Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 43-3-26 (2026)

Conflicting general and special provisions

✓ current as of July 2026
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Wherever a general provision shall be in conflict with a special provision relating to the same or to a similar subject, the two (2) provisions shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both; and in those cases, if effect cannot be given to both, the special provision shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 31 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1961–2022 · leading case: Wilkinson v. State Crime Lab'y Comm'n, 788 A.2d 1129 (R.I. 2002).
Wilkinson v. State Crime Lab'y Comm'n, 788 A.2d 1129 (R.I. 2002). · cites it 3× “1992) (holding that G.L.1956 § 43-3-26 embodies a policy of statutory construction that requires courts to give precedence to a specific statute over a- general statute when the two are in conflict).”
Kingstown Mobile Home Park v. Strashnick, 774 A.2d 847 (R.I. 2001). · cites it 8× “" G.L. 1956 § 43-3-26. Accordingly, I would hold that only when a provision of the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act expressly conflicts with a provision of the more specific legislation addressing mobile and manufactured home parks would the latter take precedence, but only…”
Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633 (R.I. 1987). · cites it 3× “— Wherever a general provision shall be in conflict with a special provision relating to the same or to a similar subject, the two (2) provisions shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both; and in such cases, if effect cannot be given to both, the…”
Power v. City of Providence, 582 A.2d 895 (R.I. 1990). · cites it 5× “1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 43-3-26, which states: “Conflicting general and special provisions.”
South Cnty. Post & Beam, Inc. v. Brian T. McMahon, 116 A.3d 204 (R.I. 2015). · cites it 3× “4 B Discussion In this case, the trial justice found that the fee generated by Brungraber’s expert testimony was not “problematic,” commenting that his testimony “was certainly helpful to the Court and necessary in this particular case,” but that the issue was whether the fee…”
Cahoon v. Shelton, 647 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2011). · cites it 2× “It concluded that application of the second sentence (Sentence 2) was sidetracked by the combined effect of R.I. Gen. Laws § 43-3-26 and Warwick’s municipal ordinances.”
Maureen O'Connell v. William Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422 (R.I. 2017). · cites it 2× “Citing to G.L. 1956 § 43-3-26 for the principle that when two statutes clash, a “general provision” yields to a “special provision,” plaintiffs aver that § 10-6-7, a general provision, should give way to § 10-7-2, a special one.”
St. Germain v. City of Pawtucket, 382 A.2d 180 (R.I. 1978). · cites it 3× “1007, not the resolution of a conflict between a statute and an ordinance, because it was by P.L. 1913, ch. 1007 that defendant was allowed to create its own pension plan.”
Marques v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins., 915 A.2d 745 (R.I. 2007). · cites it 3× “Citing G.L. 1956 § 43-3-26, 8 appellants further contend that, because the conflicting statutes cannot be reconciled, the more specific statute — which appellants assert is § 27-83-6—should prevail and the Reha-bilitator should not be permitted to defer the payments required by…”
Asadoorian v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 691 A.2d 573 (R.I. 1997). · cites it 2× “1987); see also G.L.1956 § 43-3-26 (“[w]herever a general provision shall be in conflict with a special provision relating to the same or to a similar subject, the two (2) provisions shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both”).”
Lopes v. Phillips, 680 A.2d 65 (R.I. 1996). · cites it 4× “In order to resolve this conflict, we must look to G.L.1956 § 43-3-26, which provides: “Wherever a general provision shall be in conflict with a special provision relating to the same or to a similar subject, the two (2) provisions shall be construed, if possible, so that effect…”
Felkner v. Chariho Reg'l Sch. Comm., 968 A.2d 865 (R.I. 2009). · cites it 2× “At the outset, we observe that, by the plain language of the Hopkinton Town Charter, a member of the school committee is considered an elected official.”
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