Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-21-2 (2026)

Relief from judgment or decree

✓ current as of July 2026

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(a) On motion and upon such terms as are just, a court may relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a final judgment, order, decree, or proceeding entered therein for the following reasons:

(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under applicable law;

(3) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;

(4) The judgment is void;

(5) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or

(6) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

(b) The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 49 cases, 1958–2008 · leading case: Pleasant Mgmt., LLC v. Carrasco, 960 A.2d 216 (R.I. 2008).

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Pleasant Mgmt., LLC v. Carrasco, 960 A.2d 216 (R.I. 2008). · cites it 8× “We concluded that the violation of the anti-contact rule supported defendants’ argument that the default decree entered against them foreclosing their redemption rights was a result of excusable neglect under G.L.1956 § 9-21-2. 7 Pleasant Management I, 870 A.”

Dionne v. Bouley, 583 F. Supp. 307 (D.R.I. 1984). · cites it 14× “Defendant apparently would argue that the procedure outlined in R.I.Gen.Laws § 9-21-2 (1969 reenactment), 7 which he says “permits a garnishee to sue to recover for garnishment of exempt funds,” Defendant’s Memorandum at 7, reduces the “risk of an erroneous deprivation” to a…”

Pleasant Mgmt., LLC v. Carrasco, 870 A.2d 443 (R.I. 2005). · cites it 6× “We also note that this motion to vacate is governed by G.L.1956 § 9-21-2, rather than the virtually identical Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, because those rules do not apply to "[p]etitions for foreclosure of redemption of interests in land sold for…”

Kildeer Realty v. Brewster Realty Corp., 826 A.2d 961 (R.I. 2003). · cites it 3× “On November 29, 2000, defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-21-2(a)(4), 4 asserting that the tax sale was void for want of notice and that Brewster Realty thereby was deprived of its property without due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth…”

Fireman's Fund Ins. v. McAlpine, 391 A.2d 84 (R.I. 1978). · cites it 3× “1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-21-2, and decreeing that the Family Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person at the time its order was entered on June 28, 1974.”

In Re Julie, 334 A.2d 212 (R.I. 1975). · cites it 10× “The petitioner’s motion to vacate the termination decree is based on the provisions of §9-21-2, which read as follows: “9-21-2. Control retained over judgment or decree.”

Burns v. Conley, 526 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.R.I. 2007). · cites it 3× “The Burns may also seek protection under § 9-21-2, which allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, decree, or proceeding based on a finding of “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”

Nisenzon v. Sadowski, 689 A.2d 1037 (R.I. 1997). · cites it 2× “See also G.L.1956 § 9-21-2(4) (allowing courts to relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment that is void).”

Burns Elec. Supply Co. v. Westmoreland, 356 A.2d 479 (R.I. 1976). · cites it 5× “1956, §9-21-2, and its statutory predecessors had provided that the court entering a default judgment would have control over the judgment for a period of 6 months following its entry and “for cause shown” could set aside the default and reinstate the case.”

Calcagno v. Calcagno, 391 A.2d 79 (R.I. 1978). · cites it 3× “1956 (1969 Reenactment) §9-21-2, and decreeing that the Family Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person at the time its order was entered on June 28, 1974.”

City of Providence v. Emp. Ret. Bd., 749 A.2d 1088 (R.I. 2000). · cites it 2× “” That one-year period could not be extended and G.L.1956 § 9-21-2, expressly limited the Superior Court’s control over its judgments to that one year period.”

Petition of Crepeau-Cross, 385 A.2d 658 (R.I. 1978). · cites it 4× “Presumably, this ruling was based on §9-21-2, *71 which permits a court to relieve a party from “a final judgment, order, decree, or proceeding entered therein” for any of several stated reasons.”

Show all 49 citing cases →

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-21-2(4) — 2 cases

Nisenzon v. Sadowski, 689 A.2d 1037 (R.I. 1997). “See also G.L.1956 § 9-21-2(4) (allowing courts to relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment that is void).”

Richtmyer v. Richtmyer, 461 A.2d 409 (R.I. 1983).

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-21-2(6) — 1 case

Dionne v. Bouley, 583 F. Supp. 307 (D.R.I. 1984). “Defendant apparently would argue that the procedure outlined in R.I.Gen.Laws § 9-21-2 (1969 reenactment), 7 which he says “permits a garnishee to sue to recover for garnishment of exempt funds,” Defendant’s Memorandum at 7, reduces the “risk of an erroneous deprivation” to a…”

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-21-2(a) — 3 cases

Burns v. Conley, 526 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.R.I. 2007). “The Burns may also seek protection under § 9-21-2, which allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, decree, or proceeding based on a finding of “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”

Pleasant Mgmt., LLC v. Carrasco, 960 A.2d 216 (R.I. 2008). “We concluded that the violation of the anti-contact rule supported defendants’ argument that the default decree entered against them foreclosing their redemption rights was a result of excusable neglect under G.L.1956 § 9-21-2. 7 Pleasant Management I, 870 A.”

Pleasant Mgmt., LLC v. Carrasco, 870 A.2d 443 (R.I. 2005). “We also note that this motion to vacate is governed by G.L.1956 § 9-21-2, rather than the virtually identical Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, because those rules do not apply to "[p]etitions for foreclosure of redemption of interests in land sold for…”

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-21-2(a)(4) — 4 cases

Kildeer Realty v. Brewster Realty Corp., 826 A.2d 961 (R.I. 2003). “On November 29, 2000, defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-21-2(a)(4), 4 asserting that the tax sale was void for want of notice and that Brewster Realty thereby was deprived of its property without due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth…”

Mortg. Guarantee & Title Co. v. Cunha, 745 A.2d 156 (R.I. 2000).

May v. Penn TV & Furniture Co., Inc., 686 A.2d 95 (R.I. 1996).

Ashness v. Tomasetti, 643 A.2d 802 (R.I. 1994).

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-21-2(b) — 1 case

Vickers Antone v. Vickers, 610 A.2d 120 (R.I. 1992).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.