³ [(]Indecent Assault[),] and the interests of justice must be served by granting [Appellant] a new trial? [VIII.] Did [t]he [trial c]ourt abuse its discretion and commit an error of law, as well as deny [Appellant] [d]ue [p]rocess, in imposing sentence as [his] sentence was above the standard range, starting in the aggravated range, and exceeding the aggravated range[, and] fail[ed] to call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant]; and the [c]ourt failed to consider the background and character of [Appellant], the circumstances of the crime, and impose a sentence that is consistent with the protection of the public and the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant]; and the [c]ourt failed to cite accepted aggravating factors or factors equivalent to those accepted, so the interests of justice will be served by modifying the sentence? [IX.] Did [t]he [trial c]ourt abuse its discretion and commit an error of law, as well as deny [Appellant] [d]ue [p]rocess, by failing to vacate [the] sentence as any pending motions must be disposed of before sentencing, and only after such motions have ____________________________________________ 2 We remind Appellant’s counsel that “[t]he statement of the questions involved must state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (emphasis added). Appellant’s statement of the questions involved covers seven pages of his brief, whereas his summary of the argument covers five pages of the same. This strongly suggests that Appellant’s counsel demonstrated little effort, if any, to conform to the Appellate Rules in the drafting of Appellant’s brief. reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751. That other, asexual inferences are possible from the same act does not undermine this conclusion, as the jury was free to reject such inferences. Accordingly, Appellant’s first claim lacks merit. Appellant’s second and third claims concern the weight of the evidence. Indeed, we can discern no difference between the claims, which both allege that the jury ignored “both the intoxication of the alleged victim and the lack of [Appellant]’s DNA on the alleged victim[,]” Appellant’s Brief at 27, and that such facts “are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice[,]” id. at 29. An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the trial court: Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice. This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a trial court’s discretion, we have explained: The term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion juvenile defendant had not waived his weight-of-the-evidence claim, and did not even address the merits of that claim. In two other cases, the Supreme Court did not address a weight-of-the-evidence claim at all. See Commonwealth v. Fugmann, 198 A. 99 (Pa. 1938); and see Commonwealth v. Green, 141 A. 624 (Pa. 1928). Here, the trial court rejected Appellant’s weight claims for the following reasons: [Appellant] rather nebulously alleges that the victim’s intoxication was “clearly of greater weight.” This [c]ourt’s review of the transcript shows four separate individuals, a nurse, two police officers, and a county detective who all stated they did not believe the victim to be intoxicated, as well as the victim herself. [Appellant] likewise alleges that great weight must be afforded to the fact that [his] DNA was not found on the vagina swab taken [from] the victim. Expert witness Ashley Pratt testified that this is often a common result and that finding DNA in this situation amounts to “finding a needle in a haystack.” In fact, [Appellant]’s counsel managed to get the expert witness to appear to agree that touch DNA is of skeptical validity. The jury chose to believe the expert’s testimony that the absence of DNA would not be unexpected in this kind of case. For the above reasons [Appellant]’s above claims must fail. TCO at 11-12 (citations omitted). We agree with the trial court, and ascertain no abuse of discretion in its denial of Appellant’s motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence. In his fourth claim, Appellant alleges prosecutorial misconduct, contending that the prosecutor made remarks during opening arguments, throughout the course of the trial, and during closing arguments that ostensibly “deprived [Appellant] of a fair or impartial trial and had the - 11 - J-A12010-19 unavoidable effect of prejudicing the jury and forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward [him] such that they could not weigh the evidence objectively….” Appellant’s Brief at 30. With one exception, all of the prosecutor’s comments that are discussed in Appellant’s Brief, see id. at 32-35, occurred during closing arguments. At no point did Appellant make a contemporaneous objection to those comments, nor does he point to the portion of the record where he objected.4 Accordingly, he waived that aspect of his prosecutorial misconduct claim, as “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c)(4) (requiring an appellant to identify in the statement of the case where in the record a claim was “timely and properly raised below”). Moreover, because Appellant failed to identify the specific remarks complained of in his Rule 1925(b) statement, the trial court was unable to address them. This constitutes an additional ground upon which to deem this aspect of Appellant’s claim waived. See ____________________________________________ 4 Notably, Appellant provided a reproduced record in this case containing only portions of the trial transcripts. However, the full transcripts were not provided for our review and, thus, we could not discover where else in the record Appellant’s claim might have been preserved. We remind counsel that: “It has repeatedly been held by our courts that the burden to produce a complete record for appellate review rests, solely with the appellant.” Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 932 A.2d 992, 996 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Chopak, 615 A.2d 696, 701 n.5 (Pa. 1992)). - 12 - J-A12010-19 Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (“Any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.”). Furthermore, Appellant does not discuss any comments by the prosecutor made during the trial itself. Accordingly, that aspect of Appellant’s claim is waived and/or meritless. However, the Commonwealth concedes that Appellant did object during opening arguments to the prosecutor’s use of the term “predator” to describe him. Accordingly, we will review that aspect of Appellant’s claim. It is well settled [that] a prosecutor may employ oratorical flair in arguing to the jury. Such arguments do not constitute prosecutorial misconduct when the remarks are based upon the evidence or proper inferences deduced therefrom. An improper statement during the prosecutor’s closing [or opening] argument will warrant a new trial only when the unavoidable effect of the statement is to prejudice the jury against the defendant, or prevent it from weighing the evidence objectively and rendering a true verdict. Commonwealth v. Patton, 985 A.2d 1283, 1287 (Pa. 2009). Appellant provides numerous citations of boilerplate case law, but virtually no analysis of that case law in light of the Commonwealth’s use of the term “predator” to describe Appellant during its opening argument. The Commonwealth argues: Pennsylvania’s Appellate Courts have previously ruled that similar statements comparing criminals to hunters and victims as prey are permissible. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 897 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2006) ([holding that the] Commonwealth’s opening and closing statements concerning use of noun “predator” and verb “preys” to describe defendant did not warrant new trial; defendant asked her victim for money and when refused, came back with hammer and knife and bludgeoned and stabbed her to - 13 - J-A12010-19 death, slitting her throat, and in the days that followed, she returned to victim’s apartment and stole checks, credit cards, and victim’s car, each time walking past victim’s corpse sitting at kitchen table, such that defendant’s actions could reasonably be termed predatory); Commonwealth v. Miles, 681 A.2d 1295, 1300 (Pa. 1996) (concluding [that the] prosecutor’s comparison of defendant’s actions to the hunting style of “animals of prey” was not improper); Commonwealth v. Van Horn, 797 A.2d 983, 989 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding prosecutor’s characterization of victim as prey was within the limits of proper oratorical flair). Here, as noted by the lower court, the trial testimony established that [Appellant] attempted to take sexual advantage of what he believed to be an unconscious woman. Describing [Appellant] as a predator was certainly the product of a fair deduction from the prospective evidence. Based on the evidence produced during trial, the “predator” characterization proved to be as applicable here as it was in Miller, Miles and Van Horn. Commonwealth’s Brief at 13-14. We agree with the Commonwealth, and note that Appellant fails to distinguish this case from that of Miller, Miles and Van Horn. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it declined to sustain Appellant’s objection to the Commonwealth’s use of the term “predator.” Thus, Appellant is not entitled to a new trial. Next, Appellant asserts that Robert Huttenhower, Victim’s father, testified in a manner that deprived him of a fair trial.5 However, Appellant did not issue a contemporaneous objection to either remark complained of and, ____________________________________________ 5 When asked to describe his daughter, Mr. Huttenhower stated: “We have a nickname for her. She is our smiling girl. And she [was] very bubbly, always smiling, … prior to the assault.” N.T., 8/2/17-8/8/17, at 295. When asked if the victim described the assault to him, he replied, “We did ask the details, which no father should hear, but she did give the details.” Id. at 297. Appellant describes these statements as “outbursts of grief.” Appellant’s Brief at 41. - 14 - J-A12010-19 therefore, he waived this issue for our review. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). In any event, even if we were to reach the merits of the claim, we agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant’s characterization of Mr. Huttenhower’s comments as outbursts of grief constitutes a “flagrant misrepresentation” of the record. Commonwealth’s Brief at 17. As the trial court indicates: “There [were] no outbursts by Mr. Huttenhower. There were no tears. This [c]ourt even went as far as to place on the record that Mr. Huttenhower had conducted himself with the utmost dignity and restraint. For [Appellant] to claim otherwise is simply, patently, and unequivocally false.” TCO at 13. Accordingly, if Appellant had not waived this issue, we would deem it meritless. In Appellant’s sixth issue, he asserts no less than ten separate sub claims that different testimonial remarks were inadmissible, or that they were the product of improper questioning. No common thread of evidentiary rules bind these claims. As the Appellate Rules dictate, “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Additionally, the Rules state unequivocally that each question an appellant raises is to be supported by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority. Id. Appellate arguments which fail to adhere to these rules may be considered waived, and arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived. See Commonwealth v. Murchinson, 899 A.2d 1159, 1160 (Pa. Super. 2006) (deeming the appellant’s claims waived under Rule 2119(a) because he - 15 - J-A12010-19 did not develop meaningful argument with specific references to relevant caselaw and to the record to support his claims); see also Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 546 (Pa. Super. 2005) (recognizing that failure to provide “such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent” may result in waiver); Commonwealth v. Cornelius, 856 A.2d 62, 77 (Pa. Super. 2004) (declining to review the appellant’s claim where there was limited explanation and development of the argument). As the Commonwealth accurately describes the argument presented in support of Appellant’s sixth claim, [he] does not develop his claims in any meaningful way, nor does he bother to explain how each these various instances allegedly reflected an abuse of discretion by the trial court. He has cited no case law that would tend to specifically establish that any of these utterances were improper or inadmissible. His conclusory allegations utterly fail to satisfy his burden of persuasion on appeal or to establish that he is entitled to any type of relief. Commonwealth’s Brief at 18. Because Appellant’s argument in support of his sixth claim constitutes a blatant and egregious violation of Rule 2119(a), we deem it, and all subsidiary issues contained within, waived. In Appellant’s seventh claim, he asserts that that trial court improperly instructed the jury that it could find Appellant guilty of indecent assault if he acted recklessly with regard to the victim’s consent. Given that the element of indecent contact requires “the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in any person[,]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101, he asserts it is not possible to “recklessly make indecent contact for a purpose.” Appellant’s Brief at 47 (emphasis added). - 16 - J-A12010-19 Appellant cites no authorities for this argument. The Commonwealth contends that Appellant initially objected to that portion of the jury instruction, but subsequently withdrew that objection. Commonwealth’s Brief at 18. Indeed, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court indicated “[d]efense [c]ounsel stated on the record that his own research convinced him of the fact that the instructions were correct.” TCO at 14. Moreover, Appellant provides no analysis or counterargument suggesting that this claim was preserved for our review and his argument is, therefore, unresponsive to the trial court’s opinion. Accordingly, we deem this claim waived as well. In Appellant’s penultimate claim, he asserts that the sentence imposed by the trial court constituted an abuse of its discretion. Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test: [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether [the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether [the] appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b). Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (internal citations omitted). Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 759, 831 A.2d 599 (2003). - 17 - J-A12010-19 The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Sierra, supra at 912-13. As to what constitutes a substantial question, this Court does not accept bald assertions of sentencing errors. Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006). An appellant must articulate the reasons the sentencing court’s actions violated the sentencing code. Id. Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010). Instantly, Appellant failed to include a statement pursuant to Rule 2119(f) in his brief. The Commonwealth objects to Appellant’s noncompliance with that rule. Commonwealth’s Brief at 21. “If the Commonwealth objects to the appellant’s failure to comply with [Rule] 2119(f), the sentencing claim is waived for purposes of review.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 149 A.3d 349, 353 (Pa. Super. 2016). Accordingly, Appellant’s discretionary-aspects-of- sentencing claim is waived. Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it failed to decide his motion for a new trial before sentencing him. The trial court addresses this claim as follows: [Appellate] Counsel[, Ryan A. Mergl, Esq.,] is deliberately misconstruing the timeline and facts as presented in the transcript. Said motion was not filed until the morning of the sentencing hearing by appellate counsel who had just entered his representation on this case. Trial counsel had yet to withdraw. [N.T. Sentencing, 12/7/17, at] 30-31. Appellate counsel was asked directly by this [c]ourt “it is my understanding the [c]ourt has 120 days from the filing of this motion to dispose of the motion. Does everyone agree with that?” Attorney Merg[]l - 18 - J-A12010-19 responded “Yes, Your Honor.” [Id. at] 31; 11-18. Attorney Merg[]l asked for oral argument on his motion and out of basic fairness this [c]ourt gave the Commonwealth thirty (30) days to file a responsive motion and set a date of January 31 to have argument. [Id. at] 32-33. Finally, Attorney Merg[]l then stated he wished to submit a brief on his motion within the thirty (30) days. [Id. at] 34-35. This [c]ourt finds this argument to be misleading, self-serving, specious, and one that is entirely produced by the actions of appellate counsel. Under appellate counsel[’]s view of practice it would be possible for a defendant to avoid sentencing simply by inundating the [c]ourt with superfluous motions that would have to be disposed of prior to sentencing. That is not how justice works—determinations are made and a case moves forward in a timely and orderly fashion. The above argument aside, this claim is meritless due to the fact that a Motion for a New Trial is an optional post-sentence motion under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720(B)(i)(a)(iv). By its very definition, [Appellant]’s motion should not have been ruled upon until AFTER sentencing. There is simply no merit to this claim and it must be dismissed. TCO at 16-17 (emphasis in original). Appellant argues that “[a]ny pending motions, such as motions for a new trial, must be disposed of before sentencing, and only after such motions have been argued and ruled upon may the trial judge sentence [the] defendant.” Appellant’s Brief at 51-52. He cites two cases for this proposition, Commonwealth v. Souder, 101 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1954), and Commonwealth v. Middleton, 364 A.2d 342 (Pa. Super. 1976). Appellant provides no analysis of either case in his argument. In Souder, a four-paragraph opinion by our Supreme Court, the Court reversed the order of the Superior Court, which had remanded for resentencing, because “the defendants’ motions for new trial remained undisposed of.” Souder, 101 A.2d at 694. No analysis was provided by our - 19 - J-A12010-19 Supreme Court in that decision, nor did the High Court cite any previous decision, statute, or rule of procedure. In Middleton, this Court applied former Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123, which had stated, in pertinent part, that “[p]ost-verdict motions must be decided before sentencing, because the appeal lies from the final Order of the trial court, which includes sentence.” Middleton, 364 A.2d at 345 (quoting Rule 1123 (repealed)). The Commonwealth argues that since Rule 1123 is no longer in effect, Appellant cannot rely on that rule for relief. We agree that Rule 1123, now repealed, cannot provide Appellant relief. However, Pa.R.Crim.P. 704 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (B) Oral Motion for Extraordinary Relief. (1) Under extraordinary circumstances, when the interests of justice require, the trial judge may, before sentencing, hear an oral motion in arrest of judgment, for a judgment of acquittal, or for a new trial. (2) The judge shall decide a motion for extraordinary relief before imposing sentence, and shall not delay the sentencing proceeding in order to decide it. (3) A motion for extraordinary relief shall have no effect on the preservation or waiver of issues for post-sentence consideration or appeal. Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(B). Thus, if a trial court decides to consider a post-verdict, pre-sentence motion for a new trial, it must decide such a motion before proceeding to sentence a defendant. In other words, a trial court is not obliged to consider post-verdict motions at all, but may do so at its discretion. If it chooses to - 20 - J-A12010-19 consider such motions, Rule 704 dictates that the court “shall” rule on the motion before sentencing.6 Id. Nevertheless, for the following reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief. It is clear from the record that the trial court treated Appellant’s motion for a new trial as a prematurely filed post-sentence motion, not as a Rule 704(B) motion. After acknowledging that the motion had been filed, the trial court stated: “The [c]ourt’s going to review that. The [c]ourt’s going to make a determination as to whether it wants to have a hearing on this matter or not. It’s my understanding the [c]ourt has 120 days from the filing of this motion to dispose of the motion.” N.T. Sentencing, 12/7/17, at 31. Rule 704(B) has no provisions that contemplate a hearing before a decision is made on a Rule 704(B) motion. To the contrary, Rule 704(B)(2) dictates that the court “shall decide a motion for extraordinary relief before imposing sentence, and shall not delay the sentencing proceeding in order to decide it.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(B)(2) (emphasis added). By the same token, the court does not have 120 days from the filing of a Rule 704(B) motion to decide—the rule requires an immediate decision. However, for optional post-sentence motions filed pursuant to Rule 720(B), “the court shall … determine whether a hearing or argument on the motion is required[,]” see Rule 720(B)(2)(b), and the court has 120 days to decide such a motion, see Rule 720(B)(3)(a). Thus, it ____________________________________________ 6 Notably, appellate counsel did not cite Rule 704(B) in the motion for a new trial filed on Appellant’s behalf, orally at the sentencing hearing, or in Appellant’s brief. As such, it appears that he arrived at a vaguely correct recitation of the applicable, current rule purely by accident. - 21 - J-A12010-19 is clear that the trial court treated Appellant’s motion as if it were a prematurely filed, optional post-sentence motion filed pursuant to Rule 720(B), not as a Rule 704(B) motion. As the court was not required to consider a Rule 704(B) motion at all, we ascertain no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s actions in this regard. In any event, Appellant made no objection to the manner in which the trial court indicated it would address his motion. When apprised of the court’s intention to determine whether a hearing was required, and to reach a decision within 120 days, counsel did not object. Indeed, counsel explicitly agreed with the court as to the manner in which it was going to proceed on deciding the motion. See N.T. Sentencing, 12/7/17, at 31. Finally, Appellant has provided no analysis, whatsoever, regarding how he was prejudiced by the court’s failure to decide the motion prior to sentencing.7 Thus, his final claim is waived, moot, and/or meritless. Judgment of sentence affirmed. ____________________________________________ 7 We note that Appellant’s pre-sentence, post-verdict motion presented the same weight-of-the-evidence claim that he subsequently preserved in a post- sentence motion, and which we addressed above pursuant to issue III. Thus, Appellant has not been denied the opportunity to have that claim reviewed on the merits. - 22 - J-A12010-19 Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 7/23/2019 - 23 -