Rhode Island General Laws
R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-8 (2026)
Waiver of or failure to assert claims
✓ current as of July 2026
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All grounds for relief available to an applicant at the time he or she commences a proceeding under this chapter must be raised in his or her original, or a supplemental or amended, application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds that in the interest of justice the applicant should be permitted to assert such a ground for relief.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 41
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1978–2025 · leading case: Kyle Campbell v. State of Rhode Island, 56 A.3d 448 (R.I. 2012).
Kyle Campbell v. State of Rhode Island, 56 A.3d 448 (R.I. 2012). “2007), in which we affirmed the summary dismissal of the applicant’s third application for postconviction relief, notwithstanding the absence of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, because "we agree[d] with the trial justice that G.L.1956 § 10-9.1-8 precludes consideration of…”
Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896 (R.I. 2008). “Even if we were persuaded (and we are not) that the "interest of justice” exception referred to in G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-8 required us in this case to address applicant’s arguments with respect to his 1979 Alford plea, we would still conclude that his contentions are meritless.”
Anderson v. State, 45 A.3d 594 (R.I. 2012). “The state further argued that Anderson failed to show that the medical records in question would have had an effect on the outcome of the trial.”
Tempest v. State, 141 A.3d 677 (R.I. 2016). “Moreover, Rhode Island law, as codified in G.L.1956 § 10-9.1-8, provides that: “All grounds for relief available to an applicant at the time he or she commences a proceeding under this chapter must be raised in his or her original, or a supplemental or amended, application.”
Ferrell v. Wall, 971 A.2d 615 (R.I. 2009). “The statute quoted in the text (G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-8) is entitled "Waiver of or failure to assert claims.”
Pedro Reyes v. State of Rhode Island, 141 A.3d 644 (R.I. 2016). “3d at 458 (explaining that “appointed counsel may, in an appropriate case, frame the applicant’s claims in such a way as to avoid § 10-9.1-8’s waiver rule”). We note that a tension is - 22 - unavoidable in cases in which the Shatney procedure is invoked.”
Brown v. State, 32 A.3d 901 (R.I. 2011). “On August 21, 2003, the state moved to dismiss Brown’s application pursuant to G.L.1956 § 10-9.1-8 7 based on Brown’s alleged failure to raise such arguments in his first application for post-conviction relief years prior.”
Taylor v. Wall, 821 A.2d 685 (R.I. 2003). “” This argument is barred by the waiver rule set forth in G.L.1956 § 10-9.1-8. Section 10-9.1-8 provides in pertinent part: “Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or…”
Ramirez v. State, 933 A.2d 1110 (R.I. 2007). “In denying Ramirez’s third application for postconviction relief, the trial justice cited G.L.1956 § 10-9.1-8, which provides: “All grounds for relief available to an applicant at the time he or she commences a [postconviction review] proceeding * * * must be raised in his or…”
State v. DeCiantis, 813 A.2d 986 (R.I. 2003). “” 11 G.L.1956 § 10-9.1-8. Under § 10-9.1-8: “All grounds for relief available to an applicant [for post-conviction relief] at the time he or she commences a proceeding under this chapter must be raised in his or her original, or a supplemental or amended, application.”
Miguel v. State, 924 A.2d 3 (R.I. 2007). “” The state moved to dismiss, arguing that successive applications for postconviction relief are precluded by G.L.1956 § 10-9.1-8, unless they fall within the “interest of justice” exception.”
Voravongsa v. Wall, 349 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003). “See R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-8 (“The clerk shall docket the application upon its receipt and promptly bring it to the attention of the court and deliver a copy to the attorney general.”
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