Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928 (Tex. App. 2005). · Go Syfert
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Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928 (Tex. App. 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
31 citation events (31 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: John Richard Allen v. the State of Texas (texapp, 2024-06-24)
Treatment trajectory · 2006 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2006 2016 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#4 Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 3.03 cited 1× in this case · 126 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John Richard Allen v. the State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
The parties agreed to submit an unsigned charge for purposes of the record, and the quoted language is from that charge. –2– not define “reasonable doubt.” O’Canas v. State, 140 S.W.3d 695 , 701–02 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. ref’d); Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2005, no pet.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Curtis Tyrone Bullock v. the State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
He asserts that “whether Paulson was violated by the instant instruction depends upon if it provided a ‘definition’ of reasonable doubt.” He acknowledges that some courts, including this one, have held that paragraph [3] does not define “reasonable doubt.” See, e.g., Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2005, no pet.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ruben Labrada v. the State of Texas (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
App. 2004); see also, Keller v. State, 604 S.W.3d –18– 214, 230–31 (Tex. App—Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d); Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); O’Canas v. State, 140 S.W.3d 695 , 701–02 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. ref’d).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stacy Dwayne Jackson v. State
Tex. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
See O’Canas v. State, 140 S.W.3d 695 , 701–02 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. ref’d); Chapin v. State, No. 05-15-01009-CR, 2016 WL 4421570 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 19, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Borens v. State, No. 05- 07-01516-CR, 2009 WL 998678 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 15, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adrian Roosevelt McDaniel v. State
Tex. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); Chapin v. State, No. 05–15–01009–CR, 2016 WL 4421570 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 19, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bonilla, Ronald Antonio (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Id. at 707 n. 7 (citing Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 930-31 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.); Dale v. State, 170 S.W.3d 797, 800-01 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); Hendrix v. State, 150 S.W.3d 839, 852-54 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d); Owens v. State, 96 S.W.3d 668, 671-72 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003, no pet.); Yebio v. State, 87 S.W.3d 193, 195-96 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd)). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ronald Antonio Bonilla v. State
Tex. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Owens v. State, 96 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (“Although the victim’s testimony sometimes conflicted as to the dates of the sexual assaults, a reasonable view of the evidence as a whole supported the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to run Owens’s sentences consecutively.”); Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (stating that, “if the evidence shows the offenses at issue occurred after the effective date of section 3.03(b) . . . then the trial court has the authority to stack the sentences,” and upholding cumula…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bonilla, Ronald Antonio
Tex. Crim. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Owens v. State, 96 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (“Although the victim’s testimony sometimes conflicted as to the dates of the sexual assaults, a reasonable view of the evidence as a whole supported the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to run Owens’s sentences consecutively.”); Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (stating that, “if the evidence shows the offenses at issue occurred after the effective date of section 3.03(b) . . . then the trial court has the authority to stack the sentences,” and upholding cumula…
discussed Cited "see" Jose Alberto Castillo v. State
Tex. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); Chapin v. State, No. 05-15-01009-CR, 2016 WL 4421570 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 19, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op. not designated for publication); McDaniel v. State, No. 05-15-01086-CR, 2016 WL 7473902 , at *7 (Tex. App.— Dallas Dec. 29, 2016) (mem. op. not designated for publication).
discussed Cited "see" Johnny Lee Chapin v. State
Tex. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); Washington v. State, No. 05-14-00604-CR, 2015 WL 4178345 , at *7 (Tex. App.— Dallas July 10, 2015, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
discussed Cited "see" Armando Castilleja v. State
Tex. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
As discussed below, if the evidence shows the offenses were committed on or after September 1, 1997, cumulation is permitted. 5 The indictment alleged that appellant committed: indecency with a child by sexual contact on or about January 1, 1996 (count one); indecency with a child by sexual contact on or about January 1, 1996 (count two); indecency with a child by sexual contact on or about February 1, 1996 (count three); indecency with a child by sexual contact on or about August 1, 1997 (count four); aggravated sexual assault of a child on or about August 1, 1997 (count five); indecency with…
discussed Cited "see" Sergio Valencia v. State
Tex. App. · 2014 · signal: accord · confidence high
And we said that the same wording about which appellant now complains “simply states the legally correct proposition that the prosecution’s burden is to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt and not all possible doubt.” Id. at 702 ; accord Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); Bratton v. State, 156 S.W.3d 689 , 695–96 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d).
discussed Cited "see" Glenn Rayshon Pierce v. State
Tex. App. · 2013 · signal: accord · confidence high
Instead, we said the instruction “simply state[s] the legally correct proposition that the prosecution’s burden is to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt and not all possible doubt.” Id.; accord Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); Bratton v. State, 156 S.W.3d 689 , 696–97 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d).
discussed Cited "see" Velmor Peralta Estillore v. State
Tex. App. · 2013 · signal: accord · confidence high
Estillore’s second issue challenges the jury charge, which included the following instruction: “It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution’s proof excludes all “reasonable doubt” concerning the defendant’s guilt.” This Court previously considered this instruction and concluded it does not define “reasonable doubt.” O’Canas v. State, 140 S.W.3d 695, 702 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. ref’d); accord Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).
discussed Cited "see" McCuin, Kentrail Ray v. State
Tex. App. · 2013 · signal: accord · confidence high
Instead, it “simply state[s] the legally correct proposition that the prosecution’s burden is to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt and not all possible doubt.” Id.; accord Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); Wright v. State, No. 05-10-00186-CR, 2012 WL 3104381 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).
discussed Cited "see" McCuin, Kentrail Ray v. State
Tex. App. · 2013 · signal: accord · confidence high
Instead, it “simply state[s] the legally correct proposition that the prosecution’s burden is to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt and not all possible doubt.” Id.; accord Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); Wright v. State, No. 05-10-00186-CR, 2012 WL 3104381 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).
cited Cited "see" Taylor, Samuel Willard v. State
Tex. App. · 2012 · signal: accord · confidence high
State. 140 S.W.3d 695, 702 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2003, pet. reid): accord Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928 . 93 1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).
discussed Cited "see" Bahena, Ex Parte Jaquelino Bustamante (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bates v. State , 164 S.W.3d 928, 930-31 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.); Dale v. State , 170 S.W.3d 797, 800-01 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); Hendrix v. State , 150 S.W.3d 839, 852-54 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd).; Owens v. State , 96 S.W.3d 668, 671-72 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003, no pet.); Yebio v. State , 87 S.W.3d 193, 195-96 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd). 8.
discussed Cited "see" Ex Parte Bahena (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 930-31 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.); Dale v. State, 170 S.W.3d 797, 800-01 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); Hendrix v. State, 150 S.W.3d 839, 852-54 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd).; Owens v. State, 96 S.W.3d 668, 671-72 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003, no pet.); Yebio v. State, 87 S.W.3d 193, 195-96 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd). 8 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Alan Lee Washington v. State
Tex. App. · 2015 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2005, no pet.); Bratton v. State, 156 S.W.3d 689 , 696–97 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d); Robinson v. State, No. 05–14–00521–CR, 2015 WL 1650062 , at *4 (Tex. App.––Dallas April 13, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing additional authorities).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Chung Kim v. State
Tex. App. · 2015 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2005, no pet.); Bratton v. State, 156 S.W.3d 689 , 696–97 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d); Robinson v. State, No. 05–14–00521–CR, 2015 WL 1650062 , at *4 (Tex. App.––Dallas April 13, 2015, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing additional authorities).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Mitchell Windell Wagner v. State
Tex. App. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Torres , 116 S.W.3d at 212 ; see also Bates v. State , 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.); O'Canas v. State , 140 S.W.3d 695, 701-02 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. ref'd); Ochoa v. State , 119 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) ; Fluellen v. State , 104 S.W.3d 152, 163-64 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.); Minor v. State , 91 S.W.3d 824, 828-29 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref'd); Carriere v. State , 84 S.W.3d 753 , 759 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (cases finding no error in the inclusion of the instruction in the jury charge); b…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Mitchell Windell Wagner v. State
Tex. App. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Torres, 116 S.W.3d at 212 ; see also Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2005, no pet.); O’Canas v. State, 140 S.W.3d 695, 701-02 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2003, pet. ref’d); Ochoa v. State, 119 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2003, no pet.); Fluellen v. State, 104 S.W.3d 152, 163-64 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2003, no pet.); Minor v. State, 91 S.W.3d 824, 828-29 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref’d); Carriere v. State, 84 S.W.3d 753 , 759 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (cases finding no error in the inclusion of the instruction in the jur…
Roger Kenneth BATES, Appellant,
v.
the STATE of Texas, Appellee
05-04-01404-CR, 05-04-01405-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas.
Jun 15, 2005.
164 S.W.3d 928
Allan Fishburn, Dallas, for Appellant., William T. (Bill) Hill, Jr., Christina O’Neil, District Attorney Office, Dallas, for The State.
Morris, Whittington, Mazzant.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

Opinion By

Justice MAZZANT.

Roger Kenneth Bates appeals his convictions for sexual assault of a child. A jury found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at eleven years in each case, and the trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively — “stacking” the sentences. In two issues, appellant argues the trial court erred by stacking the sentences and by including a definition of reasonable doubt in the jury charge. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant was charged with the sexual assault of a child — K.M., appellant’s neighbor. K.M., who was eighteen at the time of the trial, testified that the sexual assaults began during the summer between his eighth and ninth grades of school, when K.M. was fourteen years old. K.M. continued to see appellant throughout that summer, and the sexual assaults eventually began occurring daily. Several times during his testimony, K.M. stated that the sexual assaults occurred during the summer of 2000 and continued until May 2001. After May 2001, K.M. and appellant emailed each other and sent instant messages. But K.M. said he met appellant again in February 2002 for another sexual encounter. About a week after that meeting, K.M. told his mother about his relationship with appellant.

[*930] KM.’s parents called the police, and appellant was charged with two counts of sexual assault of a child. The jury convicted appellant of both charges, and it assessed appellant’s punishment at eleven years in each case.

After the jury assessed punishment, the State moved to have the sentences stacked pursuant to the Texas Penal Code. [1] Appellant argued against stacking the sentences, stating there had been an assumption the sentences would not be stacked. After hearing arguments, the trial court ordered the sentence in cause number F02-25117-SR to begin on the date of sentencing. It then granted the State’s motion and ordered the sentence in cause number F02-25119-SR to begin after appellant served his first sentence.

Appellant brings two issues on appeal, challenging the stacking order and the court’s charge to the jury. Appellant does not attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.

The Stacking OrdeR

In his first issue, appellant complains the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion to stack appellant’s sentences. Appellant specifically argues there was no proof that the offenses had been committed on a date after the statute under which the sentences were stacked became effective. [2] We disagree.

The indictments by which appellant was charged alleged the offenses were committed on or about June 1, 2001 and February 6, 2002. The trial court defined “on or about” as “any date prior to the date of the filing of the indictment, March 19, 2002, and within the Statute of Limitations.” The statute of limitations for sexual assault of a child is ten years from the eighteenth birthday of the victim. Tex. Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 12.01(5)(B) (Vernon Supp.2004-05). Accordingly, the jury could convict appellant if it found the offenses were committed any time before March 19, 2002.

Penal code section 3.03 addresses when sentences for offenses arising out of the same criminal episode are to run concurrently or consecutively. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 3.03 (Vernon 2003). Generally, when a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses properly joined and prosecuted in one trial, any resulting sentences must run concurrently. See id. § 3.03(a). However, in 1997, the legislature created exceptions to the general rule. See id. § 3.03(b). One such exception involves the section under which appellant was convicted, section 22.011 — sexual assault. See id. § 3.03(b)(2)(A). This exception was specifically made nonretroactive and applies only to offenses committed on or after September 1,1997. See Act of June 13, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 667, § 7, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2250, 2252-53. Accordingly, the trial court could have ordered appellant’s sentences to run consecutively unless the offenses were committed before September 1,1997.

Appellant argues that the jury was required to find as a fact that the offenses occurred on or after September 1, 1997. We disagree. The date of commission is not an element of the crime with which appellant was charged. Further, section 3.03(b) does not require a specific finding of date of commission in order to bestow[*931] on the trial court the discretion to stack the sentences. Accordingly, we conclude that a specific finding is not required. Instead, if the evidence shows the offenses at issue occurred after the effective date of section 8.03(b) — after September 1, 1997— then the trial court has the authority to stack the sentences. See Yebio v. State, 87 S.W.3d 193, 195 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd).

K.M. testified the first sexual assault occurred in the summer between his eighth and ninth grades of school — the summer of 2000. There was no evidence indicating any sexual assault occurred before the summer of 2000. Accordingly, the evidence supports the trial court’s exercise of discretion under penal code section 3.03(b), and the order stacking the sentences is not void. We resolve appellant’s first issue against him.

The CouRt’s ChaRge

In his second issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by including a definition of reasonable doubt in the jury charge. Specifically, appellant complains of the following language: “It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution’s proof excludes all ‘reasonable doubt’ concerning the defendant’s guilt.” Appellant argues that this language provides a definition of reasonable doubt, violating Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex.Crim.App.2000), which indicated the better practice was to give no definition.

This Court, however, has specifically concluded that the quoted language does not define reasonable doubt. See O’Canas v. State, 140 S.W.3d 695, 701-02 (Tex.App.Dallas 2003, pet. ref'd). Having already rejected the precise argument made by appellant, we resolve his second issue against him.

We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

1

. See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 3.03(b)(2) (Vernon 2003).

2

. Although appellant raises the cumulation issue using an argument he did not raise at trial, we address his argument. See LaPorte v. State, 840 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) ("An improper cumulation order is, in essence, a void sentence, and such error cannot be waived.").