Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304
Discharge for refusal to participate in or remain silent about illegal activities, or for legal use of agricultural product - Damages - Frivolous lawsuits
- (a) As used in this section:
- (1) "Employee" includes, but is not limited to:
- (A) A person employed by the state or any municipality, county, department, board, commission, agency, instrumentality, political subdivision or any other entity of the state;
- (B) A person employed by a private employer; or
- (C) A person who receives compensation from the federal government for services performed for the federal government, notwithstanding that the person is not a full-time employee of the federal government;
- (2) "Employer" includes, but is not limited to:
- (A) The state or any municipality, county, department, board, commission, agency, instrumentality, political subdivision or any other entity of the state;
- (B) A private employer; or
- (C) The federal government as to an employee who receives compensation from the federal government for services performed for the federal government, notwithstanding that the person is not a full-time federal employee; and
- (3) "Illegal activities":
- (A) Means activities that are in violation of the criminal or civil code of this state or the United States or any regulation intended to protect the public health, safety, or welfare; and
- (B) Does not include activities prohibited under title 4, chapter 21, § 8-50-103, or federal laws prohibiting discrimination in employment.
- (1) "Employee" includes, but is not limited to:
- (b) No employee shall be discharged or terminated solely for refusing to participate in, or for refusing to remain silent about, illegal activities.
- (c)
- (1) Any employee terminated in violation of subsection (b) shall have a cause of action against the employer for retaliatory discharge and any other damages to which the employee may be entitled, subject to the limitations set out in § 4-21-313.
- (2) Any employee terminated in violation of subsection (b) solely for refusing to participate in, or for refusing to remain silent about, illegal activities who prevails in a cause of action against an employer for retaliatory discharge for the actions shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs.
- (d)
- (1) No employee shall be discharged or terminated solely for participating or engaging in the use of an agricultural product not regulated by the alcoholic beverage commission that is not otherwise proscribed by law, if the employee participates or engages in the use in a manner that complies with all applicable employer policies regarding the use during times at which the employee is working.
- (2) No employee shall be discharged or terminated solely for participating or engaging in the use of the product not regulated by the alcoholic beverage commission that is not otherwise proscribed by law if the employee participates or engages in the activity during times when the employee is not working.
- (e)
- (1) This section shall not be used for frivolous lawsuits, and anyone trying to do so is subject to sanction as provided in subdivision (e)(2).
- (2) If any employee files a cause of action for retaliatory discharge for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause needless increase in costs to the employer, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the employee an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred, including reasonable attorney's fees.
- (f) In any civil cause of action for retaliatory discharge brought pursuant to this section, or in any civil cause of action alleging retaliation for refusing to participate in or remain silent about illegal activities, the plaintiff shall have the burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. If the plaintiff satisfies this burden, the burden shall then be on the defendant to produce evidence that one (1) or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons existed for the plaintiff's discharge. The burden on the defendant is one of production and not persuasion. If the defendant produces such evidence, the presumption of discrimination raised by the plaintiff's prima facie case is rebutted, and the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason given by the defendant was not the true reason for the plaintiff's discharge and that the stated reason was a pretext for unlawful retaliation. The foregoing allocations of burdens of proof shall apply at all stages of the proceedings, including motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff at all times retains the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the plaintiff has been the victim of unlawful retaliation.
- (g) This section abrogates and supersedes the common law with respect to any claim that could have been brought under this section.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 556, s 1, eff. 5/26/2021.
Amended by 2014 Tenn. Acts, ch. 995,s 6, eff. 7/1/2014.
Amended by 2014 Tenn. Acts, ch. 995,s 5, eff. 7/1/2014.
Amended by 2014 Tenn. Acts, ch. 995,s 4, eff. 7/1/2014.
Acts 1990, ch. 771, §§ 1, 2; 1997 , ch. 511, §§ 1, 2; 2000, ch. 688, § 1; 2009 , ch. 161, § 1; 2011 , ch. 461, § 2.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 214
cases (53 in the last 5 years), 1992–2026 · leading case: Guy v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.
Guy v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. (2002)
“The principal issue in this case is whether the Tennessee “Whistleblower” Act, Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304, preempts the common law tort of retaliatory discharge when an at-will employee is discharged for reporting illegal or unethical activity.”
Timmy Sykes v. Chattanooga Housing Authority (2011)
“…discharge and any other damages to which the employee may be entitled. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 . The provisions of this statute create a narrowly crafted exception to the long-established common law employment-at-will doctrine, which provides generally that “an employment…”
Franklin v. Swift Transportation Co. (2006)
“T.C.A. § 50-1-304. The elements required in order to prove a common law retaliatory discharge claim are similar; the plaintiff must show (1) that an employment-at-will relationship existed; (2) that he was discharged; (3) that the reason for his discharge was that he attempted…”
Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc. (2011)
“Webb filed a complaint alleging retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (2008 & Supp.”
Williams v. City of Burns (2015)
“Acts 771 (codified as amended Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (2014)). The TPPA gave stat *110 utory protection to employees whose actions served to deter, expose, and stop organizational wrongdoing.”
Brown v. Board of Education (2014)
“Brown’s Tennessee Public Protection Act Claim In Count Sixteen of his complaint, Brown alleges that the SCBOE violated the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304, *711 because he reported illegal activities— namely, corporal punishment and sealed…”
Mason v. Seaton (1997)
“I The ease is before the Court on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment asserting that the complaint does not state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge for violation of the provisions of Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (1991). 1 The evidence submitted in opposition to…”
John TODD and Cynthia Bank-Harris v. SHELBY COUNTY, Tennessee (2012)
“Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304. The provisions of this statute create a narrowly crafted exception to the long-established common law employment-at-will doctrine, which provides generally that “an employment contract for an indefinite term is terminable at the will of either the…”
Williams v. Greater Chattanooga Public Television Corp. (2011)
“Dadswell also stated an alternative cause of action that she was constructively terminated in retaliation for her refusal to participate in an illegal activity in violation of Tennessee common law and Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304. 1 The cases were consolidated for trial and for all…”
Smith v. Harriman Utility Board (2000)
“On May 16, 1997, Plaintiff filed suit against HUB and Hall for both compensatory and punitive damages, asserting claims against HUB for retaliatory discharge under T.C.A. § 50-1-304 and for breach of contract, along with claims against Hall for retaliatory discharge under T.”
David G. Young v. City of Lafollette (2015)
“See Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304.., On April 9, 2010, the Defendants filed, an amended motion for summary judgment, an answer to the amended complaint, and a counter-complaint for declaratory judgment, Mr.”
Laschinski T. Emerson v. Oak Ridge Research, Inc. a/k/a Oak Ridge Realty Holding, Inc. and Nathaniel Revis (2005)
“Does plaintiff’s hiring of a lawyer and having him privately confront her alleged harassment advance “some important public policy interest embodied in the law” so as to constitute protected whistleblower activity under the Whistleblower Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §50-1-304 ? 2.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(1)(b) — 1 case
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(4) — 1 case
Williams v. City of Burns (2015)
“Acts 771 (codified as amended Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (2014)). The TPPA gave stat *110 utory protection to employees whose actions served to deter, expose, and stop organizational wrongdoing.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(a) — 9 cases
Franklin v. Swift Transportation Co. (2006)
“T.C.A. § 50-1-304. The elements required in order to prove a common law retaliatory discharge claim are similar; the plaintiff must show (1) that an employment-at-will relationship existed; (2) that he was discharged; (3) that the reason for his discharge was that he attempted…”
Collins v. AmSouth Bank (2007)
Lawson v. Adams (2010)
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(a)(3) — 6 cases
Williams v. Greater Chattanooga Public Television Corp. (2011)
“Dadswell also stated an alternative cause of action that she was constructively terminated in retaliation for her refusal to participate in an illegal activity in violation of Tennessee common law and Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304. 1 The cases were consolidated for trial and for all…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(a)(3)(A) — 1 case
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(b) — 11 cases
Amos v. McNairy County (2014)
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(c) — 6 cases
Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co. (1992)
Franklin v. Swift Transportation Co. (2006)
“T.C.A. § 50-1-304. The elements required in order to prove a common law retaliatory discharge claim are similar; the plaintiff must show (1) that an employment-at-will relationship existed; (2) that he was discharged; (3) that the reason for his discharge was that he attempted…”
Collins v. AmSouth Bank (2007)
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(c)(1) — 3 cases
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(d)(1) — 5 cases
Guy v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. (2002)
“The principal issue in this case is whether the Tennessee “Whistleblower” Act, Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304, preempts the common law tort of retaliatory discharge when an at-will employee is discharged for reporting illegal or unethical activity.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(d)(2) — 1 case
Guy v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. (2002)
“The principal issue in this case is whether the Tennessee “Whistleblower” Act, Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304, preempts the common law tort of retaliatory discharge when an at-will employee is discharged for reporting illegal or unethical activity.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(f) — 4 cases
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(g) — 9 cases
Brown v. Board of Education (2014)
“Brown’s Tennessee Public Protection Act Claim In Count Sixteen of his complaint, Brown alleges that the SCBOE violated the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304, *711 because he reported illegal activities— namely, corporal punishment and sealed…”
John TODD and Cynthia Bank-Harris v. SHELBY COUNTY, Tennessee (2012)
“Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304. The provisions of this statute create a narrowly crafted exception to the long-established common law employment-at-will doctrine, which provides generally that “an employment contract for an indefinite term is terminable at the will of either the…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(g)(2) — 1 case
Baines v. Wilson County (2002)
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