Tennessee Code Annotated

Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-1-102 (2026)

Scope of chapter

✓ current as of May 2026
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This chapter applies to a transaction to the extent that it is governed by chapters 2-9 of this title.

Acts 2008, ch. 930, § 1.


Notes of Decisions
Cited in 27 cases, 1966–2014 · leading case: Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614 (Tenn. 2002).
Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614 (Tenn. 2002). · cites it 3× “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-1-102(1); Wakefield v.”
Union Planters Nat. Bank of Memphis v. Markowitz, 468 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Tenn. 1979). · cites it 11× “Even if we had concluded otherwise, that section would not aid Markowitz since it allows the holder of the instrument to expressly reserve his rights, as plaintiff has done here, and since the provisions of T.C.A. § 47-1-102, relied on heavily by Markowitz when he argued that…”
Bank of Crockett v. Cullipher, 752 S.W.2d 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 5× “T.C.A. § 47-1-102(3) provides that parties may not totally disclaim the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care.”
C-Wood Lumber Co. v. Wayne Cnty. Bank, 233 S.W.3d 263 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 4× “Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-1-102 (2). Thus, while generally applicable principles of law and equity can be used to supplement the UCC, they may not be used to supplant the UCC’s provisions or the purposes or policies these provisions reflect.”
Bank/First Citizens Bank v. Citizens & Assocs., 82 S.W.3d 259 (Tenn. 2002). · cites it 2× “1996) (defining “good faith” in section 47-1-102(19)). Our review of the record reveals that while First Citizens Bank was certainly negligent in permitting the deposit of a check made payable to a corporation into an individual account, no evi *265 dence shows that it knowingly…”
Waldron v. Delffs, 988 S.W.2d 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 2× “See T.C.A. § 47-1-102(2) (1996). Moreover, Waldron aptly notes that it would appear to be a “perversion of logic” if an instrument payable to “cash” qualifies as bearer paper, whereas an instrument payable to a specific amount of cash fails to qualify as bearer paper.”
Davenport v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 818 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 2× “Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-1-102 (2) (1979) provides that the [underlying purposes and policies of chapters 1 through 9 of this title are: (a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices…”
Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Tennessee, 958 S.W.2d 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2× “Further T.C.A. § 47-1-102 provides in pertinent part as follows: 47-1-102.”
Morris v. MacK's Used Cars, 824 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1992). · cites it 2× “Under T.C.A. § 47-1-102(3), this obligation may not be disclaimed.”
Wakefield v. Crawley, 6 S.W.3d 442 (Tenn. 1999). · cites it 2× “” Accordingly, we will refer to the Official Comments in this case as persuasive authority in discerning legislative intent.”
Marlow v. Oakland Gin Co. (In Re Julien Co.), 128 B.R. 987 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1991). · cites it 2× “This is consistent with the purpose and policies of the UCC described in Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-1-102(3). As such, it is clear that the parties here could agree that “F.”
Auto Credit of Nashville v. Wimmer, 231 S.W.3d 896 (Tenn. 2007). “§ 47-1-102(2) (2001). “The Uniform Commercial Code .”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-1-102(1) — 4 cases
Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614 (Tenn. 2002). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-1-102(1); Wakefield v.”
In Re Ramey, 93 B.R. 136 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988).
Marlow v. Rollins Cotton Co. (In Re Julien Co.), 202 B.R. 89 (W.D. Tenn. 1996).
Marlow v. Rollins Cotton Co. (In Re Julien Co.), 168 B.R. 647 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1994).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-1-102(19) — 1 case
Bank/First Citizens Bank v. Citizens & Assocs., 82 S.W.3d 259 (Tenn. 2002). “1996) (defining “good faith” in section 47-1-102(19)). Our review of the record reveals that while First Citizens Bank was certainly negligent in permitting the deposit of a check made payable to a corporation into an individual account, no evi *265 dence shows that it knowingly…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-1-102(2) — 5 cases
Waldron v. Delffs, 988 S.W.2d 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “See T.C.A. § 47-1-102(2) (1996). Moreover, Waldron aptly notes that it would appear to be a “perversion of logic” if an instrument payable to “cash” qualifies as bearer paper, whereas an instrument payable to a specific amount of cash fails to qualify as bearer paper.”
Auto Credit of Nashville v. Wimmer, 231 S.W.3d 896 (Tenn. 2007). “§ 47-1-102(2) (2001). “The Uniform Commercial Code .”
Stringfellow v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 878 S.W.2d 940 (Tenn. 1994).
Lindsey v. Stein Bros. & Boyce, Inc., 433 S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. 1968).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-1-102(2)(c) — 1 case
Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614 (Tenn. 2002). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-1-102(1); Wakefield v.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-1-102(3) — 8 cases
Union Planters Nat. Bank of Memphis v. Markowitz, 468 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Tenn. 1979). “Even if we had concluded otherwise, that section would not aid Markowitz since it allows the holder of the instrument to expressly reserve his rights, as plaintiff has done here, and since the provisions of T.C.A. § 47-1-102, relied on heavily by Markowitz when he argued that…”
Bank of Crockett v. Cullipher, 752 S.W.2d 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). “T.C.A. § 47-1-102(3) provides that parties may not totally disclaim the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care.”
C-Wood Lumber Co. v. Wayne Cnty. Bank, 233 S.W.3d 263 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-1-102 (2). Thus, while generally applicable principles of law and equity can be used to supplement the UCC, they may not be used to supplant the UCC’s provisions or the purposes or policies these provisions reflect.”
Morris v. MacK's Used Cars, 824 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1992). “Under T.C.A. § 47-1-102(3), this obligation may not be disclaimed.”
Marlow v. Oakland Gin Co. (In Re Julien Co.), 128 B.R. 987 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1991). “This is consistent with the purpose and policies of the UCC described in Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-1-102(3). As such, it is clear that the parties here could agree that “F.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.