¹ The District Attorney of Bucks County requested that the Office of the Pennsylvania Attorney General handle this case. When [this court] use[s] the term Commonwealth, [it] mean[s] the Office of the Attorney General. * * * An additional caveat is necessary and that is that the Commonwealth agrees that the pre[-]2013 matters are to be considered as evidence against Claire Risoldi, hereinafter Claire, only. For ease of reference, Carlo Risoldi, her son, is hereinafter referred to as Carl. The Claim of November 29, 1984 The Risoldi family,2 lived [on] Tower Circle, Yardley, PA. On November 29, 1984, their home was burglarized and items were reported taken, including jewelry. The insurer was Chubb Insurance Company. A claim was submitted for jewelry the family (father and Claire) said was taken and Chubb reimbursed them $120,324 for the jewelry.

² Carlo (father)[,] Claire, Carl[,] and Carla[.] The Claim of December 16, 1993 The Risoldis (father, Claire, Carl and Carla) still resided at the . . . Tower Circle address. The house was broken into, vandalized and items reported taken. The insurer was Nationwide Insurance Company. Among the items reported taken were pieces of jewelry. The Risoldis (father & Claire) claimed losses of $363,478. Their claim was settled for $80,000 following institution of a lawsuit against Nationwide.

³ Scheduled means insurance coverage exists for the items. The Claim of June 17, 2009 On June 17, 2009, a fire occurred in a room that Claire used for dressing and personal care purposes. She was in an adjacent room when she heard a sound and smelled smoke. The insurer at this time was American International Group, hereinafter AIG. This fire occurred on the second floor of Clairemont and caused structural damage, etc. One of the items damaged was drapery which AIG believed could be cleaned but Claire insisted be replaced. A Commonwealth theme is Claire’s ability to dominate others and to get them to act as she wishes. As a result of her demand, AIG paid $300,000 to replace the drapes. Drapes are another thread in the web the Commonwealth wove to charge the defendants.

⁴ The Commonwealth contends that the conduct surrounding this claim is attributable to all defendants and supports the corrupt organization counts against them. AIG insured Clairemont and provided the following coverages: 1. dwelling coverage on the home 2. structure coverage for out buildings, e.g., pool, garages 3. contents/personal property 4. alternative living expenses 5. guaranteed replacement cost The named insureds were Carl and Sheila and although Claire was not a named insured, she was covered under the policy. There was also a COLLECTIONS POLICY with Carl and Sheila as the named insureds. Coverage was for eleven million dollars. The policy also covered Claire’s jewelry. According to Mr. O’Keefe, AIG’s adjuster, the drapes, ceiling and wall murals (a claim for more than $800,000 was made to redo the murals[)], fall under the dwelling coverage. The insurance policy/policies were never offered into evidence and [the trial court does] not know if Mr. O’Keefe’s interpretation is correct. However, at this stage of the proceedings, [the trial court] accept[s] his interpretation as a correct statement of the policy. This fire began about 1:00 pm in an attic dormer and was so extensive as to result in Clairemont being declared a total loss by AIG. AIG paid the full policy coverage for the structure, $7,200,000, as all the PRIVATE experts who looked into the cause of the fire concluded it was accidental.5 However, as Carl and Sheila had replacement coverage, AIG was obligated to pay

⁵ We note that our reading of the certified record does reflect the following testimony from Appellee under oath: One thing we discussed, [Lieutenant Landis] cautioned me to caution Claire not to publicly scream or holler and say that she felt that the firefighters were responsible for this theft. Number one, she lives in the area and they may not come out and fight one of her fires again. Number two, the firefighters and the police are like brothers. And [Lieutenant Landis] after -- after Claire had mentioned this in public the previous day in front of the fire marshal, and in front of the other people, it got around. And [Lieutenant Landis] was having a tough time getting officers to come out and do the night shift patrol -- the night shift security because they were upset with Claire that she was insinuating that the firefighters may have something to do with this. N.T., 4/7/15, at 1886-1887. However, these statements attributable to Appellee do not establish that he claimed Lieutenant Landis specifically told him not to file a police report regarding the missing jewelry. - 18 - J-A04009-17 the intent to defraud the insurer. As previously noted, nothing in the record supports the suggestion that Appellee had the necessary mens rea to acquire anything from the insurer. Hence, the Commonwealth’s claim fails. THEFT BY DECEPTION The Commonwealth next argues that the trial court erred in determining that it failed to present a prima facie case that Appellee committed the crime of theft by deception. Commonwealth’s Brief at 44-45. In this regard, the Commonwealth contends the following: It is the Commonwealth’s position that, under the same reasoning that a prima facie case was established for insurance fraud, this count of theft by deception related to the jewelry claim was supported by sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. [Appellee’s] multiple false statements as outlined above establish that he intentionally created a false impression to AIG in an attempt to obtain insurance payments in excess of $10 million. Commonwealth’s Brief at 45. The crime of theft by deception is defined as follows: § 3922. Theft by deception. (a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally obtains or withholds property of another by deception. A person deceives if he intentionally: (1) creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law, value, intention or other state of mind; but deception as to a person’s intention to perform a promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently perform the promise[.] - 19 - J-A04009-17 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1). “The mens rea for theft by deception is intent to defraud.” Commonwealth v. Grife, 664 A.2d 116, 120 (Pa. Super. 1993). In addition, this Court observed in Commonwealth v. Grife, 664 A.2d 116 (Pa. Super. 1995): A man is defrauded if, by intentionally false representations of fact he has been induced to make a donation, or has been induced to pay money or to deliver property upon receipt of something quite different from what he understood he was getting or has been induced to lend money upon the strength of security which is not what it is represented to be. Id. at 120 (quoting Rosengarten v. State, 171 So.2d 591, 595 (Fla. App. 1965)) (original emphasis omitted). Our review of the certified record reflects that AIG did not dispense any insurance proceeds on the jewelry claim. James O’Keefe, a general adjuster with AIG who was assigned to the claims related to the 2013 fire at Clairemont, testified as follows regarding the jewelry claim: Q Did AIG pay this claim for the stolen jewelry? A No. We have disclaimed and denied coverage for this loss. Q Did you issue a denial letter? A Yes. N.T., 4/7/15, at 1840. This fact was alluded to by the Commonwealth when it stated that Appellee “intentionally created a false impression to AIG in an attempt to obtain insurance payments . . . .” Commonwealth’s Brief at 46 (emphasis added). Thus, it is evident that no property was obtained from AIG with regard to the jewelry claim. Accordingly, the Commonwealth’s - 20 - J-A04009-17 assertion that it presented a prima facie case that Appellee committed the crime of theft by deception lacks merit. CRIMINAL ATTEMPT TO COMMIT THEFT BY DECEPTION The Commonwealth next argues that the trial court erred in determining that it failed to present a prima facie case that Appellee committed the crime of criminal attempt to commit theft by deception. Commonwealth’s Brief at 45-46. The Commonwealth states the following: It is the Commonwealth’s position that under the same reasoning that a prima facie case was established for insurance fraud, this count of criminal attempt at theft by deception related to the jewelry claim was supported by sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. [Appellee’s] multiple false statements as outlined above establish that he intentionally created a false impression to AIG in an attempt to obtain insurance payments in excess of $10 million. Id. “A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). “Our Crimes Code is clear in defining the two (2) elements of the offense of attempt by providing: (1) that the actor intend to commit an offense; and (2) that the actor take a substantial step toward completion of the offense.” Commonwealth v. Henley, 474 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Pa. 1984). To obtain a conviction for attempted theft by deception, the Commonwealth is required to prove only that the defendant intended to deceive the victim and took a substantial step - 21 - J-A04009-17 toward that end. Commonwealth v. Imes, 623 A.2d 859, 862-863 (Pa. Super. 1993). As our Supreme Court has long observed: An attempt, in general, is an overt act done in pursuance of an intent to do a specific thing, tending to the end but falling short of complete accomplishment of it. In law, the definition must have this further qualification, that the overt act must be sufficiently proximate to the intended crime to form one of the natural series of acts which the intent requires for its full execution. So long as the acts are confined to preparation only, and can be abandoned before any transgression of the law or of others’ rights, they are within the sphere of intent and do not amount to attempts. Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 466 A.2d 991, 1001 (Pa. 1983) (quoting Commonwealth v. Eagan, 42 A. 374, 377 (Pa. 1899)) (emphasis omitted). As previously discussed, our review of the record reflects that Appellee made statements under oath pertaining to Claire Risoldi’s concern for the jewelry left inside of the home during the fire and her behavior in front of Lieutenant Landis during the fire. These statements were controverted by testimony from Lieutenant Landis. However, there is no evidence of record that Appellee made the statements about Claire and the jewelry with the intent to commit the crime of insurance fraud. In addition, as mentioned above, Appellee offered testimony regarding AIG insurance adjuster Anthony Amoroso’s suggestion that a police report regarding the jewelry be filed only after there was complete certainty that the jewelry was not in the house so that a fraudulent police report was not filed. These statements were not directly controverted by Mr. Amoroso. - 22 - J-A04009-17 Rather, our review reflects Mr. Amoroso offered the following innocuous testimony regarding the reporting of missing jewelry to the police: Q Did you tell them that if jewelry was missing they should not report it to the police immediately? A I never said that, no. Q Would that be consistent with your practice and general insurance industry practice to tell someone who suffered a theft loss to delay reporting it to the police? A The policy, as a condition, if there is any theft of any jewelry, anything in the home, or a mysterious disappearance, it needs to be reported to the police and we need a Police Report. N.T., 4/1/15, at 792. This testimony does not refute the testimony offered by Appellee indicating that the delay in filing a police report was due to Mr. Amoroso warning Claire to be certain of what jewelry was missing in order to avoid the filing of a false police report. Accordingly, we fail to see how Appellee’s testimony regarding the timing of the filing of a police report was offered with the intent to deceive AIG into paying the insurance claim. Hence, we discern no error on the part of the trial court in concluding that the Commonwealth failed to present a prima facie case that Appellee committed the crime of attempted theft by deception. CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY The Commonwealth next argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case that Appellee committed the crime of criminal conspiracy. Commonwealth’s Brief at 46- 56. The Commonwealth asserts that Appellee “personally delivered the - 23 - J-A04009-17 altered and forged documents knowing full well their significance and he lied under oath in an effort to bolster the false Risoldi claims.” Id. at 46. The Commonwealth points out that the trial court determined that a prima facie case was established against the members of the Risoldi family on the corrupt organizations charge and the conspiracy charge based, in part, on some of the family members “parroting the party line” with regard to the allegedly missing jewelry. Id. at 50. Thus, the Commonwealth ultimately alleges Appellee’s similar assertions under oath regarding the jewelry, coupled with “conduct [that] encompassed far more than being a ‘go-fer’ who ‘parroted the party line’” demonstrate his participation in the conspiracy. Id. at 55. In essence, the Commonwealth contends that Appellee “played an active role in the Risoldi scheme to defraud AIG.” Id. at 51. The crime of criminal conspiracy is set forth in Section 903 of the Crimes Code providing, in relevant part, as follows: § 903. Criminal conspiracy. (a) Definition of conspiracy. — A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or (2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime. - 24 - J-A04009-17 (b) Scope of conspiratorial relationship. — If a person guilty of conspiracy, as defined by subsection (a) of this section, knows that a person with whom he conspires to commit a crime has conspired with another person or persons to commit the same crime, he is guilty of conspiring with such other person or persons, to commit such crime whether or not he knows their identity. (c) Conspiracy with multiple criminal objectives. — If a person conspires to commit a number of crimes, he is guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship. * * * (e) Overt act. — No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime unless an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by him or by a person with whom he conspired. 18 Pa.C.S. § 903. Furthermore, we have explained the following: A conviction for criminal conspiracy, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, is sustained where the Commonwealth establishes that the defendant entered an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person or persons with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the common understanding that a particular criminal objective is to be accomplished. Mere association with the perpetrators, mere presence at the scene, or mere knowledge of the crime is insufficient. Rather, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant shared the criminal intent, i.e., that the Appellant was “an active participant in the criminal enterprise and that he had knowledge of the conspiratorial agreement.” The defendant does not need to commit the overt act; a co-conspirator may commit the overt act. A conspiracy is almost always proven through circumstantial evidence. “The conduct of the parties and the - 25 - J-A04009-17 circumstances surrounding their conduct may create ‘a web of evidence’ linking the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.” The evidence must, however, “rise above mere suspicion or possibility of guilty collusion.” Among the circumstances which are relevant, but not sufficient by themselves, to prove a corrupt confederation are: (1) an association between alleged conspirators; (2) knowledge of the commission of the crime; (3) presence at the scene of the crime; and (4) in some situations, participation in the object of the conspiracy. The presence of such circumstances may furnish a web of evidence linking an accused to an alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt when viewed in conjunction with each other and in the context in which they occurred. Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc) (citations omitted). Our review of the record reflects the trial court held various members of the Risoldi family for court on multiple charges, including charges of conspiracy. Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/15, at 15.6 However, the trial court ____________________________________________

⁶ In doing so, the trial court adopted its reasoning related to the finding that a prima facie case was established against the members of the Risoldi family for corrupt organizations. Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/15, at 9. In finding that Claire and Carl Risoldi should be held for trial, the trial court stated, “evidence was presented that they both pressed claims with AIG for the drapes, mural, jewelry, and [additional living expenses].” Id. As to Sheila Risoldi, the trial court noted the fact that she is a family member struck the court as “guilt by association.” The trial court then stated, “[Sheila’s] involvement . . . is based on her family name, the proof of loss statements she signed, that she stated in her [examination under oath] that she saw the jewelry bags in the hall, and that Claire was trying to get into the house (on the day of the fire) to get the bags of jewelry, i.e., that she was parroting the ‘party line’ regarding those matters.” Id. at 10. Regarding Carla (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 26 - J-A04009-17 concluded that there was no such prima facie case presented with regard to Appellee. Id. at 18-19. We are constrained to agree. First, we note that Appellee had an association with the Risoldi family because he was employed as a private investigator. In his capacity, he attended multiple meetings and examinations under oath provided by family members. Second, we observe that there is little, if any, evidence to establish that Appellee had knowledge of the commission of a crime. Specifically, with regard to the Commonwealth’s claim that Appellee delivered a binder to AIG containing “altered and forged documents knowing full well their significance,” Commonwealth’s Brief at 46, our review of the certified record reflects no evidence that Appellee was aware of the authenticity of the materials contained in the binder. Concerning the Commonwealth’s allegations that Appellee lied under oath multiple times, we first consider Appellee’s testimony about his conversation with Anthony Amoroso. We observe that Appellee testified that _______________________ (Footnote Continued) Risoldi, the trial court relied upon her family membership, and the fact that she too “parroted the party line” concerning Claire’s behavior and concern about the jewelry on the night of the fire. Id. In addition, the trial court noted Carla’s participation in a telephone call from Claire to a third party, who was scheduled to testify before the investigative grand jury, about a gift of jewelry once “it was all done.” Id. at 11. The trial court specifically stated that “Carla’s participation in this telephone call is telling as she had to be aware that the purpose of the call was to influence the testimony [the third party] would give.” Id. - 27 - J-A04009-17 Mr. Amoroso suggested that the filing of a police report should be accurate and that the report be made when the family was certain about the missing jewelry so that a fraudulent report was not presented to the police. N.T., 4/7/15, at 1884-1885, 1888-1889. This testimony was not contradicted by Mr. Amoroso. We next consider Appellee’s testimony about his conversation with Lieutenant Landis. We observe that Appellee testified that Lieutenant Landis asked Appellee to caution Claire “not to publicly scream and holler and say that she felt that the firefighters were responsible for [the] theft.” N.T., 4/7/15, at 1886. However, Appellee’s testimony does not amount to a direction from the lieutenant that a police report should not be filed. Moreover, we note that Lieutenant Landis did not contradict this testimony. We also consider Appellee’s testimony regarding Claire’s behavior on the night of the fire. Specifically, Appellee testified about a conversation with Lieutenant Landis in which he spoke about Claire’s behavior during the fire and her request that Lieutenant Landis go into the foyer for her and retrieve the bags of jewelry. N.T., 4/7/15, at 1887. Lieutenant Landis refuted this testimony. However, this disputed testimony offered by Appellee, which was supported by other testimony from Risoldi family members, does not necessarily establish an inference that Appellee had knowledge of the commission of a crime. - 28 - J-A04009-17 Third, we consider Appellee’s presence at the scene. Again, we note that Appellee was employed by the Risoldi family as a private investigator and was present at various points in time with regard to the insurance claim. However, we note that there was not a specific scene of the crime as contemplated in the factors set forth in Lambert. Accordingly, we conclude that this factor is not particularly relevant to our inquiry. Fourth, we review Appellee’s participation in the object of the conspiracy. As mentioned above, Appellee was employed as a private investigator by the Risoldi family. As such, he was present at various points in the family’s dealings with AIG. In addition, Appellee gave an examination under oath. It can only be alleged that Appellee’s testimony regarding a conversation he had with Lieutenant Landis about Claire’s behavior during the fire, which was refuted by Lieutenant Landis, amounts to a participation in the conspiracy. Accordingly, we are left to conclude that this testimony was not sufficient to furnish a web of evidence linking Appellee to an alleged conspiracy. Hence, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the Commonwealth failed to set forth a prima facie case with regard to the charge of criminal conspiracy. FORGERY The Commonwealth next argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it failed to establish a prima facie case that Appellee committed the - 29 - J-A04009-17 crime of forgery. Commonwealth’s Brief at 56-57. The Commonwealth presents the following argument: It is the Commonwealth’s position that under the same reasoning that a prima facie case was established for insurance fraud, this count of forgery related to the fabricated and altered documents submitted to AIG by [Appellee] was supported by sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. Accordingly, the lower court erred by dismissing the count. Id. at 57. We are constrained to disagree. The relevant statute regarding forgery provides as follows: (a) Offense defined. – A person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to defraud or injure anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the actor: (1) alters any writing of another without his authority; (2) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues or transfers any writing so that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize that act, or to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed; or (3) utters any writing which he knows to be forged in a manner specified in paragraphs (1) or (2) of this subsection. (b) Definition. – As used in this section, the word “writing” includes printing or any other method of recording information, money, coins, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, electronic signatures and other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification. 18 Pa.C.S. § 4101. - 30 - J-A04009-17 To establish the crime of forgery, the Commonwealth must prove that there was a false writing, that the instrument was capable of deceiving, and that the defendant intended to defraud. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 682 A.2d 811, 815 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citing Commonwealth v. Dietterick, 631 A.2d 1347, 1352 (Pa. Super. 1993). “By its plain language, the statute requires only that the act be committed with ‘intent to defraud or injure’, not that the defendant have succeeded in his endeavor.” Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 413 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citing Commonwealth v. Sheaffer, 23 A.2d 215, 219 (Pa. Super. 1941)). Intent to defraud is an essential element of forgery. Commonwealth v. Leber, 802 A.2d 648, 651 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citing Dietterick). As previously discussed, it is undisputed that Appellee delivered to AIG a binder containing documents relevant to the instant insurance claim. However, our review of the record reflects that there is a lack of evidence indicating that Appellee was aware of the particular contents of the binder, or the authenticity of the documents contained therein. Without such evidence, we cannot conclude that Appellee delivered the questionable documents to AIG with an intent to defraud the insurer. Consequently, we must conclude that the Commonwealth failed to present a prima facie case of forgery. - 31 - J-A04009-17 CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS The Commonwealth next argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it failed to establish a prima facie case that Appellee committed the crime of corrupt organizations. Commonwealth’s Brief at 57-59. In this regard, the Commonwealth offers the following argument: The lower court did not specifically address its reasoning for determining that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case for corrupt organizations against [Appellee]. It is the Commonwealth’s position that under the same reasoning that a prima facie case was established for insurance fraud and criminal conspiracy discussed above as well as intimidation of witness discussed below, this count of corrupt organizations was supported by sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. As detailed above and below, [Appellee] was associated with the Risoldi criminal enterprise and directly participated in multiple acts of insurance fraud, theft, intimidation of a witness, obstruction of justice, and forgery. Id. at 58-59. Regarding corrupt organizations, Section 911 of the Crimes Code provides, in pertinent part, as follows: It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(b)(3). To sustain a conviction for corrupt organizations, “the Commonwealth must prove that there was an ongoing organization engaged in commerce and that the associates of the organization functioned as a continuing unit....” Commonwealth v. Donahue, 630 A.2d 1238, 1245 (Pa. Super. 1993). This is to “ensure that a criminal defendant is - 32 - J-A04009-17 being convicted based on evidence of his involvement in the ongoing enterprise, as the corrupt organization statute intended, and not merely based on evidence which proves the underlying crimes [were] committed in furtherance of the alleged enterprise.” Id. The term “enterprise” is defined as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, engaged in commerce and includes legitimate as well as illegitimate entities and governmental entities.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(h)(3). “Racketeering activity” is defined to include acts that are indictable under various provisions of the Crimes Code, including Chapter 39 (relating to theft and related offenses), Section 4117 (relating to insurance fraud), and Chapter 49 (relating to falsification and intimidation. 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(h)(1)(i). “Racketeering activity” is also defined to include, inter alia, a conspiracy to commit any of the offenses set forth in subparagraph (i). 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(h)(1)(iii). The statute further defines “pattern of racketeering activity” as “a course of conduct requiring two or more acts of racketeering activity one of which occurred after the effective date of this section.” 18 Pa.C.S. §911(h)(4). Our review of the record reveals that Appellee, in his capacity as a private investigator, was employed by the Risoldi family, which the Commonwealth contends was the enterprise in question. However, the Commonwealth has failed to establish that Appellee had knowledge of the - 33 - J-A04009-17 crimes allegedly being committed by the enterprise. Moreover, our review reflects a dearth of evidence that Appellee participated in a pattern, i.e., two or more acts, of racketeering activity. Therefore, we are constrained to agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the Commonwealth has failed to set forth a prima facie case that Appellee committed the crimes of corrupt organizations. INTIMIDATION OF A WITNESS The Commonwealth also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it failed to establish a prima facie case that Appellee committed the crime of intimidation of a witness. Commonwealth’s Brief at 59-66. The Commonwealth contends that, during Appellee’s meeting with jewelry appraiser Edward T. Foris at Mr. Foris’s home, Appellee “attempted to get [Mr.] Foris to adopt” as his own documents in the form of jewelry appraisals that bore the signature of Mr. Foris, but which Mr. Foris disowned. Id. at 60. The crime of intimidation of witnesses or victims is codified at 18 Pa.C.S. § 4952 and provides the following pertinent definition of the offense: (a) OFFENSE DEFINED.-- A person commits an offense if, with the intent to or with the knowledge that his conduct will obstruct, impede, impair, prevent or interfere with the administration of criminal justice, he intimidates or attempts to intimidate any witness or victim to: * * * (2) Give any false or misleading information or testimony relating to the commission of any crime to - 34 - J-A04009-17 any law enforcement officer, prosecuting official or judge. 18 Pa.C.S. § 4952(a)(2). Moreover: actual intimidation of a witness is not an essential element of the crime. The crime is committed if one, with the necessary mens rea, “attempts” to intimidate a witness or victim.... The trier of the facts, therefore, could find that [the defendant] attempted to intimidate his accuser and that he did so intending or, at least, having knowledge that his conduct was likely to, impede, impair or interfere with the administration of criminal justice.... The Commonwealth is not required to prove mens rea by direct evidence. Frequently such evidence is not available. In such cases, the Commonwealth may rely on circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Beasley, 138 A.3d 39, 48 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Our review of the certified record reflects that Mr. Foris offered the following testimony regarding his meeting with Appellee: Q. Now, I want to direct your attention back to the spring months of this past -- of this year, 2015. During that time period, did you have contact with an individual named Mark Goldman? A. Yes. Q. Can you tell us the circumstances under which that occurred? A. I was asked -- and I can’t remember who had called me and asked me -- to speak to him, to try to verify some information that he had. Q. He being Mark Goldman? A. Mark Goldman, yeah. Q. And where was it that you received this phone call? A. At my house. - 35 - J-A04009-17 Q. That’s your house in Trenton? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember was it a man or a woman who called you? A. I can’t remember. I really can’t remember, but I believe it was a man. Q. And the man told you that -- what specifically, what did he tell you about Mark Goldman? A. That he was an investigator for Mrs. Risoldi and that he wanted me to verify some appraisal slips that he had. Q. What did you say to the -- when the person told you that, what did you say to them? * * * A. I said, yes, I would look at it. Yeah. Q. What happened after that? A. Mr. Goldman showed up at the house and showed me the photos of the appraisal slips and asked me whether I could verify that that was my signature on those. * * * Q. Before I show those, the appraisals that Mr. Goldman brought to you -- now, first of all, where did -- did Mr. Goldman come to your house? A. Yes. Q. Was he with anyone or just by himself? A. He was by himself. Q. And can you describe the appraisals that Mr. Goldman brought to you? A. As to what? - 36 - J-A04009-17 Q. You said that he came to your house? A. He had photostats of appraisal slips for Fairless Hills Auction. Q. Now, I’m going to show you what’s been marked as Exhibit 212. * * * Q. Mr. Foris, you're now looking at what’s been identified as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 212, which is a packet of appraisals that say Fairless Hills Auction on the top? A. Yes. * * * Q. . . . Now, Mr. Foris, you have in front of you Exhibit 212. Do you recognize those documents? A. They appear to be the ones that he showed me. Q. He being Mr. Goldman? A. Correct. Q. And when he came to your house he identified -- how did he identify himself? A. He had an identification card as being a private investigator, basically. Q. It said Mark Goldman on the card? A. Yes. * * * Q. Do you recognize those as the documents that Mr. Goldman showed you? A. They appear to be the same ones, yes. - 37 - J-A04009-17 Q. And those appraisals appear to have a signature on them, Edward T. Foris? A. Yes. Q. Did you prepare those appraisals? A. No. Q. Now, tell me what transpired when Mr. Goldman came to your house with those appraisals. A. Well, he asked me about the appraisals and whether I could verify my signature. I told him that it appeared to be my signature, except for the fact that they all looked identical. And I don’t -- I don’t think anyone ever signs their name identically one right after the other. Q. And with respect to the appraisal itself, did you recognize that as an appraisal you would prepare? A. As one I prepared? Q. Yes. A. No, I didn’t prepare this. Q. How can you tell you didn’t prepare those appraisals? A. It’s typed. I’ve never put my signature on a typed appraisal, ever. Q. Now, what could you tell Mr. Goldman about those appraisals? A. The same thing that I’m telling you, that, you know, I don’t type up appraisals. And I don’t have someone type them up and then sign them. Q. And when you told Mr. Goldman -- when you told Mr. Goldman that, did anything else happen after that, or did he say anything to you? A. Well, he seemed a little upset about it. - 38 - J-A04009-17 * * * Q. And backing up to when Mr. Goldman was there, how long was he at your house? A. Maybe 20 minutes, a half-hour. Q. And do you recall if he was taking any notes or writing anything down? A. He was taking notes. I’m trying to remember whether he had recorded anything, but I know he was taking notes. Q. Did he ask you to sign anything? A. Not that I can remember. Q. And when he left, had you asked him to leave, or did he just leave on his own? A. No, he just left on his own. N.T., 11/20/15, at 18-25. This testimony from Mr. Foris, read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, does not reflect that, at any point during their meeting at Mr. Foris’s residence, Appellee intimidated or attempted to intimidate Mr. Foris into giving any false or misleading information or testimony regarding the appraisals in question. Accordingly, we are constrained to conclude that the Commonwealth has failed to establish a prima facie case that Appellee committed the crime of intimidation of a witness. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE Next, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it failed to establish a prima facie case that Appellee - 39 - J-A04009-17 committed the crime of obstruction of justice. Commonwealth’s Brief at 66- 67. The Commonwealth offers the following argument in support of its claim: It is the Commonwealth’s position that under the same reasoning that a prima facie case was established for intimidation of witness, this count of obstruction of justice was supported by sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. [Appellee’s] conduct, in conjunction with co-defendant Claire Risoldi’s actions, demonstrate an effort to influence the testimony of Edward Foris by use of threats and bribes. Accordingly, the lower court erred by dismissing the charge. Id. at 67. The Crimes Code defines the crime of obstruction of justice as follows: A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act, except that this section does not apply to flight by a person charged with crime, refusal to submit to arrest, failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental functions. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5101. Our Supreme Court has explained that: [i]n order to establish that [a defendant] obstructed the administration of law under section 5101, the Commonwealth must establish that: (1) the defendant had the intent to obstruct the administration of law; and (2) the defendant used force or violence, breached an official duty or committed an unlawful act. Commonwealth v. Goodman, 676 A.2d 234, 235 (Pa. 1996). As we observed in Commonwealth v. Snyder, 60 A.3d 165 (Pa. Super. 2013); [i]n evaluating § 5101 convictions, our courts have explained that § 5101 is substantially based upon the Model Penal Code section 242.1. As stated in the comment to section 242.1 of the - 40 - J-A04009-17 Model Penal Code “[t]his provision is designed to cover a broad range of behavior that impedes or defeats the operation of government.” Id. at 175 (case citations omitted). As set forth in the testimony in our review of the charge of intimidation of a witness, it is undisputed that Appellee did not use force or violence or breach an official duty when he met with Mr. Foris regarding the appraisals that bore Mr. Foris’s signature. Moreover, as discussed previously in this decision, it is our conclusion that the Commonwealth has not shown that Appellee committed an unlawful act by visiting Mr. Foris and discussing the appraisals. Accordingly, the Commonwealth’s contrary claim lacks merit. CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO INTIMIDATE A WITNESS The Commonwealth last argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it failed to establish a prima facie case that Appellee committed the crime of criminal conspiracy to intimidate a witness. Commonwealth’s Brief at 67-68. In this regard, the Commonwealth presents the following argument: It is the Commonwealth’s position that under the same reasoning that a prima facie case was established for insurance fraud and the related criminal conspiracy as well as intimidation of witness, this count of obstruction of justice [sic] was supported by sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. [Appellee’s] participation in the overall conspiracy was detailed above and amply established. His efforts to influence Edward Foris were clearly made in conjunction with Claire Risold[i]’s conduct on the heels of [Appellee’s] own efforts. It is reasonable to infer that [Appellee] agreed with Risoldi to attempt to coerce [Mr.] Foris into adopting the fabricated appraisals. Accordingly, based on all of the above, it is clear that the Commonwealth - 41 - J-A04009-17 established a prima facie case and the lower court erred in dismissing the charge. Id. We set forth the relevant law pertaining to the crimes of criminal conspiracy and intimidation of a witness above. Therefore, we will not repeat it here. In support of its claim, the Commonwealth infers that Appellee attempted in influence Mr. Foris and that his efforts to do so were in conjunction with Claire’s efforts. However, our thorough review of the record reflects no such evidence. The only evidence that links Appellee’s visit with the telephone call and visit from Claire was the following testimony from Mr. Foris: A. . . . And right after [Appellee] left, I had gotten a -- I’m trying to remember now how the sequence went. You have to understand, I just recently lost my wife, so I’m a little bit upset here. I’m trying to remember whether Mrs. Risoldi, or Claire, had called me and asked me to -- I believe she did call me and asked me if I would verify that I had done those, and I told her no. And she said, well, I want to do something for you. She said, can I send you some money or something. I said, no. And shortly thereafter we received -- my wife and I received at the house some flowers and a fruit basket. And then shortly after that, I believe it was, not too long after, Mrs. Risoldi showed up at the house and was sort of begging me to say that I had signed these. Q. When she showed up -- do you know about how long after [Appellee] was there that Mrs. Risoldi showed up? - 42 - J-A04009-17 A. It wasn’t too much longer, couldn’t have been not a month, I know that. N.T., 11/20/15, at 24-25. This evidence lacks a specific connection between Appellee’s conduct in visiting Mr. Foris and Claire’s conduct in phoning Mr. Foris, sending a fruit basket, and then visiting Mr. Foris’s home. Indeed, Mr. Foris was equivocal in the timing of events, and how much time elapsed between Appellee’s visit and the contact from Claire. Moreover, the only time frame that Mr. Foris specified for certain was that Claire visited his home “not too much longer” after Appellee’s visit to his home. He then specified that the visit “couldn’t have been not a month [later].” This ambiguous testimony was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy between Appellee and Claire to intimidate a witness. Hence, the Commonwealth’s contrary claim lacks merit. Order affirmed. Judge Solano joins the Memorandum. Judge Platt files a Dissenting Statement. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 9/18/2017 - 43 -