R.I. Gen. Laws § 43-3-26
Conflicting general and special provisions
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Wherever a general provision shall be in conflict with a special provision relating to the same or to a similar subject, the two (2) provisions shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both; and in those cases, if effect cannot be given to both, the special provision shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 31
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1961–2022 · leading case: Wilkinson v. State Crime Laboratory Commission
Wilkinson v. State Crime Laboratory Commission (2002)
“1992) (holding that G.L.1956 § 43-3-26 embodies a policy of statutory construction that requires courts to give precedence to a specific statute over a- general statute when the two are in conflict).”
Kingstown Mobile Home Park v. Strashnick (2001)
“" G.L. 1956 § 43-3-26. Accordingly, I would hold that only when a provision of the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act expressly conflicts with a provision of the more specific legislation addressing mobile and manufactured home parks would the latter take precedence, but only…”
Brennan v. Kirby (1987)
“*642 Moreover, we note that § 43-3-26 states that when a general provision conflicts with a specific provision, the specific provision is controlling.”
Power v. City of Providence (1990)
“1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 43-3-26, which states: “Conflicting general and special provisions.”
South County Post & Beam, Inc. v. Brian T. McMahon (2015)
“2007); see G.L.1956 § 43-3-26. 4 B Discussion In this case, the trial justice found that the fee generated by Brungraber’s expert testimony was not “problematic,” commenting that his testimony “was certainly helpful to the Court and necessary in this particular case,” but that…”
Cahoon v. Shelton (2011)
“It concluded that application of the second sentence (Sentence 2) was sidetracked by the combined effect of R.I. Gen. Laws § 43-3-26 and Warwick’s municipal ordinances.”
Maureen O'Connell v. William Walmsley (2017)
“Citing to G.L. 1956 § 43-3-26 for the principle that when two statutes clash, a “general provision” yields to a “special provision,” plaintiffs aver that § 10-6-7, a general provision, should give way to § 10-7-2, a special one.”
St. Germain v. City of Pawtucket (1978)
“1956 (1970 Reenactment) §43-3-26 and in the case of Landers v. Reynolds, <a href="/opinion/1488828/landers-v-reynolds/" aria-description="Citation for case: Landers v.”
Marques v. Pawtucket Mutual Insurance (2007)
“Citing G.L. 1956 § 43-3-26, 8 appellants further contend that, because the conflicting statutes cannot be reconciled, the more specific statute — which appellants assert is § 27-83-6—should prevail and the Reha-bilitator should not be permitted to defer the payments required by…”
Asadoorian v. Warwick School Committee (1997)
“1987); see also G.L.1956 § 43-3-26 (“[w]herever a general provision shall be in conflict with a special provision relating to the same or to a similar subject, the two (2) provisions shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both”).”
Lopes v. Phillips (1996)
“In order to resolve this conflict, we must look to G.L.1956 § 43-3-26, which provides: “Wherever a general provision shall be in conflict with a special provision relating to the same or to a similar subject, the two (2) provisions shall be construed, if possible, so that effect…”
Felkner v. Chariho Regional School Committee (2009)
“2d 290 (1974); see also G.L.1956 § 43-3-26; Casey v. Sundlun, <a href="/opinion/1975572/casey-v-sundlun/#483" aria-description="Citation for case: Casey v.”
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