective Dec. ^[24], 2018). If a petitioner fails to invoke a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar, courts are without jurisdiction to review the petition and provide relief. Spotz, 171 A.3d at 676. Upon conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court made the following findings of fact: