Galan v. State, 301 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957). · Go Syfert
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Galan v. State, 301 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
41 citation events across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Muller (texapp, 1990-08-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1957 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1957 1991 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Muller (2×)
Tex. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
Galan v. State, 164 Tex.Crim. 521 , 301 S.W.2d 141, 143 (1957); Randolph v. State, 145 Tex.Crim. 526 , 169 S.W.2d 178, 180 (1943).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Coyle v. State
Tex. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
Galan v. State, 164 Tex.Crim. 521 , 301 S.W.2d 141, 143 (1957).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reddie v. State
Tex. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] In Galan v. State, 164 Tex.Crim. 521 , 301 S.W.2d 141, 142 (1957) the defendant was indicted for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and the jury was charged they might convict upon finding the defendant did "drive and operate" a motor vehicle.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Keffer
Or. Ct. App. · 1970 · confidence medium
Cases so holding include United States v. Martin, 223 F2d 666, 667 (2d Cir 1955); State v. Sauerbry, 233 Iowa 1076 , 10 NW2d 544, 546 (1943); State v. D’Orio, 136 NJL 204, 51 A2d 97 (1947); Golan v. State, 164 Tex Cr App 521, 301 SW2d 141, 143 (1957); Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis 2d 159 , 150 NW2d 370, 378 (1967).
discussed Cited "see" Denton v. State
Tex. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Galan, 301 S.W.2d at 142-43 ; Protz, 681 S.W.2d at 298 . 2 The remaining case appellant relies on, Hawkins v. State, also does not support appellant’s limited definition of “operate.” In Hawkins , a police officer observed the defendant and a companion looking under the hood of a stalled pickup truck at an intersection, and he stopped to investigate.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hawkins v. State (2×)
Tex. App. · 1987 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Galan v. State, 164 Tex.Crim. 521 , 301 S.W.2d 141 (1957); Chamberlain v. State, 163 Tex.Crim. 529 , 294 S.W.2d 719 (1956); Rogers v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. 602 , 183 S.W.2d 572 (1944) (more expansive meaning of “operate” in the DWI statute).
Joaquin Galan
v.
State
28858.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Mar 6, 1957.
301 S.W.2d 141
B. L. Jeffrey, Carrizo Springs, and G. C. Jackson, Crystal City, for appellant., Leon Douglas, State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.
Belcher.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

[*522] MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

The offense is driving while intoxicated; the punishment, 3 days in jail and a fine of $50.00.

Highway Patrolman Pirtle testified that on the occasion in question his attention was directed to an automobile which was coming toward him and which was being driven first off the pavement on its right side and then across the center stripe into the left hand traffic lane, that he took to the ditch to avoid being hit, turned around, and gave pursuit. He stated that after considerable effort he was able to bring the vehicle to a halt, instructed the appellant, who was the driver, to get out and exhibit his driver’s license. He stated that the appellant staggered, “his hands seemed all thumbs,” his eyes were dilated, he conducted himself in an entirely different manner than he did on other occasions when he had seen the appellant sober, and concluded that he was intoxicated and placed him in jail.

The appellant did not testify or offer any evidence in his own behalf.

We find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction and shall discuss the bills of exception in the order advanced in the appellant’s brief.

Bill of Exception No. 5 reflects that near the conclusion of Officer Pirtle’s testimony the appellant moved for a mistrial “because all this very prejudicial testimony was before the Jury; and could not help but have an effect on them. The court overruled this motion, and defendant then requested the court to instruct the jury not to consider any testimony given covering the time when the witness approached defendant’s car, to the time he was ‘Warned’; which was by the court refused, to which action defendant then and there in open court excepted.”

Appellant would have this court apply this motion for a mistrial as an objection to a certain portion of the officer’s testimony, which he now says was in violation of the rule announced by this court in Apodaca v. State, 140 Texas Cr. Rep. 593, 146 S.W. 2d 331. There was no objection made at the time the testimony was elicited, and no reason has been assigned for his failure to object. A motion requesting the jury not to consider all of the officer’s testimony covering a certain period of time, some of which was admissible without question, will not take the place of an objection to that portion which he now contends was in[*523] admissible. Mitchell v. State, 156 Texas Cr. Rep. 128, 239 S.W. 2d 384, and Cornelius v. State, 157 Texas Cr. Rep. 129, 246 S.W. 2d 886.

Bill of Exception No. 6 complains of the failure of the court to define “drunk” or “intoxicated” in his charge. Such terms need not be defined. Davis v. State, 142 Texas Cr. Rep. 602, 155 S.W. 2d 801; Driggs v. State, 151 Texas Cr. Rep. 391, 208 S.W. 2d 557; and Pierce v. State, 159 Texas Cr. Rep. 504, 265 S.W. 2d 601.

Bill of Exception No. 4 complains of the failure of the court to charge the jury that the complaint and information were no evidence of guilt. Recently, in Magness v. State, 156 Texas Cr. Rep. 573, 244 S.W. 2d 810, in writing on the same contention, we said:

“Though the trial court might well have given the requested charge, we are unable to agree that his failure to do so was prejudicial to the rights of appellant. See Adams v. State, 113 Texas Cr. Rep. 501, 21 S.W. 2d 1057.”

Appellant next complains of that portion of the court’s charge in which he instructed the jury that they might convict if they found that the appellant did “drive and operate” a motor vehicle on the ground that the complaint and information charged only that he did “operate” a motor vehicle.

We hold such terms to be synonymous, and the court’s charge to be proper.

No reversible error appearing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Rehearing

on appellant’s motion for rehearing

BELCHER, Judge.

The complaint of the refusal of the court to charge the jury on the appellant’s failure to testify cannot be sustained. Such an instruction is not required to be given to the jury. 1 Branch’s Ann. P.C., 2nd Ed., 419, Sec. 397; Pounds v. State, 142 Texas Cr. Rep. 52, 150 S.W. 2d 798; Oakley v. State, 152 Texas Cr. Rep. 361, 214 S.W. 2d 298; Ponder v. State, 159 Texas Cr. Rep. 585, 265 S.W. 2d 836.

The motion for rehearing is overruled.

Opinion approved by the Court.