Commonwealth v. Nelson, 317 A.2d 228 (Pa. 1974). · Go Syfert
Commonwealth v. Nelson, 317 A.2d 228 (Pa. 1974). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
33 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Com. v. Thomas, A. (pasuperct, 2016-07-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Thomas, A.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2016 · confidence medium
The Affidavit of Probable Cause has been deemed a valid factual basis for accepting a guilty plea in Pennsylvania. [Commonwealth] v. Nelson, [ 317 A.2d 228, 229 (Pa.1974)].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Davis
Ct. Jud. Disc. Pa · 2008 · confidence medium
We believe this Court’s obligation to make an independent examination of the facts to determine if they support the charges which a respondent concedes they support is no less than the obligation of a trial court receiving a guilty plea in a criminal case “to satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Nelson, 455 Pa. 461, 463 , 317 A.2d 228, 229 (1974), and “to determine ... whether the facts acknowledged by the defendant constitute the prohibited offense.” Commonwealth v. Anthony, 504 Pa. 551, 558 , 475 A.2d 1303, 1307 (1984), see also Commo…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Flanagan (6×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Pa. · 2004 · confidence medium
See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 460 Pa. 169 , 331 A.2d 473, 477 (1975) (“[T]he omission of any particular question [recommended in the comment to now-Rule 590] will not necessarily invalidate the guilty plea so long as there exists sufficient indication that the defendant did plead knowingly and voluntarily.”); Commonwealth v. Nelson, 455 Pa. 461 , 317 A.2d 228, 229 (1974) (failure of court to elicit from accused the factual basis for guilty plea “is not sufficient to invalidate the plea, if during the plea proceedings the facts of the crime and the factual basis for the plea are placed on …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Strock (2×)
Ct. Jud. Disc. Pa · 2003 · confidence medium
We believe this Court’s obligation to make an independent examination of the facts to determine if they support the charges which a respondent concedes they support is no less than the obligation of a trial court receiving a guilty plea in a criminal case “to satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Nelson, 455 Pa. 461, 463 , 317 A.2d 228, 229 (1974), and “to determine... whether the facts acknowledged by the defendant constitute the prohibited offense.” Commonwealth v. Anthony, 504 Pa. 551, 558 , 475 A.2d 1303, 1307 (1984), see also Common…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Herberg
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1982 · confidence medium
“And, while it may be more advisable for the court to elicit from the accused personally the factual basis for the guilty plea, the failure to follow this procedure is not sufficient to invalidate the plea, if during the plea proceedings the facts of the crime and the factual basis for the plea are placed on the record in the presence of the accused and the court.” Commonwealth v. Nelson, 455 Pa. 461, 464 , 317 A.2d 228, 229 (1974).
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Lukyanchikov (2×)
pactcomplbucks · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Nelson, 455 Pa. 461, 462 , 317 A.2d 228, 229 (1974) (a valid factual basis established where the trial court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea before the factual basis was made a part of the record). .
examined Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Everett (4×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Nelson, 455 Pa. 461 , 317 A.2d 228 (1974).
Commonwealth
v.
Nelson, Appellant
Appeal, 124.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Mar 25, 1974.
317 A.2d 228
Richard G. Phillips, for appellant., John II. Isom, Assistant District Attorney, with him Milton M. Stein, Assistant District Attorney, Richard A. Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, and Arlen Specter, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix, Mandeeino, Jones.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Eagen,

On September 15, 1972, Nathaniel Nelson, the appellant, while assisted by counsel, entered a general plea of guilty to an indictment charging him with the murder of Eonald Lee Campbell on May 29, 1971. In answer to questions by the court, Nelson affirmatively indicated he understood the presumption of innocence in favor of a criminal defendant; the right to trial by jury; that by pleading guilty he was waiving Ms right to a trial and “was admitting doing everything” that he “was charged with”; that he was aware of the possible consequences and was pleading guilty “of my own free will.” The assistant district attorney then recommended to the court that Nelson be adjudged guilty of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to prison for not less than three and one-half and no more than ten years.

Following the foregoing, the court stated it was accepting “the plea of voluntary manslaughter,” although at that point in the proceedings, no factual basis for the guilty plea had been made part of the record. However, immediately thereafter, an evidentiary hearing ensued and the assistant district attorney with the acquiescence of defense counsel introduced into evidence in the presence of Nelson a recorded extra[*463] judicial inculpatory statement by Nelson, and a recitation or summary of the testimony of certain named eyewitnesses who were present in court and ready to testify to the circumstances of the crime. This evidence indicated Nelson fatally stabbed Ronald Lee Campbell with a knife during a fight which began in a bar in Philadelphia and continued on out in the street; that Campbell was unarmed at the time and the fight was the culmination of prior hard feelings existing between the two. When the district attorney finished, the court asked defense counsel, “Do you wish the court to hear from the defendant or any witnesses on behalf of the defendant? Counsel replied, “No, Sir.” The court then asked, “None at all?” Counsel responded, “None.”

The court then directed questions to Nelson concerning his background after which defense counsel was asked if he wished to bring to the court’s attention any facts concerning Nelson. In response to this, Nelson’s mother was called and testified to his prior personal history.

At the conclusion of the above testimony, the court postponed sentence until a later date. On October 11, 1972, Nelson appeared with counsel before the court for sentencing. No request to withdraw the guilty plea was made. A prison sentence of three and one-half to ten years was imposed. This direct appeal was filed on November 9th.

It is now urged the guilty plea should be set aside, and the judgment that followed be reversed because the trial court did not “make a personal inquiry into the facts of the case to determine that there was a substantial basis for a guilty plea.”

Before accepting a plea of guilty to a criminal indictment, the court is required to satisfy itself there is a factual basis for the plea of guilt. See Rule 319, Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure; Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A. 2d 77 (1974);[*464] Commonwealth v. Maddox, 450 Pa. 406, 300 A. 2d 503 (1973); and Commonwealth v. Jackson, 450 Pa. 417, 299 A. 2d 209 (1973). And, while it may be more advisable for the court to elicit from the accused personally the factual basis for the guilty plea, the failure to follow this procedure is not sufficient to invalidate the plea, if during the plea proceedings the facts of the crime and the factual basis for the plea are placed on the record in the presence of the accused and the court. Cf. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 451 Pa. 465, 304 A. 2d 121 (1973), and Commonwealth v. Maddox, supra. If this is done, the purpose of Rule 319 is satisfied.

The validity of the guilty plea is also challenged because allegedly his counsel told Nelson the assistant district attorney agreed that if a guilty plea were entered, Nelson would be sentenced to Eaglesville Sanatorium where he would be treated for chronic alcoholism. Since there isn’t an iota of evidence in the record to support this allegation, it is impossible for us at this time to intelligently determine the truth or merits thereof.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice Jones took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.