State v. Corley, 708 S.E.2d 217 (S.C. 2011). · Go Syfert
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State v. Corley, 708 S.E.2d 217 (S.C. 2011). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 1 distinct case · "A finding of probable cause may be based upon less evidence than would be necessary to support a conviction."
29 citation events (29 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Adams v. SCDMV (scctapp, 2015-11-04)
Treatment trajectory · 2011 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Adams v. SCDMV (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2015 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
a finding of probable cause may be based upon less evidence than would be necessary to support a conviction.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) State v. Burgess (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the scope and duration of must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances that rendered its initiation proper.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Harrison (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence low
See State v. Banda, 371 S.C. 245, 252 , 639 S.E.2d 36, 40 (2006) ("The decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred."); see also State v. Corley, 392 S.C. 125 , 126-27 n.2, 708 S.E.2d 217 , 217-18 n.2 (2011) (Corley II) (noting, where officer observed certain actions by defendant raising officer's suspicion and causing officer to follow defendant in car, and officer initiated traffic stop after observing defendant failing to use a turn signal, the traffic violation served as an independent basis for the vehic…
The STATE, Respondent,
v.
Glenn Ireland CORLEY, Petitioner
26957.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Apr 4, 2011.
708 S.E.2d 217
C. Rauch Wise, of Greenwood, for Petitioner., Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of Columbia, and Solicitor Jerry W. Peace, of Greenwood, for Respondent.
Kittredge, Toal, Pleicones, Beatty, Hearn.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 89%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of South Caro… (4)
Justice KITTREDGE.

We granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision in State v. Corley, 383 S.C. 232, 679 S.E.2d 187 (Ct.App.2009). We affirm as modified.

I.

At approximately 2:50 in the morning, Greenwood City police officer Nicholas Futch saw Petitioner Glenn Ireland Corley drive up to a known drug house, [1] get out of his vehicle, walk to the back of the house, stay for less than two minutes, return to his vehicle and leave. Officer Futch briefly followed Corley’s vehicle, then stopped Corley when Corley failed to use a turn signal. While Futch requested Corley’s license, insurance, and registration documents, he noticed Corley was[*127] nervous, “fidgety,” short of breath and avoiding eye contact. As a result, Futch asked Corley to step out of his vehicle.

Officer Futch asked Corley about his presence in the neighborhood so early in the morning. Corley informed Futch that he had just left a particular home, but not the residence he had actually visited. Futch confronted Corley with the false information, which soon resulted in Corley’s admission that he purchased crack cocaine from the drug house he visited immediately prior to the stop. The traffic stop lasted approximately five to seven minutes. Corley was arrested and charged with possession of crack cocaine.

Following Corley’s unsuccessful motion to suppress his statements during the traffic stop and the drugs that were recovered, he was convicted. The court of appeals affirmed.

II.

We affirm the court of appeals’ excellent opinion, with one modification. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that Officer Futch had probable cause to stop Corley and investigate for possible drug activity. This was error. Nevertheless, the vehicle stop was justified based on the presence of reasonable suspicion. [2] See State v. Foster, 269 S.C. 373, 378, 237 S.E.2d 589, 591 (1977) (“It is recognized that the police may briefly detain and question a person upon a reasonable suspicion, short of probable cause for arrest, that he is involved in criminal activity.”); State v. Woodruff, 344 S.C. 537, 546, 544 S.E.2d 290, 295 (Ct.App.2001) (“The term ‘reasonable suspicion’ requires a particularized and objective basis that would lead one to suspect another of criminal activity. In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the whole picture must be considered. If the officer’s suspicions are confirmed or are further aroused, the stop may be prolonged and the scope enlarged as required by the circumstances.” (citations omitted)); see also U.S. v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 128-30 (4th Cir.2010) (providing a thorough discussion of how a motorist’s behavior during a traffic stop, including his nervousness and his inconsistent statements regarding the[*128] purpose of his trip, created a reasonable suspicion that the motorist was engaged in illegal activity).

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY and HEARN, JJ., concur.
1

. The residence was known by law enforcement as a place with a "high amount of drug activity." Moreover, Futch had personal knowledge that "several cases were made” at the home and "[a] number of search warrants had been executed” there. Corley has not disputed Futch's characterization of the home as a known drug house.

2

. The traffic violation served as an independent basis for the vehicle stop.