U.S.S.G. § 8B1.1

Restitution – Organizations

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(a) In the case of an identifiable victim, the court shall—

(1) enter a restitution order for the full amount of the victim's loss, if such order is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 2248, § 2259, § 2264, § 2327, § 3663, or § 3663A; or

(2) impose a term of probation or supervised release with a condition requiring restitution for the full amount of the victim's loss, if the offense is not an offense for which restitution is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) but otherwise meets the criteria for an order of restitution under that section.

(b) Provided, that the provisions of subsection (a) do not apply—

(1) when full restitution has been made; or

(2) in the case of a restitution order under § 3663; a restitution order under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A that pertains to an offense against property described in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii); or a condition of restitution imposed pursuant to subsection (a)(2) above, to the extent the court finds, from facts on the record, that (A) the number of identifiable victims is so large as to make restitution impracticable; or (B) determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or amount of the victim's losses would complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process.

(c) If a defendant is ordered to make restitution to an identifiable victim and to pay a fine, the court shall order that any money paid by the defendant shall first be applied to satisfy the order of restitution.

(d) A restitution order may direct the defendant to make a single, lump sum payment, partial payments at specified intervals, in-kind payments, or a combination of payments at specified intervals and in-kind payments. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(3)(A). An in-kind payment may be in the form of (1) return of property; (2) replacement of property; or (3) if the victim agrees, services rendered to the victim or to a person or organization other than the victim. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(4).

(e) A restitution order may direct the defendant to make nominal periodic payments if the court finds from facts on the record that the economic circumstances of the defendant do not allow the payment of any amount of a restitution order, and do not allow for the payment of the full amount of a restitution order in the foreseeable future under any reasonable schedule of payments.

(f) Special Instruction

(1) This guideline applies only to a defendant convicted of an offense committed on or after November 1, 1997. Notwithstanding the provisions of §1B1.11 (Use of Guidelines Manual in Effect on Date of Sentencing), use the former §8B1.1 (set forth in Appendix C, amendment 571) in lieu of this guideline in any other case.

Commentary

Background: Section 3553(a)(7) of title 18, United States Code, requires the court, "in determining the particular sentence to be imposed," to consider "the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense." Orders of restitution are authorized under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2248, 2259, 2264, 2327, 3663, and 3663A. For offenses for which an order of restitution is not authorized, restitution may be imposed as a condition of probation.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1991 (amendment 422). Amended effective November 1, 1997 (amendment 571); November 1, 2023 (amendment 824).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 16 cases, 1995–2016 · leading case: United States v. Julian Martinez-Rodriguez, 821 F.3d 659 (5th Cir. 2016).

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United States v. Julian Martinez-Rodriguez, 821 F.3d 659 (5th Cir. 2016). “' His presentence report (“PSR”) recommended, in part," that Martinez receive a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 8B1.1 (as an organizer/leader), as well as a two-level enhancement under U.”

United States v. Manuel Hernandez (98-1239/2298), Oscar Solis (99-1616), 227 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2000). “U.S.S.G. § 8B1.1 commentary, applic. note 4.”

United States v. William F. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226 (3rd Cir. 2000). “” U.S.S.G. § 8B1.1, Background (emphasis added).”

United States v. Joseph J. Johnson, 278 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2002). “This responsibility amounts to sufficient “additional evidence” to demonstrate that Johnson exercised a leadership role warranting an enhancement under USSG § 8B1.1. Bryson, 110 F.3d at 585 (internal quotations omitted).”

United States v. Bisong, 645 F.3d 384 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “Bisong challenges the four-level enhancement to his sentence on the ground that the district court clearly erred in finding that he was an “organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.”

United States v. Lavoyce R. Billingsley, 115 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 1997). “” These terms are not specifically defined in the guidelines, but application note four lists seven factors relevant to the determination of whether such an enhancement is warranted: the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the…”

United States v. Olabimpe Olejiya, 754 F.3d 986 (D.C. Cir. 2014). “They now raise parallel challenges to their sentences, claiming that the district court erred in calculating their respective United States Sentencing Guidelines offense levels by (1) improperly applying an aggravated role enhancement of three levels for Olejiya and four for…”

United States v. Barraza, 365 F. App'x 526 (4th Cir. 2010). “USSG § 8B1.1 cmt. n. 4. Here, the evidence did not clearly establish the relative positions of Barraza and Garcia within the conspiracy.”

United States v. Ring, 811 F. Supp. 2d 359 (D.D.C. 2011). “U.S.S.G. § 8B1.1. 7. Whether to apply the 2-level enhancement for obstruction of justice.”

United States v. Martinez, 16 F. App'x 410 (6th Cir. 2001). “Second, Martinez contends that the district court erred in enhancing his base level offense by two points for being a leader or organizer of the conspiracy pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 8B1.1(c). While admitting that he recruited a courier to transport the drugs, Martinez argued at…”

United States v. Apex Roofing of Tallahassee, Inc., 49 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1995). “…a court can order an organization to pay restitution only if it is authorized under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664 . U.S.S.G. § 8B1.1(a)(1).”

United States v. Elmer Melesio, 532 F. App'x 596 (6th Cir. 2013). “” U.S.S.G. § 8B1.1 application note 2; see also United States v.”

Show all 16 citing cases →

— U.S.S.G. §8B1.1(a)(1) — 1 case

— U.S.S.G. §8B1.1(c) — 1 case

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