¹ Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 2 Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa.2009). J-A10035-15 advocate’s brief as to whether Appellant was denied the right to counsel. We find the remaining issues raised in the Anders brief to be frivolous. On November 29, 2010, a criminal complaint charged Appellant with two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of criminal attempt (aggravated assault), and two counts of simple assault. 3 Police Criminal Complaint at 2-3. The complaint alleged that on November 18, 2010, Appellant, a prisoner at the State Correctional Institution at Coal Township, assaulted two correctional officers. Id. On January 4, 2011, public defender James Rosini represented Appellant at a preliminary hearing. On March 31, 2011, Mr. Rosini filed a motion to withdraw, alleging Appellant failed to cooperate with counsel, insisted counsel file frivolous motions, and requested counsel issue subpoenas to witnesses who would not assist the defense. The motion also stated Appellant requested that Mr. Rosini withdraw. Motion to Withdraw, 3/31/2011, at ¶¶ 2-7. Although the trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion to withdraw for April 21, 2011, it granted the motion on April 15, 2011, ordered the court administrator to appoint new counsel, and cancelled the hearing. Order, 4/15/2011.4 ____________________________________________ 3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(3), 901(a), and 2701(a)(1), respectively. 4 The Anders brief, the Commonwealth, and the trial court repeatedly state Mr. Rosini withdrew because he left the Public Defender’s Office. N.T., 3/8/2012, at 3, 7; N.T., 5/23/2012, at 3 (stating John Broda was Appellant’s second counsel); Opinion, 1/6/2014, at 1 n.2; Anders Brief at 9; Appellee’s Brief at 3. Further, the trial court did not rely on Mr. Rosini’s motion to (Footnote Continued Next Page)

² [Appellant’s] first attorney, from the Public Defender’s office, left the office for another position, at which point [Appellant] was assigned to [Mr.] Michael Seward. At some point, [Appellant] and his new counsel did not see eye to eye, at which point his request for new counsel was granted and he was assigned to [Mr.] John Broda. [Appellant] then attempted several times to dismiss [Mr.] Broda, culminating in his status as set forth above. Of equal importance is that the request to proceed pro se be unequivocal. While this court has not considered when a request to proceed pro se is deemed “unequivocal” a review of federal case law reveals that the courts generally consider a myriad of factors in concluding whether a request was unequivocal including: whether the request was for hybrid representation, see, e.g., [United States v. Callwood, 66 F.3d 1110, 1113 (10th Cir. 1995)], or merely for the appointment of standby or advisory counsel, [United States v. Baker, 84 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir.1996)]; the trial court’s response to a request, [United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614 - 19 - J-A10035-15 (9th Cir. 2000)]; whether a defendant has consistently vacillated in his request, Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1982); and whether a request is the result of an emotional outburst, Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Reese v. Nix, 942 F.2d 1276 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding that request that was merely an impulsive response to the trial court’s denial of a request for new counsel was not unequivocal). The essence of these cases is that the inquiry surrounding whether a request to proceed pro se is unequivocal is fact intensive and should be based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the request. Commonwealth v. Davido, [868 A.2d 431 (Pa.2005)]. Here, [Appellant] elected to proceed with standby counsel, and standby counsel was available to him at all times. He consulted with standby counsel several times during various proceedings, up to and including jury selection and trial. Thus, [Appellant’s] right to counsel was not violated, and the [trial court] was not obligated to conduct a colloquy, although it in fact did so. Opinion, 1/6/2012, at 1-2.11 The Anders brief maintains, without citing any case law, that Appellant was not denied his right to counsel. It notes Appellant had three court-appointed attorneys. The Anders brief reasons that the trial court appointed stand-by counsel, Appellant was not aggrieved by the stand-by counsel arrangement, Appellant did not object when the court reminded him that he chose to proceed pro se, and Appellant “ably represented himself at trial and won acquittal on 5 of 6 counts.” The Anders brief further states ____________________________________________ 11 The trial court opinion is not paginated. All page numbers are supplied by this Court. - 20 - J-A10035-15 that “as the [trial court] note[d] in its [o]pinion, Mr. Broda was present throughout and was consulted by [Appellant],” and “[the trial court] had conducted an adequate colloquy with [Appellant].” Anders Brief at 9-10. Counsel did not conduct any analysis of the colloquy the court allegedly conducted; he merely relied on the trial court’s conclusion that it conducted an adequate colloquy.12 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provide defendants with the right to counsel for his or her defense. Commonwealth v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1178 (Pa.2009) (quoting Rothgery v. Gillespie County, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 2583 n. 8, 171 L.Ed.2d 366 (2008) and Commonwealth v. McDonough, 812 A.2d 504, 506 (Pa.2002)). The right to counsel, however, is not absolute. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Randolph, 873 A.2d 1277, 1282 (Pa.2005)). A defendant who seeks court-appointed counsel “does not have a right to choose the particular counsel to represent him.” Commonwealth v. Rucker, 761 A.2d 541, 542 n.1 (Pa.2000) (citing Commonwealth v. Moore, 633 A.2d 1119, 1125 (Pa.1993)). After counsel has been appointed, ____________________________________________ 12 The Commonwealth concedes the trial court did not conduct a proper colloquy and argues Appellant forfeited his right to counsel. Appellee’s Brief at 3 (noting the colloquy did not comply with all requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121). - 21 - J-A10035-15 the defendant cannot “change to other assigned counsel unless a substantial reason exists for the change.” Id. (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 316(c)(ii)). A defendant can waive or forfeit his right to counsel. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d at 1178-79. Our Supreme Court has explained: Waiver is “an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right.” By contrast, forfeiture . . . does not require that the defendant intend to relinquish a right, but rather may be the result of the defendant’s “extremely serious misconduct” or “extremely dilatory conduct.” Id. at 1179 (internal citations omitted). If a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, “the judge shall ascertain from the defendant, on the record, whether this is a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 93 A.3d 847, 852 (Pa.Super.2014) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(c)). The waiver colloquy must “contain a clear demonstration of the defendant’s ability to understand the questions posed to him during the colloquy.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. McDonough, 812 A.2d 504, 507 n.1 (Pa.2002)). A trial court must “fully advise the accused [of the nature and elements of the crime] before accepting waiver of counsel.” Id. at 853 (quoting Commonwealth v. Clyburn, 42 A.3d 296, 299 (Pa.Super.2012) (emphasis deleted and alteration in original). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 121 governs waiver of the right to counsel and provides: (2) To ensure that the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the judge or issuing authority, at a minimum, shall elicit the following information from the defendant: - 22 - J-A10035-15 (a) that the defendant understands that he or she has the right to be represented by counsel, and the right to have free counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent; (b) that the defendant understands the nature of the charges against the defendant and the elements of each of those charges; (c) that the defendant is aware of the permissible range of sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged; (d) that the defendant understands that if he or she waives the right to counsel, the defendant will still be bound by all the normal rules of procedure and that counsel would be familiar with these rules; (e) that the defendant understands that there are possible defenses to these charges that counsel might be aware of, and if these defenses are not raised at trial, they may be lost permanently; and (f) that the defendant understands that, in addition to defenses, the defendant has many rights that, if not timely asserted, may be lost permanently; and that if errors occur and are not timely objected to, or otherwise timely raised by the defendant, these errors may be lost permanently. Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2). The trial court must further inquire “about the defendant’s age, educational background, and basic comprehension skills.” Phillips, 93 A.3d at 853 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(C)). Further, this Court reviews “the totality of the relevant circumstances only after we decide the trial court has met the minimum requirements of Rule 121, to determine whether the defendant’s waiver of the constitutional right to counsel was a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver.” Id. at 854. - 23 - J-A10035-15 In Lucarelli, our Supreme Court held that Rule 121 does not apply where a defendant forfeits his right to counsel. 971 A.2d at 1179. The Rule applies only where the defendant waives his right to counsel. Id. The Court held a defendant forfeits his right to counsel where his “course of conduct demonstrates his or her intention not to seek representation by private counsel, despite having the opportunity and financial wherewithal to do so.” Id. It further noted that: Upon examining the jurisprudence developed by other jurisdictions regarding forfeiture of the right to counsel, we observe that defendants have been held to have forfeited the right to counsel where they have either engaged in physically abusive and threatening conduct, or have engaged in dilatory conduct. See e.g., Minnesota v. Lehman, 749 N.W.2d 76, 81-82 (Minn.Ct.App.2008), review denied, 2008 Minn. LEXIS 478 (Minn. filed August 5, 2008) (collecting cases and holding that defendant forfeited his right to court-appointed counsel where defendant attacked and beat the attorney in open court); Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758 (Del.2006) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel where he engaged in ongoing abuse of his attorney and requiring defendant to proceed pro se at trial); Wilkerson v. Klem, 412 F.3d 449, 454 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a defendant who had been duly notified of the date of his trial, who had been advised to obtain counsel in sufficient time to be ready for trial, and who appeared on the scheduled date without counsel and with no reasonable excuse for his failure to have counsel present, forfeited his right to counsel). Id. at 1179-80. In Commonwealth v. Kelly, this Court found a defendant who was appointed counsel forfeited his right to counsel. 5 A.3d 370 (Pa.Super.2010). We reasoned: - 24 - J-A10035-15 Kelly was a criminal defendant who had been unwilling to cooperate with all three counsel assigned to him; who argued all counsel were incompetent because they refused to argue what he believed was the law; who, the day after his pro se motion to withdraw his first guilty plea was granted, filed pro se an omnibus pre-trial motion seeking suppression of evidence on a ground the trial court had already addressed (validity of search warrant); who wanted a counsel, but only one who would please him; who treated appointed counsel with disdain; whose trial had been already postponed because he could not agree with assigned counsel (counsel 2); who had been warned by the trial court that failure to cooperate with assigned counsel (counsel 3) would result in him representing himself pro se at trial; who sought to have other counsel appointed to him (who would have been counsel 4) and postpone the trial instead of trying to cooperate with counsel 3; and who clearly was not interested in listening closely [to] what [the trial judge] was telling him, consumed as he was in making his point counsel were ineffective and he knew the law better than assigned counsel. Id. at 381-82.13 ____________________________________________ 13 The court in Kelly noted the case differed from Lucarelli and the other Pennsylvania forfeiture cases because, in Kelly, the defendant was eligible for court-appointed counsel. 5 A.3d at 379 n.7. The Kelly court also noted a “hybrid situation” where a defendant loses his right to counsel, stating: [T]here is a hybrid situation (“waiver by conduct”) that combines elements of waiver and forfeiture. Once a defendant has been warned that he will lose his attorney if he engages in dilatory tactics, any misconduct thereafter may be treated as an implied request to proceed pro se and, thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel. .... (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 25 - J-A10035-15 The trial court did not conduct a proper colloquy of Appellant at any stage of the proceedings. Although President Judge Sacavage inquired as to some elements of Rule 121 prior to the February 11, 2013 jury selection, his colloquy was not complete. He did not ensure Appellant understood the nature of the charges, the elements of each charge, or the permissible range of sentences of the charges. He did not inform Appellant there were possible defenses that counsel might be aware of which would be permanently lost if not raised or that Appellant had rights that would be lost permanently if not timely raised, and he did not advise Appellant his right to challenge errors would be lost permanently if not timely asserted. N.T., 2/11/2012, at 10- 13. Further, the trial court did not inquire about the defendant’s age, educational background, and basic comprehension skills. Because the trial court failed to comply with the minimum requirements of Rule 121, and failed to inquire as to Appellant’s background, Appellant did not waive his _______________________ (Footnote Continued) These are not “waiver” cases in the true sense of the word. In many situations there will be defendants who engage in dilatory conduct but who vehemently object to being forced to proceed pro se. These defendants cannot truly be said to be “waiving” their Sixth Amendment rights because although they are voluntarily engaging in misconduct knowing what they stand to lose, they are not affirmatively requesting to proceed pro se. Thus, instead of “waiver by conduct,” this situation more appropriately might be termed “forfeiture with knowledge.” Id. at 379 (quoting United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100-01 (3d Cir. 1995)). - 26 - J-A10035-15 right to counsel. See Phillips, 93 A.3d at 855 (vacating judgment of sentence and remanding for further proceedings where trial court failed to meet minimum requirements of Rule 121 and failed to question appellant on qualitative aspects of waiver of counsel at critical stages of proceedings). Because Appellant did not waive his right to counsel, his constitutional right to counsel was violated unless he forfeited this right. See Lucarelli, 971 A.2d at 1179. Appellant filed pro se motions to remove two court- appointed attorneys because he disagreed with their assessment of his case, they refused to advance legal arguments Appellant believed had merit, and Appellant believed a conflict of interest existed because they both were from the Public Defender’s Office.14 There is no evidence, however, that Appellant treated either counsel with disrespect or disdain. Further, although Appellant filed motions which delayed trial, it is not clear that any delay was intentional. See N.T., 3/8/2012, at 3-8; N.T., 5/7/2012, at 3-4, 6-12. It appears Appellant may not have known counsel did not file the motions he requested until after the pretrial conference. N.T., 5/7/2012, at 6-12. Nor is there evidence Appellant “engaged in physically abusive and threatening conduct.” See Lucarelli, 971 A.2d at 1179. Although the issue of whether ____________________________________________ 14 As noted above, Appellant’s first court-appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw, but the trial court did not rely on this motion when finding Appellant was not denied his right to counsel. Motion to Withdraw, 3/31/2011; Opinion, 1/6/2014. - 27 - J-A10035-15 Appellant was denied his right to counsel may not merit relief on appeal, it is not wholly frivolous. We further note that, as to the issue concerning Appellant’s right to counsel, appointed counsel did not comply with the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago. Prior to withdrawing as counsel on a direct appeal under Anders, counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago. The brief must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders brief to the appellant, together with a letter that advises the appellant of his or her right to “(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of the court’s attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.” Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa.Super.2007). Substantial compliance with these requirements is sufficient. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa.Super.2007). - 28 - J-A10035-15 Appellant’s counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw as counsel states: “Counsel has carefully considered this matter and can find no basis which is not frivolous to appeal [Appellant’s] conviction for one count of aggravated assault.” Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, at ¶ 2; see also Letter from James L. Best, Esq. to DaShaun Laquin Jamison, dated 11/10/2014 (“Letter to Appellant”). Counsel notified Appellant of the withdrawal request, supplied him with copies of the motion for leave to withdraw and the Anders brief, and sent Appellant a letter explaining his right to proceed pro se or with new, privately-retained counsel to raise any additional points or arguments that Appellant believed had merit. See Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel at ¶ 5; Letter to Appellant. Counsel’s Anders brief provides a “Statement of the Facts,” which briefly summarizes the factual and procedural history of the case. The section, however, is incomplete and does not contain citations to the record. Anders Brief at 7. For six of the seven arguments, it provides citations to the record, refers to evidence of record that might arguably support the issues raised on appeal, provides citations to relevant case law, states counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is wholly frivolous, and states his reasons for concluding the appeal is frivolous. Id. at 10-20. However, for the issue regarding whether Appellant was denied his right to counsel, the Anders brief provides no citations to case law and states that the trial court conducted an adequate colloquy, even though it failed to do so. Id. at 9-10. Accordingly, in addition to finding Appellant’s argument concerning his right to counsel is - 29 - J-A10035-15 non-frivolous, we conclude counsel failed to comply with the technical requirements of Anders for that issue.15 Appellant’s remaining issues are frivolous. Appellant’s second issue maintains the trial court erred when it failed to admit into evidence a written report authored by Captain Charles Stetler prior to Captain Stetler’s testimony and failed to admit testimony from Appellant’s mother, father, and grandmother about telephone conversations they had with individuals who did not testify. Anders Brief at 10-11. “[T]he admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, and such rulings will not form the basis for appellate relief absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Hoover, 107 A.3d 723, 729 (Pa.2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1228 (Pa.2009)). Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 802 provides that “[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, by other rules prescribed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or by statute.” Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Pa.R.Evid. 801. Both Captain Stetler’s report and the proposed testimony of Appellant’s family members constitute inadmissible ____________________________________________ 15 Although the “Statement of the Facts” section of the brief does not contain citations to the record, the argument sections for the remaining six issues contain citations to the record. Anders Brief, at 10-20. Therefore, the brief as to the remaining sections substantially complies with Anders and Santiago. - 30 - J-A10035-15 hearsay. The court acted within its discretion when it refused to admit Captain Stetler’s report until he testified. N.T., 2/19/2013, at 172. Further, the trial court acted within its discretion when it refused to admit the testimony of Appellant’s family members. N.T., 2/19/2013, at 223. This claim is frivolous. Appellant’s third issue claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a videotaped recording of the incident. Appellant claims the prison staff tampered with the video captured by the prison facility cameras, that the videotape included only a portion of the relevant incident, and that it failed to include an earlier encounter between the prison guards and Appellant. Anders Brief at 11; N.T., 8/30/2012, at 11-12. We review a denial of a suppression motion to determine “whether the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are free from error.” Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Pa.Super.2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. McClease, 750 A.2d 320, 323 (Pa.Super.2000)). Judge Saylor determined at the August 30, 2012 pre-trial hearing that Appellant presented no evidence the prison staff manipulated the videotape. N.T., 8/30/2012. Further, the Commonwealth presented testimony from an electronics technician from the prison who stated the tape was extracted from digital recordings made by the facility’s cameras and the facility does not have the ability to edit the videotapes. N.T., 8/30/2012, at 6-7. Judge Saylor found Appellant’s claims that the prison staff included only a portion of the relevant incident “may be - 31 - J-A10035-15 arguments at trial,” but were not a basis for suppression. Id. at 12. The trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the videotape, and Appellant’s claim is frivolous. In his fourth issue, Appellant alleges the Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), when it failed to disclose a portion of a video and audio recording from a handheld camera (“video/audio recording”)16 that would have captured the moments prior to the incident at issue.17 Anders Brief at 11-12, N.T., 2/15/13, at 162-193. Pursuant to Brady, “the prosecution’s failure to divulge exculpatory evidence is a violation of a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.” Commonwealth v. Com Ly, 980 A.2d 61, 75 (Pa.2009). To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must “demonstrate that exculpatory or impeaching evidence, favorable to the defense, was suppressed by the ____________________________________________ 16 The prison had cameras at different locations throughout the prison facility. The facility cameras did not have audio. N.T., 2/15/2013, at 164. In addition, a guard captured a portion of the incident on a handheld camera, that had video and audio. Id. at 164-65. The guard had the camera because a prisoner housed near Appellant needed to be recorded when he exited his prison cell and the guards had taken that prisoner to the shower prior to the incident. Id. 17 It appears the Commonwealth produced a portion of the video/audio recording that captured the incident, but not the moments leading up to the incident, which Appellant claimed would have captured relevant conversation. N.T., 2/15/13, at 162-193. - 32 - J-A10035-15 prosecution, to the prejudice of the defendant.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110, 1126 (Pa.2008)). At the end of the first day of trial, after the video/audio recording of the incident was admitted, the trial court ordered the Commonwealth to attempt to locate the portion of the video/audio recording that preceded the admitted portion. N.T., 2/15/2013, at 184-86. At the next trial day,18 the Commonwealth admitted the requested portion of the video/audio recording from the handheld camera. N.T., 2/19/2013, at 4. Appellant was able to cross-examine the witness regarding the video/audio recording. The trial court found, although the “Commonwealth may have inadvertently at best, caused the initial suppression of evidence,” Appellant did not contend he was prejudiced by the evidence or establish the evidence had exculpatory or impeachment value. Opinion, 1/6/2014, at 5. This was not error, and Appellant’s Brady claim is frivolous. In his fifth issue, Appellant argues the verdict was inconsistent because the jury found him guilty of aggravated assault, but acquitted him of simple assault, a lesser included offense. Anders Brief at 12. Although “often perplexing,” inconsistent verdicts “are not considered mistakes and do not constitute a basis for reversal.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 65 A.3d 939, 944 (Pa.Super.2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stokes, 38 A.3d ____________________________________________ 18 The first day of trial was a Friday. The next day of trial was a Tuesday, as the Monday was a court holiday. - 33 - J-A10035-15 846, 855 (Pa.Super.2011)). “[T]he rationale for allowing inconsistent verdicts is that it is the jury’s sole prerogative to decide on which counts to convict in order to provide a defendant with sufficient punishment.” Id. at 944-45 (quoting Stokes, 38 A.3d at 855). The trial court did not err in denying relief based on an inconsistent verdict and we agree the claim is wholly frivolous. Appellant claims in his sixth issue that the trial court erred in refusing to send certain items to the jury room during deliberations. Anders Brief at 13. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provide: “the jury may take with it such exhibits as the trial judge deems proper.” Pa.R.Crim.P.646(A). “Whether an exhibit should be allowed to go out with the jury during its deliberation is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Commonwealth v. Barnett, 50 A.3d 176, 194 (Pa.Super.2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Merbah, 411 A.2d 244, 247 (Pa.Super.1979)). “The underlying reason for excluding certain items from the jury’s deliberations is to prevent placing undue emphasis or credibility on the material, and de-emphasizing or discrediting other items not in the room with the jury.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d 1089, 1103 (Pa.Super.2005)). Appellant requested that Captain Stetler’s report be sent to the jury. The court denied this request, noting only portions of the report were read into the record. N.T., 2/19, at 167-68. Appellant also requested that a document he wrote to the superintendent be sent to the jury, and the trial - 34 - J-A10035-15 court denied the request because it would place undue emphasis on the exhibit. Id. at 168-69.19 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s request to send exhibits with the jury, and this claim is frivolous. Appellant’s last claim maintains the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Anders Brief at 13. We apply the following standard when reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim: “[W]hether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Lehman, 820 A.2d 766, 772 (Pa.Super.2003), affirmed, 870 A.2d 818 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574 (Pa.Super.2001)). When we apply this standard, “we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder.” Id. “[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.” Lehman, 820 A.2d at 772. Moreover, “[a]ny doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved ____________________________________________ 19 The trial court agreed with Appellant that, under its reasoning, it would deny Appellant’s request to send any document to the jury. N.T., 2/19/2013, at 369-70. Appellant noted his objection for the record. Id. at 370. - 35 - J-A10035-15 by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances.” Id. “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Id. In applying the above test, we must evaluate the entire record and we must consider all evidence actually received. DiStefano, 782 A.2d at 582. Further, “the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Id. A jury convicted Appellant of aggravated assault of a correctional officer. To sustain an aggravated assault of a correctional officer conviction, the Commonwealth must establish the appellant “attempt[ed] to cause or intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to [an officer or employee of a correctional institution], in the performance of duty.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(3). Bodily injury is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301. Here, Correctional Officer Todd Kepner testified that, while working in the restrictive housing unit of SCI Coal Township, Appellant punched him in the jaw. N.T., 2/15/2013, at 94, 96. Officer Kepner experienced redness and pain in the jaw. Id. at 99. The jury was entitled to believe Correctional Officer Kepner’s testimony, which was sufficient to establish the elements of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 636 A.2d 1195, 1196 - 36 - J-A10035-15 (Pa.Super.1994) (evidence sufficient where officer testified Appellant’s punch broke officer’s glasses, caused officer to stumble backwards, and caused pain for next few days). Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim is frivolous. Whether a verdict is against the weight of the evidence is “addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (citing Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751–52 (2000)). “A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, ‘the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.’” Id. at 1055 (quoting Widmer, 744 A.2d at 752). Courts should award “a new trial . . . when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 648 A.2d 1077, 1189 (Pa.1994)). Further, “[a]ppellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055 (quoting Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753). “Because the trial judge had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when - 37 - J-A10035-15 reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753). The jury heard testimony from 17 witnesses, including the victims of the alleged assaults, eyewitnesses, and the investigating officer. It viewed 32 exhibits, including witness statements and videotape recordings depicting the events. The trial court found the verdict not against the weight of the evidence. Opinion, 1/6/2014, at 7. The trial court acted within its discretion and Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim is frivolous. Our independent review of the record reveals no additional non- frivolous claims. Case remanded for the filing of an advocate’s brief consistent with this memorandum. Counsel shall file the advocate’s brief within 45 days of the issuance of this opinion. The Commonwealth shall have 30 days from the filing of Appellant’s brief to file an Appellee’s brief. Jurisdiction retained. President Judge Gantman joins in the memorandum. Judge Mundy concurs in the result. - 38 -