¹ Has the [C]ommonwealth abandoned the original theory of “exigent circumstances” and for the first time on appeal advance a new theory or argument of “inevitable discovery” and “incident to arrest” to establish legitimacy of [O]fficer [C]elce’s warrantless search and therefore by [R]ule 9544(a)(2) waived the “new theory” and has no argument on this appeal[?]

² Did the use of the firearm evidence and testimony about it influence a verdict of guilt when its use was admitted based

³ Did the “misconduct reports” written by the Commonwealth prevent trial counsel from knowing that [O]fficer [C]elce tends to be untruthful in reports and investigation, denying trial counsel the ability to prepare for impeachment, pre- trial suppression and objections to his many inconsistent statements and reports, denying petitioner a fair trial[?]

⁴ Did the reports and testimony of [O]fficer [C]elce not only affect the preparation and trial strategy of the defense but the [C]ommonwealth as well prejudicing both sides and causing a verdict unworthy of confidence and denying a fair trial[?]

⁵ Cumulatively, did the evidence complained of such as, out of court identification procedures, co-defendant statements, firearm, and other errors such as improper arguments, no limiting cautionary instructions for tape recorded co- defendant statements, errors of phone recording transcripts, and the information withheld by the [C]ommonwealth prejudice petitioner and deny a fair trial[?] Appellant’s Brief at A(6)(a)-A(6)(b). Prior to addressing Appellant’s claims, we must determine whether Appellant properly invoked our jurisdiction by timely filing a notice of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Powell, 290 A.3d 751, 757 n.12 (Pa. Super. 2023) (“Jurisdiction is vested in the Superior Court upon the filing of a timely notice of appeal”) (citation omitted). Where the petition at issue was dismissed on July 22, 2022, the thirty-day period for filing a timely notice of appeal would have expired on August 22, 2022. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (setting the general rule for the thirty-day filing deadline). Here, the trial court’s docket indicates that Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal was not filed until January 12, 2023. - 10 - J-A10041-24 Conversely, the notice of appeal docketed with this Court contains an incomplete filing stamp by the trial court, indicating a filing date of “FEB 08,” with an indecipherable year on the date stamp. Because the date stamp on the notice of appeal is incomplete, the date listed on the appellate docket for its filing is January 12, 2023, to conform with the trial court docket. Regardless of which date is used, Appellant’s notice of appeal is facially untimely. Our examination of the record shows that there are no entries on the trial court’s docket indicating that Appellant was served with the PCRA court’s dismissal order. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c) (stating that the docket entries “shall contain” the “date of service of the order”). In Commonwealth v. Midgley, 289 A.3d 1111, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2023), this Court addressed a trial court’s failure to comply with Rule 114(C)(2)(c), concluding that, “Where the trial court docket in a criminal case does not indicate service on a party or the date of service [of the order under appeal], we will not quash the appeal or require further proceedings. Rather, we will treat the time in which to take an appeal as never having started to run and treat the appeal as timely.” On this basis, we may consider this appeal as timely filed. 5 ____________________________________________ 5 Our application of the holding in Midgley to this appeal is somewhat generous in that Appellant makes multiple assertions in the certified record suggesting that proper service of the dismissal order was completed by the PCRA court even if the lower court did not indicate the service as required on its dockets. In the “Verified Statement” attached to the notice of appeal, Appellant stated “[d]ismissal of PCRA was received on 7/27/22.” Similarly, in (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 11 - J-A10041-24 The next procedural issue we must address is the existence of an applicable exception to the PCRA’s time-bar in order to permit the PCRA court to review Appellant’s underlying petition on its merits. See Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 964 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“Despite the Commonwealth’s failure to object to the untimeliness of Appellant’s current petition, as well as the PCRA court’s decision to address the petition on its merits, the timeliness of the PCRA petition remained at issue and could not be waived or established by consent.”); see also Commonwealth v. Gamboa- Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000) (where a PCRA petition is not timely filed and is not eligible for an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar, the PCRA court lacks authority to address the substantive merits of the PCRA claims). The underlying petition was untimely filed where it was filed more than four years after Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final. 6 42 Pa.C.S. ____________________________________________ the “Form of Affidavit” notarized on December 29, 2022, also attached to the Notice of Appeal, Appellant stated, “I received the order dismissing my PCRA on 7-27-22.” We note that the Commonwealth does not address Midgley, let alone ask us to distinguish it on the basis that service of the dismissal order was completed in a timely manner. Appellee’s Brief at 8 n.5. Instead, the Commonwealth notes that Appellant “provided the PCRA court with documentation suggesting that he mailed a notice of appeal multiple times, the earliest being sent on August 17, 2022.” Id. In the absence of any relevant briefing about our holding in Midgley, we will not sua sponte create an exception to its applicable holding even though the record suggests that lack of notice concerning the dismissal of the petition played no apparent role in causing Appellant to file an untimely notice of appeal. 6 Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on June 13, 2017, after the denial of his direct review petition for allowance of appeal when his time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 12 - J-A10041-24 § 9545(b)(1) (PCRA petitions, other than where three statutory exceptions to timeliness apply, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final). The Commonwealth did not object to substantive review based on the timeliness of Appellant’s petition in its motion to dismiss, and, by only engaging in a merits analysis, it seemed to the PCRA court that it had tacitly accepted Appellant’s assertion of the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s time-bar.7 PCRA Court Opinion, 8/24/23, 6-7 (“Appellant has established, and the Commonwealth concedes, that the PMD report was not known to him, nor could it have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence prior to trial.”); Pro Se Second PCRA Petition, 7/28/21, § 5 (asserting the 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) exception based on “[p]olice misconduct reporting affecting one of the key witnesses[’] reports ____________________________________________ expired. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (“For purposes of [the PCRA], a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13(1) (setting 90-day deadline for filing a petition for writ of certiorari). 7 The Commonwealth disagrees with the PCRA court’s conclusion in its opinion that the Commonwealth conceded “the issue of timeliness” with respect to the petition by remaining silent as to the applicability of a time-bar exception. Appellee’s Brief at 12 n.6, citing PCRA Court Opinion, 8/24/23, 6-7. It asserts, “Although the Commonwealth did not explicitly argue timeliness, it did not concede the issue; rather it assumed for the sake of argument alone that even if a timeliness exception were properly developed and invoked, defendant was nonetheless not entitled to relief on the merits of his claim.” Id. (emphasis in original). When the existence of jurisdiction is in question, as it was in this case, we suggest to the Commonwealth that it should address the matter, at a minimum, for the sake of judicial economy. - 13 - J-A10041-24 and testimony not disclosed before trial); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (permitting a time-bar exception where a PCRA petitioner alleges and proves that “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence”). While the Commonwealth took no position on the applicability of an exception to a time-bar before the PCRA court, it now argues on appeal that Appellant did not prove the applicability of a time-bar exception due to a lack of argument: [Appellant]’s form petition included a checkbox allegation of the newly-discovered facts exception. But beyond this cursory demarcation, [Appellant] did not argue—let alone meaningfully acknowledge—the PCRA’s jurisdictional timeliness mandates. Moreover, [Appellant] again failed to recognize the time-bar on appeal. His brief, while lengthy, makes no mention of or citation to the relevant statute, nor does it provide any argument regarding how any of the statute’s enumerated timeliness exceptions were satisfied below. Appellee’s Brief at 12-13 (record citation and footnote omitted). Our review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to determining whether the record supports the PCRA court’s ruling and whether its decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Williams, 196 A.3d 1021, 1026- 27 (Pa. 2018). While the Commonwealth now takes issue with Appellant’s “checkbox” assertion of the Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) time-bar exception, we find no legal error with the PCRA court’s application of the exception to Appellant’s claim - 14 - J-A10041-24 concerning the PMD report about Officer Celce. The combined assertions in the PCRA petition and a handwritten supplement to the petition between numbered pages eight and nine reflected that the Commonwealth supposedly withheld from Appellant impeachment material that included previously unknown facts to Appellant, which was in the Commonwealth’s possession, including parts of the PMD report that were attached to the petition. Pro Se Second PCRA Petition, §§ 5(ii), 6(A), 6(C), Supplement (A). The copy of the report is included in the certified record in a filing Appellant made with the lower court prior to the filing of his PCRA petition at issue. Attached to the copy of the report is correspondence from the District Attorney’s Office’s PCRA Unit to Appellant, dated July 28, 2020, referring to the enclosure of the report and directing Appellant that the office had identified Officer Celce, among others, as a person “who may have or have [sic] engaged in misconduct that necessitate[d] disclosure.”8 Correspondence from PCRA Unit to Appellant, 7/28/20, 1, attached to Notice Entering “New Evidence,” 8/17/20. Appellant’s petition asserting the PMD report as a form of previously unknown facts for time-bar purposes was filed exactly one year after the date on the disclosure correspondence. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2) (“Any petition invoking an ____________________________________________ 8 For the sake of our latter discussion concerning the relevance of the PMD report, we note the District Attorney’s Office included in their letter that their disclosure to Appellant was “in no way a concession to the admissibility, relevance, or significance of any of the disclosed information.” Correspondence to Appellant from PCRA Unit, 7/28/20. - 15 - J-A10041-24 exception provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.”). In these circumstances, we agree that the PCRA court correctly applied the Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) exception and proceeded with substantive review of Appellant’s related Brady claim. We reject the Commonwealth’s argument that Appellant waived a time-bar exception claim by failing to develop his argument concerning it as we find that Appellant minimally proved the application of the exception in his petition. Having concluded that the PCRA court properly considered the substantive merits of the Brady claim, we now may proceed with reviewing Appellant’s appellate claims addressing the PCRA court’s dismissal for lack of merit premised on an insufficient demonstration that the withholding of the PMD report affected the outcome of Appellant’s case. Appellant initially argues that the Commonwealth improperly presented new theories supporting the police officers’ recovery of the gun in its motion to dismiss when it argued that the gun could not have been suppressed based on inevitable discovery and recovery incident to lawful arrest theories. Appellant’s Brief at 1-6. He suggests that the Commonwealth waived new theories supporting the recovery of the gun by not arguing them before the trial court. Id. at 1. In support of that point, he cites, inter alia, this Court’s unpublished memorandum at Commonwealth v. Linaberry, 2020 WL 5135337 (Pa. Super., filed Aug. 31, 2020) (holding the Commonwealth as the appellant challenging a grant of a suppression motion could not raise a new - 16 - J-A10041-24 theory on appeal that was not presented to the suppression court), and Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Appellant’s Brief at 1-3. Linaberry and Rule 302(a) address an appellant’s burden to have preserved a theory for relief (for issues other than challenges to the legality of a sentence or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction) before the trial court, prior to an appeal. Appellant in this regard fails to appreciate that only appellants are charged with issue preservation obligations, whereas appellees, including the Commonwealth in this case, bear none. See Heim v. MCARE Fund, 23 A.3d 506, 511 (Pa. 2011) (explaining that an appellee does not bear the burden of issue preservation). Instead, “an appellate court may affirm a valid judgment based on any reason appearing as of record, regardless of whether it is raised by the appellee.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 937 A.2d 1062, 1073 (Pa. 2007); see also Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 652, 657 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“this Court ‘may affirm a PCRA court’s order on any legal basis’”) (citation omitted). As we may affirm on any legal basis, independent of preservation on the part of an appellee, Appellant’s assertion of waiver on the part of the Commonwealth is unavailing. In his next three issues, Appellant challenges the PCRA court’s determination that the absence of a timely disclosure of the PMD report concerning Officer Celce would have not affected the outcome of his case. He surmises that if the impeachment evidence concerning Officer Celce would have been made available to him, the recovered firearm would have been - 17 - J-A10041-24 suppressed prior to trial and the jury’s verdict would have changed. Appellant’s Brief at 7-26. At a minimum, Appellant maintains that the “withholding of that evidence resulted in the denial of a fair trial.” Id. at 7. The law governing Brady claims is well settled: In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even if there has been no request by the accused, and that the duty may encompass impeachment evidence as well as directly exculpatory evidence. Furthermore, the prosecution’s Brady obligation extends to exculpatory evidence in the files of police agencies of the same government bringing the prosecution. Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 853-54 (Pa. 2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The prosecution’s duty under Brady is limited as “the Constitution is not violated every time the government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence that might prove helpful to the defense.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37 (1995) (citing U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 and n.7 (1985)). “[T]here are three necessary components that demonstrate a violation of the Brady strictures: the evidence was favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice ensured.” Lambert, 884 A.2d at 854 (quoting Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136, 1141 (Pa. 2001)). - 18 - J-A10041-24 Here, the parties only dispute whether the PMD report was material such that prejudice ensued from it being withheld. As to that prong of the Brady standard, “prejudice occurs when a defendant shows a ‘reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Commonwealth v. Conforti, 303 A.3d 715, 730 (Pa. 2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1189 (Pa. 2014). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 133 (Pa. 2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 450 (Pa. 2011). “In other words, ‘the undisclosed evidence must be ‘material to guilt or punishment.’’” Conforti, 303 A.3d at 730, quoting Bomar, 104 A.3d at 1189. The reports of misconduct concerning Officer Celce that were appended to Appellant’s petition included three different sets of allegations. Only one of the three sets is relevant for our review.9 With respect to that set, the Commonwealth notes: ____________________________________________ 9 The latter sets involved alleged misconduct that either did not take place or were not reported to the Commonwealth until after Appellant was on post- conviction review of his first PCRA petition. See Appellee’s Brief at 6 n.3. Accordingly, they could not be relevant for a determination on a Brady violation. See District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osbourne, 557 U.S. 52, 68-69 (2009) (Brady obligations do not extend to post-conviction proceedings; holding that the Ninth Circuit “went too far” in applying Brady to post-conviction proceedings; noting, “Osbourne’s right to due process is not parallel to a trial right, but rather must be analyzed in light of the fact that he has already been found guilty at a fair trial, and has only a limited interest in postconviction relief. Brady is the wrong framework.”). - 19 - J-A10041-24 The report established that Officer Celce was alleged to have physically assaulted two women and vandalized one of their phones during a personal, unofficial domestic dispute occurring on April 5, 2014. In a memorandum dated October 14, 2014, the assigned Internal Affairs inspector “sustained” the allegations of physical abuse and vandalization. The inspector also concluded that Officer Celce lied during the investigation and falsified police reports regarding the assaults. However, following an April 23, 2015 board hearing, Officer Celce was found “not guilty” of lying during the investigation. Appellee’s Brief at 6 (footnote and record citation omitted). Officer Celce’s trial testimony reflected that: (1) he responded to the report of the shooting in the 2600 block of West Harold Street on November 29, 2013, at which point he encountered victim Enoch Carter (N.T. 4/21/15, 86-88); (2) he and Carter then went to Appellant’s apartment at 2642 N. 26 th Street, based on the information provided by Carter (id. at 88-90); (3) Appellant answered the door while co-defendant Dozier was sitting on a couch (id. at 91); (4) Carter identified Dozier as “the guy who shot at [his] house” (id.); (5) he detained Dozier and lifted the couch cushion Dozier had been sitting on and found a gun there where Dozier’s hand had been (id. at 91-92); and (6) he placed Dozier in handcuffs in a patrol car after Carter again positively identified Dozier as the shooter (id. a 92-93). Officer Celce testified that he grabbed the gun “[f]or safety purposes” because Appellant and an unidentified female on the side of the couch were present. N.T. 4/21/15, 98- 99. He then “h[e]ld it for detectives” while he “h[e]ld the house for a search warrant.” Id. at 99, 147. Officer Celce later took victim Carter to the Central Detectives’ office. Id. at 100. Based on the information included in a - 20 - J-A10041-24 statement Carter then provided to the police, Officer Celce returned to Appellant’s apartment and took him into custody. Id. at 100-01. The PCRA court found that no prejudice resulted from the lack of disclosure of the impeachment evidence in this case because the firearm would have been inevitably recovered pursuant to the search warrant that was secured for Appellant’s home, regardless of the fact that Officer Celce initially secured the gun at the scene: Assuming, arguendo, that Appellant had the opportunity to impeach Officer Celce’s credibility concerning the recovery of the gun, and further assuming that Officer Celce’s testimony was completely disregarded, the firearm would have nevertheless been discovered upon execution of a lawfully issued search warrant for the home. Therefore, even if Appellant succeeded in showing that Officer Celce’s account of how the firearm was first recovered was untruthful, it would have been inevitably discovered upon search of the house. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 (1984) (inevitable discovery of evidence by lawful means is admissible); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879 (Pa.[ ]Super. 2009). Furthermore, although Appellant does not challenge the legality of the affidavit of probable cause or of the warrant, a review of the affidavit shows that there was no mention of discovery of the firearm having already been observed by Officer Celce (Commonwealth’s Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit “A”). Thus, Officer Celce’s account of how the gun was discovered was not considered by the magistrate approving the warrant. Because the firearm would have been discovered with or without Officer Celce’s account, Appellant is unable to show that suppression of the firearm would have been likely. PCRA Court Opinion, 8/24/23, 9 (footnote omitted). Our review of the affidavit in support of the search warrant in the certified record confirms that it was signed by Detective Repici – not Officer Celce – and that it was based only on - 21 - J-A10041-24 the information provided by victim Carter without any mention as to the sighting of a firearm in Appellant’s home. Because the record reflects that Officer Celce’s input played no role in the police obtaining the search warrant, which was independently supported by probable cause from victim Carter’s account, we are unable to find that the PCRA court erred by concluding that there was not a likelihood that impeachment of Officer Celce with the available misconduct report would have resulted in the suppression of the recovered gun.10 In general, we fail to grasp from Appellant’s arguments focused on the possible suppression of the recovered gun that impeachment of Officer Celce based on a single incident of possibly lying about an off-duty, personal domestic abuse allegation would have undermined confidence in the verdict in this case where the convictions in this case would have been independently supported by victim Carter’s testimony and the ballistics evidence at the scene of the shooting even if the gun had never been recovered. See N.T. 4/22/15, ____________________________________________ 10 The PCRA court additionally analyzed whether Appellant could have prevailed by alleging that the impeachment evidence concerning Officer Celce constituted after-discovered evidence. We need not evaluate that discussion because Appellant’s arguments fail to demonstrate any manner in which the PMD report would have been used for any purpose other than for impeachment purposes. See Commonwealth v. McCracken, 659 A.2d 541, 545 (noting that after-discovered evidence may warrant a new trial, inter alia, only where it is not submitted solely for impeachment purposes). Appellant baldly alleges that the PMD report could have been used for “[Pa.R.E.] 404(b)(2) evidence,” Appellant’s Brief at 9, but he never develops that point to demonstrate that the PMD report would have been used as anything other than for impeachment of Officer Celce’s account of the discovery of the gun recovered in this case. - 22 - J-A10041-24 15-19 (Carter identifying co-defendant Dozier at the person who shot at him after Appellant, referred to as “Chase,” told Dozier to “go ahead,” in response to Dozier asking Appellant, “What do you want me to do?”). We essentially concluded as much in denying, without any discussion as to the recovery of the firearm, Appellant’s sufficiency challenge on direct review in which he alleged that the evidence was insufficient for his intent to commit attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Matthews, 2016 WL 4978355, at *5; see Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 741 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“It is hornbook law that a member of a conspiracy is criminally culpable for all actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.”). Appellant’s direction to co-defendant Dozier to “go ahead” immediately before Dozier then began firing the gunshots at Carter, along with their subsequent flight together provided sufficient evidence to establish a conspiracy between the two men which in turn made Appellant liable for the criminal actions that Dozier committed with the gun in the pursuit of their conspiracy. See Commonwealth v. Taraschi, 475 A.2d 744, 750 (Pa. Super. 1984) (“A conspiracy may be inferentially established by showing the relationship, conduct or circumstances of the confederacy which demonstrates a unity of purpose to accomplish an unlawful act.”). Appellant concludes his brief by arguing that cumulative error from the lack of the PMD report disclosure in addition to six other claims of ineffective - 23 - J-A10041-24 assistance warrants relief.11 Appellant’s Brief at 26-31. We are unable to address this claim because it was never developed in his PCRA petition beyond a vague assertion below about “cumulative errors, prosecut[orial] misconduct[,] and ineffective assistance.” Pro Se Second PCRA Petition, 7/28/21, § 6(A). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 902, which governs the content of PCRA petitions, provides that “[e]ach ground relied upon shall be stated in the [PCRA] petition. Failure to state a ground shall preclude the defendant from raising that ground in any proceeding for post-conviction collateral relief.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(B). Moreover, it is well-established a petitioner bears the burden of proving counsel’s ineffectiveness through a three-part ineffectiveness test. Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144 (Pa. 2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655, 664 (Pa. 2007). While we found that Appellant minimally preserved his Brady issue concerning the PMD report in his petition, his blanket assertion of “cumulative errors” and “ineffective assistance” in his PCRA petition failed to adequately preserve the instant claim for our review. Cf. Commonwealth v. Small, 980 A.2d 549, 579 (Pa. 2009) (concluding that a broad and vague ____________________________________________ 11 His additional claims referenced here included challenges to trial counsel’s effectiveness for: (1) “not requesting a limiting/cautionary instruction to the jury for the use of the co-defendant[’]s statements in a joint trial;” (2) “not challenging or objecting to the search warrant;” (3) “not objecting to the use of the ‘entire’ prison tape recorded call of the co-defendant;” (4) “not objecting to Officer Celce’s ‘Brady’ violation of withholding his illegal search from discovery;” (5) “not objecting to the improper argument in the prosecutor[’]s opening and closing argument;” and (6) “not objecting to identification testimony and physical evidence obtained in violation of petitioner[’]s 4 th Amendment rights.” Appellant’s Brief at 26-27. - 24 - J-A10041-24 claim of the prejudicial effect of cumulative errors did not entitle the appellant to relief). Even if Appellant had elaborated on his blanket assertion of “cumulative errors” and “ineffective assistance” in his PCRA petition and included the last section of his appellate brief in the petition, we would lack jurisdiction to address the additional ineffective assistance of counsel claims because the Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) time-bar exception that permitted us to review the Brady claim concerning the withheld PMD report would not apply to unrelated claims of ineffective assistance because the PCRA’s time-bar exceptions are claim-specific. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 35 A.3d 4, 13-14 (Pa. 2012) (Section 9545(b) “speaks in singular terms of ‘the claim’ or ‘the right’ which is the subject of a serial PCRA ‘petition’” and, as such, the time-bar exceptions “are claim specific”); Commonwealth v. Woods, 179 A.3d 37, 44 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“if the right announced in Miller [v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)] applies to any of [a]ppellant’s claims, the petition is timely as to that specific claim”). Where Appellant did not plead and offer to prove any time- bar exceptions that would apply to claims of ineffective assistance unrelated to his reviewable Brady claim, we are unable to review his cumulative error claim. Order affirmed. - 25 - J-A10041-24 Date: 12/20/2024 - 26 -