Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-102 (2026)
Chapter definitions
✓ current as of May 2026
For purposes of this chapter:
- (1) "Claim" means any request or demand for money, property, or services made to any employee, officer, or agent of the state or of any political subdivision, or to any contractor, grantee, or other recipient, whether under contract or not, if any portion of the money, property, or services requested or demanded issued from, or was provided by, the state, referred to in this chapter as "state funds" or by any political subdivision thereof, referred to in this chapter as "political subdivision funds";
- (2)
- (A) "Knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person, with respect to information, does any of the following:
- (i) Has actual knowledge of the information;
- (ii) Acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or
- (iii) Acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information;
- (B) Proof of specific intent to defraud is not required;
- (A) "Knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person, with respect to information, does any of the following:
- (3) "Person" means any natural person, corporation, firm, association, organization, partnership, limited liability company, business, or trust;
- (4) "Political subdivision" means any city, town, municipality, county, including any county having a metropolitan form of government, or other legally authorized local governmental entity with jurisdictional boundaries; and
- (5) "Prosecuting authority" means the county counsel, city attorney, or other local government official charged with investigating, filing, and conducting civil legal proceedings on behalf of, or in the name of, a particular political subdivision.
Acts 2001, ch. 367, § 2.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8
cases, 2010–2020 · leading case: Hamilton Cnty. Emergency Commc'ns Dist. v. BellSouth Telecomm. LLC, 852 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2017).
Hamilton Cnty. Emergency Commc'ns Dist. v. BellSouth Telecomm. LLC, 852 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2017). “T.C.A. § 4-18-102(2)(A) & (B). That the section concludes with “[pjroof of specific intent to defraud is not required” (emphasis added), is significant; it means that knowing the truth and withholding it is enough.”
Hamilton Cnty. Emergency Commc'ns Dist. v. BellSouth Telecomm., LLC, 154 F. Supp. 3d 666 (E.D. Tenn. 2016). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-102 (2)(A). 27 Although the TFCA does not require proof of specific intent, Tenn.”
Town of Smyrna v. Mun. Gas Auth., 129 F. Supp. 3d 589 (M.D. Tenn. 2015). “]” Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 4-18-102(3) & 103. MGAG was created by the Georgia General Assembly in 1987 as a “public body corporate and politic” — a nonprofit “instrumentality” and “public corporation of the State of Georgia,” charged by statute with securing “adequate, dependable, and…”
Smith Cnty. Reg'l Plan. Comm'n v. Hiwassee Vill. Mobile Home Park, LLC, 304 S.W.3d 302 (Tenn. 2010). “§§ 4-18-102(4) (2005) (False Claims Act defines “political subdivision” as meaning “any city, town, municipality, [or] county, including any county having a metropolitan form of government”); 8-48-111 (2002) (applying emergency interim succession provisions “to officers of…”
Pamela Cotham v. Nicholas Jay Yeager (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020). “” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-102 (containing definitions of terms used in statutory scheme).”
The City of Chattanooga Ex Rel. Don Lepard, Qui Tam v. Elec. Power Bd. of Chattanooga (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). “See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-102 (3) (2015) (“‘Person’ means any natural person, corporation, firm, association, organization, partnership, limited liability company, business, or trust[.”
Roane Cty. Emer. Commc'ns v. BellSouth (6th Cir. 2017). “T.C.A. § 4-18-102(2)(A) & (B). That the section concludes with “[p]roof of specific intent to defraud is not required” (emphasis added), is significant; it means that knowing the truth and withholding it is enough.”
Nashville Cmty. Bail Fund, The v. Howard Gentry (M.D. Tenn. 2020). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-102 (4), cited in Smith Cty.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-102(2)(A) — 2 cases
Hamilton Cnty. Emergency Commc'ns Dist. v. BellSouth Telecomm. LLC, 852 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2017). “T.C.A. § 4-18-102(2)(A) & (B). That the section concludes with “[pjroof of specific intent to defraud is not required” (emphasis added), is significant; it means that knowing the truth and withholding it is enough.”
Roane Cty. Emer. Commc'ns v. BellSouth (6th Cir. 2017). “T.C.A. § 4-18-102(2)(A) & (B). That the section concludes with “[p]roof of specific intent to defraud is not required” (emphasis added), is significant; it means that knowing the truth and withholding it is enough.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-102(2)(B) — 1 case
Hamilton Cnty. Emergency Commc'ns Dist. v. BellSouth Telecomm. LLC, 852 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2017). “T.C.A. § 4-18-102(2)(A) & (B). That the section concludes with “[pjroof of specific intent to defraud is not required” (emphasis added), is significant; it means that knowing the truth and withholding it is enough.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-102(3) — 1 case
Town of Smyrna v. Mun. Gas Auth., 129 F. Supp. 3d 589 (M.D. Tenn. 2015). “]” Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 4-18-102(3) & 103. MGAG was created by the Georgia General Assembly in 1987 as a “public body corporate and politic” — a nonprofit “instrumentality” and “public corporation of the State of Georgia,” charged by statute with securing “adequate, dependable, and…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-102(4) — 1 case
Smith Cnty. Reg'l Plan. Comm'n v. Hiwassee Vill. Mobile Home Park, LLC, 304 S.W.3d 302 (Tenn. 2010). “§§ 4-18-102(4) (2005) (False Claims Act defines “political subdivision” as meaning “any city, town, municipality, [or] county, including any county having a metropolitan form of government”); 8-48-111 (2002) (applying emergency interim succession provisions “to officers of…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-102(A)(2)(ii) — 2 cases
Hamilton Cnty. Emergency Commc'ns Dist. v. BellSouth Telecomm. LLC, 852 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2017). “T.C.A. § 4-18-102(2)(A) & (B). That the section concludes with “[pjroof of specific intent to defraud is not required” (emphasis added), is significant; it means that knowing the truth and withholding it is enough.”
Roane Cty. Emer. Commc'ns v. BellSouth (6th Cir. 2017). “T.C.A. § 4-18-102(2)(A) & (B). That the section concludes with “[p]roof of specific intent to defraud is not required” (emphasis added), is significant; it means that knowing the truth and withholding it is enough.”
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