Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-87-3 (2026)

Discriminatory acts

✓ current as of July 2026

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The discriminatory acts prohibited by § 42-87-2 include, but are not limited to, the following activities:

(1) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, no person or entity licensed or regulated by the state, or having received financial assistance from the state, or doing business within the state, shall:

(i) Deny an otherwise qualified person with a disability the opportunity to participate in or benefit from any aid, benefit, or service;

(ii) Afford an otherwise qualified person with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from any aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others;

(iii) Provide an otherwise qualified person with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective as that provided to others;

(iv) Provide different or separate aid, benefits, or services to otherwise qualified persons with a disability or to any class of otherwise qualified persons with a disability unless that action is necessary to provide otherwise qualified persons with a disability with aid, benefits, or services that are as effective as those provided to others;

(v) Aid or perpetuate discrimination against an otherwise qualified person with a disability by providing significant assistance to an agency, organization, or person that discriminates on the basis of disability in providing any aid, benefit, or service to beneficiaries of the recipients program;

(vi) Deny an otherwise qualified person with a disability the opportunity to participate as a member of planning or advisory boards; or

(vii) Otherwise limit an otherwise qualified person with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving an aid, benefit, or service.

(2) Notwithstanding any inconsistent terms of any collective bargaining agreement, no otherwise qualified person with a disability shall, solely on the basis of disability, who with reasonable accommodation and with no major cost can perform the essential functions of the job in question, be subjected to discrimination in employment by any person or entity receiving financial assistance from the state, or doing business within the state. The provisions of this subsection (2) apply to the following activities:

(i) Recruitment, advertising, and the processing of applications for employment;

(ii) Hiring, upgrading, promotion, award to tenure, demotion, transfer, layoff, termination, right to return from layoff, and rehiring;

(iii) Rates of pay or any other form of compensation and changes in compensation;

(iv) Job assignments, job classifications, organizational structures, position descriptions, lines of progression, and seniority lists;

(v) Leave of absence, sick leave, or any other leave;

(vi) Fringe benefits available by virtue of employment, whether or not administered by the recipient;

(vii) Selection and financial support for training, including apprenticeship, professional meetings, conferences, and other related activities, and selection for leaves of absence to pursue training;

(viii) Employer sponsored activities including social or recreational programs; and

(ix) Any other term, condition, or privilege of employment.

(3) Any persons with a disability shall be entitled to full and equal access, as other members of the general public, to all housing accommodations offered for rent, lease, or compensation in this state, subject to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.

(4) Every person with a disability who has a personal assistive animal, or who obtains a personal assistive animal, shall be entitled to full and equal access to all housing and other public accommodations provided for in this chapter and shall not be required to pay extra compensation for the personal assistive animal, but shall be liable for any damage done to the premises by a personal assistive animal. For the purposes of this subsection (4), a “personal assistive animal” is an animal specifically trained, by a certified animal training program, to assist a person with a disability perform independent living tasks.

(5) No qualified individual with a disability, as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., nor any individual or entity because of a known relationship or association with an individual with a disability shall be:

(i) Discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation or commercial facilities covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.;

(ii) Excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of, or be subjected to discrimination by, a public entity covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; and

(iii) Subject to discrimination in employment by a public entity or employer covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

(6) The application, exemptions, definitions, requirements, standards, and deadlines for compliance with subsection (5) shall be in accordance with the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C., § 12101 et seq., and the federal regulations pertaining to the Act, 28 C.F.R. Part 36, 28 C.F.R. Part 35, and 29 C.F.R. Part 1630.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 7 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 2003–2022 · leading case: Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 944 A.2d 925 (Conn. 2008).

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Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 944 A.2d 925 (Conn. 2008). “112 (2) (e) (2005); R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-87-3 (2) (2007); S.C.”

Pamela Azar v. Town of Lincoln, 173 A.3d 862 (R.I. 2017). · cites it 2× “see G.L. 1956 § 42-87-3(5). 10 . General Laws 1956 § 16-19-1 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that every child "shall regularly attend some public day school during all the days and hours that the public schools are in session in the city or town in which the child resides.”

Kriegel v. State of Rhode Island, Dept. of Corrs., 266 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.R.I. 2003). · cites it 2× “Although RICRIHA protects disabled employees who can perform the essential functions of the job "with reasonable accommodation" (as opposed to the ADA's protection of disabled employees "with or without reasonable accommodation"), this distinction is likely meaningless and the…”

Kingston Hill Academy v. Chariho Reg'l Sch. Dist., 21 A.3d 264 (R.I. 2011). “1956] § 42-87-3 by discriminating against children with disabilities”; (2) whether the board “misconstrue[d] * * * § 16-77.”

Kriegel v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Corr., 266 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.R.I. 2003). · cites it 2× “Although RICRIHA protects disabled employees who can perform the essential functions of the job "with reasonable accommodation” (as opposed to the ADA’s protection of disabled employees "with or without reasonable accommodation”), this distinction is likely meaningless and the…”

Adkins v. Nat'l Grid USA Serv. Co., Inc. (D.R.I. 2022). · cites it 6× “G.L. § 42-87-3. In his Amended Complaint, the plaintiff does not allege that National Grid excluded him from any aid, benefit or service as required to establish a RIPDA claim.”

Curtis W. Andrade v. Westlo Mgmt. LLC (R.I. 2022). · cites it 2× “” Section 42-87-3(4). The record is devoid of any evidence that Andrade’s dog received the requisite training to fall within the meaning of these classifications.”

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-87-3(2) — 2 cases

Kriegel v. State of Rhode Island, Dept. of Corrs., 266 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.R.I. 2003). “Although RICRIHA protects disabled employees who can perform the essential functions of the job "with reasonable accommodation" (as opposed to the ADA's protection of disabled employees "with or without reasonable accommodation"), this distinction is likely meaningless and the…”

Kriegel v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Corr., 266 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.R.I. 2003). “Although RICRIHA protects disabled employees who can perform the essential functions of the job "with reasonable accommodation” (as opposed to the ADA’s protection of disabled employees "with or without reasonable accommodation”), this distinction is likely meaningless and the…”

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-87-3(4) — 1 case

Curtis W. Andrade v. Westlo Mgmt. LLC (R.I. 2022). “” Section 42-87-3(4). The record is devoid of any evidence that Andrade’s dog received the requisite training to fall within the meaning of these classifications.”

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-87-3(5) — 1 case

Pamela Azar v. Town of Lincoln, 173 A.3d 862 (R.I. 2017). “see G.L. 1956 § 42-87-3(5). 10 . General Laws 1956 § 16-19-1 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that every child "shall regularly attend some public day school during all the days and hours that the public schools are in session in the city or town in which the child resides.”

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-87-3(5)(i) — 1 case

Adkins v. Nat'l Grid USA Serv. Co., Inc. (D.R.I. 2022). “G.L. § 42-87-3. In his Amended Complaint, the plaintiff does not allege that National Grid excluded him from any aid, benefit or service as required to establish a RIPDA claim.”

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-87-3(5)(ii) — 1 case

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