An injured party, or, in the event of that party’s death, the party entitled to sue
for that death, in the party’s suit against the insured, shall not join the insurer
as a defendant. If the officer serving any process against the insured shall return
that process “non est inventus,” or where before suit has been brought and probate
proceedings have not been initiated the insured has died, or where a suit is pending
against an insured in his or her own name and the insured died prior to judgment,
or where a nonresident had been involved in an automobile accident in Rhode Island
as an operator or owner and died before suit has been brought, the injured party,
and, in the event of that party’s death, the party entitled to sue for that death,
may proceed directly against the insurer. The injured party, or, in the event of that
party’s death, the party entitled to sue for that death, after having obtained judgment
against the insured alone, may proceed on that judgment in a separate action against
the insurer; provided, the payment in whole or in part of the liability by either
the insured or the insurer shall, to the extent of the payment, be a bar to recovery
against the other of the amount paid. The time limitations for filing such actions
shall be governed by the provisions of § 9-1-14 as appropriate, including, but not limited to, any extension of the statute of limitations
for injuries to the person provided by § 9-1-14(c).
Notes of Decisions
D'AMICO v. Johnston Partners, 866 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 2005).
· cites it 24× “This Court likewise has refrained from an overly inferential reading of § 27-7-2, a similar direct action statute.”
DeSantis v. Prelle, 891 A.2d 873 (R.I. 2006).
· cites it 22× “May an injured party initiate a direct action against a tortfeasor’s insurance carrier under G.L.1956 § 27-7-2 after the expiration of the three-year limitations period applicable to personal injury actions? In the context of this case, the Superior Court relied on clearly…”
Rivers v. Am. Com. Ins., 836 A.2d 200 (R.I. 2003).
· cites it 11× “On March 19, 2002, plaintiff filed an amended complaint that named ACIC as codefen-dant with Quesada, alleging that ACIC insured Quesada under a policy of automobile insurance at the time of the accident, that ACIC was responsible for the damages incurred, and that, in…”
Goodman v. Turner, 512 A.2d 861 (R.I. 1986).
· cites it 8× “1956 (1979 Reenactment) § 27-7-2. 2 Prior to this ruling, however, defend *863 ants' motion for summary judgment based on the same argument had been denied by another Superior Court justice.”
Markham v. Allstate Ins. Co., 352 A.2d 651 (R.I. 1976).
· cites it 8× “*154 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §27-7-2 1 in ordering Allstate Insurance Company as a party defendant in each case.”
Collier v. Travelers Ins., 197 A.2d 493 (R.I. 1964).
· cites it 20× “In any event, the writ was returned "non est inventus" and, pursuant to the provisions of G.L. 1956, § 27-7-2, an action was commenced against defendant at bar.”
Mendez v. Brites, 849 A.2d 329 (R.I. 2004).
· cites it 6× “Under G.L.1956 § 27-7-2, entitled "Remedies of injured party against insurer,” "[a]n injured party * * ® in his or her suit against the insured, shall not join the insurer as a defendant” absent a "non est inventus" return of process or the satisfaction of other specified…”
Gnys v. Amica Mut. Ins., 396 A.2d 107 (R.I. 1979).
· cites it 9× “1956 (1968 Reenactment) §27-7-2 against the defendant insurer, Amica Mutual Insurance Company (Amica), to *133 recover damages for personal injuries sustained in a collision between two motor vehicles.”
Shayer v. Bohan, 708 A.2d 158 (R.I. 1998).
· cites it 6× “” On February 25, 1992, plaintiffs amended their complaint, filing a direct action against the owner’s insurance carrier, USAA Property and Casualty Company (USAA), pursuant to G.L.1956 § 27-7-2. On April 29, 1992, the deputy sheriff spoke to the driver’s mother, who informed…”
Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co. v. Bellini, 746 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000).
· cites it 7× “After judgment entered against Norbell in the personal injury action, DeSantis filed a claim against Imperial, in which he alleged that he was a judgment creditor of Imperial’s insured, namely Norbell, and therefore, G.L.1956 § 27-7-2, rendered Imperial liable for the judgment.”
Kevin R. Hough v. Shawn P. McKiernan, 108 A.3d 1030 (R.I. 2015).
· cites it 3× “Subsequently, due to the death of Bower, Quincy was substituted as a party defendant in place of its deceased insured pursuant to G.L.1956 § 27-7-2. 6 A jury trial commenced on November 28, 2012.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.