green
Positive treatment
60.3 score
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983
2004
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Frank James Hughes v. the State of Texas
Reasons for Delay “While the State has the burden of justifying the length of the delay, the defendant has the burden of proving the assertion of the right and showing prejudice.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 ; Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Stephen Jerome Hunt v. the State of Texas
If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, then the burden shifts to the State to prove that the defendant “suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 826 (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Marion Ray Mosley v. the State of Texas
There we adopted the test that if an accused made a prima facie showing of prejudice, the State ‘must carry the obligation of proving that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.’” McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d at 123 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Daniel Youngblood v. the State of Texas
If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to prove that the defendant “suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 826 (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
David Lewis Holland v. the State of Texas
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Marie Elaine Black v. the State of Texas
The defendant has the initial burden to make some showing of prejudice, Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 826 , and if a defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to prove that the defendant “suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.”21 Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Elijah Munoz v. the State of Texas
The record before us is also silent as to why the case did not go to trial on February 11, 2019, and we cannot speculate 40 Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 ; Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Miguel Marco Melendez
When a defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the State has the burden to prove “the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Francisco Nieto, Jr.
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
David Thames A/K/A David Thomas v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued 22 from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. John MacKenzie
See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280 (citing Barker, 407, U.S. at 531; Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Jesse Sanchez v. State
When a defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to prove that the defendant “suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.’” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Balderas, Juan A/K/A Apache
“When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the State carries the burden of proving that the defendant ‘suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.’” State v. Guerrero, 110 S.W.3d 155, 162 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Cr.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marc Allen Mason v. State
(2×)
STATEMENT OF FACTS 8-10 COUNTERPOINT NO. 1 RESTATED 11 STATEMENT OF FACTS 11-13 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 14 ARGUMENT 14-32 COUNTERPOINT NO. 2 RESTATED 33 STATEMENT OF FACTS 33 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 33 ARGUMENT 33-42 PRAYER 43 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 43 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 44 2 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES TEXAS CASES Boitnott v. State, 48 S.W.3d 289 35 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) Brunson v. State, 2009 WL 3858018 26 (Tex.App.—Waco, 2009) (not reported) Christmas v. State, 2009 WL 579278 26 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2009) (not reported) Douglass v. State, 2010 WL 2196082 39, 41 (Tex.…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Humphrey Brock, Jr. v. State
App. 2008) (footnote omitted) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 ; Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Shawn Michael Lewis v. State
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice based on excessive delay, the burden shifts to the State to show the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 826 (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Rolando M. Romero v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jeremy Jerome Shedd v. State
Ed.2d 520 (1992); Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Charles Edward Barringer, Jr. v. State of Texas
“While the State has the burden of justifying the length of delay, the defendant has the burden of proving the assertion of the right and showing prejudice.” Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ; Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App.1973)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Don Parr Bosworth, Jr. v. State
“When a defendant makes a ‘prima facie showing of prejudice,’ the State carries ‘the obligation of proving that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.’ ” Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 826 (citing Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App.1973)). 16 A failure by the accused to show that the conduct of his trial was damaged by such a delay does not entirely negate the other Barker factors which go into the evaluation or render them worthy of no consideration.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Justin Cox
Where a defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice.” See Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lionel Gonzales v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Clarence Cerf v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered "no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay." Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cerf v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App.1973)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Clarence Cerf v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Linda Booker
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ricky Castillo Jalomo v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. at 826 (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973)). 9 Appellant asserts the following considerations as evidence that he was prejudiced “in connection with the prosecution”: (1) having been arrested three times, (2) having been shot while the case was pending, (3) “anxiety,” and (4) excessive bond.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ricky Castillo Jalomo v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered "no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay." Id. at 826 (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jose Luis Rodriguez v. State
Id. (citing Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jose Luis Rodriguez v. State
Id. (citing Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jose Luis Rodriguez v. State
Id. (citing Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert M. White v. State
If a “prima facie” showing of prejudice is made, the burden shifts to the State to prove the accused suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brant Alan Alsenz v. State
If shown, the State must prove that “the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id . (quoting Ex parte McKenzie , 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Adrian Nathan Salazar v. State
Once the defendant does so, it is the State’s ‘obligation of proving that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.’” Clarke , 928 S.W.2d at 716 (quoting Ex parte McKenzie , 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Adrian Nathan Salazar v. State
Once the defendant does so, it is the State‘s ‗obligation of proving that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.‘‖ Clarke, 928 S.W.2d at 716 (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Mark Wren Boyer v. State
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie , 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mark Wren Boyer v. State
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Stephen Centeno v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Darryl B. Wells v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Wells v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App.1973)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Douglas Wilkens v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Marcus Anthony Lopez v. State
App. 2002). <P><A NAME="N_24_">24. </A><EM>See Ex parte McKenzie</EM>, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Patrick Puckett v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered "no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay." Id . (quoting Ex parte McKenzie , 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Puckett v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App.1973)); Blaylock v. State, 259 S.W.3d 202, 210 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. ref'd).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Patrick Puckett v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered "no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay." Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
John Arlin Walters v. State
When a defendant makes a "prima facie showing of prejudice," the State carries "the obligation of proving that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay." Munoz , 991 S.W.2d at 826 (quoting Ex parte McKenzie , 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Antron Rammel Blaylock v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered "no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay." Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie , 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Antron Rammel Blaylock v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered "no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay." Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Blaylock v. State
When the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to show that the defendant suffered “no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” Id. (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App.1973)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cantu, Alberto
App. 1992). 17 See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 . 18 See Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim.
Ex Parte Gene Everett McKENZlE
46641.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Mar 7, 1973.
Herbert Green, Jr., Dallas, for relator., Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty. and Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.
Douglas.
Cited by 139 opinions | Published
OPINION
This is a post conviction habeas corpus proceeding. The complaint is that applicant was denied a speedy trial. McKenzie was convicted in 1968 for an offense committed in 1964.
When this contention was raised on appeal in McKenzie v. State, 450 S.W.2d 67, the record then showed a motion for speedy trial was filed in June, 1968. The trial was held in September of 1968. This Court held under that record that he was not denied a speedy trial.
In 1972, the applicant was taken from the Texas Department of Corrections, where he was serving other sentences, to Dallas for a hearing on the application for a writ of habeas corpus. A hearing was conducted by the Honorable Jerome Chamberlain, Judge of the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. After the hearing, Judge Chamberlain found that the applicant had written letters and made requests for a speedy trial and concluded that the applicant “was, to his prejudice, denied a speedy trial.”
The indictment returned on November 4, 1964, in the present case recites that McKenzie committed the offense of robbery on or about the 13th day of October, 1964. Evidence was introduced at the habeas corpus hearing that witnesses who could have testified that McKenzie was in Alabama on that date had died and were unavailable at the trial. Copies of letters and a motion showing the applicant had requested a speedy trial were introduced. One was dated December 1, 1967. A copy of a motion for speedy trial prepared while the applicant was incarcerated in Mississippi, dated May 9, 1967, was introduced. It recited that in 1965 detainers or warrants for him were issued in Dallas County. He requested that a speedy trial be afforded him or that charges be dismissed. It is not shown what happened to this motion, but on December 1, 1967, the applicant, who was then in the correctional institution in Mississippi, received a letter from a student deputy counsel for a legal clinic at Southern Methodist University reciting that he had talked to the district attorney and that the district attorney refused to extradite the applicant. The letter also recited that the letters of the applicant and his mother had been received and answered by the district attorney’s office. Without reciting everything that was introduced at the hearing, suffice it to say, there was sufficient evidence for the hearing judge to conclude, as he did, that the applicant had been prejudiced by the denial of a speedy trial.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Texas, Vernon’s Annotated Statutes, guarantee the right of a speedy trial. In Courtney v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 472 S.W.2d 151, this Court discussed the four factors to be considered in an alleged violation of an accused’s right to a speedy trial. They are the length of delay, reason for delay, waiver of the right and prejudice to the accused. Cases from other jurisdictions and the different approaches were also discussed. There we adopted the test that if an accused made a prima facie showing of prejudice, the State “must carry the obligation of proving that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay.” See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182,[*124] 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Perkins v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 485 S.W.2d 792, McKinney v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 491 S.W.2d 404 (1973).
In the present case, the applicant has made at least a prima facie showing of prejudice which has not been rebutted.
For the reasons stated, the applicant is entitled to be released in Cause No. E— 8202-JH in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. Since the denial of a speedy trial has prejudiced his right to a fair trial, the prosecution should be dismissed.
It is so ordered.